Court of Appeal for Ontario
Date: 2022-06-23 Docket: C69958
Before: Huscroft, Nordheimer and Copeland JJ.A.
Parties and Counsel
BETWEEN
Gerald Anthony Applicant (Respondent)
and
Attila Vinczer Respondent (Appellant)
Counsel: Attila Vinczer, acting in person Gerald Anthony, acting in person
Heard: June 22, 2022
On appeal from the order of Justice R. Cary Boswell of the Superior Court of Justice, dated October 4, 2021, with reasons reported at 2021 ONSC 6481.
Reasons for Decision
[1] Mr. Vinczer appeals from the order of the application judge that declared him to be a vexatious litigant. At the conclusion of the hearing, we dismissed the appeal for reasons to follow. We now provide our reasons.
[2] The appellant and the respondent have been embroiled in litigation for many years. The litigation arises out of a mortgage granted by the appellant and his parents to the respondent’s company. The mortgage was secured against properties owned by the appellant and his parents.
[3] The application judge set out in detail the history of the proceedings between the parties. In essence, the respondent has been attempting to enforce the mortgage against the properties but has been resisted at every turn by the appellant. This resistance involves numerous motions for injunctions, improper registration of a caution, appeals, and like conduct.
[4] Beyond the mortgage proceeding, the appellant commenced three actions – the first advancing a claim for over $24 million in damages based on more than 40 different causes of action, the second seeking roughly $3.8 million in damages for bad faith conduct, and the third involving a claim for over $1 million in damages arising out of an alleged defamation.
[5] In his appeal, the appellant alleges that the application judge was biased because of some comments that the application judge had made in earlier proceedings that were not favourable to the appellant. The appellant asked the application judge to recuse himself from the vexatious litigant application, but the application judge declined to do so.
[6] The appellant failed to make out a proper foundation for the bias allegation. Inevitably, in ongoing proceedings between parties that are heard by the same judge, comments are necessarily going to be made by the judge disposing of a particular step in the proceeding that a party may not like. That reality does not establish bias on behalf of the judge concerned. An informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, would not conclude that unfavourable comments of the type involved here would amount to a showing of bias by the presiding judge: Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, at p. 394, per de Grandpré J. (dissenting); Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 282, at paras. 20-21.
[7] The appellant also asserts that the application judge erred in staying two of the three other actions without determining whether they were unreasonable or bound to fail. [1] The appellant’s assertion in this regard ignores the fact that the application judge only provisionally stayed those two actions. The application judge expressly left open the opportunity for the appellant to satisfy the court “that the claims advanced in those actions are sufficiently meritorious that it is in the interests of justice that they continue”. That opportunity is still available to the appellant.
[8] Finally, the appellant challenges the vexatious litigant declaration itself. The application judge set out, in his reasons, the basis upon which he concluded that the appellant “bears a significant number of the hallmarks of a vexatious litigant.” The appellant has failed to show any error in the application judge’s reasons, or conclusion, on that issue.
[9] It is for these reasons that the appeal was dismissed. The respondent is entitled to his costs of the appeal which we fix in the amount of $500 inclusive of disbursements and H.S.T.
“Grant Huscroft J.A.”
“I.V.B. Nordheimer J.A.”
“J. Copeland J.A.”
[1] The third action had already been provisionally stayed by other judges.

