Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONCA

The appellant, convicted of fraud, brought two motions related to his appeal: one for document production (dismissed as redundant) and another to appoint a special commissioner under s. 683(1)(e) of the Criminal Code to inquire into alleged email deletion by police and alteration of trial transcripts, seeking fresh evidence for a stay of proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both motions, finding no credible evidence to support the allegations of obstruction of justice or abuse of process, and that the proposed inquiry would not reasonably lead to admissible fresh evidence under the Shulman test.

The appellant, P.B., appealed convictions for two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's alleged failure to address material contradictions between Crown witnesses and the impermissible use of complainants' lack of embellishment to bolster credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the inconsistency regarding a peripheral detail (a television in the appellant's room) was not a reversible error, especially given the complainants' age at the time of the events.

Furthermore, the court held that the trial judge's reference to the complainants' lack of embellishment was not used to improperly bolster credibility but rather to explain why their evidence was not rejected, particularly in light of defence suggestions of fabrication.

The appellant, Marvin Smith, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, imposed after pleading guilty to aggravated assault, intimidation of a justice system participant, and weapon possession.

The central issue was whether the sentencing judge erred in interpreting "pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour" under s. 753(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, specifically regarding a six-year gap in his criminal history and the admission of hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge correctly concluded the appellant exhibited a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour, notwithstanding the gap, and that the indeterminate sentence was appropriate given the high risk of reoffending and intractability.

This appeal concerned convictions for second-degree murder and discharge of a firearm with intent.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's jury charge was unfair and unbalanced due to alleged errors in presenting evidence and failing to adequately relate evidence to the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions.

The court concluded that the charge, read as a whole, was fair and adequately conveyed the defence's position and the relevant legal principles, upholding the convictions.

The appellant, Khaophone Sychantha, appealed an extradition order to the United States on drug-related charges.

He argued that the extradition hearing was unfair due to his unrepresented status and that the identification evidence was flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material unfairness in the hearing despite the appellant's self-representation, noting that he had discharged multiple lawyers.

The court also reiterated that an extradition judge's role is not to evaluate the strength, credibility, or reliability of evidence unless it is "so defective" or "so unreliable," and that challenges to identification quality are matters for trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm and forcible confinement against his spouse, as well as his sentence of 7 months' incarceration.

The trial judge had accepted the complainant's evidence over the appellant's, finding the appellant not credible.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the trial judge's credibility assessments or treatment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors for a serious domestic assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and sought leave to appeal his eight-year sentence.

The conviction appeal raised two issues: whether the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by using a 911 call to corroborate Crown evidence, and whether the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice of the time required to stash a firearm and move a vehicle.

The sentence appeal argued that the trial judge double-counted breaches of weapons prohibition orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or sentencing approach.

The appellant, Trae Worrie, appealed his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted murder, arguing he was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder.

Two forensic psychiatrists unanimously opined he was NCR, but the trial judge rejected this defense, finding him guilty.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge materially misapprehended expert evidence, particularly concerning a psychologist's testimony, and misused the appellant's after-the-fact conduct.

The court concluded there was no rational basis to reject the unanimous expert opinion that the appellant was NCR.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a verdict of NCR was substituted.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a 20-year custodial sentence for 18 counts of home invasion sexual assaults and related offences committed between 1985 and 1987.

The appeal argued two errors by the sentencing judge: improper application of the totality principle and failure to adequately consider the passage of time and the appellant's advanced age as mitigating factors.

The majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the sentencing judge's approach to totality or the consideration of mitigating factors.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 14 years, arguing that the trial judge erred in her consideration of the "laying low" factor and the appellant's life expectancy, leading to a disproportionate and "crushing" sentence.

Mr. Stephens brought a motion seeking to set aside the dismissal of his motion for leave to appeal as abandoned, to appoint amicus curiae, and to order a fresh psychiatric report regarding his criminal responsibility.

