Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ONCA

The appellant appealed a jury verdict from a motor vehicle accident trial where the jury found she suffered injuries but not a loss of competitive advantage.

The appellant argued the jury's answers were irreconcilable and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the jury's verdict, finding it was supported by evidence and met the high standard of appellate review for jury findings.

The appellants sought to certify a class proceeding against the provincial government for its response to COVID-19 in long-term care homes, asserting claims in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of Charter s. 7.

The motion judge certified the negligence claim against the Minister of Long-Term Care (MLTC) but struck the other claims.

This appeal and cross-appeal challenged that decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appellants' appeal (seeking to certify the struck claims) and the respondent's cross-appeal (seeking to decertify the negligence claim against the MLTC), thereby upholding the motion judge's original certification decision.

The appellant, a Markham city councillor, appealed the dismissal of her anti-SLAPP motion (pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act) against an action brought by a developer.

The developer's action alleged defamation and other torts arising from the councillor's opposition to a development and her report to the police regarding an incident with the developer.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by adopting an overly narrow interpretation of "expression relating to a matter of public interest" and by conflating the stages of the s. 137.1 test.

The Court clarified that reporting concerns to the police and a city councillor's actions related to their public duties are matters of public interest, warranting a broad interpretation at the initial stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to a different judge to consider the second stage of the s. 137.1 test.

These are supplementary reasons to an appeal previously dismissed, addressing the calculation of losses for investors.

The Court of Appeal accepted the appellants' submissions that interest should be calculated on a simple, annual basis, consistent with the "Fixed Interest Rate" clause in the Loan Participation Agreements.

Consequently, the amounts awarded to the respondents in the original judgment were varied to reflect this simple interest calculation.

The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce appealed three lower court decisions in a class action initiated by Dara Fresco on behalf of 31,000 customer service employees.

The class action alleged that the Bank's overtime policies and record-keeping practices led to uncompensated overtime, contrary to the Canada Labour Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed all three appeals.

It upheld the motion judge's interpretation of "permitted" overtime under s. 174 of the Code, affirming that the Bank's policies and record-keeping were "institutional impediments" to proper compensation.

The Court also confirmed the certification of aggregate damages, ruling that the Supreme Court's Pro-Sys decision allowed the trial judge to reconsider this issue despite a previous refusal at certification.

Finally, the Court upheld the motion judge's decision to defer a class-wide limitations order and a constitutional question regarding the extra-territorial application of the Class Proceedings Act, deeming them premature.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario partially allowed an appeal by the family of a deceased First Nations child, Brody Meekis, who died of strep throat following an allegedly flawed coronial investigation.

The family's civil claim, which included allegations of misfeasance in public office, negligent supervision, and Charter s. 15 discrimination, had been entirely struck by the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal reinstated the misfeasance in public office and Charter claims, finding that the motion judge erred in concluding they had no reasonable prospect of success.

The court clarified that discriminatory conduct, even within discretionary powers, can constitute unlawful action for misfeasance, and that adverse impact discrimination under s. 15 of the Charter can arise from the application of seemingly neutral laws that disproportionately disadvantage protected groups.

The claim for negligent supervision remained struck.

This is an appeal from a jury trial in a personal injury case arising from a single-vehicle crash.

The plaintiffs (Tuffnail family) were injured, and liability was apportioned among the driver (Meekes), the host (Bolton), the bartender (Coulthard), and the plaintiff (Tuffnail).

Multiple parties appealed the post-verdict rulings.

The Court of Appeal found that Coulthard was "jointly liable" with Meekes for the purposes of OPCF 44R, allowing State Farm to deduct Coulthard's insurance limits, thereby reducing State Farm's payout to the Tuffnails.

The court clarified that State Farm must share subrogation recoveries with the Tuffnails on a pro rata basis until the Tuffnails receive full indemnification under the judgment, correcting the trial judge's order that limited it to the OPCF 44R endorsement.

