Administrative Law - ONCA

The appellant was charged with offences under the Taxation Act, 2007 and brought a certiorari application that was dismissed.

After filing a notice of appeal from that dismissal, the appellant entered guilty pleas and was sentenced.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal was moot, as any decision on the certiorari ruling would have no impact on the guilty pleas, convictions, and sentence.

The appeal was dismissed without adjudication on the merits.

The appellant's application for a publication ban on his full name was also dismissed, as he failed to establish that court openness posed a serious risk to an important public interest.

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's order dismissing her request for an extension of time to cross-appeal a Divisional Court decision that had upheld the Law Society of Ontario's invalidation of her barrister examination result as procedurally fair and reasonable.

The moving party had been among candidates whose exam results were voided following an investigation into widespread cheating.

The panel held that the motion judge made no error in finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the procedural protections sought were ancillary to a right to a hearing that this court had previously held was not required, and candidates receiving a lesser sanction could not be accorded greater procedural fairness than those who faced more serious sanctions.

The motion was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant subject to a vexatious litigant order, sought to abandon her appeal of an order dismissing her application for relief from candidacy ineligibility under the Canada Elections Act, and sought costs of the appeal against the Chief Electoral Officer.

The appeal was rendered moot after Elections Canada reinterpreted s. 65(i) of the Act and removed the moving party from the ineligibility list.

The court addressed whether a grant of leave under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to commence a proceeding extends to appeals, holding that it does not and a fresh grant of leave is required.

Despite the moving party's failure to obtain leave, the court granted leave in the exceptional circumstances.

However, costs were declined, as the Agency's prior interpretation was reasonable and its proactive reinterpretation advanced Charter values.

The Law Society of Ontario (LSO) appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed its administrative decision to void the registrations of 20 licensing candidates implicated in a cheating scandal.

The Divisional Court had found the LSO breached procedural fairness by not holding oral hearings before voiding the registrations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court misapplied the Baker factors and conflated the LSO's administrative licensing functions with its disciplinary good character functions.

The Court held that the written process provided by the LSO, which included disclosure and multiple opportunities to respond, satisfied the duty of procedural fairness.

The Court also admitted new evidence and found the Divisional Court breached procedural fairness by making costs orders without allowing submissions.

The appellant municipality appealed a Divisional Court order that quashed an Ontario Land Tribunal decision assuming jurisdiction over a dispute regarding a municipal servicing agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that the Tribunal's decision was interlocutory, as it only assumed jurisdiction on a prima facie basis and deferred the final determination of forum to the Superior Court.

Because the Ontario Land Tribunal Act only permits appeals of final decisions, the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The appeal was allowed and the Tribunal's order was restored.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the court issued a costs endorsement.

The successful respondent was awarded its costs of the appeal.

The court ordered the appellant to pay the respondent costs in the all-inclusive amount of $10,000.

The moving party sought a panel review of a decision dismissing her motion for an extension of time to perfect her motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court had previously dismissed her appeal of five Licence Appeal Tribunal decisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, agreeing with the motion judge that despite meeting the first four factors for an extension of time, the justice of the case weighed against granting leave because the proposed appeal lacked merit and general public importance.

The appellant, a non-profit organization, sought public interest standing to bring nine applications for judicial review challenging decisions made by the Ontario Integrity Commissioner under the Lobbyists Registration Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the applications, finding the appellant lacked standing.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the applications did not raise a serious justiciable issue as they merely challenged individual exercises of discretion rather than statutory interpretation.

The Court also agreed that the applications were not a reasonable and effective means to bring the issues before the courts, as they would conflict with the statutory scheme and its strict confidentiality provisions.

The moving party sought a panel review of a single judge's order that dismissed her request for an extension of time to review a previous order denying leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no error in principle in the single judge's decision that the moving party failed to provide evidence of intention to review, lacked an explanation for the delay, and that the underlying proposed appeal lacked merit.

The moving party, a surgeon whose hospital privileges were not renewed in 2016, brought a motion to set aside a single judge's order dismissing his motion to set aside a Registrar's dismissal for delay.

The responding hospitals requested a dismissal under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal found the moving party exhibited hallmarks of a vexatious litigant by exhausting all rights of review and attempting to re-determine settled issues.

The motion was dismissed as an abuse of process and a collateral attack on underlying decisions, with costs awarded to the responding parties.

The appellant municipality was charged with contraventions under the Endangered Species Act for road maintenance activities that allegedly harmed an endangered butterfly species.

The municipality sought declaratory relief stating that its road maintenance obligations under the Municipal Act superseded the Endangered Species Act, exempting it from compliance.

