ONCA 2020

The parties entered into a prenuptial agreement waiving spousal support and property rights.

After separation, the appellant husband sought equalization and spousal support, and requested the marriage contract be set aside under the Family Law Act.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent wife, finding the request to set aside the contract was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period in the Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a request to set aside a marriage contract is a proceeding for a declaration where no consequential relief is sought, and is therefore not subject to a limitation period under s. 16(1)(a) of the Limitations Act.

The underlying claims for equalization and support remain subject to their respective limitation periods.

The appellant appealed from a decision denying certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on firearms charges.

The charges related to a handgun with a defective firing pin.

A firearms expert testified that a replacement pin could be sourced and installed relatively easily, though it was temporarily out of stock.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the reviewing judge's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to infer the handgun could be adapted for use as a firearm within a reasonable time.

The appellant appealed her sentence, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding the harsh conditions she endured during presentence custody.

As a transgender inmate identifying as female, she was subjected to 22-hour lockdowns, segregation, and a lack of rehabilitative programs, leading to severe mental distress and two suicide attempts.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, noting it should have been before the sentencing judge and demonstrated intense human suffering.

The appeal was allowed, and the custodial portion of the sentence was reduced to time served, with the probation order remaining in force.

The appellant was convicted of accessing, possessing, and distributing child pornography after police obtained his subscriber information via a production order and subsequently searched his home.

On appeal, the appellant argued the production order was invalidly issued based on a standard of 'reasonable suspicion' rather than 'reasonable grounds to believe'.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the production order and subsequent search warrant violated the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, allowed the appeal, and entered acquittals on all counts.

The appellant owns a cottage lot with a right-of-way over the respondents' beach lot for 'all the usual purposes'.

The appellant sought a declaration that this included the right to launch and retrieve watercraft using a motor vehicle.

The application judge held that the right-of-way was limited to pedestrian access and the portaging of small craft, based on historical use and the intention of the original grantor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the easement did not permit motorized vehicles to cross the beach.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a decision refusing to amend its declaration under s. 109(3) of the Condominium Act.

The dispute centered on who should bear the cost of replacing deteriorated chimney flues that exclusively serviced 22 residential units.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in concluding there was no inconsistency between sections 22 and 23 of the declaration.

The Court held that the sections failed to clearly delineate the responsibilities for repairing exclusive use common elements after normal wear and tear, creating an unworkable mutual obligation.

The appeal was allowed and an order was granted to amend the declaration to clarify that unit owners are responsible for maintaining and repairing exclusive use common elements at their own expense.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault, incest, sexual assault with a weapon, and mischief against his sibling.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of a defence witness, failed to provide meaningful reasons, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were sound, the reasons were sufficient for appellate review, and there was no uneven scrutiny of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions arising from a vehicular accident, arguing his guilty pleas should be struck.

He claimed he pled guilty under the mistaken belief it would grant him access to drug treatment court and that he could easily strike the pleas later.

The Court of Appeal found the pleas were not informed, noting the absence of a s. 606(1.1) Criminal Code plea inquiry and a comment by the trial judge suggesting the pleas could be easily struck.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty pleas were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the lower court.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on multiple charges, including break and enter, which resulted from a trial judge's decision to quash a DNA warrant and exclude the resulting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge found insufficient grounds to link the respondent to the crimes.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapplied the standard of review for warrants by substituting his own view rather than assessing whether the issuing judge could reasonably have found reasonable grounds.

The Court found sufficient evidence, including a fingerprint in a stolen truck linked by DNA to the crime scenes, to support the warrant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered on four counts.

Following a successful appeal, the appellants sought costs of the proceedings in the Superior Court on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents contested a disbursement for the appellants' expert witness on damages, arguing the expert's evidence was rejected by the application judge as a mere mathematical exercise.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the respondents, finding that disallowing the disbursement did not amount to an improper distributive costs order, and that the expert evidence provided no value as it consisted only of basic calculations using publicly available share prices.

Costs were awarded to the appellants excluding the expert disbursement.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its application for summary judgment for possession and sale of the respondent wife's property.

The respondents had guaranteed the indebtedness of a corporation to the appellant, with the wife granting a mortgage on her property as collateral.

The motion judge found the mortgage unenforceable due to presumed undue influence by the husband.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge failed to consider the nature of the transaction and the wife's significant interest in the corporation.

The Court held that even if the presumption arose, the appellant took sufficient steps to ensure the wife entered the transaction freely, and the presumption was rebutted by the wife's own evidence.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment dismissing his tort claims against the police for false arrest, negligent investigation, and other causes of action arising from two separate interactions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the appellant's arrest in March 2016, dismissing the claims related to that incident.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in dismissing the tort claims related to the February 2015 incident, as those claims did not hinge on the reasonable and probable grounds for the later arrest.

The appeal was allowed in part to permit the February 2015 tort claims to proceed alongside the Charter claims.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing the victim 30 times.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge and Crown misstated forensic evidence, that the jury instructions on self-defence, provocation, and mens rea were inadequate, and that the trial judge erred in finding him the aggressor for sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the jury instructions, read as a whole, properly equipped the jury and that any misstatements of evidence did not vitiate the verdict.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's finding that the appellant was the aggressor was supported by the physical evidence and post-offence conduct.

The appellant pled guilty to trafficking approximately 3.5 kg of cocaine over four transactions and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in applying the parity principle and in establishing an eight-year starting range before mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application of the parity principle given the co-accused's lesser roles, nor in the determination of the appropriate sentencing range for kilogram-level cocaine trafficking.

Following a successful appeal where the appellant was awarded $500 in Charter damages, the parties made written submissions on costs for the proceeding below.

The appellant sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing his action was public interest litigation.

The court rejected this argument, finding the action did not meet the criteria in Carter.

However, the court found that applying the strict costs consequences of Rule 49.10(2) would result in the successful appellant paying costs to the respondent, which would be a harsh result for enforcing constitutional rights.

The court departed from the rule in the interests of justice and awarded the appellant $25,000 in costs.

The appellant father appealed a trial decision granting sole custody of the child to the respondent mother, ordering him to pay child and spousal support, and awarding trial costs to the respondent.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to determine an exact separation date, in awarding spousal support given his high student debt, and in not ordering parallel custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the best interests of the child framework or the spousal support guidelines, and noting the trial judge appropriately considered the appellant's debt and the history of intimate partner violence.

The appellant physician appealed a jury verdict finding him liable for negligent management of a twin pregnancy, which resulted in premature birth and brain damage to one of the twins.

The appellant argued the jury's verdict on causation was unreasonable due to a lack of evidence that the required treatment, amnioreduction, was available at the referral hospital in 1991.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding adverse inferences, the characterization of expert evidence, and the failure to instruct on loss of chance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was an evidentiary basis for the jury's conclusion on causation and that the jury charge was fair, balanced, and legally correct.

Following the release of the court's decision on the appeal, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The respondent was awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $12,000, inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The Court of Appeal previously dismissed the appeal and awarded costs of $3,500 to the respondent.

Unbeknownst to the panel, the parties had reached an agreement that if the appeal was dismissed, the respondent would receive $11,000 for costs.

The court amended its reasons to reflect the parties' agreement, awarding $11,000 in costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm-related offences, arguing that his identification as the person who threw a package containing a handgun from a balcony was not established beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge relied on circumstantial evidence, including police observations during the execution of a warrant, to conclude that the appellant was the only person who could have thrown the package.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the only reasonable inference was that the appellant possessed and threw the firearm, and dismissed the appeal.