The court found no explanation for reinstating the abandoned motion, no proper foundation for a new psychiatric report, and no basis for appointing amicus curiae.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and criminal harassment against his estranged spouse, as well as his 42-month global sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the timing of divorce proceedings and failed to properly apply the W.(D.) principles to his testimony.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence from family court proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and rejecting the fresh evidence as it failed the Palmer test.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court affirming that the sentence was fit and that the trial judge properly considered the abusive domestic context and parental alienation as aggravating factors.

The appellant was charged with several criminal offences.

The Ontario Securities Commission obtained a production order for the appellant's accounting and taxation files.

The appellant claimed solicitor-client and litigation privilege over the documents, which the application judge largely rejected.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the appeal on the basis that the matter was criminal and no appeal route existed under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the production order was directed at the enforcement of a criminal order, and quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography.

The Crown's case relied on evidence obtained when police reviewed a mirror copy of the appellant's work computer hard drive without a warrant.

The trial judge found a Charter breach under s. 8 but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's conclusion that possession had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis or his conclusion regarding possession based on the totality of the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault following a jury trial.

On appeal, the court considered whether the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the appellant's failure to appear at his original trial date as post-offence conduct evidence, and whether the jury was properly instructed on the use of such evidence.

The majority found that the trial judge erred by refusing to allow the appellant to testify on the voir dire regarding his explanation for non-appearance, and by failing to properly instruct the jury on alternative explanations for the post-offence conduct.

The majority held that these errors undermined the fairness of the trial and ordered a new trial.

The dissent argued that the trial judge had sufficient information to make an informed decision on admissibility and that the jury instructions were adequate.

The appellant was convicted on 18 counts relating to drug trafficking and firearm possession following an undercover police operation.

He was sentenced to seven years imprisonment (three and one-half years on firearm offences and four years on drug offences, made consecutive and then reduced on a global basis).

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on three main grounds: alleging a breach of section 8 Charter rights regarding the search warrant, claiming the trial judge's amended reasons constituted after-the-fact justification, and asserting the verdict was unreasonable.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence, arguing the consecutive sentences were inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent was found passed out in the driver's seat of a running vehicle with the engine on and seatbelt fastened.

He had consumed significant alcohol and provided breath samples showing readings of 210 and 200 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial judge rejected the respondent's evidence that he had no intention to drive.

The Court of Appeal found that the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge erred in characterizing the trial judge's findings as palpable and overriding errors and restored the original convictions.

Three appellants challenged mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for unauthorized production of marijuana under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act as violating s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (cruel and unusual punishment).

The Court of Appeal found that certain mandatory minimum provisions were grossly disproportionate when applied to reasonably foreseeable circumstances, including cases involving minimal involvement, mistaken licensees, and situations lacking culpability regarding statutory aggravating factors.

The court struck down provisions imposing two and three-year mandatory minimums for production of more than 500 plants and the statutory aggravating factor provision.

The court reduced one appellant's sentence and dismissed appeals in the other cases.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction for impaired driving from the Superior Court's dismissal of his summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the proposed appeal and dismissed the application for leave to appeal.

The court determined that the case had no significance for the general administration of justice and denied the request for costs.

The witness, an alleged victim of historical sexual assaults, sought to wear a niqab while testifying at a preliminary inquiry.

The accused objected, arguing it would impair their right to make full answer and defence by preventing effective cross-examination.

The preliminary inquiry judge ordered the witness to remove the niqab, finding her religious belief was not strong enough.

The Superior Court quashed this order on certiorari.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that a preliminary inquiry judge has jurisdiction to regulate proceedings and balance competing Charter rights.

The Court established a framework for reconciling a witness's freedom of religion with an accused's right to a fair trial, requiring a fact-specific inquiry.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the matter was remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge to conduct a proper inquiry.

The appellant appealed a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board.

At the Board hearing, the appellant's counsel did not challenge the expert report of Dr. Gojer, which was filed and accepted.

On appeal, the self-represented appellant sought to challenge the underlying basis of the report but did not raise ineffective assistance of counsel or file fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board's decision was not unreasonable and dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant would have the opportunity to challenge the report at his upcoming Board hearing.