Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ONCA

The appellant filed a Notice of Abandonment for the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs of the abandoned appeal to the respondent, fixed at $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

Following the certification of a class action on behalf of franchisees against a franchisor, a group of franchisees opposed to the action waged a campaign encouraging others to opt out.

The motion judge invalidated the opt-out notices received after the campaign began, finding the campaign coercive and misleading.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in drawing an inference of intimidation without direct evidence and in holding the opposing franchisees to a standard of objectivity.

The communications amounted to acceptable intra-class debate, and the opt-out notices were reinstated.

The plaintiff was seriously injured in a motor vehicle collision with a propane truck on a snow-covered road.

At trial, the central issue was the municipality's liability for failing to provide proper winter maintenance.

The plaintiff's expert testified that he could not reconcile the municipality's snowplough records with photographs of the accident scene.

The trial judge erroneously characterized this testimony as an unpleaded allegation of fraud and repeatedly refused to accept plaintiff counsel's assertions to the contrary.

Furthermore, the trial judge made an adverse credibility finding against the plaintiff mid-trial based on an allegedly falsified curriculum vitae, and suggested the parties consider this finding in their settlement discussions.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's interventions and premature credibility findings gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a judgment deciding a matter by way of application, arguing that disputed facts precluded this procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while peripheral facts were disputed, the facts necessary to dispose of the application were not.

The court also granted leave to appeal the initial costs award, reducing it based on the proportionality principle, and awarded costs for the stay application and the appeal to the respondent.

The respondent, the wife of a notorious convicted murderer, intended to commence divorce proceedings and successfully applied for non-publication and sealing orders to protect her privacy and mental health.

Media organizations appealed the orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the Court held that the respondent failed to provide convincing evidence that the orders were necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice, as the psychiatric evidence relied upon was based on unsupported assumptions about media harassment.

The appellants failed to appear for the hearing of their appeal, despite prior endorsements of the court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $5,000.

The respondents sought costs of $77,362 for the motion for leave to appeal, the motion to expedite the appeals, and the appeals.

The Court of Appeal noted that the arguments were similar to those advanced before the motion judge and the Divisional Court.

The Court fixed the respondents' costs on a partial indemnity scale at $45,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable by the appellants.

The appellant employee appealed the dismissal of his civil action against his employer, which included a claim for malicious prosecution arising from a traffic charge instigated by the employer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the essential character of the dispute arose from the interpretation, application, administration, or violation of the collective agreement.

As the statement of claim attacked a wide array of employer conduct in managing the workplace, the courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by an uninsured driver who was fleeing police.

The plaintiff sued the uninsured driver and her own insurer under the uninsured coverage provisions of her policy, but did not sue the police or municipality.

The insurer brought a third-party claim against the police and municipality, arguing that the plaintiff was disentitled from uninsured coverage because she failed to sue the insured joint tortfeasors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that the phrase 'entitled to recover' in the Uninsured Automobile Coverage Schedule means 'entitled to recover in fact', and an injured insured is not required to sue potential joint tortfeasors to access their uninsured coverage.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim for slander and libel under Rule 21.

The slander claim was struck because it failed to allege the words were spoken to anyone other than the plaintiff.

The libel claim, based on a letter from the respondents' solicitors, was struck because it failed to specify the exact words complained of and was protected by absolute privilege as it was sent in contemplation of litigation.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge and dismissed the appeal.

Following the dismissal of the appeal and cross-appeal, the respondent sought partial indemnity costs of $26,457.59.

The Law Foundation of Ontario, responsible for the appellants' costs, argued for a reduction to $12,000 due to novelty, public interest, and access to justice concerns.

The Court of Appeal fixed the respondent's costs at $18,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST, reflecting the nature of the appeal and the dismissal of the cross-appeal.

The insured struck a pedestrian in a strip mall parking lot while driving alone, contrary to her G1 licence conditions.

She pleaded guilty to Highway Traffic Act offences.

Her insurer denied coverage, arguing she was not 'authorized by law' to drive under Statutory Condition 4(1).

The Court of Appeal held that the guilty pleas did not create issue estoppel in the civil action due to the minor stakes of the traffic tickets compared to the civil suit.

Furthermore, the parking lot was not a 'highway' under the Highway Traffic Act, meaning the graduated licensing restrictions did not apply at the time of the accident.

The insurer was ordered to defend and indemnify the insured.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action regarding a land transaction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the action was statute-barred.

The court held that the appellants' real estate lawyer had knowledge of a zoning problem in August 2000, and this knowledge was imputed to the appellants, triggering the limitation period.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant bank appealed a summary judgment requiring it to pay the respondent $299,419.82 from his bank account.

The appellant argued there was an agreement to freeze the funds pending the outcome of related litigation, supported by consideration in the form of continued cheque cashing facilities.

The Court of Appeal found genuine issues for trial regarding the existence of the agreement and mutual consideration, allowed the appeal, and set aside the summary judgment.

The appellant insurers appealed a summary judgment finding them liable under a Commercial General Liability policy to indemnify condominium owners for extensive foundation damage caused by the insured general contractor's negligence.

The contractor had negligently installed a dewatering system that washed away the natural foundation beneath the building.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the damage to the natural foundation and structural columns constituted third-party property damage, not merely damage to the contractor's own work product.

Furthermore, the negligent installation that caused the damage was an 'accident' and therefore an 'occurrence' within the meaning of the policy.

The appellant appealed a judgment on the basis that the motion judge erred in refusing to allow viva voce evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the exercise of discretion given the history of delays by the appellant, indulgences granted, and prior notice given by a Master.

The court concluded there was no procedural unfairness or denial of natural justice.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellants failed to meet the test to set aside the default judgment and that their affidavit evidence did not disclose a triable issue.

The appellants, executors of the estate of a deceased nurse, sued her former employer for negligence in administering a group life insurance plan, resulting in the denial of enhanced benefits.

The trial judge found the employer negligent but dismissed the action, concluding the dispute was governed by the collective agreement and thus subject to arbitration.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the essential character of the dispute did not arise from the collective agreement, which only required the employer to pay premiums and provide an information booklet.

Judgment was granted in favour of the appellants for the value of the enhanced benefits.

The appellant sued the respondent accountant and his firms for negligent misrepresentation, alleging she lost approximately $825,000 invested in a company based on his advice.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no accountant-client relationship existed when the initial investment was structured, and that the appellant did not rely on the accountant's representations when making further investments despite knowing the company was in financial difficulty.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the action but allowed the appeal on costs on consent, reducing the trial costs awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiff fell on a municipal sidewalk and served notice of her claim on the City ten days later.

The City moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was barred by the seven-day notice requirement under s. 284(5) of the Municipal Act.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, applying Rule 3.01(1)(b) to exclude holidays from the computation of time.

The Court of Appeal allowed the City's appeal, holding that the Interpretation Act, not the Rules of Civil Procedure, governs statutory time limits.

Under s. 28(h) of the Interpretation Act, holidays are not excluded from the calculation unless the final day falls on a holiday.

As the seventh day was not a holiday, the notice was out of time and the action was dismissed.