ONCA 2020

The appellant, a consultant who submitted a bid for a government standing offer, was investigated and charged with bid-rigging after a government contract manager reported similarities between his bid and another.

The charges were later stayed.

The appellant sued the government and the contract manager for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and defamation, seeking $2,000,000 in damages.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the government's answers to bidders were accurate and not misleading, and that the contract manager's statements to investigators were protected by qualified privilege without malice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to sell 15 gas stations in Ontario and Quebec, requiring the assignment of leases and credit/debit card agreements.

The respondent refused to consent to the assignments unless the appellant agreed to a five-year contract extension.

The application judge found the refusal unreasonable for the leases but dismissed the application entirely due to Quebec choice of law and forum selection clauses in some leases.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the judge erred by not granting relief for the Ontario stations, by failing to apply the strong cause test to depart from the forum selection clauses, and by not finding that the duty of good faith precluded the respondent from unreasonably withholding consent to the credit/debit card agreements.

The appellant Bank appealed a summary judgment finding it negligently breached its contract with the respondents regarding a Canada Small Business Financing Loan and a HELOC.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the motions judge erred by treating all respondents as one entity when the loan agreement was only with the corporate respondent, 1633092 Ontario Ltd. The Court varied the judgment to reflect that the Bank only breached its contract with the corporate respondent.

The Court dismissed the Bank's request for immediate judgment on the HELOC, referring the issue of set-off and the respondents' counterclaims to trial due to the pitfalls of partial summary judgment.

The appellant, a litigation financer, appealed a motion judge's order granting priority over settlement funds to the respondent, the debtor's former partner.

The debtor had signed a separation agreement promising to pay the respondent from any settlement, and later signed irrevocable directions assigning the settlement funds to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the separation agreement did not constitute a valid equitable assignment because it lacked a clear intention to assign the specific funds, whereas the irrevocable directions did.

The appellant was granted priority over the funds.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order granting sole custody of their daughter to the respondent father, ordering her to pay child support, equalization, and full recovery costs of $249,765.47.

The appellant argued that the trial process denied her natural justice, the credibility assessment was flawed, and the trial judge erred in determining income and post-separation adjustments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment, her focus on the child's best interests, or her financial determinations.

Leave to appeal the costs award was also denied, as the trial judge properly exercised her discretion based on the appellant's bad faith conduct.

The appellant, a ranking creditor, appealed a motion judge's decision that residential condominium purchasers were not obliged to pay the Receiver their proportionate share of the notional value of land conveyed to the City of Toronto to meet the developer's parkland obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the standard form Tarion Addendum clause, finding that the term 'parks levy' in the agreement indicated a payment of cash-in-lieu rather than a conveyance of land.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his six-year sentence for sexual offences and drug trafficking, and applied for release pending appeal, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and his health conditions.

The motion judge granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the application for release.

The judge found the appeal had little merit and would likely be determined before the sentence expired.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to show his detention was not necessary in the public interest, given his history of breaching recognizances, lack of insight into his offences, and the serious nature of the crimes against children.

The plaintiff killed his son while experiencing a psychotic episode allegedly caused by the antidepressant Paxil, manufactured by the defendant.

He was found not criminally responsible and was under the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board until receiving an absolute discharge in December 2009.

He commenced an action against the defendant in October 2011.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff lacked the psychological capacity to sue until his absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge materially misapprehended the evidence.

Exercising its fact-finding powers, the Court concluded the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of capacity under s. 7(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, as he had demonstrated the ability to instruct counsel, manage affairs, and understand the litigation process well before his discharge.

The action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the dismissal of her appeal from a conviction for contravening a municipal zoning by-law regarding accessory structures.

The appeal judge had dismissed her appeal after she failed to file an abandonment of various grounds of appeal as ordered.

The moving party argued the appeal judge was biased and that the justice of the peace erred regarding the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding no evidence of bias or denial of natural justice, and noting the limitation period issue was a factual finding rather than a question of law.

The appellant purchased land from the respondent, agreeing to develop it for retail use.

The agreement included an indemnity clause for community cost-sharing agreements.

The appellant later obtained a zoning amendment for residential development, triggering a $2.8 million fee for school lands, and sought indemnity from the respondent.

