ONCA 2020

The appellant was successful in her appeal and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $12,026.61.

The respondents argued against awarding costs despite the general rule that the successful party is entitled to them.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to depart from the general rule and awarded the appellant $10,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The costs of the underlying application were remitted to the application judge for determination.

The applicants, convicted of defrauding investors of over $5 million in a Ponzi scheme, sought the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for their appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicants failed to demonstrate that it was desirable in the interests of justice to have legal assistance, as the issues were straightforward and the applicants were capable of advancing their claims.

Furthermore, the applicants failed to provide adequate evidence of their financial need or that they had exhausted all other means of paying for counsel.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated by an unlawful arrest and an illegal strip search.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the police had reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant based on a confidential tip and observed behavior consistent with a drug transaction.

The Court also found that while the rearrangement of the appellant's clothing constituted a strip search, it was conducted reasonably and was necessary for officer safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery with an offensive weapon, arguing that the trial judge engaged in uneven scrutiny of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no indication that the trial judge applied different standards in assessing the credibility of the appellant and the complainant.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable, grounded in the evidence, and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for breaking and entering, voyeurism, and criminal harassment against his former intimate partner.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding animus, failing to explicitly find the complainant was fearful, and convicting on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence of animus, clear evidence of fear upon the discovery of a hidden camera, and overwhelming circumstantial evidence that left no reasonable doubt of guilt.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment for the sexual assault of his estranged spouse and use of an imitation firearm.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by treating premeditation as an aggravating factor, by granting insufficient enhanced credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, and by imposing an overly long probationary period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the agreed statement of facts supported the finding of premeditation, the sentence was within the appropriate range, and the enhanced credit and probation orders were reasonable exercises of discretion.

Traders General Insurance Company moved to review a single judge's decision denying it leave to appeal an order under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The underlying dispute involved a bad faith claim assigned to the respondents by a discharged bankruptcy trustee following a motor vehicle accident judgment.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to review the single judge's decision because the judge had mistakenly declined jurisdiction by failing to address the merits of the leave motion.

Applying the Pine Tree Resorts test, the Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal raised prima facie meritorious issues of general importance to bankruptcy practice.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, who pleaded guilty to sexual interference.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by departing from the parties' agreement on ancillary orders, specifically a section 161 prohibition and probation terms, without applying the Anthony-Cook joint submission standard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the agreement on ancillary orders did not constitute a joint submission on the core sentence, as the parties disagreed significantly on the length of custody.

The Court also held that the trial judge's discretionary orders were not demonstrably unfit.

The successful appellant, Mount Pleasant Group of Cemeteries, sought costs of the appeal and the underlying application from the respondents.

The respondents argued they should be shielded from costs as public interest litigants.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the respondents were public interest litigants but held this did not excuse them from all costs consequences.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01(1) and the respondents' public interest status, the Court ordered the corporate respondent to pay $350,000 in total costs and the individual respondent to pay $10,000.

The Court of Appeal fixed the respondents' costs of the appeal at $90,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and carrying a weapon, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting and relying on recognition evidence from two police officers who identified him from video surveillance.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in admitting one officer's evidence due to insufficient prior acquaintance, the error was harmless and curable under the proviso because the trial judge independently concluded the appellant was the perpetrator based on high-quality video and photographic evidence.

The court also held the verdict was not unreasonable, and the appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The respondent was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $50,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following an appeal, the parties agreed on the judgment amount but could not agree on costs.

The respondent sought full indemnity costs of $20,866.02 based on the standard charge terms of the subject mortgage.

The Court of Appeal awarded the requested amount, finding it fair, reasonable, and proportionate given the appellant's unfounded allegations of fraud and new issues raised on appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking methadone after a fellow resident at a transition home fatally overdosed on methadone supplied by the appellant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and misapprehended DNA expert evidence regarding the transfer of the deceased's DNA to the appellant's methadone bottle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the Jordan framework, properly excluded verdict deliberation time, and reasonably concluded that a mistaken trial estimate constituted an exceptional circumstance.

The Court also found no misapprehension of the expert evidence, as the trial judge's findings were supported by the totality of the evidence.

The appellants, who own and manage the majority of units in a condominium operating as a retirement residence, appealed a summary judgment finding their conduct oppressive under s. 135 of the Condominium Act.

The motion judge found the appellants unfairly prejudiced the respondent minority unit owners by not requiring their own tenants to sign the standard services agreement, allowing the appellants to offer discounted services and gain an unfair marketing advantage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the oppression finding and the costs award, but varied the judgment to ensure it only applied prospectively so as not to affect the rights of current tenants who were not parties to the action.

The appellant was convicted of child luring after communicating online with an undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl.

The trial judge relied on the statutory presumption of belief in age and the appellant's failure to take reasonable steps to ascertain the interlocutor's age.

On appeal, the court applied the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Morrison, which struck down the presumption of belief in age as unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's reliance on the unconstitutional presumption and the failure to take reasonable steps to establish the essential element of belief was a reversible error.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and conditional stays were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Following the quashing of the appellant's conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, the Court of Appeal issued an addendum to address the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge had improperly grounded the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence on convictions for failure to comply with an undertaking, which are not serious personal injury offences.

The Court set aside the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence, substituting concurrent 30-day sentences for the failure to comply convictions.

Following the release of the appeal judgment, the parties requested on consent to amend the partial indemnity costs of the applications below.

The Court of Appeal allowed the amendment, reducing the costs awarded to the appellants for the proceedings below from $93,000 to $55,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellants, renewable energy companies, appealed the dismissal of their application for a determination of their rights under Feed-in Tariff (FIT) Contracts with the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO).

The IESO terminated the contracts after the appellants failed to achieve commercial operation of their solar facilities by the Milestone Date for Commercial Operation (MCOD).

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the contracts made time of the essence and permitted termination for failure to meet the MCOD.

The Court also agreed that the IESO was not estopped from terminating the contracts, as there was no shared assumption or promise that the IESO would waive its termination rights.

The applicant, convicted of second degree murder for killing his son, applied for bail pending his conviction and sentence appeal.

The Crown opposed bail solely on the public interest ground under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal granted bail, finding that the reviewability interest outweighed the enforceability interest.

The court noted the applicant's advanced age, health challenges, successful prior release history, and the strength of his appeal, particularly the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on the partial defence of provocation.