COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

DATE: 20260209

DOCKET: M55800 (COA-24-CV-0319)

Sossin, Favreau and Wilson JJ.A.

In the Matter of the Receivership of 2442931 Ontario Inc.

BETWEEN

Unity Health Toronto

Moving Party (Responding Party/Respondent)

and

2442931 Ontario Inc.

Responding Party (Respondent)

AND BETWEEN

Bank of Montreal, as Administrative Agent

Applicant (Moving Party/Appellant)

and

Unity Health Toronto

Respondent (Responding Party/Respondent)

Matthew P. Gottlieb, Harvey G. Chaiton and Darren L. Marr, for the moving party

Sarit E. Batner, Andrew Kalamut and Michael (Ruofan) Cui, for the responding party

Heard: August 27, 2025

On review of the order of Justice Steve A. Coroza of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, dated February 7, 2025, with reasons reported at 2025 ONCA 93 , 176 O.R. (3d) 37.

Favreau J.A.:

A. Introduction

[ 1 ] The moving party, Bank of Montreal, as Administrative Agent for the Lenders (the “Agent”), seeks to appeal two orders made by Kimmel J., [1] in a decision reported at 2024 ONSC 1333 . The first order lifted a stay of proceedings for the purpose of allowing the responding party, Unity Health Toronto (“Unity Health”), [2] to terminate the Project Agreement concerning the redevelopment of St. Michael’s Hospital in Toronto (the “Lift Stay Order”). The second order dismissed an application brought by the Agent seeking a declaration that a stage of construction defined as “Tower Interim Completion” (“TIC”) in the Project Agreement had been achieved or, alternatively, an order compelling Unity Health to take all remaining steps to achieve TIC (the “Dismissal Order”). The parties agreed that the Agent can appeal the Dismissal Order as of right as a final order of a Superior Court judge under s. 6(1) (b) of the Courts of Justice Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. However, the parties do not agree about whether the Lift Stay Order can be appealed as of right under s. 193 (c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (“ BIA ”) or whether leave was required under s. 193(e) of the Act.

[ 2 ] The Agent brought a motion to a single judge of this court for a determination that it can appeal the Lift Stay Order as of right or, alternatively, for an order granting it leave to appeal. The chambers judge [3] found that the Lift Stay Order could not be appealed as of right because it is procedural in nature and does not “directly” involve property exceeding $10,000 in value. The chambers judge also denied leave to appeal the Lift Stay Order. The Agent now seeks to review the chambers judge’s decision, arguing that he erred in finding that it cannot appeal the Lift Stay Order as of right or, alternatively, by denying leave to appeal.

[ 3 ] I would dismiss the motion. I see no reversible error in the chambers judge’s determination that the Agent cannot appeal the Lift Stay Order as of right. He followed well settled principles that s. 193 (c) of the BIA is to be interpreted narrowly. In addition, I find that this court does not have jurisdiction to review the chambers judge’s dismissal of the motion for leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of the BIA because there are no exceptional circumstances in this case warranting the panel’s interference.

B. Background

[ 4 ] The factual background to this matter is complex. I only set out the background necessary to give context to the motion.

1. Underlying receivership proceedings

[ 5 ] The underlying dispute arises from the financing of a redevelopment project involving St. Michael’s Hospital in Toronto. The original project included the construction of a 17-storey tower.

[ 6 ] In 2015, the project was awarded to 2442931 Ontario Inc. (“ProjectCo”), which was an affiliate of Bondfield Construction Company Limited (“Bondfield”). ProjectCo and Unity Health entered into an agreement pursuant to which ProjectCo was to design, build and finance the project for a fixed price (the “Project Agreement”).

[ 7 ] In turn, ProjectCo entered into a lending agreement, referred to as the “Credit Agreement”, with a syndicate of lenders (the “Lenders”). The Bank of Montreal is the administrative agent for the Lenders. Under the Credit Agreement, the Lenders were to incrementally advance a construction loan of approximately $230 million.

[ 8 ] Pursuant to the Project Agreement and Credit Agreement, ProjectCo obtained a performance bond and a labour and materials payment bond from Zurich Insurance Company.

