Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ONCA

The appellants brought a class action against defendant manufacturers and suppliers alleging they conspired to fix the price of lithium-ion batteries sold in Canada between January 2000 and December 2011.

The conspiracy allegedly impacted all purchasers, including "umbrella purchasers" whose batteries originated from non-defendants, as the cartel's price increases caused non-conspirators to also raise prices.

The certification judge certified only a statutory claim under the Competition Act for non-umbrella purchasers.

The Divisional Court certified an unlawful means conspiracy claim but excluded umbrella purchasers, citing indeterminate liability concerns.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the principle of indeterminate liability does not apply to either the statutory claim or the unlawful means conspiracy claim, and that umbrella purchasers should be included in the class with a subclass created for non-umbrella purchasers regarding aggregate damages quantification.

On appeal from a trial judgment finding the municipal defendants liable for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident on a rural road during winter conditions.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's interpretation and application of the Municipal Act, 2001 duty to clear roads of snow and ice.

The trial judge found the road in a state of non-repair and held the municipality failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or correct the condition.

The appellants argued the trial judge applied an unreasonably high standard of maintenance for a Class 4 rural road, erred in requiring the application of straight salt rather than sand/salt mixture, and excluded relevant evidence regarding financial costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, set aside the liability findings, and ordered a new trial on liability issues while upholding the damages assessment.

The appellant tenant sued the respondent landlord for negligence after a fire damaged its leased premises.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding no evidence of the landlord's negligence and holding that expert evidence was required to prove causation.

On appeal, the appellant argued that common sense inferences and the landlord's spoliation of evidence (destroying a space heater) should suffice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that expert evidence was necessary given the technical nature of the building's electrical system, and noting that an adverse inference from spoliation cannot serve as positive proof of negligence.

The parties were partners in a dental practice.

The appellant's wife acted as the bookkeeper and failed to allocate profits in accordance with a 2004 agreement between the parties.

The misallocation was discovered in 2009 during negotiations to terminate the partnership.

The trial judge found the 2004 agreement binding, ordered an accounting, and awarded the respondent $119,056 for the misallocated profits.

On appeal, the appellant argued the claim was barred by the limitation period, laches, and estoppel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the misallocation was not reasonably discoverable until 2009 and that the respondent could not have acquiesced to conduct of which he was unaware.

The appellants, who provided personal indemnities to the respondent insurer for a Tarion bond on a condominium project, appealed a partial summary judgment ordering them to pay unpaid premiums, legal fees, and bond demands.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court rejected the appellants' arguments regarding unjust enrichment and the respondent's alleged obligation to release the bond.

The court also found no procedural error in the motion judge's decision to allow a second reply affidavit, noting the procedure was consistent with the Supreme Court's guidance in Hryniak.

This appeal concerned ownership of a strip of land between riverfront lots and the Ottawa River, and whether the relevant subdivision plan extended the respondents' lots to the water's edge.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding of latent ambiguity and confirmed that extrinsic evidence could properly be used to interpret the deed and plan under the governing property law framework.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge improperly focused on the original subdividers' intention, made a palpable and overriding factual error, or relied on immaterial evidence.

On the cross-appeal respecting costs, the court held that most individual defendants were properly treated as nominal parties, but found that one individual was sufficiently involved in the litigation to justify a costs award against him personally.

The appellants appealed orders arising from a franchise rescission dispute under the Arthur Wishart Act, 2000.

The respondents had obtained partial summary judgment on rescission-related claims, and a Master fixed compensation under s. 6(6).

The appellants also sought to amend their pleading to assert equitable set-off, but the appeal court upheld the interpretation that any such amendment was confined to the still-outstanding s. 7 claims and could not reopen the already-adjudicated s. 6 claims.

The court further held that the Master's factual findings attracted deference and disclosed no misapprehension, error in principle, or palpable and overriding error.

The appeals were dismissed with fixed costs to the respondents.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed for delay by the Registrar.

The Master set aside the dismissal, finding the delay was inadvertent and there was no actual prejudice to the defendants.

