Civil Litigation - Defendant - ONCA

The moving party brought a motion for directions regarding the responding party's failure to comply with previous court orders requiring the production of documents and attendance at an examination in aid of execution.

The court found that the contemnor, the sole director of the responding corporate debtor, had not purged his civil contempt as he failed to produce several important categories of documents.

As a sanction, the court ordered the contemnor to pay the full judgment amount of $424,769.22 into court, make a charitable donation, and pay full indemnity costs, failing which he would be deemed to have discontinued a related action against the moving party.

The appellant sought to set aside a motion judge's order dismissing her Notice of Objection to a Will and an order for interest on legacies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual findings and upholding the summary determination of the estate matter under Rule 75.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also denied leave to appeal the costs order, affirming the discretionary nature of interest and costs awards.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal, reversing a Divisional Court decision that had quashed an umpire's assessment of actual cash value (ACV) for a fire-damaged business premises under section 128 of the Insurance Act.

The Court found that the Divisional Court erred by giving undue weight to market value and by failing to defer to the umpire's reasonable assessment.

It clarified that "actual value" means the value to the insured, which can exceed market value, and that repair estimates are relevant to ACV.

The umpire's pragmatic approach in choosing between parties' proposed ACV amounts was upheld as non-arbitrary, reinforcing the deferential standard of review for such appraisals.

The appellant, Mr. Flight, appealed two orders from a motion judge concerning three issues: whether the transfer of a "Trustee Action" to him required the Trustee's consent, the Trustee's production of documents, and the motion judge's costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusions regarding document production or the costs award.

The court also noted that the issue of Trustee consent for the action transfer had been previously addressed in a prior decision and was currently under reserve by another motion judge, thus requiring no further comment from the Court of Appeal.

The Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms (JCCF) appealed a motion judge's order requiring it to pay $156,461.99 in costs following an unsuccessful interlocutory injunction motion brought by students against Seneca College's COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The Court of Appeal found the costs order fundamentally flawed because the motion judge failed to determine if the litigation was public interest litigation and did not apply the correct legal tests for awarding costs against a non-party (the "person of straw" test or abuse of process).

The Court clarified that fundraising or promoting a case on a website does not constitute abuse of process.

The Court also stated that JCCF's refusal to disclose whether it was indemnifying the students was a relevant consideration for costs.

The appeal was allowed, the costs order set aside, and the matter remitted to the motion judge for a fresh determination.

The moving party, 11534599 Canada Corp., sought review of a motion judge's order that granted an extension of time to perfect its appeal on terms that suspended the payment of per diem interest for a specific period.

The original appeal stemmed from an order finding 115 in unlawful possession of a property and requiring mortgage assignment and payment with interest.

The motion judge had imposed the interest suspension to address prejudice caused by 115's delay and attempts to impose preconditions on the mortgage assignment. 115 argued that the motion judge, as a single judge, lacked jurisdiction to vary the original order by suspending interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, holding that the motion judge's order merely suspended interest pending the appeal's hearing and did not permanently alter the substance of the original order.

This term was deemed necessary in the interests of justice to grant the extension.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement.

The core issue was the interpretation of an email clause regarding the direction of share purchase monies, specifically whether the phrase 'Subject to any contrary direction by His Honour' allowed the motion judge to direct funds into court for creditors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding it was open to him based on the record.

The appellants' application to introduce fresh evidence was dismissed as irrelevant or already dealt with by the settlement terms.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This appeal concerned a failed residential real estate transaction where the appellant refused to close, alleging an undisclosed basement defect.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondents (sellers), finding the defect was readily apparent and applying the principle of *caveat emptor*.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision, finding no material error in the analysis, despite acknowledging a minor error in relying on hearsay evidence.

The court emphasized the appellant's delay in raising the issue and his financial difficulties as factors supporting the motion judge's findings.

The respondent sued the appellants for constructive dismissal.

During a summary judgment motion, the appellants sought production of draft affidavits, which the motion judge dismissed as privileged, while also prohibiting further examinations without leave.

The appellants appealed these orders to the Court of Appeal.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing the orders were interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal agreed, quashed the appeal, and directed the appellants to seek leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The appellant property manager appealed the dismissal of its summary judgment motion, arguing that the respondent condominium corporation's action for construction defects was a nullity because it failed to provide owners with notice under s. 23(2) of the Condominium Act, 1998 before issuing a notice of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, taking the rare step of overruling its own previous decision in Medhurst.