[ 9 ] Under the Project Agreement, Unity Health agreed to pay ProjectCo for the project in two instalments. The first instalment was referred to as the Tower Interim Completion Payment (the “TIC Payment”). The TIC Payment was for $173,274,150 less permitted set-offs, and was to be paid to ProjectCo when ProjectCo achieved TIC, a specified milestone in completing the tower.

[ 10 ] ProjectCo also entered into a Lenders’ Direct Agreement (the “LDA”) with Unity Health and the Lenders. The Project Agreement and LDA set out the rights of the parties if ProjectCo defaulted under the Project Agreement. In the event of default, the Lenders had the right to “step-in” and assume the rights and obligations of ProjectCo under the Project Agreement. If the Lenders did not exercise their right to “step-in” within a specified time after delivery of a default notice by Unity Health to the Agent, Unity Health was entitled to terminate the Project Agreement. Upon termination, Unity Health was required to pay the Agent any applicable compensation provided for in the Project Agreement.

[ 11 ] In August 2018, ProjectCo’s affiliate became insolvent and ProjectCo was in default under the Project Agreement. In November 2018, Unity Health delivered an indebtedness notice to ProjectCo and the Lenders, giving the Lenders an opportunity to exercise their “step-in” rights. At that point, the requirements for certification of the TIC Payment had not been met. The Lenders chose not to “step-in”.

[ 12 ] In December 2018, the Agent obtained an order placing ProjectCo into receivership. The order had the effect of staying all proceedings against ProjectCo, including Unity Health’s ability to terminate the Project Agreement.

[ 13 ] The receiver called on Zurich’s performance bond. Originally, Zurich elected to complete the project, paying trades for the next twelve months. In August 2019, Zurich decided to discontinue its involvement in the project. In April 2020, Zurich brought an application to rescind the bonds, alleging fraud and collusion in the procurement process.

[ 14 ] In the meantime, in December 2019, Unity Health obtained an order lifting the stay of proceedings for the limited purpose of allowing it to hire contractors to carry out the works required to achieve TIC. The stay was lifted without prejudice to Unity Health’s right to apply to the court to exercise its right to terminate the Project Agreement.

[ 15 ] By the time the motion below was argued, construction of the patient tower had proceeded to the point where it was occupied and in use, but it was not completed to the point that TIC had been achieved. The redevelopment work was ongoing under a new contract with a different construction manager. However, the project was altered such that it no longer included all the steps contemplated by the TIC milestone.

2. Motion judge’s decision

[ 16 ] In April 2022, the Agent brought an application for a declaration that TIC had been achieved or, alternatively, for an order that all steps required to achieve TIC be completed and that Unity Health make the TIC payment to the Agent (the “TIC application”). In August 2022, the Agent brought a motion asking that it be assigned ProjectCo’s rights to enforce and recover the TIC Payment from Unity Health, or alternatively that the receiver join the TIC application as a co-applicant.

[ 17 ] In July 2022, Unity Health brought a motion to lift the stay of proceedings for the purpose of allowing it to terminate the Project Agreement. Unity Health then brought a motion to dismiss the Agent’s application and motion, in part on the basis that the Agent lacked standing.

[ 18 ] In her Lift Stay Order, the motion judge granted Unity Health’s motion to lift the stay of proceedings for the purpose of allowing it to terminate the Project Agreement. In her Dismissal Order, the motion judge also granted Unity Health’s motion to dismiss the Agent’s application and motion, based in part on her finding that the Agent did not have standing to enforce the right to payment of the TIC.

3. Chambers judge’s decision

[ 19 ] The Agent commenced appeals from the Lift Stay Order and the Dismissal Order. The parties agreed that the Agent can appeal the Dismissal Order as of right, but disagreed over whether it can appeal the Lift Stay Order as of right. The Agent brought a motion to the chambers judge for a determination that it could appeal the Lift Stay Order as of right pursuant to s. 193 (c) of the BIA or, alternatively, that it be granted leave to appeal the Lift Stay Order under s. 193(e) of the BIA . The chambers judge dismissed the motion.

[ 20 ] The chambers judge concluded that the Agent could not appeal the Lift Stay Order under s. 193 (c) of the BIA for three reasons: (1) the Lift Stay Order was procedural in nature, (2) the Lift Stay Order did not directly put any of ProjectCo’s property in play, and (3) the Lift Stay Order did not result in a direct loss to the Lenders.

