Civil Litigation - Defendant - ONCA

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the Mental Health Legal Committee brought motions for leave to intervene as friends of the court in an upcoming appeal concerning the constitutionality of the involuntary detention provisions of the Mental Health Act.

The appellant supported the motions, while the respondent Crown and mental health facility opposed them, arguing the proposed interventions would be duplicative or raise new issues.

The Court of Appeal granted both motions, finding that the proposed interveners had special expertise, would make useful contributions without duplicating the appellant's arguments, and that the new legal arguments raised did not require fresh evidence or cause prejudice to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a permanent injunction preventing him from interfering with a mutual driveway and sought leave to appeal the costs awarded.

The respondent moved to quash the appeals due to late filing.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal of the injunction order, finding it lacked merit as the appellant had installed a fixed, locked barrier on the driveway.

However, the court dismissed the motion to quash the costs appeal, granted leave to appeal costs, and reduced the motion judge's costs award by $3,000, finding the judge erred in treating a restatement of the claim as an offer to settle attracting substantial indemnity costs.

The successful appellant sought costs of the appeal and a stay motion.

The respondent and the Receiver argued that costs should be in the cause or paid from funds held in trust, citing special circumstances including the matter returning to the Superior Court and the Receiver managing the property without rent payments.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to depart from the usual rule that a successful party is entitled to costs forthwith, and awarded costs to the appellant payable jointly and severally by the respondent and the Receiver.

The appellants brought an application in Ontario for a declaration that assignments of mining licences relating to Mongolian properties were null and void.

The motion judge stayed the application, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the connection to Ontario was weak and that any declaratory or injunctive order would likely be unenforceable in Mongolia under the rules of private international law regarding foreign land.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding an assessment officer's refusal to grant an adjournment.

The appellant had sought the adjournment to argue a prior motion to have his solicitor's accounts assessed by a Superior Court Judge due to complexities involving alleged fraud, incompetence, negligence, and breach of trust.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on terms, finding that despite the appellant's reprehensible conduct in walking out of the hearing, the assessment officer erred in refusing the adjournment given the case's complexities.

The appeal was allowed on the condition that the appellant pay $25,000 in costs and post a $75,000 letter of credit, failing which the appeal would be dismissed.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's conclusion regarding the threshold test in a motor vehicle accident claim.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the threshold test was not met until after February 1994.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $17,500.

The plaintiff was injured on a roller coaster in October 1995 and commenced an action in February 2002.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the six-year limitation period had expired.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding the limitation period had not expired.

On appeal, the majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, holding that the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known all elements of her claim in October 1995, and the mere possibility of no causal connection did not delay the limitation period.

The appellants appealed from a judgment granting summary judgment and dismissing a motion to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that there were triable issues regarding margin requirements, the respondent's conduct, and the 'Know Your Client Rule'.

The court also set aside the default judgment against one of the appellants, finding an arguable defence on the merits regarding undue influence and the respondent's obligation to ensure she understood the indemnity.

The respondents, who operated a horse farm, were sued by a horse trainer who sustained injuries after falling from a horse.

The trainer initially pleaded she was an employee, but later amended her claim to remove references to employment, as the respondents' farm liability insurance policy excluded coverage for employees.

The insurer refused to defend the action, arguing the pleadings were manipulated and seeking to introduce extrinsic evidence to prove the trainer was an employee.

The applications judge declared the insurer had a duty to defend and declined to consider the extrinsic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that the duty to defend is determined by the pleadings and the policy, and that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to make premature findings of fact on matters at issue in the underlying tort litigation.

The parties, two dentists, practised together under a Cost Sharing Agreement containing an arbitration clause.

After their relationship broke down, the respondent sued for breach of contract, conversion, and malicious prosecution.

The appellant moved for a stay of proceedings under s. 7 of the Arbitration Act, which the motions judge dismissed on the basis that the malicious prosecution claim fell outside the arbitration agreement and the matters could not easily be separated.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal because a finding that a dispute falls outside an arbitration agreement is not barred by s. 7(6).

The Court upheld the motions judge's decision, finding no error in the refusal to grant a partial stay.

