Civil Litigation - Defendant - ONCA

The appellants, Olympia Trust Company and William Loucks, appealed a motion judge's order discharging a second mortgage on property owned by the respondents.

The respondents had borrowed funds from First Swiss Mortgage Corp., which assigned the mortgage to Olympia as bare trustee.

When the respondents refinanced and paid out the mortgage to First Swiss, the discharge was never registered and First Swiss misappropriated the funds.

The motion judge found that First Swiss was acting as Olympia's agent in receiving the payout and discharging the mortgage based on the terms of agreements between First Swiss and Loucks and the course of dealings between the parties.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding, dismissing the appeal and awarding costs to the respondents.

A case management conference was held to schedule the next steps in an appeal concerning the eviction of individuals from city parks.

The case management judge set deadlines for perfecting the appeal, filing responding materials, a motion for fresh evidence, and intervention motions.

The judge also granted the parties leave to file factums up to 12,000 words, exceeding the standard limits, due to the extensive evidentiary record involving fourteen appellants.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Robert and Catherine Hurst, who challenged their removal as estate trustees of the Estate of Ruth Eileen Stevens MacBeth.

The court upheld the motion judge’s discretionary decisions to deny an adjournment, remove the Hursts as trustees, and order a $50,000 holdback from the estate.

The court found no error in the motion judge’s application of the legal tests and awarded costs against the appellants personally, concluding the appeal was unnecessary and not in the interests of the estate.

The appellants, a police services board and a chief of police, appealed a Divisional Court decision allowing a negligence action against them to proceed.

The respondent alleged he was assaulted by police officers during an arrest and claimed the chief was negligent in supervision and training, and the board was directly and vicariously liable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the chief's appeal, finding the pleadings advanced a tenable claim with sufficient material facts.

The board's appeal was granted in part to strike the direct negligence claims, though the board remains a defendant based on vicarious liability.

The respondents purchased a motel and gas station from the appellants.

The trial judge found the appellants fraudulently misrepresented the condition of the underground fuel tank system and breached the Agreement of Purchase and Sale by failing to provide a required safety compliance report.

The trial judge awarded damages based on the cost to replace the tank system.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred by not granting an adjournment due to late disclosure of a Pierringer agreement, misapprehending evidence about compliance alternatives, and using the wrong measure of damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants never requested an adjournment or stay at trial, and the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in her assessment of damages or contractual interpretation.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants' appeal was allowed.

The Court of Appeal addressed the disposition of costs for a motion previously heard in the Superior Court.

The appellants sought $20,098.48 for the motion costs.

Applying s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed the motion costs at the requested amount and ordered them payable to the appellants by the respondents, conditional on the appellants' success in the ongoing main action.

The court noted the respondents' original motion had a low prospect of success.

This motion concerned an application for security for costs on appeal, brought by the respondent (Gauthier Estate) against the appellant (White) pursuant to Rule 61.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The underlying appeal stemmed from a dispute over a real estate agreement of purchase and sale.

The moving party argued for security based on the appeal being frivolous/vexatious, an unpaid costs order, and low prospects of success coupled with difficulty in collecting costs.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous/vexatious and the paid costs order was insufficient on its own.

However, the court granted the motion, finding a low prospect of success on appeal and compelling evidence that it would be nearly impossible to collect costs from the appellant, citing his illiquid assets and history of non-payment of prior costs and mortgage obligations.

Security for costs was ordered in the amount of $15,000, and the appeal was stayed until payment.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that dismissed their Rule 59.06 motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and imposed a leave requirement for any further motions in the underlying action.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, concluding that the Rule 59.06 motion was a third attempt to re-litigate issues already decided, which constituted vexatious conduct and an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The appellant, Patrick Gregory Ellis, appealed support and related orders made after an uncontested trial, which was uncontested because his pleadings were struck due to wilful non-compliance and refusal to provide financial disclosure.

The respondent, Amy Dawn Lamothe, brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion on two bases: first, courts typically do not hear appeals from unopposed proceedings, and no exception was warranted; second, the appellant had chronically and wilfully breached numerous court orders, causing prejudice.