[ 21 ] In finding that the Lift Stay Order was procedural, the chambers judge first quoted the relevant portions of the order:

2. THIS COURT ORDERS that the stay of proceedings against ProjectCo, granted pursuant to the Receivership Order, is hereby lifted for the purpose of permitting Unity [Health] to exercise the remedy pursuant to section 34.3(a) of the Project Agreement to terminate the Project Agreement.

3. THIS COURT DECLARES that the Project Agreement is terminated effective as of the date this issued and entered Order, together with the Notice of Termination appended as Schedule A to this Order, is served on counsel to the Receiver and counsel to the Administrative Agent, and upon such service, the written notice provisions of the Project Agreement and Lenders’ Direct Agreement will be satisfied. [Same emphasis added as in chambers judge’s decision.]

[ 22 ] The chambers judge then reasoned that “the order is procedural in nature because it simply ‘lift[s]’ the stay for the purpose of permitting [Unity Health] to exercise its rights under the Project Agreement.” He did not accept that the Lift Stay Order terminated the Project Agreement, finding instead that “[a]lthough paragraph 3 declares that the Project Agreement is terminated as of the date of service of the order and notice of termination, this declaration simply outlines when and how the agreement may be terminated, not that the agreement is in fact terminated by the order” (emphasis in original).

[ 23 ] The motion judge further found that the Lift Stay Order did not “directly” involve property exceeding $10,000, reasoning, in part, that the effect of the Lift Stay Order is to deny the Lenders a chance to obtain the TIC Payment rather than denying the actual TIC Payment:

Even if the [Agent] was successful on appeal of the Lift Stay Order, its success would not guarantee its recovery of the TIC payment. At best, the [Agent] would have the opportunity to sue [Unity Health] for the TIC payment. The order’s effect, then, is to deny the [Agent] the chance to try to obtain the TIC payment, not to deny the [Agent] the actual TIC payment due. [Emphasis in original.]

[ 24 ] Finally, the chambers judge found that the Lift Stay Order does not directly result in a loss because the purported loss is speculative and because that loss would result from the terms of the Project Agreement and not from the Lift Stay Order. The chambers judge concluded that:

In sum, any loss to the [Agent] is a result of the parties’ respective contractual rights under the Project Agreement. The Lift Stay Order does not determine the [Agent]’s right to the TIC payment; it simply lifts the stay and lets the parties’ preexisting contractual rights under the Project Agreement play out.

[ 25 ] Having found that there was no direct right of appeal, the chambers judge also denied leave to appeal. He reached this conclusion based on his findings that: (1) the proposed appeal is not prima facie meritorious because, in lifting the stay, the motion judge was exercising discretion to which this court owes deference; (2) the proposed appeal does not raise issues of general importance because the “appeal is from a decision about specific contracts in a unique set of circumstances”; and (3) further delay in terminating the Project Agreement will delay progress of the insolvency proceedings.

C. Issues and analysis

[ 26 ] The Agent seeks to review the chambers judge’s order. The Agent submits that the chambers judge erred in finding that it could not appeal the Lift Stay Order as of right or, alternatively, that the chambers judge erred in refusing to grant leave to appeal. The Agent emphasizes that, in effect, the chambers judge’s decision will not only prevent an appeal from the Lift Stay Order but will also make the appeal from the Dismissal Order moot; if the Project Agreement is terminated, there is no basis for the Lenders to pursue the TIC Payment.

[ 27 ] Unity Health’s primary position on the motion is that a panel of this court does not have jurisdiction to review the decision of a single judge finding that there is no appeal as of right under s. 193 (c) of the BIA or dismissing a motion for leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of the BIA . Alternatively, Unity Health submits that the chambers judge did not make any reviewable errors in finding that there is no appeal as of right from the Lift Stay Order and in denying leave to appeal.

[ 28 ] As a preliminary issue, I address this court’s jurisdiction to review the decision of a single judge under s. 193 of the BIA determining that leave to appeal is required and denying leave to appeal. I then address the chambers judge’s determination that leave to appeal is required in this case and, finally, his decision to deny leave.

1. Jurisdiction of the court

[ 29 ] As indicated above, Unity Health takes the position that a panel of this court does not have jurisdiction to review the chambers judge’s decision. I only agree with Unity Health in part. As I explain below, a panel of this court has jurisdiction to review the chambers judge’s determination that there is no appeal as of right under s. 193 of the BIA . However, a panel of this court only has jurisdiction to review the chambers judge’s decision denying leave under s. 193(e) of the BIA in exceptional circumstances.