The court upheld the trial judge's decision on Coulthard's several liability to Bolton, rejecting the argument for reapportionment of fault without Meekes.

The court found the trial judge erred in awarding prejudgment interest higher than the bank rate, reducing it to 1.3% as market rates did not justify a higher rate and the "expectation" factor was inappropriate.

Finally, the court upheld the denial of Coulthard's request to amend pleadings to add a limitation defence post-verdict due to non-compensable prejudice.

This appeal concerned two class actions (Brazeau and Reddock) brought by federal inmates challenging the legality of administrative segregation practices.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld the motion judge's finding of liability against Canada for breaches of ss. 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, concluding that the prolonged administrative segregation practices constituted cruel and unusual punishment and lacked independent review.

The court found that Canada's failure to alter its policies despite long-standing criticism met the "clear disregard for Charter rights" threshold for awarding damages.

However, the court set aside the motion judge's order in Brazeau to use aggregate damages for structural changes to penal institutions, deeming it an unjustifiable assumption of judicial control and a misinterpretation of the Class Proceedings Act.

The court also overturned the finding of systemic negligence in Reddock, concluding that Charter damages were the more appropriate remedy.

The appeals were allowed in part, with the Brazeau damages remitted for re-determination and the Reddock negligence finding reversed.

The appellant was jogging on an indoor track at McMaster University when struck from behind by a member of the Flying Angels Running Club, suffering a serious shoulder injury requiring surgery.

At trial, no negligence was found against McMaster University or the runner who struck the appellant.

However, the Flying Angels Running Club and its coach were found negligent.

The jury determined the appellant was 40 percent contributorily negligent for failing to move to a different lane when asked to do so.

The appellant received approximately $80,000 net in damages including prejudgment interest.

On appeal, the appellant challenged four evidentiary rulings by the trial judge: the characterization of lane one as the "default lane" in the jury charge, the exclusion of an email from a track employee, the exclusion of a letter to the Ontario Ministry of Labour, and the exclusion of insurance reimbursement charts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions.

The appellant appealed a default judgment obtained by the respondents in a real estate dispute.

The respondents, as purchasers, alleged that the appellant, as vendor, made negligent misrepresentations regarding property taxes in MLS listings for two properties.

The motion judge declined to set aside the default judgment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the judgment was irregularly obtained.

The Court of Appeal upheld the default judgment, finding that the statement of claim provided a sufficient basis for the judgment as it included allegations of negligent misrepresentation and a plea that the respondents would not have entered into the transactions but for the misrepresentations.

The appellant appealed from the dismissal of his application for damages arising from his exclusion from WeChat groups related to his occupation as a real estate agent.

He also sought a declaration that the WeChat groups belonged to the respondent Homelife.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that an application was not the appropriate proceeding for advancing a damages claim of this type, and that there was no proper evidentiary foundation for either an intentional interference with economic relations claim, a civil conspiracy claim, or the declaration sought.

A landlord leased commercial property to a tenant who operated a contracting business.

The tenant modified the property by dumping landfill in a regulated flood plain without proper authorization, leading to environmental remediation orders.

The landlord and tenant had an oral agreement whereby the tenant would pay rezoning costs and complete required site plan modifications.

When the tenant failed to complete remediation work and the relationship broke down, the landlord terminated the lease and seized the tenant's commercial equipment on the property.

The landlord sued for unpaid rent and property damage; the tenant counterclaimed for conversion of the seized chattels and lost business income.

The trial judge awarded damages to both parties and set them off.

Both parties appealed on liability and damages.

A lawyer appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for malicious prosecution and breach of contract against her.

The trial judge found that the lawyer had initiated criminal proceedings against an unlicensed paralegal by making misleading complaints to police regarding missing client files.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding the lawyer initiated the prosecution, as the police exercised independent discretion in their investigation.

The court also found errors in the trial judge's application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn and in taking judicial notice regarding mitigation of damages.

