Civil Litigation - Defendant - ONCA

The appellant appealed a Rule 2.01 order dismissing his action concerning the respondent's mortgage.

The court held the action raised no valid issue and found the motion judge's reasons were thorough.

No error warranting appellate intervention was established.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs fixed to the respondent.

The appeal arose from a dispute over whether a substantial contribution to a home purchase created a beneficial ownership interest under resulting trust principles.

The majority held the trial judge made a legal error by disregarding key third-party evidence probative of the transferor’s objective intention and allowed the appeal.

The court declared the appellants entitled to a 50% beneficial interest in the property, set aside the judgment and costs below, and remitted related sale and accounting remedies for case management.

A dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible legal or factual error and concluding the transfer was supported by consideration.

This costs endorsement follows the dismissal of Susan Henderson’s motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from a judgment dismissing her will challenge application.

The court considered written submissions on costs, ultimately awarding partial indemnity costs of $3,630.69 to the responding party, Wei Wang, rejecting arguments of financial hardship, public interest, and self-representation as reasons to deny costs.

The applicant, West Whitby Landowners Group Inc., sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that dismissed their judicial review application against the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) and Elexicon Energy Inc. The Divisional Court had found it lacked jurisdiction over the OEB's opinion on cost allocation, deeming it not a statutory power of decision affecting legal rights, and that certiorari was unavailable.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, clarifying the test for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The court emphasized that the key consideration for granting leave is the impact the decision will have on the development of Ontario's jurisprudence, particularly in administrative and public law, moving away from a rigid checklist approach.

The appellant appealed an order requiring it to reimburse the respondents for legal fees incurred in collecting on promissory notes.

The appellant argued that the fees were related to a global settlement of disputes rather than collection, and that the application judge erred in awarding full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the enforcement efforts were inextricably linked to the settlement discussions, and that the application judge properly reduced the claimed fees by a third to arrive at a reasonable amount as required by the general security agreement.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision awarding damages for breach of an unconditional agreement of purchase and sale.

The appellant claimed the agreement was frustrated by a government policy announcement that caused real estate prices to drop 20-30 percent, preventing her from obtaining financing and selling her own home.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that frustration did not apply because the appellant deliberately chose not to include financing or sale conditions in her offer to make it more attractive to the vendor.

The court held that the policy announcement did not constitute a "radical change" in the appellant's obligations and that the appellant knowingly assumed the risk of being unable to obtain financing.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing their application and sought leave to appeal a costs order.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge correctly identified and applied the applicable legal principles, and that section 6.2 of the Shared Property Agreement was enforceable.

The court upheld the costs order, finding that the respondents were entitled to indemnification of legal costs from the Common Fund under sections 3.7 and 11 of the Shared Property Agreement.

The appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal the costs order was refused.

The respondents were awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis to be assessed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion for a declaration that the respondent insurer had a duty to defend him against his daughter's negligent parenting claim.

The appellant was an occupant of a vehicle driven by an impaired driver at the time of the alleged injury.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was not covered under the automobile insurance policy because his liability did not arise from the use or operation of the automobile, but rather from his parenting decisions.

The plain language of section 239(1)(a) of the Insurance Act requires that an occupant's liability must arise from the use or operation of the automobile to be covered.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment order finding them liable for breach of contractual warranty and/or negligent representation arising from an inaccurate tree inventory attached to an Asset Purchase Agreement for the sale of tree farm assets.

The respondents claimed a shortfall of 83,106 saleable trees from the represented inventory of 236,341 trees.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the liability finding, holding that the tree inventory was not a contractual representation or warranty but rather a description of purchased assets.

The court found that the respondents had expressly agreed through due diligence inspection provisions that they had satisfied themselves as to the quantity and quality of plant material, precluding subsequent claims of misrepresentation.

This appeal concerns whether a court has jurisdiction to extinguish a third party's gross overriding royalty (GOR) interest in land through a vesting order in a receivership proceeding.

The Court of Appeal held that while the court has jurisdiction under section 243 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to grant vesting orders, the motion judge erred in exercising that jurisdiction to extinguish the appellant's GORs, which constituted interests in land akin to ownership interests rather than fixed monetary claims.

However, the appellant failed to appeal within the prescribed 10-day period under the BIA Rules, and the justice of the case did not warrant an extension of time.

The appeal was dismissed, though the appellant retained the $250,000 payment it had received.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision rendered by the motion judge in favour of the respondent on claims for breach of contract and breach of trust under the Construction Act.