[ 30 ] Section 193 of the BIA sets out the circumstances under which an appeal lies to this court from a decision under the Act. Sections 193 (a) to (d) provide a direct right of appeal in enumerated circumstances. Section 193 (e) provides for a right of appeal “in any other case by leave of a judge of the Court of Appeal”. A single judge of this court can decide the issue of whether there is an appeal as of right under ss. 193(a) to (d) of the BIA on a motion for directions: Cardillo v. Medcap Real Estate Holdings Inc. , 2023 ONCA 852 , at para. 25 , motion to review dismissed, 2024 ONCA 278 ; Global Royalties Limited v. Brook , 2016 ONCA 50 , at para. 17 . [4] A single judge can also decide a motion for leave to appeal as directed by the language of s. 193(e) of the BIA .

[ 31 ] Pursuant to s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act , a panel of this court has jurisdiction to review the decision of a single judge deciding a motion for directions regarding the issue of whether an appeal can proceed as of right under ss. 193 (a) to (d) of the BIA : Hillmount Capital Inc. v. Pizale , 2021 ONCA 364 , 462 D.L.R. (4th) 228, at para. 18 . However, a panel reviewing such a decision owes deference to the chambers judge’s determination that leave is required. The panel will only interfere if the chambers judge failed to identify the applicable principles, erred in principle or reached an unreasonable result: Hillmount , at para. 18.

[ 32 ] In contrast, as a general proposition, the decision of a single judge on a leave motion under s. 193 (e) of the BIA is not subject to review by a panel of this court: Business Development Bank of Canada v. Aventura II Properties Inc ., 2016 ONCA 408 , 132 O.R. (3d) 159, at paras. 3-4 , leave to appeal refused, [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 280; Ting (Re) , 2022 ONCA 258 , 98 C.B.R. (6th) 199, at paras. 2-3 . Despite this jurisdictional constraint, however, a panel of this court may review the decision of a single judge dismissing a motion for leave to appeal under s. 193(e) of the BIA in very exceptional circumstances. In McEwen (Re), 2020 ONCA 511 , 452 D.L.R. (4th) 248, the court held that a panel may review such a decision where the chambers judge “mistakenly declines jurisdiction”, such as where the chambers judge did not reach a decision “on the merits of [the] leave to appeal motion”: at paras. 70-71.

[ 33 ] Accordingly, below, I first address the issue of whether the chambers judge made any reviewable errors when he found that leave to appeal is required. I then address whether this motion meets the exceptional circumstances that would justify a review from the chambers judge’s refusal of leave to appeal.

2. The motion judge did not err in finding that leave was required

[ 34 ] The Agent submits that the motion judge erred in finding that it does not have a right to appeal the Lift Stay Order. I disagree.

[ 35 ] The Agent relies on s. 193 (c) of the BIA in support of its position that it can appeal the Lift Stay Order as of right. Section 193(c) of the BIA provides that an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from an order or decision “if the property involved in the appeal exceeds in value ten thousand dollars”.

[ 36 ] As recognized by the chambers judge, this right of appeal has consistently been interpreted narrowly: North House Foods Ltd. (Re) , 2025 ONCA 563 , 20 C.B.R. (7th) 1, at para. 28 ; Hillmount , at para. 28; Enroute Imports Inc. (Re) , 2016 ONCA 247 , 35 C.B.R. (6th) 1, at para. 5 ; Romspen Investment Corporation v. Courtice Auto Wreckers Limited , 2017 ONCA 301 , 138 O.R. (3d) 373, at para. 22 , leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 238. In Enroute , at para. 5, the court explained that the narrow approach derives from the “broad nature” of the automatic stay imposed by s. 195 of the BIA that applies to appeals to this court under the Act.

[ 37 ] Based on this narrow approach, this court has identified three types of orders that do not fall within the scope of the right of appeal under s. 193 (c), namely orders that: (1) are procedural in nature, (2) do not bring into play the value of the debtor’s property, or (3) do not result in a loss: North House Foods , at para. 28, citing 2403177 Ontario Inc. v. Bending Lake Iron Group Limited , 2016 ONCA 225 , 369 D.L.R. (4th) 635, at para. 53 ; Hillmount , at para. 25.