The Court held that applying the modern approach to statutory interpretation, non-compliance with the notice provision does not render an action a nullity, as doing so would undermine the consumer protection purpose of the Act and cause injustice to the condominium owners the provision was designed to protect.

The appellants appealed from a Superior Court judgment that enforced a term of Minutes of Settlement between the parties arising from a failed business arrangement and law practice shared between siblings.

The appellants raised two issues: (1) that the application judge erred in refusing to grant an adjournment, and (2) that the application judge erred in concluding that paragraph one of the Minutes of Settlement was a separate enforceable term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjournment was properly refused and that paragraph one was indeed a separate enforceable obligation independent of other disputed amounts between the parties.

The appellants appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing their motion for a declaration that they were entitled to indemnification for legal fees and expenses under a consulting agreement.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order was interlocutory rather than final because it did not address the substantive merits of whether the consulting agreement required advance payment of legal fees or whether there had been a breach.

The court quashed the appeal and noted that the appellants could seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court or bring a separate application for interpretation of the agreement.

The appellant township disqualified the respondent's tender for failing to include the company name and return address on the outside of the sealed envelope, as required by the tender process.

The respondent sued for breach of contract.

The trial judge found the respondent's tender was in substantial compliance with tender requirements and that the omission was a mere irregularity.

The trial judge awarded damages representing the respondent's lost profit, finding it had submitted the lowest bid and would have been awarded the contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, dismissing the appeal and awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed from an order striking his pleadings and limiting his trial participation rights in a family law proceeding.

The respondent sought spousal support and equalization of net family property following a brief marriage.

The appellant failed to comply with multiple court orders requiring disclosure of financial information and answers to undertakings and refusals given during examination.

The motion judge struck the appellant's Answer and imposed restrictions on his participation at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but varied the order to augment the appellant's trial participation rights, permitting him to make an opening statement, cross-examine witnesses, and make closing submissions without requiring leave of the trial judge.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal of a trial judgment in an employment law matter.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's costs award of $82,600 to the respondent, arguing for either no costs or a reduced amount of $20,000.

The respondent sought to maintain the trial judge's award.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the merits but reduced the costs award to $40,000, considering that while the respondent succeeded on the constructive dismissal claim, the trial was significantly lengthened by unsuccessful claims and the respondent failed to proceed under the simplified procedure despite being eligible to do so after other claims were struck out.

The appellant, a collision repair and storage facility, appealed the dismissal of its application to have an initial certificate issued by Intact Insurance under section 24(5) of the Repair and Storage Liens Act declared null and void.

The dispute arose over storage charges for a motor vehicle.

The appellant argued that Intact was not entitled to obtain the certificate because it had not yet paid the vehicle owner for the loss.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that Intact, having assumed liability under the insurance contract, was subrogated to the rights of its insured under section 278 of the Insurance Act and was therefore a person lawfully entitled to the vehicle under the RSLA.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to Intact.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice conditionally approving a third-party litigation funding agreement for a proposed class action.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory and thus only appealable to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal held that the conditional approval order was interlocutory, not final, because it did not finally dispose of the substantive rights of the parties.

The order merely conditioned approval on amendments to the funding agreement; failure to amend resulted in dismissal of the approval motion, not from the order itself.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellant brought a motion for directions seeking an order that motions for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court be heard by the Court of Appeal.

The respondent opposed and brought a cross-motion to adjourn the appeal hearing and extend time to file responding materials.

The motions judge dismissed the motion for directions, finding the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to determine a motion for leave to appeal pending before the Divisional Court.

The cross-motion for extension of time was granted, but the request to adjourn the appeal was denied.

Costs were fixed at $5,000 with disposition deferred to the appeal panel.

The appellants appealed orders of the Superior Court dismissing their motions to set aside a settlement order approving a settlement of their son George Lochner's claim for damages arising from a police altercation in which he was tasered.

The appellants lacked standing to challenge the settlement order as they were not parties or persons affected by it within the meaning of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Their second motion was an abuse of process as it attempted to re-litigate the same standing issue.

The appellants' proposed fresh evidence regarding George Lochner's taser injuries was inadmissible as it could not have affected the outcome of the motions.

The appeals were dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents and the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The appellant law firm appealed an order directing the assessment of all its accounts to the respondent, refusing to impose a solicitor's lien on a personal loan made to the respondent, and awarding solicitor and client costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding no 'special circumstances' under s. 4(1) of the Solicitors Act to justify assessing accounts paid without objection more than six years prior.

However, the Court upheld the refusal to grant a charging order under s. 34(1) for a personal loan, as such orders must relate to legal services.

The costs award was also affirmed.