The appellants argued that the motion judge erred in finding no genuine issue requiring trial, contending that the case turned on credibility findings that required cross-examination or examination for discovery, which were unavailable under the simplified procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's factual findings were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The applicant sought a motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from a Divisional Court decision that had dismissed his appeal of a Small Claims Court judgment.

The original action involved a claim for negligence against a condominium corporation for damages resulting from vandalism to the applicant's automobile in the condominium's underground garage.

The applicant alleged the vandalism resulted from a change in the security system.

The Divisional Court upheld the Small Claims Court's dismissal, finding the applicant failed to meet his burden of proving the condominium's security decision was unreasonable or that it foreseeably caused his loss.

The motion for leave to appeal was brought late, exceeding the 15-day filing period by more than 20 days.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding the proposed appeal lacked merit as a matter of public importance and did not meet the threshold for a second appeal.

The appellants sought an extension of time to appeal a decision by Sosna J. dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment in a mortgage action.

The respondent bank had obtained a default judgment and a writ of possession.

The appellants' appeal to the Court of Appeal was well out of time.

Although the court found that the appellants intended to appeal within the appeal period and the delay was not long, the motion was dismissed on the merits.

The appellants had not paid the mortgage in months and were merely seeking to delay execution of the default judgment through the appeal process.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a trial judgment concerning liability for damages arising from an accident.

The appellants sought to challenge the trial judge's costs award.

The Court of Appeal determined that liability should be apportioned two-thirds to Safranyos and one-third to Hamilton.

The court made a Sanderson order requiring Safranyos to pay one-third of McHugh's costs of trial and appeal, but declined to impose such an order against Hamilton, as Hamilton made no arguments relating to McHugh's liability at trial or on appeal.

The applicant sought leave to appeal under section 131 of the Provincial Offences Act from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Justice that dismissed her appeal from a conviction for operating a rental unit without a valid licence.

The applicant contended that she had entered an uninformed guilty plea at trial, arguing this raised a question of law essential to the public interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's complaint was fact-based rather than a question of law, and that she had failed to meet the very high threshold for granting leave to appeal under section 131 of the POA.

Appeal from a summary judgment decision enforcing settlement agreements between Mars Canada Inc. and the appellants regarding the sale of grey market Mars products in Canada.

The appellants challenged the enforceability of the settlement agreements as being in restraint of trade, the motion judge's jurisdiction to order a reference on damages, and the award of substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the settlement agreements reasonable under the Tank Lining test, confirming the court's jurisdiction to order a reference under Rule 20.04(3) on summary judgment, and affirming the substantial indemnity costs award based on the appellants' reprehensible conduct.

Two consolidated appeals concerning whether a claim for contribution and indemnity represents property of a bankrupt that vests in the Trustee under section 71 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and whether a bankrupt can advance such a claim when the Trustee refuses to do so and a creditor has obtained a lifting of the stay of proceedings.

The appellants sought to issue third party claims for contribution and indemnity against a co-defendant.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the claim constituted property vested in the Trustee and that the undischarged bankrupt lacked capacity to deal with it.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a claim for contribution and indemnity is property under the BIA and that the motion judge erred in failing to consider relief under section 37 of the BIA.

The appellants successfully appealed orders from the Superior Court of Justice that had reinstated a default judgment and permitted the sale of certain property.

The appeal was allowed because the respondent failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts concerning the appellants' alleged default and participation in the action when attending before the court without notice to the appellants.

The appellants were self-represented throughout most of the proceedings and only retained counsel a few months before the appeal was argued.

The court awarded costs to the appellants on a partial indemnity basis, finding their claim for substantial or full indemnity costs to have no basis and their partial indemnity claim to be excessive and disproportionate.

An accounting firm filed a corporate client's tax returns after the due date, resulting in the denial of approximately $550,000 in tax credits by the Canada Revenue Agency.

The client received notices of assessment in April 2010 and pursued administrative remedies through the CRA appeal process, with the accountant's assistance, until May 2011 when the CRA advised it intended to confirm the assessments.

The client commenced a negligence action in August 2012.

The motion judge dismissed the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, finding the claim was discoverable in April 2010.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim was not discovered until May 2011 when the CRA appeal process concluded, as it would not have been appropriate to commence proceedings while alternative remedies remained available.

An appeal by solicitors regarding the approval of contingency fee agreements in an infant settlement involving both a tort claim and an accident benefits claim arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The motion judge approved the contingency fee agreement for the tort claim but reduced the fees for the accident benefits claim, and declined to award GST/HST.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to consider the two claims separately and to reduce the accident benefits fees based on the lower risk and complexity of that claim compared to the tort claim.

However, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in not awarding GST/HST on the approved fees, as the contingency fee agreement explicitly provided for such taxes in addition to the fee amount.