[ 38 ] In this case, the chambers judge explicitly set out these principles. He then carefully reviewed the nature and effect of the Lift Stay Order and concluded that it was procedural in nature, that it did not bring into play the value of the property and that it did not directly result in a loss. The chambers judge did not fail to identify the applicable principles, err in principle or reach an unreasonable result. On the contrary, his reasoning and conclusion were rooted in the applicable legal principles and the record.

[ 39 ] First, on its face, as found by the chambers judge, there is no doubt that the Lift Stay Order is procedural in nature. It simply lifts the stay of proceedings for the purpose of allowing Unity Health to terminate the Project Agreement. The Lift Stay Order does not terminate the Project Agreement. It restores Unity Health’s power to do so. That power ultimately flows from the Project Agreement itself, not from the Lift Stay Order.

[ 40 ] Second, I see no error in the chambers judge’s determination that the Lift Stay Order did not bring into play the value of property. In reaching this conclusion, the chambers judge considered the nexus between lifting the stay and any loss the Lenders may suffer. He found that there was no direct nexus because, even if the Agent succeeded in appealing the Lift Stay Order, “[a]t best, the [Agent] would have the opportunity to sue [Unity Health] for the TIC payment. The order’s effect, then, is to deny the [Agent] the chance to try to obtain the TIC payment, not to deny the [Agent] the actual TIC payment due” (emphasis in original). I see no error in this reasoning. The motion judge’s Dismissal Order found that the Lenders did not have standing to seek the TIC Payment. Even if the Agent succeeded in appealing this determination, it would still have to establish that Unity Health had an obligation to make the TIC Payment. Accordingly, there is a far distance between keeping the stay in place and the Lenders receiving the TIC Payment.

[ 41 ] Third, for similar reasons, I see no error in the chambers judge’s conclusion that the Lift Stay Order does not result in a loss. Even if the Agent succeeded in appealing the Lift Stay Order, it would also have to succeed in appealing the Dismissal Order and in establishing its entitlement to the TIC Payment as well as the quantum of the payment. As the chambers judge stated, relying on Hillmount , at para. 42, “a determination of whether an order falls under s. 193 (c) requires a critical examination of the evidence – bald assertions of a $90 million loss are not enough.”

[ 42 ] The Agent argues that the chambers judge failed to appreciate that the Lift Stay Order effectively renders its appeal from the Dismissal Order moot. If Unity Health terminates the Project Agreement in accordance with the Lift Stay Order, the Agent will no longer be able to pursue the TIC Payment, which the Agent claims is worth approximately $90 million. There is no basis for concluding that the chambers judge did not appreciate the effect of his order on the Agent’s other appeal. More importantly, the impact of the Lift Stay Order on the other appeal does not transform what was clearly a procedural order into an order involving property that exceeds $10,000 in value. As recognized by the chambers judge, even if the Agent were to succeed on the other appeal and were permitted to pursue a claim against Unity Health for the TIC Payment, it would simply have a “chance” of success.

[ 43 ] The Agent also argues that the chambers judge erred when he used the word “directly” in stating that the Lift Stay Order did not “ directly put any property of the debtor into play” or “ directly result in loss” (emphasis added). The Agent submits that the chambers judge improperly imported a requirement that the loss be direct or that the appeal directly involve the debtor’s property, and that this was an error in principle. However, the motion judge’s use of the word “directly” is supported by this court’s case law. In Enroute , at para. 5, this court stated that an appeal under s. 193 (c) of the BIA must “ directly involve property exceeding $10,000” (emphasis added); see also Proex Logistics Inc. (Re) , 2025 ONCA 832 , at para. 49 ; Romspen , at para. 22; Crate Marine Sales Limited (Re) , 2016 ONCA 140 , 33 C.B.R. (6th) 169, at para. 7 . In any event, the Agent’s focus on the use of the word “directly” is misplaced. It is evident that the chambers judge made no errors in principle nor is his decision unreasonable. He had proper regard to the applicable legal principles requiring him to apply the right of appeal under s. 193 (c) narrowly, which he did.

[ 44 ] Accordingly, I see no basis for interfering with the chambers judge’s conclusion that there is no direct right of appeal from the Lift Stay Order.