On appeal, the Superior Court judge reinstated the dismissal, finding the Master misapprehended the evidence and failed to consider the public interest in finality.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff's appeal and reinstated the Master's order, holding that the Master's discretionary decision was entitled to significant deference and his findings were reasonable.

The infant plaintiff sued the defendant for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant appealed an order striking out her third party claim against the infant plaintiff's mother.

The motion judge had struck the claim on the basis that the plaintiff's claim was limited to the defendant's proportionate degree of negligence.

The Court of Appeal amended the formal order on consent to explicitly state that the plaintiff's claim is limited to the damages apportioned to the defendant's relative degree of fault, and otherwise dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision finding implied consent for his son to drive his vehicle.

The motions judge had drawn an adverse inference against the appellant for failing to make efforts to provide his son's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge erred by drawing the adverse inference without first assessing the credibility of the appellant's own evidence, which strongly suggested a lack of consent.

The summary judgment motion was dismissed.

The respondent law firm sued the appellant for unpaid legal bills arising from divorce proceedings.

The appellant counterclaimed for an order that the bills be referred for assessment, alleging his lawyer failed to address a material change in circumstance and a mathematical error in an arbitration award.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the law firm, finding the request for assessment disingenuous because the appellant had promised to pay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the request was not tactical as the factual basis was known to the solicitor during the relationship, and referred the accounts for assessment.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and ordered two of the appellants to pay costs of $8,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a decision denying his application to amend his statement of claim to plead illegal consideration.

The Master and the appeal judge had refused the amendment, finding it an abuse of process because a judge on a prior interlocutory injunction motion ruled the allegation did not raise a triable issue.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction is a preliminary decision and does not finally determine the cause of action.

The appellant was granted leave to amend his statement of claim.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondents for damages related to cracked heat recovery steam generators at a power plant.

The motion judge had ruled the claims were barred by the 12-month limitation period under the Professional Engineers Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of claims based on engineering design deficiencies but allowed the appeal regarding the proposed amended claims for breach of a product durability warranty, finding a genuine issue for trial as to whether those claims fell outside the scope of professional engineering services and were subject to a six-year limitation period.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict in a medical malpractice action, arguing the trial judge erred in his instructions on informed consent and the use of a doctor's post-surgery opinion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the modified objective test for informed consent, which considers whether a reasonable person in the appellant's position would have refused the procedure.

The court also found no error in the instructions regarding the post-surgery opinion evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $15,000.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge regarding an oppression motion and a bank's application.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to address the issues and arguments he was required to decide, including the factors regarding the oppression remedy and whether the bank had valid security in priority to a judgment creditor claim.

The order was set aside and the issues were returned to the Commercial List for determination.

The appellant commenced a third action asserting the same claim that was previously raised in a 1984 arbitration and a 1989 court action, both of which ended when the appellant failed to pay costs.

The motion judge dismissed the present action on the grounds of the expiration of the limitation period and res judicata.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that allowing the litigation to proceed would constitute an abuse of process and violate principles of judicial economy, consistency, finality, and the integrity of the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent doctor.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that summary judgment is generally inappropriate when the rule of discoverability is central to a limitation issue and facts are in dispute.

Furthermore, the court held that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is not related to a claim for malpractice in respect of professional services and is therefore not subject to the limitation period in the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The appellants appealed an order finding that the dispute forming the subject-matter of the claim fell outside the ambit of the arbitration clause in the minutes of settlement.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motions judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of an action on a livestock mortality insurance policy after a racehorse died from bismuth poisoning.

The Court of Appeal held that, once the trial judge found the malicious or intentional act exclusion inapplicable to the insured and his bailee, the poisoning constituted an accident as between the parties to the policy.

The court further held that the exclusion for administration of drugs, medication or inoculation applies to substances given for a beneficial medicinal purpose, not a lethal substance forced into the animal to injure or destroy it.

The insurer failed to prove the poison was given for medicinal purposes.

The appeal was allowed and judgment was entered for the policy amount plus prejudgment interest.