ONCA 2025

The appellant sought a stay of execution of a possession order pending appeal of a summary judgment decision.

The property was mortgaged to Equitable Bank for $610,000.

The appellant defaulted on payments in September 2023 and failed to comply with a forbearance agreement.

The lower court granted summary judgment for possession and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for stay, finding no serious issue to be tried on appeal, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the stay.

The appellant had admitted default and the mortgage terms clearly permitted the lender to demand full payment and take possession.

The appellant suffered a catastrophic spinal cord injury in a cycling accident on a dirt path adjacent to Stone Church Road in Hamilton.

The City brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal under s. 44(8) of the Municipal Act, 2001, which exempts municipalities from liability for damages caused by construction, obstruction, or erection on untravelled portions of highways.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the accident occurred on an untravelled portion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge applied the wrong legal test.

The correct test requires determining whether the portion of highway was commonly and habitually used by the public for travel, not whether such use was reasonably foreseeable.

The court found the dirt path was commonly and regularly used by pedestrians and cyclists and therefore constituted a travelled portion of the highway, placing it outside the statutory exemption.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement between the respondent mortgagee and the appellants regarding mortgage enforcement proceedings.

The appellants argued the settlement agreement was unenforceable because the mortgagee failed to comply with notice requirements under section 244(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act before enforcing its mortgage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the appellants had voluntarily relinquished any claim based on section 244 when they entered into the settlement agreement with full knowledge of that claim, having previously raised it in their statement of defence.

The court found no basis for appellate intervention and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal a motion judge's decision striking her amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The claim alleged breach of confidence arising from the disclosure of a settlement email to the Crown, which led to the withdrawal of criminal sexual assault charges against her former business partner.

The motion judge found the email contained unambiguous impropriety as it offered to withdraw criminal charges in exchange for money, was not protected by settlement privilege, and caused no compensable harm.

The Court of Appeal denied the extension of time, finding no merit to the proposed appeal and no reversible error in the motion judge's analysis.

The appellant, a property developer, purchased contaminated land in 1990 and commenced an action in January 2004 seeking damages for soil contamination.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding the action was statute-barred because the appellant had actual knowledge of the contamination by April 1991, triggering a six-year limitation period that had expired long before the action was commenced.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in principle, made palpable and overriding errors of fact, and failed to consider whether its continuing nuisance claim was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's knowledge of contamination in 1991, albeit to an uncertain extent, was sufficient to trigger the limitation period, and the appellant was not required to know the full extent of the contamination for the period to begin running.

The appellants, David Hui and Musab Saboon, appealed their convictions for kidnapping and first-degree murder of Lee Chiodo, as well as Hui's sentence for kidnapping.

Both were convicted after a trial by judge alone and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's credibility and reliability analysis of Marshall Hardy-Fox, a Vetrovec witness whose evidence was key to the convictions.

The appellants also argued the trial judge failed to apply the proper legal test for assessing credibility and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of Hardy-Fox's evidence, proper application of the credibility test, and adequate reasons.

The court also dismissed Hui's sentence appeal based on the parity principle.

The appellant appealed a judgment interpreting the will of Eleanor Martha Devonport.

The application judge found that a specific bequest of the Hopewell Avenue property to the testator's predeceased son passed to the son's wife pursuant to section 31 of the Succession Law Reform Act (the anti-lapse provision), rather than lapsing into the residue of the estate.

The appellant argued the will showed a contrary intention and that the solicitor's evidence should have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation of the anti-lapse provision or the will's terms.

The court also upheld the occupation rent requirement, finding it was properly raised and calculated.

An appeal from a trial judge's order setting aside a separation agreement under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act and section 15.2 of the Divorce Act.

The trial judge had set aside the agreement in its entirety and recalculated spousal support.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge erred in setting aside the entire agreement under section 56(4), the spousal support terms did not comply with the objectives of the Divorce Act under the Miglin analysis.

The court allowed the appeal in part, maintaining the separation agreement but modifying the spousal support provisions to remove the cohabitation clause and make support indefinite, while preserving the original quantum of $28,800 annually.

Binance Holdings Limited appealed orders from the Divisional Court and Ontario Securities Commission regarding an investigation into Binance's operations in Ontario.

The Commission had issued a summons demanding production of documents and communications relating to alleged violations of the Securities Act.

Binance challenged the summons as unconstitutionally overbroad under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the Divisional Court erred in declining to judicially review the Charter arguments and that the summons was an unreasonable seizure because it lacked a reasonable foundation to believe the demanded documents were relevant to the investigation.

The appellant appealed his guilty pleas to operation of a vehicle while disqualified and obstruction of an officer, as well as his sentence of 18 months in custody.

The appellant sought to strike his plea on the basis that he did not understand the consequences of pleading guilty.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for allowing the conviction appeal, noting that the appellant acknowledged understanding the Crown's position and the consequences during the plea inquiry, and provided no fresh evidence to support his claim.