The application judge dismissed the application as premature and not ripe for adjudication, noting the municipality had not attempted to obtain a permit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the finding that the issues were not justiciable and should be addressed either through the permit process or in the ongoing quasi-criminal prosecution.

The appellants, several local governments, appealed the dismissal of their application for declarations and injunctions against Canadian National Railway Company (CN) regarding the construction of an intermodal hub.

The appellants sought to compel CN to comply with over 65 provincial and municipal laws.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding that the majority of the claims lacked a factual foundation and were premature, and that the three specific bylaws at issue impaired the core of the federal railway undertaking under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the construction and operation of the intermodal hub is a vital part of a federal railway undertaking and that the municipal bylaws requiring official plan amendments impaired this core federal power.

The appeal and the application for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The appellant, a justice of the peace, wrote a newspaper article criticizing the conduct of Crown prosecutors in bail courts.

A Hearing Panel found she committed judicial misconduct and recommended her removal from office, finding she was irremediably biased against Crown prosecutors.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the Panel's finding of bias was unreasonable as it relied on a subjective test and lacked evidentiary support.

The Court further held that the recommendation for removal was grossly disproportionate, failed to properly apply the Doré framework to balance the appellant's Charter right to freedom of expression, and ignored mitigating factors.

The appeal was allowed, and a reprimand with a 30-day suspension without pay was substituted.

The appellants, two churches and their members, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's COVID-19 regulations that imposed capacity restrictions on indoor and outdoor religious gatherings.

The motion judge found that the regulations infringed the appellants' freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter but were justified under s. 1.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in her treatment of expert evidence, her refusal to use hindsight evidence, her decision not to conduct separate analyses for other s. 2 Charter rights, and her s. 1 justification analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's deferential approach to the government's response to an unprecedented public health emergency, her application of the precautionary principle, or her conclusion that the measures were minimally impairing and proportionate.

The appellant abattoir owner sued the provincial government for negligence, trespass, and conversion after Ministry officials occupied its plant for 19 months following an investigation into illegal meat processing.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding no duty of care and no breach of the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the Ministry owed a duty of care to the targeted suspect, breached the standard of care by unreasonably prolonging its occupation of the plant and allowing meat to spoil, and caused the appellant's inability to sell the plant.

Damages of $3,520,000 were awarded for loss of enterprise value.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a class action against Ontario for the early cancellation of the Basic Income Pilot Program.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the certification judge erred by engaging in a merits-based analysis of the breach of contract claim rather than applying the 'plain and obvious' test under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act.

However, the Court upheld the dismissal of the negligence, breach of undertaking, and Charter s. 7 claims, finding that the government's decision to cancel the program was a core policy decision immune from negligence liability and that the Charter claim failed to plead the requisite principles of fundamental justice.

The Ministry of Health appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review of Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decisions.

The Tribunal had found that the Ministry engaged in systemic gender discrimination against Ontario midwives by abandoning equitable compensation principles established in 1993, leading to a significant compensation gap between midwives and community health clinic physicians.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the standard of review for the Tribunal's decisions is reasonableness, even post-Vavilov.

The Court held that the Adjudicator's liability and remedy decisions were reasonable, as they revealed a rational chain of analysis supported by the evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the Ontario Ombudsman.

The motion judge proceeded in the appellant's absence after finding he knew of the motion and chose not to participate.

The motion judge dismissed the action because the respondent was immune from proceedings absent bad faith, and the appellant provided no evidence of bad faith.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's discretionary decision to proceed or in granting summary judgment, and dismissed the appeal.

The moving party sought review of a single judge’s refusal to extend the time to file a notice of motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court’s dismissal of an application for judicial review of a social benefits tribunal decision.

The Court of Appeal applied the leave to appeal framework from Sault Dock Co. v. Sault St. Marie (City).

It held that the proposed appeal did not raise a question of law or an issue of public importance and was of interest only to the parties.

Because the proposed appeal lacked merit, the interests of justice did not support granting an extension of time.

The motion was dismissed without costs.

The appellant owned two handguns registered in the 1980s.

Under the new Firearms Act, he had until December 31, 2002, to re-register them as grandfathered s. 12(6) handguns.

He failed to do so, and his registrations expired.

In 2007, he applied to re-register the handguns, but the Registrar refused in 2009 because he no longer held a valid licence with s. 12(6) privileges.

The provincial court and superior court upheld the refusal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant lost his grandfathered status by failing to continuously hold a registration certificate, and was therefore ineligible for a licence and registration under the Act.