Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - ONCA

The appellant Township appealed a trial decision finding it 45% liable for damages resulting from a negligently installed solar panel array on the respondents' barn.

The Township admitted negligence in failing to have an engineer inspect the installation before closing the building permit, but argued its liability should be lower and challenged the quantum of damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 45% apportionment of liability, finding no palpable and overriding error.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the quantum of damages, finding the trial judge made material errors in adopting the respondents' expert's estimate, including double-counting truss repair costs.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a reassessment of damages.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their application for a declaration that the respondent insurance company had a duty to defend a third party claim.

The claim involved property damage allegedly caused by pollution from dry cleaner tenants at the appellants' shopping plaza.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the claims asserted were either outside the scope of coverage or fell within the policy's pollution and owned-property exclusions.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the release of its reasons on appeal, the Court of Appeal received written submissions on costs.

The successful respondent, the Municipality of Clarington, was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

Erie Sand and Gravel Limited entered into an oral agreement with Seres' Farms Limited to purchase land containing aggregate essential to Erie's business.

The land was subject to a right of first refusal held by Tri-B Acres Inc. Erie provided a written offer reflecting the oral agreement, which Seres' Farms presented to Tri-B. Tri-B failed to match the offer, but Seres' Farms accepted Tri-B's offer anyway.

Erie sued for specific performance.

The trial judge found a binding oral agreement existed and that acts of part performance took it outside the Statute of Frauds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Tri-B's appeal, upholding the specific performance order because the property was unique and damages were inadequate.

The appellant appealed an order of a Superior Court Judge, which had struck his appeal from a Master's order on the basis that the Master's order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, confirming that the Master's order was interlocutory and that the proper appeal route was to the Divisional Court with leave pursuant to s. 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant sued his insurer for a fire loss but was subsequently convicted of arson.

Despite having a legal opinion that his criminal appeal had merit, he agreed to settle the civil action by a consent dismissal without costs.

His criminal convictions were later quashed on appeal and the charges withdrawn.

He moved to set aside the civil settlement and consent order, arguing common mistake and fresh evidence.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, emphasizing the principle of finality in litigation and noting that the appellant knew his appeal had merit when he chose to settle.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal of an order directing it to pay principal and accrued interest to the respondents and to pay further sums into court.

The moving party argued the order was interlocutory and that the respondents were estopped from appealing because they had derived a benefit from the order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the order was final in respect of the respondents' secured priority position.

The Court also held that the respondents were not estopped from appealing, as they had complied with the order and immediately notified the moving party of their intention to appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding joint or several liability and the rate of prejudgment interest.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent was not precluded from pursuing the action against the appellant after obtaining default judgment against a numbered company, as the causes of action were independent.

However, the Court agreed with the appellant that prejudgment interest should have been calculated at 5% per annum rather than 2% per month.

The appeal was dismissed subject to the variation of the prejudgment interest award.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment which found that the respondent had no beneficial interest in a property and that his transfer of his half-interest to his son was not a fraudulent conveyance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made palpable and overriding factual errors in assessing the 'badges of fraud' and the respondent's beneficial interest.

The trial judgment was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The moving parties brought motions to quash an appeal from an order that dissolved two earlier orders.

The responding parties argued that the order was a final determination on the issue of standing, making it appealable as of right to the Court of Appeal.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory, as it did not finally dispose of the issue of standing, and granted the motions to quash the appeal.

Borins J.A. dissented, finding the order final as it disposed of the plaintiffs' claim for interlocutory injunctive relief.

The respondents in a civil appeal brought a motion to quash the part of the appeal that relied on the alleged incompetency of the appellant's trial counsel.

The moving parties argued that incompetence of counsel is not a recognized ground for a civil appeal, that the appellant had already recovered damages from his former lawyer, and that the appeal lacked merit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the ground relating to a mistrial was sufficiently interrelated with the other grounds and should be considered by the panel hearing the appeal.

The court also directed that the appellant's former counsel be served with the materials and given an opportunity to respond.

The appellant commenced an action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and abuse of process against the respondents, including a lawyer who had allegedly urged police to arrest her.

The motions judge dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the police conducted their own independent investigation and made their own decision to arrest the appellant, meaning the action against the lawyer had no chance of success.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial judge on three issues of liability and the allocation of costs.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error on the liability issues and no error in principle in the discretionary allocation of costs.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $6,000.

The appellant moved for an adjournment of the hearing of the appeal after recently retaining new counsel.

The appeal was from an order refusing to set aside a previous order that struck out the appellants' statement of defence and counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal denied the adjournment and quashed the appeal, finding that the order appealed from was interlocutory, not final.

Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction, as any appeal from the interlocutory order lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

The plaintiff wrote a negative book review of the defendant's novel.

The defendant responded with an allegedly defamatory letter sent by email to the magazine's editors, which was published in print and online.

The defendant also faxed the letter to two other newspapers, which did not publish it.

The plaintiff sued for libel but failed to serve notice under s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the defendant could rely on the notice provision for the print and online magazine publications, as the online version constituted a 'newspaper'.

However, the faxes and the original email to the editors were separate publications not in a newspaper, so the action could proceed regarding those specific transmissions.

The appellant was arrested for sexual assault during an undercover police operation targeting public sex in a park.

After the criminal charge was withdrawn, the appellant sued the police for negligence, malicious prosecution, and Charter breaches.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in rejecting proposed expert evidence, failing to consider his section 15(1) Charter discrimination claim, and dismissing the malicious prosecution claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert evidence was unnecessary, the trial judge properly considered and rejected the Charter claim, and there was no evidence of malice to support malicious prosecution.

The plaintiff was injured by a crank while attempting to connect his transport truck to a tomato wagon owned by the defendant in a farmer's field.

The defendant appealed a motion judge's finding that the tomato wagon was not an 'automobile' under s. 267.1(1) of the Insurance Act, which would have precluded the plaintiff's action for damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the tomato wagon was not being operated on a public highway at the time of the accident, it was not required to be insured under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act, and therefore did not fall within the expanded definition of 'automobile' in the Insurance Act.

The appellant doctor appealed a trial judgment finding him liable in medical malpractice for failing to detect a lump on the respondent's testicle or advise him of the potential seriousness of his condition.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by ignoring a respectable body of medical opinion that supported not alarming the patient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not choose between competing opinions on the standard of care for a family practitioner, as the appellant's expert was a urologist.

The Court upheld the finding that the appellant was negligent in failing to detect the lump or impress upon the patient the need for further examination.

The landlord entered into an agreement to sell a commercial property to a third-party purchaser, subject to the tenant's right of first refusal.

After the tenant indicated it would not pay the proposed price, the landlord and purchaser entered into a second agreement without the right of first refusal condition.

The tenant subsequently exercised its right of first refusal, leading both the tenant and the purchaser to seek specific performance.

The trial judge granted specific performance to the purchaser, finding the right of first refusal void for uncertainty.

The Court of Appeal allowed the tenant's appeal, holding that the right of first refusal was enforceable, converted into an equitable interest when the landlord accepted the purchaser's offer, and was not waived by the tenant's negotiating tactics.

The appellant trustee in bankruptcy appealed a trial judgment finding no intention to form a debt between the bankrupt and the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual findings, which accepted the respondent's explanation for questionable book entries, could not be disturbed.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and reduced the trial costs award from a solicitor and client scale to a party and party scale, noting the trustee was justified in being suspicious of the altered accounting records.