The application judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant breached its obligation to develop the land for retail use and could not profit from its own breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the contract.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary child support, arguing the motion judge erred in attributing income based on bank deposits, failing to deduct vacation time, requiring life insurance, and ignoring an equalization debt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly relied on the appellant's financial records to establish income, the life insurance was a pre-existing obligation, and the equalization issue was res judicata.

The plaintiff developer built stacked townhouses and applied for a condominium exemption under the Condominium Act to bypass Planning Act requirements.

The City granted the exemption but imposed a condition prohibiting the units from being used as boarding or rooming houses.

The developer sued, arguing the City lacked authority to impose conditions and challenging barrier-free accessibility requirements.

The motion judge struck the condition but upheld the accessibility requirements.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the City had broad authority under the Condominium Act and Municipal Act to impose conditions on exemption approvals to protect health and safety.

The developer's cross-appeal regarding accessibility requirements was dismissed as moot.

The appellants and respondent, owners of adjoining properties, disputed the use of a mutual driveway.

The application judge found that a 1975 right-of-way agreement bound successor owners despite lacking a formal enurement clause, as the agreement's wording showed a manifest intention to create an easement running with the land.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal, upholding the findings on rectification and factual issues regarding vehicular access and substantial interference.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its motion to enforce a share purchase agreement.

The parties negotiated a $100,000 purchase price for shares, and the respondent sent an unexecuted share purchase agreement to the appellant.

The appellant executed it, but the respondent did not.

The motion judge found that the agreement contained an enurement provision requiring execution by both parties to be effective, meaning there was no intention to contract until formal execution.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the parties intended to defer their obligations until a formal contract was executed.

The appellant landlord wrongfully terminated a commercial lease held by the respondent, who was the sole shareholder of a corporation operating a restaurant on the premises.

The termination caused the restaurant to close and the respondent's shares to become worthless.

The landlord appealed the summary judgment awarding the respondent damages for the diminution in share value, arguing the claim was barred by the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the rule does not apply where the wrong was committed against the shareholder personally and the corporation has no cause of action.

The appellant and a co-accused were charged with possession of a loaded restricted firearm following an altercation at a nightclub.

At trial, the appellant's counsel cross-examined a security guard, suggesting he was lying to protect the co-accused.

The trial judge restricted certain lines of questioning regarding identity, prior statements, and an alleged drug deal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 48-month sentence, arguing the trial judge's rulings undermined trial fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her trial management discretion and the rulings did not deprive the appellant of a fair trial.

The applicant, facing extradition to the United States for identity theft and misrepresentation, applied for judicial interim release pending the Minister of Justice's decision on surrender.

The applicant had previously fled the United States to Canada while on bail and made a refugee claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he would surrender himself into custody, given his history of using fraudulent identification and breaching bail conditions to avoid returning to Ghana.

The Court of Appeal previously dismissed the moving party's motions for leave to appeal and permitted the responding party to make written submissions for full indemnity costs.

The responding party failed to file its costs submissions by the extended deadline and was deemed to have abandoned its request for full indemnity costs.

The court ordered partial indemnity costs of the four motions for leave to appeal to the responding party, fixed at $1,500 inclusive.

The applicants, who were respondents on a Crown appeal from a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay, brought a motion to dismiss the appeal for the Crown's failure to perfect it in time.

The Crown filed its factum over nine months late without explanation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while the Crown's delay was excessive and negligent, the applicants had taken no steps to ensure timely perfection, were not prejudiced by the delay, and the charges of serious fraud warranted a hearing on the merits.

The court also dismissed the applicants' request for costs against the Crown, as the Crown's conduct did not amount to a marked and substantial departure from reasonable standards.

A separate motion by one applicant for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code was granted.

The self-represented appellant was convicted of fentanyl trafficking, conspiracy, and uttering forged documents.

He appealed on the basis that he was denied access to the Crown's digital disclosure while incarcerated during the trial.

The Crown conceded the trial was unfair and the appeal should be allowed, but argued for a new trial.

The appellant sought acquittals, arguing he had already served part of his sentence and the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding there was sufficient evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could convict.