Court of Appeal for Ontario

Date: 2025-05-01
Docket: COA-24-CV-0983
Coram: Paul Rouleau, K. van Rensburg, S. Gomery JJ.A.

Between

Ying Huang
Applicant (Respondent)

and

Aliamisse O. Mundulai
Respondent (Appellant)

Appearances:
Aliamisse O. Mundulai, acting in person
Tahir Majeed, for the respondent

Heard: 2025-04-29

On appeal from the order of Justice Amelia M. Daurio of the Superior Court of Justice, dated September 3, 2024, with reasons at 2024 ONSC 4599.

Reasons for Decision

[1] This is an appeal of a final order in a family law dispute. The appeal was dismissed, with reasons to follow. These are our reasons.

[2] Since their separation in 2019 the parties have been engaged in litigation primarily concerning the parenting of their children, who are now 14 and 12 years old. They were able to resolve several issues, while the remaining issues, including certain financial and property issues that had not been raised in the appellant’s pleadings, were determined after a five-day trial.

[3] The appellant advanced three grounds of appeal.

1. Orders Regarding the Older Child's Therapy

[4] First, the appellant submitted that the trial judge erred in his orders regarding the parties’ older child, O.M., who has autism and receives therapy funded by the Ontario Autism Program (the “OAP”). The trial judge refused to order the transfer of O.M. from his current therapy centre to a different therapy centre (the “Vaughan Centre”) and gave the respondent sole decision-making authority in respect of O.M.’s therapy. The appellant argued that the order of Himel J. dated October 28, 2021, which provided for O.M. to transfer to the Vaughan Centre, was a final order that ought not to have been disturbed by the trial judge.

[5] We do not give effect to this ground of appeal. The order of Himel J. is on its face a temporary order. While it granted the appellant’s motion to transfer O.M. to the Vaughan Centre, there were difficulties in its implementation due to certain requirements for continued OAP funding. The day after the temporary order was made, Himel J. suspended the operation of her order, and she subsequently provided a number of endorsements setting out what was required before she would authorize O.M.’s move to the Vaughan Centre. Neither the order suspending the temporary order nor any of the follow-up orders were appealed. We do not agree with the appellant that the trial judge was bound by the temporary order of Himel J.

[6] Contrary to the appellant’s argument, the trial judge considered the order of Himel J., and properly addressed all of the circumstances, including what happened following the suspension of the order. In the end, the trial judge made findings of fact that were available on the evidence: that the respondent had conducted herself appropriately in relation to the temporary order; that the appellant had not demonstrated that OAP funding would be available for the program at the Vaughan Centre; and that the best interests of O.M. did not require his transfer as requested by the appellant. Nor are we persuaded that the trial judge made any reversible error in her orders respecting the treatment and decision-making authority in respect of O.M. The trial judge’s decision in this regard was well-founded on the evidence.

2. Beneficial Ownership of Office Unit

[7] As his second ground of appeal, the appellant asserted that the trial judge erred in determining that he was not the sole beneficial owner of an office unit the parties owned as tenants in common.

[8] Again, the appellant demonstrated no reversible error in respect of this ground of appeal. The trial judge assessed the evidence and concluded that the appellant’s claim that he was the only party to contribute toward the purchase and the carrying costs of the office unit was not supported by any evidence. Indeed, the trial judge accepted the respondent’s assertion that she had paid half of the down payment and the closing costs and that mortgage costs were paid from rental income on the unit. There was consequently no error in the trial judge’s determinations that the appellant failed to prove a gratuitous transfer from the appellant to the respondent, that without such a transfer neither a resulting trust nor unjust enrichment were made out on the facts of the case, and that the parties were each entitled to a one-half share of the property, including its increased value since separation (subject to adjustments). Given these findings, the trial judge did not err in ordering the sale of the office unit to satisfy the appellant’s equalization and child support obligations.

3. Treatment of Respondent’s Pension

[9] Similarly, we do not give effect to the third ground of appeal, that the trial judge erred in her order with respect to the treatment of the respondent’s Manulife pension as part of the parties’ equalization of property. The appellant asserted that the Statement of Family Law Value (the “SFLV”), which was prepared by the pension administrator and provided to the parties by at least October 2023, was inaccurate and unsigned, and that in relying on the SFLV, the respondent had contravened an order for disclosure. He sought an order from this court directing the pension administrator to provide a valid SFLV and providing for the immediate transfer of a lump sum to him pursuant to s. 10.1(3) of the Family Law Act.

[10] We see no error in the trial judge’s refusal to permit the appellant to benefit from what she characterized as his lack of good faith and attempts to “ambush” the respondent at trial, when he failed to bring forward the alleged errors in time for a revised SFLV to be provided. After observing that there was no evidence that the respondent ever had more than $21,928.65 in her pension accounts at the date of separation, and that dividing the pension at source would only add to the parties’ conflict, the trial judge reasonably granted the respondent’s request to have the value of her pension included in her net family property at trial rather than excluding it and having the funds divided at source.

Disposition and Costs

[11] For these reasons we dismissed the appeal. We order costs to the respondent fixed at $8,000 all-inclusive, which is in addition to the costs of $10,500 already awarded in respect of motions that were brought in this appeal.

Paul Rouleau J.A.
K. van Rensburg J.A.
S. Gomery J.A.