ONCA 2020

The respondent and the appellant were equal shareholders and directors of a corporation that operated a dairy farm.

The corporation sold its milk quota, and the appellant director used the net proceeds to purchase a property registered in the name of a company owned by his wife, characterizing the transaction as a loan.

The respondent sought an oppression remedy, and the trial judge declared the property was held in constructive trust for the corporation due to the appellant's breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the unauthorized transfer of corporate funds constituted oppressive conduct and that a constructive trust was the appropriate remedy.

The appellant, a Senator, sued the Senate and the Attorney General of Canada for damages arising from his suspension from the Senate for allegedly claiming inappropriate expenses.

The Senate successfully moved to dismiss the action against it for lack of jurisdiction based on parliamentary privilege.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the Senate's actions fell within established categories of parliamentary privilege, including the power to discipline its members, administer its internal affairs, and control parliamentary proceedings and freedom of speech.

The Court held that parliamentary privilege immunized the Senate's actions from judicial review, even where unlawful conduct or Charter breaches were alleged.

The successful respondent on appeal sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondent $5,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, noting the principle of proportionality as the proceeding originated in Small Claims Court for $25,000.

The appellant, who had a lengthy history of violent offences against intimate partners, was convicted of attempted murder and choking.

The sentencing judge designated him a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

On appeal, the appellant argued the judge improperly presumed an indeterminate sentence was required and failed to adequately consider treatment options.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge engaged in a rigorous, individualized assessment of the evidence and properly concluded that the appellant's risk could not be managed in the community.

The appellant, a police officer, was criminally charged following an SIU investigation into a training exercise explosion.

After the charges were stayed, he sued his fellow officers and the police board for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office, alleging they intentionally misled the SIU.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding it was a workplace dispute governed exclusively by the collective agreement and the Police Services Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the essential character of the claim involved an independent criminal investigation outside the workplace, and therefore the court's jurisdiction was not ousted.

The moving party sought leave to file an appellate factum exceeding the 30-page limit, proposing a draft factum of approximately 125 pages.

The moving party argued that the issues were complex, the trial was long, and it needed to rely on proposed fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances justifying an extension.

The court emphasized the importance of conciseness and efficiency in appellate advocacy, noting that the moving party's choice to raise numerous grounds of appeal did not warrant an extended factum.

The appellant sold his company to the respondents and entered into an employment agreement.

After the company was assigned into bankruptcy, the appellant sued for breach of contract, oppression, and wrongful dismissal.

The trial judge awarded damages for oppression but dismissed the claims for the share purchase price, wrongful dismissal, and punitive damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in interpreting the share purchase agreement, holding that the plain wording required a minimum payment of $750,000 for the shares after five years regardless of profitability.

The appeal was allowed in part to award the $750,000, but dismissed regarding wrongful dismissal and punitive damages.

The moving party brought a motion to extend the time to appeal a garnishment order issued over two years prior.

The moving party argued that its delay was due to its sole shareholder's ignorance of the law and the belief that the company was judgment proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party made a tactical decision not to appeal and that the delay caused prejudice to the victims of the underlying fraud.

The court also noted that the proposed appeal was not obviously meritorious.

The moving party filed a motion for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeal that should have been filed in the Divisional Court.

He sought an order under s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act transferring the file to the Divisional Court.

The responding party opposed the transfer and requested the motion be dismissed as frivolous and vexatious.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the transfer motion, finding there was no realistic chance the Divisional Court would grant leave to appeal and that a transfer would cause undue prejudice and delay to the responding party.

The appellant municipality appealed a decision refusing to declare the self-represented respondent a vexatious litigant and refusing to dismiss his action under Rule 2.1.01.

The application judge had struck portions of the claim but allowed allegations of false arrest, false imprisonment, and misfeasance in public office to proceed under strict case management.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's substantive decisions, finding no error in his cautious approach to Rule 2.1.01 and his decision to case manage rather than declare the respondent a vexatious litigant.

However, the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal costs, finding the appellant achieved overall success below and awarding it $15,000 in partial indemnity costs for the application.

The appellant employer was convicted on appeal of an offence under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following a workplace fatality.

Before sentencing, the appellant brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, which the appeal judge summarily dismissed.

The Court of Appeal held that while the appeal judge had jurisdiction to hear the Charter application, he did not err in exercising his discretion to summarily dismiss it, as constitutional issues should only be raised for the first time on appeal in exceptional circumstances where there is no prejudice to the parties.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was awarded costs of the appeal in the agreed upon, all-inclusive amount of $15,000.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision affirming a trial judge's order that denied him access to a child placed in extended society care.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the appellant had standing to appeal under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and concluded that determining the appeal on the merits was in the child's best interests.

The Court admitted fresh evidence regarding the child's wishes to be adopted without ongoing access by the appellant.

Finding no error in the courts below and prioritizing the child's best interests, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $12,300.00, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The costs of the summary judgment motion below were ordered to be fixed by the trial judge at the end of the proceedings.

Following the release of the appeal decision which allowed the appeal in part by reducing damages for statute-barred advances, the parties provided written submissions on the calculation of damages and costs.

The Court of Appeal accepted the appellants' submissions, reducing the damages and pre-judgment interest by $336,273, and awarded costs of the appeals and cross-appeal to the self-represented respondent in the fixed amount of $16,500.

The purchasers agreed to buy the vendors' house.

Shortly before closing, the basement flooded.

The vendors informed the purchasers of the damage and insurance details the day before closing.

The purchasers refused to close on the scheduled date and demanded a price reduction or an extension with conditions.

The vendors offered reasonable extensions, which were rejected.

The application judge found the vendors breached the contract and acted in bad faith.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, finding no substantial damage that would allow the purchasers to terminate.

The purchasers' refusal to close constituted repudiation, entitling the vendors to terminate and claim damages for the lower resale price.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal regarding a decision that dismissed his motion to strike his guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeal did not raise a question of law alone and that the motion judge applied the correct test for an extension of time without error.

The appellant appealed her 8.5-year custodial sentence and a $185,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture following convictions for human trafficking and related sex trade offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the serious aggravating circumstances and the paramountcy of denunciation and deterrence.

The court also upheld the fine, concluding it was amply supported by evidence of the profits the appellant derived from her crimes.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and firearms offences arising from a shooting during a fictitious drug transaction.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the Crown's key witness, rejecting the victim's testimony, making findings about the shotgun without expert evidence, and that he was deprived of a remedy for late disclosure Charter breaches.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, evidentiary inferences, or handling of the Charter remedies.

The appellant pled guilty to attempted break and enter and was sentenced to a short custodial term, probation, and a lifetime weapons prohibition under s. 109(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He appealed the weapons prohibition, arguing it prevented him from hunting for food.

The Crown conceded the appeal, agreeing that the offence involved intoxicated confusion with no intent to commit theft and no weapons or violence, making the prohibition discretionary rather than mandatory.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the weapons prohibition order on consent.