3. There is no basis to review the chambers judge’s denial of leave

[ 45 ] The Agent submits that the chambers judge erred in refusing leave to appeal from the Lift Stay Order pursuant to s. 193 (e) of the BIA . As addressed above, the panel may only assume jurisdiction to review the chambers judge’s decision denying leave in exceptional circumstances.

[ 46 ] As indicated above, in McEwen , at paras. 70-71, the court described the exceptional circumstances that might justify intervention by a panel as including where the chambers judge “mistakenly declines jurisdiction”, for instance if the chambers judge did not reach a decision “on the merits of [the] leave to appeal motion”.

[ 47 ] There is no basis for making such a finding in this case. In dismissing leave to appeal, the chambers judge articulated the well-established test for leave to appeal under s. 193 (e) of the BIA set out in Business Development Bank of Canada v. Pine Tree Resorts Inc ., 2013 ONCA 282 , 115 O.R. (3d) 617, at para. 29 , which requires the court to look at whether the proposed appeal:

(a) Raises an issue that is of general importance to the practice in bankruptcy/insolvency matters or to the administration of justice as a whole, and is one that this court should therefore consider and address;

(b) Is prima facie meritorious; and

(c) Would unduly hinder the progress of the bankruptcy/insolvency proceedings.

[ 48 ] The chambers judge then applied each of these factors to the circumstances of this case. He found that the proposed appeal does not raise issues of general importance because it concerns “a decision about specific contracts in a unique set of circumstances”. He addressed the merits of the proposed appeal, finding that the Agent “would face a difficult task in convincing a panel of this court to interfere with [the motions judge’s] decision to lift the stay”. He also addressed the impact that the appeal would have on the progress of the receivership, concluding that delay in terminating the Project Agreement would delay the progress of the insolvency proceedings, given that the Project Agreement is ProjectCo’s only asset.

[ 49 ] While the Agent may not agree with the chambers judge’s analysis and may be persuaded that it contains serious errors, it has not demonstrated that the chambers judge declined jurisdiction in the sense that he applied the wrong test or that he did not decide the issue of leave on the merits. On the contrary, the chambers judge clearly decided not to grant leave based on an application of the correct test to the circumstances of the case.

[ 50 ] The Agent argues that the chambers judge failed to recognize that his refusal to grant the appeal will render its appeal from the Dismissal Order moot. In other words, if Unity Health is allowed to terminate the Project Agreement, the Agent will no longer be able to pursue any rights it claims as under the Project Agreement. The Agent submits that the chambers judge’s alleged failure to recognize this issue amounts to the type of exceptional circumstances that warrants the panel’s intervention. I disagree. Even if the chambers judge had failed to address an issue raised by the Agent, that does not amount to declining jurisdiction or a failure to apply the correct test. In any event, while the chambers judge did not address this issue explicitly in his reasons for dismissing leave to appeal, it is evident from his reasons as a whole that he was aware of this issue. Specifically, when describing the parties’ positions on the motion, the chambers’ judge explicitly recited the Agent’s concern “that if it cannot appeal the Lift Stay Order, its appeal of the Dismissal Order will be rendered moot because the respondent will terminate the Project Agreement once the stay is lifted and any claim to the TIC payment will be extinguished.”

[ 51 ] There are no exceptional circumstances that would justify this panel’s interference.

D. Disposition

[ 52 ] I would dismiss the motion to review the chambers judge’s decision.

[ 53 ] As agreed between the parties, I would award costs to Unity Health in the amount of $30,000 all inclusive.

Released: February 9, 2026 “L.S.”

“L. Favreau J.A.”

“I agree. Sossin J.A.”

“I agree. D.A. Wilson J.A.”

[1] I refer to Kimmel J. as the “motion judge” throughout these reasons.

[2] Unity Health was formerly known as St. Michael’s Hospital. For clarity, I refer to the responding party as Unity Health throughout these reasons.

[3] To avoid confusion with the orders granted by Kimmel J., who was the motion judge below, I refer to Coroza J.A. as the “chambers judge”.

[4] However, a motion to quash an appeal brought under ss. 193 (a) to (d) of the BIA must be brought to a full panel of the court because a single judge does not have jurisdiction to quash an appeal: Courts of Justice Act , s. 7(3).