The appeal was quashed, and the appellant was barred from initiating further financial proceedings without paying outstanding amounts or obtaining leave.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on an elevated scale.

The moving parties (appellants) brought a motion seeking an order for the release of transcripts from Superior Court hearings, an extension of time to perfect their appeal, and costs.

The responding parties did not oppose the release of transcripts or the extension but opposed the request for costs.

The court granted the release of the transcripts and the extension of time, directing the Superior Court to expedite its review and release.

However, the court denied the moving parties' request for costs, finding that their essential problem was with the Superior Court, not the responding parties.

The court also clarified it had no jurisdiction over the settling of the Superior Court order.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence and counterclaim for failing to produce an affidavit of documents.

They argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction because the order was purportedly made under Rule 76, despite the litigation continuing under the ordinary procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the order did not refer to Rule 76, and even if it had, it would be a mere technical irregularity that did not deprive the motion judge of jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring them vexatious litigants.

They failed to appear at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the application judge's reasons and the appellants' written arguments, finding no merit to the appeal and agreeing that the appellants' conduct met the definition of vexatious litigants.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the constitutional issues had already been decided.

The Court held that under the current Limitations Act, fiduciary claims are subject to limitation periods as they fall under 'claims pursued in court' pursuant to section 2(1).

However, the Court noted the appellant could still pursue a claim solely for declaratory relief, which is not subject to limitations under the Act.

The appellant appealed two summary judgments dismissing her medical negligence claims against two psychiatrists.

The motion judges found that the appellant failed to provide expert evidence from a qualified psychiatrist to establish a breach of the standard of care, whereas the respondents provided expert evidence that they met the standard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, confirming that without expert psychiatric evidence, the appellant's claims had no hope of success.

Following a successful appeal that set aside a Norwich order, the Court of Appeal issued an addendum to explicitly set aside the underlying December Order.

The Court also determined the costs of the proceedings below.

Departing from the general rule that costs follow the event, the Court ordered that no costs be awarded to any party for the Superior Court proceedings, citing the appellants' shifting legal positions, the unsettled nature of the law regarding Norwich orders, and the underlying conduct of the appellants.

The moving parties, two not-for-profit corporations in receivership, sought an interim order allowing their boards of directors to retain counsel for an appeal and directing that the legal fees be paid from the corporations' assets.

The motion judge had previously ruled the boards could not retain counsel without leave of the court or the receiver's approval.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, holding that the boards' right to pursue the appeal would be hollow without counsel, and ordered that reasonable legal fees be paid from the corporations' assets.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's interpretation of a Defence Fee Funding Protocol, arguing they should have access to further frozen assets to pay legal costs after their bank account was depleted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the protocol's wording specifically limited access to the bank account and did not extend to assets subject to a proprietary claim.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding the appellants' access to $3,500 per month for living expenses from all frozen assets was also dismissed.

The moving parties brought a motion to set aside an order dismissing their application to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from a 2007 judgment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's finding that the moving parties failed to explain their two-year delay or their failure to appear before the original judge.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The respondent brought an application for an oppression remedy, alleging that preference shares were improperly released from escrow based on the cash flow of the parent company rather than its subsidiary.

An application judge found the escrow agreement ambiguous and ordered a trial of the issue.

The trial judge subsequently found the agreement clear and unambiguous, concluding the release was improper and constituted oppression.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was bound by the application judge's finding of ambiguity due to issue estoppel.

Interpreting the ambiguous agreement in its factual context, the Court concluded the cash flow reference applied to the parent company.

The release of shares was therefore proper, and the appeal was allowed.

The applicant held debentures issued by the respondent and applied for an oppression remedy under the Business Corporations Act to prevent the respondent from converting the debentures to common shares.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the applicant lacked standing under the trust indenture.

The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing jurisdiction lay with the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, holding that the dismissal of the oppression application was an order made under the Act, and therefore the appeal must be heard by the Divisional Court.