Civil Litigation - Defendant - ONCA

Pine Glen Thorold Inc. appealed the dismissal of its action against Rolling Meadows Land Development Corporation and Glen Gordon.

The motion judge had struck the claim on the basis that it did not disclose reasonable causes of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, but on different grounds.

Rather than analyzing each individual cause of action, the court found that the claim as a whole constituted an abuse of process.

Pine Glen sought to relitigate issues that were already decided or could have been raised in prior applications between the parties, and its claim was primarily based on the respondents' conduct during the previous litigation.

The court held that absent exceptional circumstances (such as viable claims for malicious prosecution or abuse of process), parties should not be permitted to pursue civil actions based on the conduct of prior litigation.

This appeal concerned the recognition of a foreign divorce obtained in Russia.

The appellant (husband) sought divorce in Russia shortly after separating from the respondent (wife) in Canada, where spousal support is not generally available under Russian law.

The respondent sought to set aside the Russian divorce in Ontario to pursue spousal support.

The trial judge refused to recognize the Russian divorce, finding the appellant engaged in "unfair forum-shopping tactics" to avoid spousal support obligations under Ontario law.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, holding that "unfair forum-shopping tactics" constitute a distinct exception to the recognition of foreign judgments, separate from the public policy defence focused on "repugnant laws" as articulated in Beals v. Saldanha.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment motion concerning a repudiated agreement of purchase and sale for a cottage.

The appellants challenged the motion judge's findings on mitigation of damages and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding that the appellants failed to meet their onus to prove the respondents did not take reasonable steps to mitigate their losses, and that the motion judge did not err in her assessment of the evidence.

The Court also granted leave to appeal the costs order but ultimately dismissed the costs appeal, upholding the motion judge's application of Rule 49.10 and the award of substantial indemnity costs to the respondents, finding that an informal settlement discussion did not revoke a prior formal offer to settle.

The receiver of assets in receivership proceedings moved to determine whether an appeal brought by Canada Investment Corporation (CIC) from an order of Penny J. was as of right or required leave under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The order had directed that proceeds from the sale of the Caldwell property, otherwise payable to CIC, be paid to the Stanbarr Claimants based on findings in a prior action that CIC was indebted to them.

The motions judge held that the appeal was as of right under section 193(c) of the BIA because the order resulted in a loss to CIC by directing payment of funds otherwise due to it to third parties.

The receiver's motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her request for broad relief and the granting of child support by the application judge.

The appellant argued that the application judge lacked jurisdiction and erred in assessing the parties' requests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the jurisdiction argument and declining to find error in the application judge's assessment of the merits.

Costs were fixed at $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and relevant taxes.

The appellant clinic and respondent chiropractor had a business arrangement that broke down over a fee-splitting dispute.

The respondent abruptly left the clinic, leading to claims and counterclaims.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent for loss of income.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by granting summary judgment in the face of conflicting evidence without explaining how the conflict was resolved or deploying the fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04.

The judgment was set aside and the parties were left to pursue their claims.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against the respondent doctor following the death of a patient who underwent an axillary-femoral bypass.

The trial judge found the respondent breached the standard of care by using a graft that was 'not recommended' by the manufacturer and failing to obtain informed consent, but concluded the appellants failed to prove causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in his robust and pragmatic analysis of the evidence and correctly concluded that the 'material contribution' approach to causation was inapplicable.

The respondent applied for a police records check and discovered it included a withdrawn assault charge.

After the police service refused to remove the reference, the respondent successfully brought an application before the Superior Court under Rule 14.05 to have the reference removed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the police service's appeal, holding that the application judge lacked jurisdiction.

The court found that the police service's decision was an administrative decision subject to the Judicial Review Procedure Act, and therefore the challenge had to be brought by way of an application for judicial review to the Divisional Court, not via a Rule 14.05 application.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for a declaration that a release in a settlement agreement with her former employer did not bar her claim for long-term disability benefits against the insurer.

She argued the release violated the Employment Standards Act by effectively waiving her right to benefit coverage during the statutory notice period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the employer had maintained coverage as required by the Act, and the appellant was free to compromise her claim for benefits.

