Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ONCA

The appellant motorcyclist was rendered paraplegic after colliding with the respondent's recycling truck, which was making a left turn.

A jury found the appellant 100% responsible for the accident.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and that expert evidence was improperly adduced during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's verdict was not so plainly unreasonable that no jury could have reached it, and that the expert evidence elicited on cross-examination was not outside the witnesses' expertise.

The appellant moved for a stay of an administrative judge's order pending the disposition of an appeal and cross-appeal regarding a claim under the Independent Assessment Process of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement.

The claimant and the Independent Counsel Group did not oppose the stay.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay, finding that there was a serious issue to be tried regarding the scope of review of factual errors, that irreparable harm to the public interest would result without a stay, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The court also ordered that the hearing of the appeal and cross-appeal be expedited.

The appellant insurer appealed an order requiring it to pay interest on retroactive attendant care and housekeeping benefits to the respondent, who was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer argued the benefits were not overdue until a catastrophic impairment determination was made in 2013.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the respondent had been catastrophically impaired since the accident and that the benefits were therefore overdue from the dates they were initially terminated or capped, entitling her to interest.

The appellant, who had a history of bringing meritless proceedings against the respondent professional association following his suspension for unpaid fees, sought to appeal a Superior Court order denying him leave to appeal an internal disciplinary decision.

The respondent requested the Court of Appeal dismiss the appeal and related motion under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal found the proceedings to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as they attempted to re-litigate previously decided issues.

The appeal and motion were dismissed, and the Court provided new procedural directions for future Rule 2.1 requests.

The appellant brought an application for a declaration that an arbitrator had no authority to reopen an arbitration.

The application judge dismissed the application as premature, directing that the matter should proceed before the arbitrator first to create a complete record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the application judge's exercise of discretion, noting that the efficient operation of the arbitral process is best served by having an initial determination made by the arbitrator.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to renew a writ of execution, arguing that the underlying judgment debt was owed by a trust and she was duty-bound to maintain its confidentiality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it could not go behind the judgment and that the appellant's assertion did not justify refusing to renew the writ.

The court deferred to the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The vendor appealed a trial judgment finding that an Agreement of Purchase and Sale terminated on its own terms, entitling the purchasers to a return of their deposit.

The vendor argued the trial judge erred in finding time was not of the essence and in placing the onus on the vendor to set a new closing date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the original agreement lacked a time of the essence clause and the vendor failed to provide a revised occupancy statement or address the purchasers' concerns as promised.

The vendor was estopped from claiming the agreement was not at an end.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a brief costs endorsement fixing the costs of Independent Counsel at $60,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes, payable by Canada.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their solicitor negligence action, arguing the trial judge failed to consider the solicitor's duty to warn about the consequences of signing a mortgage discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that at trial, the appellants claimed they never met the solicitor, and their counsel conceded the action would fail if the trial judge found they had indeed signed the documents.

Because the trial judge accepted the solicitor's evidence that the meeting occurred, the duty to warn was not a live issue.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order transferring his damages claim to the Small Claims Court and striking his claim for declaratory relief regarding professional misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the transfer as the damages claimed were within the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction.

The Court also upheld the striking of the declaratory relief claim, noting that allegations of professional misconduct are properly matters for the Law Society.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision dismissing its application for a preliminary determination of whether the respondent was involved in an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer argued this was a coverage issue that had to be determined by a court before the mandatory dispute resolution scheme under s. 279 of the Insurance Act applied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the s. 279 scheme is a comprehensive alternative dispute resolution process that governs all disputes concerning entitlement to statutory accident benefits, including whether a claimant qualifies as an insured person involved in an accident.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal and motion for leave to appeal under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal and the motion for leave to appeal at $25,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable by the appellant union to the respondent.

The respondents brought a motion to quash an appeal from a trial judge's order declaring a mistrial and discharging the jury.

The appellant argued the order was final because it went to the jurisdiction of the court.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not lose jurisdiction but expressly retained it, making the mistrial declaration an interlocutory order.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The appellant landlord appealed an order granting the respondent tenant relief from forfeiture of a commercial sublease.

The appellant had issued notices of termination alleging the tenant permitted stolen hardwood flooring to be stored on the premises, constituting criminal activity.

The application judge found no admissible evidence of criminal activity by the tenant and granted relief from forfeiture for a minor breach regarding storage by a related company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and a motion to admit fresh evidence, finding no palpable or overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence.

The appellant moved for leave to appeal an order of the Divisional Court that dismissed her Judicial Review Application for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant had sought $1,800,000 in damages in her application.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction to grant such relief under section 2 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed as devoid of merit under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order of the Divisional Court that dismissed her appeal under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court had dismissed the appeal because the amount claimed exceeded $50,000, placing it outside its jurisdiction under section 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the motion for leave to appeal under Rule 2.1 as devoid of merit.

The appellant appealed from two orders: one striking his statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, and another declaring him a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the statement of claim lacked factual underpinnings and that the appellant's history of numerous lawsuits supported the vexatious litigant declaration.

Costs of $7,000 were awarded to the respondents.

During the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto, the appellant and his friends were walking down a public street intending to demonstrate in support of animal rights.

They were stopped by police officers who demanded to search their bags as a condition of proceeding further.

The appellant refused and was grabbed and pushed by an officer.

The Court of Appeal held that the police conduct was not authorized by the common law ancillary powers doctrine, as it was not reasonably necessary to preserve the peace.

The court found that the police violated the appellant's common law right to travel unimpeded and his freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The court also held that the officer committed the tort of battery, as he lacked lawful authority and the contact was unnecessary.

The plaintiffs sued their insurer for allegedly breaching a hold harmless agreement related to outstanding accounts from health service providers.

When the insurer failed to deliver statements of defence, the plaintiffs obtained a noting in default and a default judgment.

The motion judge refused to set aside the defaults.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the defaults, finding that the insurer had a reasonable explanation for its failure to defend because the hold harmless agreements had not yet been triggered, and that the plaintiffs would suffer no prejudice from setting aside the defaults.

Two personal injury appeals were heard together to determine the scope of Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses.

The Court of Appeal held that Rule 53.03 does not apply to 'participant experts' (such as treating physicians) or 'non-party experts' who form opinions based on their observation of or participation in the events at issue, rather than being engaged by a party for the litigation.

In Westerhof, the trial judge's erroneous exclusion of such evidence warranted a new trial.

In McCallum, the trial judge correctly admitted the treating practitioners' opinion evidence.