ONCA 2024

This appeal addressed the interpretation of "fraud" in sections 46(1)9 and 47(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, specifically whether it includes "constructive fraud." The application judge had set aside an arbitral award, finding constructive fraud by the Condominium Corporation for expanding the scope of arbitration beyond costs.

The Court of Appeal reversed this, holding that "fraud" in the Act refers only to actual fraud, requiring dishonesty or moral turpitude, not the broader equitable concept of constructive fraud.

The court emphasized the Act's objectives of efficiency and finality in arbitration, and the narrow grounds for judicial intervention.

The appellant, J.A., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference following a judge-alone trial.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's and complainant's (S.M.) evidence, specifically regarding the implausibility of the appellant's film project as a ruse and the credibility of S.M. despite his criminal record and the timing of his disclosures.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's credibility findings, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges in such assessments, and finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning or her reliance on common-sense inferences.

The applicant was convicted of operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit and received a 15-month driving prohibition and a $3,000 fine.

After his conviction was restored by the Court of Appeal, he sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and moved for a stay of his driving prohibition and fine pending the leave application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that under s. 320.25 of the Criminal Code, it lacks jurisdiction to stay a driving prohibition unless leave to appeal has already been granted.

Furthermore, the court found that even if it had jurisdiction, the applicant failed to meet the test for a stay on the merits.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for negligence, fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and intentional interference with economic relations against an accountant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by prematurely dismissing the action and erroneously rejecting the appellants' accounting expert's testimony.

The expert's reports, though not explicitly using "standard of care," clearly opined on the impropriety and negligence of the respondent's accounting actions, which was relevant to the claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the dismissal, and ordered a new trial before a different justice due to a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant, T.L., appealed his conviction for three counts of sexual exploitation of his stepdaughter, arguing the trial judge's reasons were inadequate for appellate review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, as they clearly explained the acceptance of the complainant's credible evidence and the rejection of the appellant's denial, consistent with the principles in R. v. W.(D.).

This is an appeal from a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings on mitigation efforts, the award for lost benefits, and the award of moral damages.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the determination that the respondent made reasonable mitigation efforts, the calculation of lost benefits, or the award of moral damages, noting that the bases for moral damages were pleaded and the appellants' conduct warranted censure.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, who pleaded guilty to second degree murder, indignity to human remains, and arson, sought to set aside his guilty plea.

He claimed he was unaware of the consequences of his plea, specifically his right to appeal a conviction if he had gone to trial, including challenging the voluntariness ruling of his police statement.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant's fresh evidence on this point to be untrue and accepted the trial counsel's credible recollection that the appellant was indeed informed of his appeal rights.

The court concluded that the guilty plea was a strategic, voluntary, unequivocal, and informed decision, given the formidable Crown case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his three-year imprisonment sentence.

The appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable due to forensic evidence contradicting the complainant's account and that the trial judge erred in sentencing by attempting to reconstruct the jury's path to conviction and providing insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's fact-finding for sentencing to be independent and sufficiently reasoned.

The appellant sought to purchase a residential property under an Option to Purchase Agreement or, alternatively, the return of a $25,000 downpayment.

She appealed the dismissal of her application by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Option Agreement had clearly expired by its terms, the appellant failed to establish a causal link between the respondent's alleged failure to provide rent receipts and her inability to secure mortgage financing, and the application judge did not err in declining to convert the application into an action.

The appellant, Waqar Ali, appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault and one count of assault causing bodily harm, and sought leave to appeal his global sentence of 22 months.

The appeal raised issues concerning an alleged s.11(b) Charter delay, the trial judge's decision to grant a similar fact application, the assessment of DNA evidence, and the credibility assessment of the appellant's testimony regarding his vehicle.

On sentence, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding a breach of trust as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding both the conviction and the sentence, finding no errors in principle or demonstrably unfit sentence.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario determined that the appeal was not devoid of merit or frivolous, and there was no partial success or misconduct by the respondent.

