Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ONCA

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to amend their statement of claim to advance personal claims for damages and increase the prayer for relief, stemming from an explosion in an apartment building they previously owned through a numbered company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision.

The court found the motion to amend was brought too late, would cause presumed non-compensable prejudice to the defendants by materially altering the factual framework and requiring new evidence, and that the proposed personal claims by shareholders lacked a proper legal foundation as they did not demonstrate a personal cause of action separate from the company's claims.

The respondents were injured in a water taxi accident in Venice, Italy, and sued the foreign water taxi operators in Ontario, relying on their travel booking contract with Amex Canada to establish jurisdiction.

The motion judge found that the Ontario court had jurisdiction based on the fourth presumptive connecting factor from Van Breda (a contract connected with the dispute was made in the province).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that even if the presumptive connecting factor was established, the foreign appellants successfully rebutted it because the Ontario contract had little or nothing to do with the subject matter of the litigation against them.

This appeal concerned an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant, a medical resident, sued an investigation firm and its investigator for defamation based on executive summaries of a workplace harassment investigation.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the summaries related to a matter of public interest, were protected by qualified privilege, and lacked evidence of malice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that the expressions related to public interest due to the nature of the educational institution, media attention, and public safety concerns, and were protected by qualified privilege.

The respondent's husband died during a follow-up angiogram as part of a clinical trial.

The respondent sued the principal investigator, Dr. Strauss, for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The jury found breach of standard of care but no causation in negligence.

The trial judge found breach of an ad hoc fiduciary duty and awarded damages, stating causation was removed from the analysis in the fiduciary context.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by not examining causation in the fiduciary context.

The Court found no causal link between the alleged fiduciary breach and the loss, relying on the jury's finding on causation in the negligence claim, as the claims were based on substantially the same conduct.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment in favour of the respondent bank for a credit card debt and the dismissal of his counterclaim.

The appellant argued that documents he sent to the bank constituted an accord and satisfaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant could not unilaterally dictate the terms of repayment and finding no procedural unfairness in the denial of cross-examination where no notice of examination was served.

The appellants appealed from a judgment made at an undefended trial, arguing they were not properly served with notice of two preceding orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had actual knowledge of the proceedings and had failed to move to set aside the underlying orders.

The court noted that an order made without notice is not a nullity but remains an order of the court until set aside.

The appellant sought to enforce a letter of request from a U.S. court to obtain documents and viva voce testimony from the respondent, a federal Crown corporation, for use in a U.S. action.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the respondent enjoyed Crown immunity and the appellant failed to meet the criteria for enforcing letters rogatory.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 60 of the Ontario Evidence Act is a rule of practice and procedure that binds the Crown under section 27 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.

The Court further held the application judge erred by treating the factors for enforcing letters rogatory as strict pre-conditions and by concluding that alternative disclosure under the Access to Information Act provided evidence of the same value.

The plaintiff was injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist.

His insurer denied uninsured automobile coverage because the plaintiff was driving with a suspended licence.

The Minister of Finance, administering the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, brought a cross-claim on behalf of the uninsured defendant seeking a declaration of coverage.

The insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim and cross-claim, arguing the cross-claim was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal held that the statutory condition regarding authorized driving did not apply to uninsured automobile coverage unless explicitly provided in the policy, which it was not.

While the cross-claim was out of time under the Limitations Act, the court stayed the limitation defence in the interest of judicial economy.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision declining to enforce a mediated settlement under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial judge had found that the respondent was stressed and emotional during the brief mediation, and that enforcing the settlement would result in a real injustice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual findings were supported by evidence and her discretionary decision not to enforce the settlement was entitled to deference.

The court noted that the appellants suffered no financial prejudice from the partial implementation of the settlement.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing an adjournment in an oppression remedy proceeding under the Business Corporations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the decision not to adjourn was an order ancillary to the OBCA proceeding and therefore appealable to the Divisional Court under s. 255 of the OBCA.

The appellant appealed an order recognizing a foreign default judgment, arguing that the English process denied him natural justice through the registration of the default judgment, refusal to set it aside, denial of an adjournment, and absence of reasons for a costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had ample opportunity to be heard had he complied with the English rules of court, and that the denial of an adjournment was an exercise of judicial discretion.

The court awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant employee was terminated for cause after misappropriating company resources to renovate his home.

The employer sued for breach of fiduciary duty, and the employee counterclaimed for unpaid bonuses.

An arbitrator awarded damages to the employer for the misappropriation but also awarded the employee his unpaid bonuses, finding they were an integral part of his employment contract.

The Superior Court overturned the bonus award, holding that a fiduciary is not entitled to compensation during a period of wrongdoing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the employee's appeal and restored the arbitrator's award, finding no absolute rule disentitling an errant fiduciary to bonus compensation, and holding that the arbitrator's decision reasonably achieved the goals of restitution and deterrence.

The appellant solicitors appealed a motion judge's decision upholding an assessment officer's reduction of their legal fees.

The assessment officer reduced the fees because the solicitors failed to adequately advise the client of the costs consequences of the tactics she insisted upon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the assessment officer's conclusion was not unreasonable given the specific circumstances of the client, which required extra efforts to clarify the harsh realities of costs consequences.

The appellants' action was dismissed by a motion judge because they were two days late in paying an $8,000 costs award mandated by a peremptory scheduling order.

The appellants appealed the dismissal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge exercised her discretion unreasonably by failing to consider the justice of the case, the lack of prejudice to the respondents, and the minor nature of the breach.

The Court extended the time for compliance and reinstated the action.

The appellant, a Canadian pig producer, appealed an order dismissing its motion for an anti-suit injunction and granting a stay of its Ontario action against a Russian corporation.

The appellant sought to avoid an arbitration clause requiring arbitration in Moscow, alleging the respondent's CEO made death threats against its chief operating officer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the injunction issues moot as the arbitration had already occurred.

The court upheld the stay of the Ontario action, concluding the arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass the appellant's related tort claims.

The moving party sought to set aside an order of the Chief Justice of Ontario, which had dismissed his motion to set aside a deputy registrar's order.

Ultimately, the moving party sought to re-open a summary judgment granted by the Superior Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal, alleging newly discovered evidence of fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a motion to set aside a Superior Court order based on fresh evidence of fraud, and that such a motion must be brought in the Superior Court.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that the 1996 exercise of a power of appointment was a fraudulent conveyance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact regarding the appellant's complete interest in the property and the fraudulent nature of the conveyance were not open to challenge.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a substantial indemnity basis.

The insured stored its boat at a marina, which subsequently sold the boat to an innocent third party without the insured's knowledge or consent.

After unsuccessfully suing the third party, the insured claimed against its all-risk insurance policy for the direct physical loss of the boat.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the loss was due to the transfer of title rather than a physical loss.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that the marina's unlawful conversion was the proximate cause of the loss and constituted a fortuitous, direct physical loss covered by the policy.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it breached a contract by failing to award a roofing subcontract to the respondent, who was the lowest bidder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the bidding process created a binding contract.

The court also upheld the damages award and rejected the argument that the respondent failed to mitigate its loss.

The Assistant Commissioner applied for leave to appeal, raising issues regarding the standard of review by the Divisional Court.

The appellant moved to quash the application, arguing the Assistant Commissioner lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and adjourned the motion to quash to be determined by the panel hearing the appeal.