The court also found no error in the sentence, given the appellant's twenty prior similar convictions.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal the sentence was allowed but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a 9-year global sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that he did not receive adequate credit for presentence custody given the hardship endured.

Although the trial judge accepted the appellant's account of hardship and granted 3:1 credit, duty counsel submitted that the trial judge may have misapprehended the appellant's primary submission for a time-served sentence.

The appellate court found no error warranting interference, noting that the trial judge provided significant credit for hardship and properly rejected the time-served submission based on the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's degree of responsibility.

The Crown sought an order to bifurcate its sentence appeal from the respondent's conviction appeal, both arising from the same proceedings.

The respondent was convicted of firearms offences, failing to remain at the scene of an accident, and refusing to comply with a demand for a breath sample, and was sentenced to a conditional sentence of 2 years less one day (618 days after Summers credit).

The Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence as tainted by errors in principle and demonstrably unfit, seeking a penitentiary sentence of 46 months and re-incarceration.

The respondent's conviction appeal was not yet perfected, with legal aid pending and no transcripts ordered.

The motion judge granted the Crown's request to bifurcate the appeals, finding that the conviction and sentence appeals were discrete and that delay in perfecting the conviction appeal would significantly prejudice the Crown's position on the sentence appeal.

This is a costs decision following the respondent's successful appeal of orders certifying an action as a class proceeding and granting leave to proceed under the Securities Act.

The respondent sought $120,000 in total costs ($20,000 for the Divisional Court leave to appeal motion and $50,000 for each of two appeals to the Court of Appeal).

The court awarded $70,000 in total costs ($20,000 for the leave to appeal and $50,000 for the appeals), finding that while there were technically two separate appeals, the issues and arguments were inextricably bound together in substance.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day imposed for theft over $5,000, forgery, and possession of stolen property over $5,000 for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant had stolen the famous "Roaring Lion" portrait photograph of Winston Churchill by Yousuf Karsh from the Château Laurier Hotel in Ottawa, replaced it with a forgery, and sold the original through an auction house in London.

The majority upheld the sentence, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The dissenting judge found errors in principle in the sentencing judge's approach to establishing the sentencing range, particularly in relying on foreign precedents and narrowing focus to art crimes, and would have substituted a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed an order from Henderson J. dismissing a motion to set aside a summary judgment order granted by Donohue J. The Court of Appeal found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the order of Henderson J. was interlocutory rather than final, and any appeal from that order lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant was also out of time to appeal the original summary judgment order and had not sought an extension of time.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the respondents.

This is a costs decision following a successful appeal by the mother in a family law matter involving the Hague Convention and refugee status.

The mother's appeal overturned the application judge's decision to return the child to the country of origin after Canada granted the child refugee status.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the mother as the wholly successful party, fixing costs at $50,000 for the application and $30,000 for the appeal, totalling $80,000, while reversing the application judge's award of $75,000 to the father.

The appellant sought to compel the respondent bank to reinstate a chequing account that had been closed.

The appellant argued that section 627.17(1) of the Bank Act required the bank to maintain the account once opened.

The application judge rejected this argument, holding that section 627.17 pertains only to the opening of accounts, not their closure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding no reviewable error and agreeing that the word "open" means to start something, not to continue it indefinitely.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $15,000 payable to the respondent.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault against his stepdaughter beginning when she was 15 years old, with violations occurring over approximately 20 months.

The trial judge relied heavily on an audio recording surreptitiously captured by the complainant in her bedroom on November 3, 2019.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge unfairly amplified the audio recording during deliberations, misapprehended its contents, misapprehended evidence relating to chronology of events, erred in assessing credibility of both the complainant and appellant, and misused a prior consistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no trial fairness issues, no misapprehension of evidence, and no credibility errors.

The appellants, founders of International Capital Management Inc., sold their client portfolio to Optimize Inc. in 2017 through referral and non-competition agreements.

The agreements provided that Optimize would pay fees to ICM, but could demand repayment if more than 15% of the transferred assets were subsequently moved to entities associated with the Sanchez brothers.

When the appellants' associated firm, T.I.P. Wealth Manager Inc., received over 15% of the transferred assets, Optimize terminated the agreements and demanded repayment of all fees paid.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favor of Optimize, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the 15% threshold and characterizing the fee repayment clause as an enforceable forfeiture clause rather than an unenforceable penalty.

The appellants appealed, challenging both the summary judgment finding and the characterization of the remedy clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's analysis.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order striking his claim against Transport Canada and Francois Collins under Rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure without leave to amend.

The motion judge found that the claim, concerning alleged misrepresentations made by the employer to an insurer, related to the terms and conditions of employment and was therefore grievable under the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act, placing it outside the court's jurisdiction.

The appellant argued he was no longer an employee, the grievance procedure was unavailable, and procedural fairness was denied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's jurisdictional analysis or refusal to grant leave to amend.