The Court also upheld the finding that the insurer, as a third-party beneficiary, could enforce the release.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing a settlement with the respondent general contractor regarding substantial renovations to their family home.

The issue was whether the settlement included amounts potentially owed to a millwork sub-contractor with whom the appellants had dealt directly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the settlement did not include work carried out by the sub-contractor as a result of direct dealings with the appellants.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision that ordered the production of an insurance policy under Rule 30.02(3).

The motion judge had originally refused production, finding the policy was sought for a collateral purpose and that uncontradicted evidence showed the deductible exceeded the claim amount.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge did not make a palpable and overriding error by relying on uncontradicted affidavit evidence without reading the policy itself.

The Divisional Court's order for production was set aside and the motion judge's decision was restored.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its counterclaim for professional negligence and breach of contract against the respondent accounting firm.

The motion judge dismissed the counterclaim on a summary judgment motion because the appellant failed to provide direct evidence, relying instead on an affidavit based on information and belief.

The respondent cross-appealed the motion judge's finding that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding the timing of payment of its fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the fees and granting summary judgment to the respondent.

The respondent was injured when a spider rope, left secured to a guardrail by the appellant's employees, was released by an unknown vandal and struck her car on the highway below.

The trial judge found the appellant liable in negligence for failing to meet industry standards to prevent tampering.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while a duty of care was owed, the trial judge erred in finding a breach of the standard of care.

The intervening act of vandalism was not reasonably foreseeable given the lack of prior incidents and the location of the work.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action alleging that the respondents, former officers and directors of a renovation company, conspired to divest the company of its assets to prevent the appellants from realizing on a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had only pleaded the tort of conspiracy and failed to prove that they suffered special damages as a result of the respondents' unlawful conduct.

The court also rejected arguments regarding reasonable apprehension of bias and entitlement to punitive damages.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict regarding a motor vehicle accident where the respondent made a left-hand turn into the path of the appellant's approaching vehicle.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions to the jury were inadequate and erroneous, particularly by suggesting 'competing onuses' rather than emphasizing the heavy onus on a left-turning driver under the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial judge also failed to adequately review the evidence and improperly expressed personal opinions on the appellant's possible negligence.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order enforcing a settlement agreement for the purchase of shares for $275,000.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the settlement was not contingent on a corporate reorganization and that payment was due within a reasonable time.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the motion judge erred in ordering an additional payment for tax consequences, as the $275,000 was inclusive of taxes.

The Court also reduced the motion costs from substantial to partial indemnity, finding that a letter sent by the respondent did not constitute a Rule 49 offer.

The appellant sued the respondent school board and its former director for defamation based on statements made during a television broadcast regarding her allegations of a teacher's sexual misconduct.

At trial, the jury found the statements defamatory and malicious, but true, resulting in the dismissal of the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's charge to the jury unfairly restricted the context of the words complained of, leading to a substantial wrong.

Despite the appellant's failure to object to the charge at trial, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial in the interests of justice.

The appellant wrongfully terminated a 36-month agency contract with the respondent after 15 months.

The contract contained a clause allowing the appellant to terminate on three months' notice after the 18th month.

The trial judge awarded damages based on the full 36-month term discounted by 25 percent for the likelihood of early termination.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the early termination clause defined the upper limit of the appellant's liability for damages, and reduced the damages to reflect a 22-month period.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision finding them bound by a December 17, 1999 agreement.

The appellants argued the agreement was based on a misrepresentation regarding the accounting approach used for a pay-out calculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that differing views on accounting approaches did not constitute a misrepresentation, especially since the view of the appellant's Chief Financial Officer was known to the appellant.

The appellant challenged a contempt order arising from non-payment of a lump-sum support-related amount ordered in dependant support proceedings under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal held that rules 60.05 and 60.11(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure permit contempt enforcement only for orders requiring an act other than the payment of money, and that this includes support orders.

The court rejected any purported family law exception and held that the Rules displaced any inherent jurisdiction to use contempt for money judgments in proceedings governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The contempt order was set aside and the motion for contempt was dismissed.