Court and Parties

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO DATE: 20241218 DOCKET: COA-24-CR-0001

BEFORE: van Rensburg, George and Gomery JJ.A.

BETWEEN:

His Majesty the King Respondent

and

Landi Hanna Appellant

COUNSEL: Landi Hanna, acting in person Scott Cowan, appearing as duty counsel Erica Whitford, for the respondent

HEARD: December 5, 2024

On appeal from the sentence imposed on November 1, 2023 by Justice Paul Robertson of the Ontario Court of Justice.

Reasons for Decision

[1] The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery (one causing wounds) and one count of failure to comply with an undertaking (breach of his bail on an unrelated charge). After credit for pre-sentence custody, he received a sentence of 4 years: he was sentenced to 3.5 years on the first robbery, 2 years consecutive on the second robbery (to which 18 months’ credit for pre-sentence custody was applied) and 2 months concurrent for the failure to comply. With the assistance of duty counsel the appellant seeks to appeal his sentence.

[2] The appellant points out that robbery offences can attract the entire range of sentencing options, from discharge to life in prison. He contends that the sentencing judge erred (1) in failing to respect the “jump” principle, which cautions a court against imposing a dramatically more severe sentence than those imposed on the offender for similar offences in the recent past; and (2) in imposing a disproportionate sentence after relegating rehabilitation to a secondary role. In making his submissions, duty counsel emphasized that the appellant, who was addicted to opiates, committed the offences for money to buy drugs, and that his crimes were imperfectly executed and easily detected.

[3] Absent an error in law or principle that impacted the sentence, or a sentence that is demonstrably unfit, the sentence imposed by a trial judge is entitled to deference. Sentencing is a fact-specific exercise, and each case must be considered contextually: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at paras. 10-11, 39-41, 44, 48-51 and 53; see also R. v. Gray, 2021 ONCA 86, at para. 20.

[4] We see no reversible error here.

[5] The seriousness of these offences and their effects on the victims should not be minimized. On two separate occasions, October 19 and 30, 2022, the appellant threatened and robbed gas station attendants who were working alone in a kiosk. On the first occasion, while threatening to shoot the cashier, the appellant pulled on and kicked the handle to the door leading into the enclosed cashier area, and attempted to pull down a plastic barrier before the cashier handed him some money. During the second robbery the appellant grabbed the complainant by her shoulders and pushed her to the ground before taking the cash till.

[6] The sentencing judge correctly identified denunciation and deterrence as the paramount sentencing objectives for robbery offences: see R. v. Wolynec, 2015 ONCA 656, 339 O.A.C. 237, at para. 117. He recognized as aggravating factors the appellant’s criminal record, that included three prior convictions for robbery within the past six years, the fact that he was on release at the time of the offences, and the circumstances of the offences. He noted that the appellant had not been deterred despite the increasingly long sentences he had received, and that the appellant did not abide by court orders (he committed the first robbery only two weeks after he had been released on an unrelated offence and the second while he was under two release orders). The sentencing judge acknowledged the vulnerability of the victims, recognizing that appropriate deterrent sentences are required for the protection of vulnerable store clerks: see R. v. Clarke, 2014 ONCA 296, at para. 18; R. v. Foster, 2023 ONSC 5066, at para. 38; R. v. Edusei, 2020 ONSC 7432, at paras. 24, 28.

[7] The sentencing judge fully respected the “jump” principle. The appellant’s prior robbery convictions had attracted sentences of 30 months and 36 months respectively. On this occasion he was sentenced for two robberies that occurred on different occasions, with the first attracting a sentence of three years and the second a sentence of two years. In any event, as the sentencing judge observed, “[t]he [appellant’s] pattern of committing serious robberies shortly after being granted bail, and [his] resilience to correction after lengthy sentences of incarcerations [justified] a significant increase in sentence.”

[8] We also disagree with the appellant’s argument that the sentencing judge failed to give proper emphasis to rehabilitation in sentencing the appellant. The sentencing judge was informed by defence counsel during submissions on sentence that the appellant had not consumed drugs since he was incarcerated on these offences. In his reasons for sentence the sentencing judge recognized that the appellant’s guilty plea was a sign of remorse and that he had engaged in some limited programs while in custody, which was commendable. That said, the sentencing judge noted that there was no evidence that the appellant had attempted to engage seriously in addressing his significant and long-standing drug addiction. The sentencing judge reasonably concluded that, given his repeated criminal history and the lack of counselling or other treatment for his addiction, the appellant’s rehabilitative potential was low.

[9] Having regard to all of the circumstances in this case, the appellant’s sentence was entirely fit.

[10] For these reasons we grant leave to appeal sentence and dismiss the appeal.

“K. van Rensburg J.A.”

“J. George J.A.”

“S. Gomery J.A.”