The respondent, a partner in an accounting firm, accepted a directorship with a corporate client of the firm.

While he disclosed the directorship and remitted his director's fees to the partnership, he failed to disclose his entitlement to shares and stock options under the client's key employee stock plan.

After the partnership dissolved, the appellants sought an accounting of these benefits.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent breached his fiduciary duty and his statutory duty of disclosure under the Partnerships Act.

The court found that the shares and options were compensatory benefits derived from a transaction concerning the partnership and from the use of a partnership business connection.

The respondent was ordered to account to his former partners for their proportionate share of the benefits realized.

The appellant submitted the lowest acceptable bid in response to a Request for Proposals for a computer cabling project.

Due to a budget reduction, the respondent school board negotiated with the three lowest bidders instead of solely with the appellant, ultimately awarding the contract to another bidder.

The appellant sued for breach of the duty of fairness and good faith.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the board was permitted to conduct wider negotiations and that any differing treatment during negotiations did not affect the outcome.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action arising from the birth of a child who suffered severe brain damage due to oxygen deprivation during a breech delivery.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by failing to make an explicit finding on causation, misapprehending expert evidence regarding fetal monitoring, and failing to apply the 'Breech Plus Rule' for the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to explicitly determine causation did not affect the trial judge's conclusion that the obstetrician met the standard of care.

The court found the trial judge's factual findings regarding the obstetrician's decisions and the rejection of an absolute rule for breech deliveries were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant was injured in a collision between his all-terrain vehicle and the respondent's pickup truck on a gravel road.

A jury found the appellant 100% liable and assessed damages at $566,634.

The appellant appealed the liability finding, and the respondent cross-appealed the damages assessment.

The Court of Appeal found the jury's verdict on liability unreasonable, as the evidence overwhelmingly showed the respondent failed to leave one-half of the road clear, creating a prima facie case of negligence.

The court ordered a new trial on liability only and dismissed the cross-appeal regarding damages.

The respondent moved to quash an appeal from a motions judge's refusal to grant judgment on an allegedly accepted offer to settle under Rule 49.09, arguing the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that the order was final because it fully and finally disposed of the new lis created by the alleged settlement.

The appellant insurer appealed a trial judgment finding the respondent entitled to disability benefits under a policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was reasonably based on the medical evidence and the respondent's testimony, and that the trial judge did not err in refusing to consider mitigation.

The respondent's cross-appeal was allowed to vary the commencement date for pre-judgment interest.

Class counsel brought a motion to quash appeals filed by the defendants and intervenors from an order approving class counsel fees under s. 32 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellants had no standing to appeal because they were not parties to the fee agreements, the settlement agreement did not reserve their rights to participate in fixing fees, and their rights were not affected by the fee approval order.

The appeals were quashed.

The appellant insurer sought to add Livent Inc. and several of its directors as defendants by counterclaim in an action brought by outside directors to enforce a Directors and Officers Liability policy.

The insurer also sought to lift a CCAA stay of proceedings against Livent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, adding Livent as a party because the insurer was entitled to seek a declaration regarding the policy's validity against the policyholder.

However, the court refused to add the additional directors, finding it would unnecessarily complicate the discrete legal issue of coverage for the innocent outside directors.

The CCAA stay was lifted to the extent necessary to give effect to the order.

Appeal from a judgment requiring a homeowner to pay outstanding lumber invoices used in the construction of his residence after dismissal of a construction lien claim.

The appellant argued the evidence did not prove the lumber was ordered or delivered, and further argued he was merely an undisclosed principal not liable for unauthorized acts of his project manager and related entities.

The court deferred to the trial judge's factual findings on delivery and ordering, and held the appellant was liable for earlier invoices within the agents' actual authority and for later invoices through ratification once the agency relationship had become disclosed though the principal remained unnamed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged an order rejecting their allegation that the respondent had committed perjury in prior trial evidence.

The court held that the taped conversation relied upon did not establish, directly or by reasonable inference, that the respondent had deliberately misled the trial court.

The proposed affidavit evidence was not fresh because it could have been adduced on the motion, and in any event did not provide clear and cogent evidence of perjury or fraud.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.