Consequently, the respondent was awarded partial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding that a security interest granted by the appellant's predecessor was oppressive to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the application judge's conclusion that the granting of the security interest was oppressive.

The court affirmed that the application judge's findings aligned with the two requirements for an oppression remedy claim, specifically that the respondents had a reasonable expectation that the appellant's predecessor would not act prejudicially, and that this expectation was violated by corporate conduct that was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial.

This is an appeal from a judgment concerning a failed real estate transaction.

The trial judge found the appellants breached the agreement of purchase and sale, struck their statement of defence due to a lack of standing for their representative (daughter acting in person), and awarded $1 million in damages.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in striking the statement of defence (though it did not affect the outcome on the merits) and, crucially, erred in the assessment of damages.

The Court clarified the proper measure of damages for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale and reduced the damages awarded to $45,000.

The court also confirmed the appellants failed to meet their onus to prove the respondents failed to mitigate damages.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault, appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that directed his transfer from Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

The ORB's decision was based on the recommendation of the appellant's treating psychiatrist, who believed CAMH's sexual behaviour clinic was necessary to address the appellant's hypersexuality and concerning behaviours.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the ORB's decision on a reasonableness standard, as established in R. v. Owen, and found that the ORB's analysis and conclusion were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a permanent resident, pleaded guilty to failing to remain at the scene of a fatal accident and received an 18-month imprisonment sentence, which subjected him to deportation without the right to appeal on humanitarian or compassionate grounds.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his plea was uninformed about these collateral immigration consequences and that his right to be present during his trial was violated when the trial judge conducted a post-plea inquiry with his counsel in his absence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal, finding a miscarriage of justice due to the appellant's improper exclusion from proceedings where his vital interests were discussed and misleading representations were made by his counsel regarding his understanding of immigration consequences.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion for leave to amend their dental malpractice claim.

The motion judge found the proposed amendments constituted new, statute-barred claims, causing non-compensable prejudice to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the amendments created a new claim and that the finding of actual prejudice due to the expired limitation period was entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on child pornography charges.

The lower court had excluded evidence, finding the search warrant invalid due to an expired commissioner of oaths stamp on the Information to Obtain (ITO) and a misleading description of the videos.

The Court of Appeal found that the expired stamp was a curable facial defect, as extrinsic evidence confirmed the commissioner's valid appointment.

Furthermore, the Court determined that the affiant's description of the videos, despite minor inaccuracies, was sufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds for child pornography, and that the videos themselves met the statutory definition.

The appeal was allowed, the evidence admitted, and a trial ordered.

The appellant law firm appealed the dismissal of its motion for a charging order under s. 34 of the Solicitors Act.

The motion judge had found that the property in question had already been preserved by a prior order and exercised discretion to refuse the charging order.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, concluding that the appellant had not successfully obtained any order recovering or preserving property, and the declaratory relief sought to that effect was refused.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal arose from a civil jury trial concerning a collision between a motorist and a pedestrian, Jasmine Jarvis, who suffered severe brain injuries.

The jury at trial found the motorist not liable.

The appellants (plaintiffs) appealed, arguing the trial was unfair due to the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial bad character evidence (Ms. Jarvis fleeing a taxi without paying fare) and inflammatory remarks by respondent counsel.

The Court of Appeal found the taxi fare evidence inadmissible and its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value.

The court also found respondent counsel's jury address inflammatory and the trial judge's instructions inadequate to cure the prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the cross-appeal (on costs) was dismissed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Losani Homes (1998) Ltd., appealed a lower court decision that found their employment termination clauses void but upheld the validity of a fixed-term employment contract for the respondent, Kim Kopyl.

Losani Homes argued that the invalidity of the termination clauses, per *Waksdale*, should also void the fixed-term clause, converting the contract to one terminable on reasonable notice with a duty to mitigate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the invalidity of termination clauses does not affect a fixed-term clause, distinguishing *Waksdale* and reaffirming *Howard v. Benson Group Inc.* The Court held that the employee was entitled to compensation for the unexpired portion of the fixed term without a duty to mitigate.