Catalyst Capital Group Inc. attempted to acquire VimpelCom Ltd.'s interest in Wind Mobile Corp. but negotiations failed.

During negotiations, a junior analyst employed by Catalyst left to work for West Face Capital Inc., a member of a consortium that subsequently acquired Wind.

Catalyst sued the former employee and West Face for breach of confidence and other claims (the Moyse Action).

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that no confidential information was communicated and that Catalyst suffered no detriment because its own refusal to agree to a break fee and its insistence on regulatory concessions made the deal impossible.

Catalyst then commenced a second action against the consortium members and others alleging breach of confidence, conspiracy, and inducing breach of contract.

The motion judge dismissed the second action as barred by issue estoppel, cause of action estoppel, and as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that Catalyst was attempting to relitigate factual findings from the first action and that it could have advanced all claims in the first proceeding.

The appellant, Linda-Sue Pearce, appealed from a motion judge's refusal to allow her to withdraw an admission made during a summary judgment motion regarding ownership of a Ford truck.

The truck was driven by her son, Trevor Middleton, when it was involved in a collision with a Honda Civic.

Middleton was convicted of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and aggravated assault.

The respondent Liu sued his own insurer, The Personal Insurance Company, for relief against uninsured or underinsured motorists.

During the motion, all parties agreed that if Pearce was found to be the owner, Wawanesa would respond and the action against Personal could be dismissed.

After the motion judge found Pearce was the owner and dismissed the action against Personal, Pearce sought to withdraw her admission, arguing that section 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act made her liable only for negligence, not intentional torts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the interests of justice did not favour allowing withdrawal of the admission.

The appellants appealed from a summary judgment dismissing their counterclaim for professional negligence against their former solicitors.

The law firm had been retained for nearly five years to represent the appellants in protracted litigation and subsequently sued for unpaid fees.

The appellants counterclaimed for damages, alleging the firm failed to provide a meaningful assessment of potential damages that would have enabled an earlier settlement.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding no causal link between the firm's failure to obtain a formal damages assessment and the continuation of the litigation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law and that genuine issues requiring trial existed.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice conditionally approving a third-party litigation funding agreement for a proposed class action.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory and thus only appealable to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal held that the conditional approval order was interlocutory, not final, because it did not finally dispose of the substantive rights of the parties.

The order merely conditioned approval on amendments to the funding agreement; failure to amend resulted in dismissal of the approval motion, not from the order itself.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court order dismissing his negligence action against his former lawyers and ordering him to pay costs.

The action arose from the lawyers' representation in a companion motor vehicle accident claim.

The Superior Court dismissed the action because the appellant twice failed to attend a court-ordered defence medical examination by a neurologist, and made clear his intention never to comply with such an order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the motion judge had no alternative but to dismiss the claim given the appellant's refusal to comply with the court order.

This appeal concerns a class action by General Motors of Canada Limited (GMCL) dealers against the law firm Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP for breach of fiduciary and contractual duties.

During the 2009 financial crisis, Cassels represented three potentially conflicting clients: the Saturn Dealers, Industry Canada (regarding GMCL bailout financing), and GMCL dealers generally regarding a potential restructuring or insolvency.

The trial judge found that Cassels breached its duties by failing to disclose the conflict of interest with Industry Canada to the dealers and by failing to provide proper advice regarding Wind-Down Agreements (WDAs) offered by GMCL.

The dealers lost the opportunity to negotiate collectively for better compensation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability findings but reduced the damages award from $45 million to approximately $41 million (subject to further calculation regarding class composition).

The respondent Crown brought a motion to quash an appeal from a Superior Court order requiring the appellant to produce Youth Records under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The motion judge had ordered the appellant to produce specified Youth Records or face a stay of his proposed class action proceeding.

The appellant challenged the order as final rather than interlocutory, arguing the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory in nature—a production order with a sanction for non-compliance—and therefore any appeal lay to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the Crown.