ONCA 2017

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to order his surrender to the United States of America pursuant to the Extradition Act.

The applicant, a Mohawk of Akwesasne with Aboriginal heritage, argued that the Minister failed to give proper consideration to Gladue principles and his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Minister's decision, finding that she had properly considered all relevant factors, including the applicant's Aboriginal background and Gladue principles, and that the applicant's circumstances were distinguishable from prior cases.

The court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found the Minister's decision fell within a range of acceptable outcomes.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearm-related offences and his sentence.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence that he possessed and fired a firearm into the complainant's vehicle.

The appellant argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by requiring him to identify an alternative suspect.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the trial judge's question regarding alternative suspects was merely rhetorical and that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof.

The court found ample evidence supported the conviction and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction for impaired driving from the Superior Court's dismissal of his summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the proposed appeal and dismissed the application for leave to appeal.

The court determined that the case had no significance for the general administration of justice and denied the request for costs.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of impaired driving and driving over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial judge acquitted on both counts, finding the Crown could not prove impairment and could not rely on the presumption of identity in s. 258(1)(c) to establish the blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The Crown sought to rely on the included offence of care or control over 80, but the trial judge rejected this, holding that s. 258(1)(c) applied only to the charged offence.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the acquittals on fairness grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the included offence issue, holding that the presumption of identity applies to included offences and that it is not unfair to convict on an included offence arising from the same facts as the charged offence.

The appellant was convicted at trial of sexual interference and sexual assault arising from an incident in a laundry room involving a 14-year-old complainant.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant of charges relating to a separate hotel incident but found him guilty of the laundry room charges.

The trial judge's conviction was based primarily on his finding that the appellant's failure to report the complainant's inappropriate sexual comments to her mother, cease contact with her, or tell her such comments were inappropriate demonstrated the falsity of his denial of sexual misconduct.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence by failing to consider the appellant's explanation that he did not report the conversation to the complainant's mother because he feared it would cause a "big commotion" and potentially lead to self-harm by the complainant, given her documented mental health issues.

The Court held this failure to address a plausible explanation constituted a miscarriage of justice and allowed the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing claims in negligence and against an individual employee of a child protection agency.

The motion judge had relied on Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D. to conclude that the respondents' duty of care was owed to the children, not the parents, and therefore no duty of care existed toward the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's reasoning.

The court confirmed that both before and after apprehension of children, the respondents' duty of care was to the children, creating a conflict that precluded a duty to the parents.

The court also upheld the immunity provision under section 15(6) of the Child and Family Services Act for the employee, finding no facts suggesting bad faith.

The appellant's claims for intentional infliction of mental suffering remained intact.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug-related offences, challenging the trial judge's assessment of eyewitness identification evidence and the lawfulness of police entry into his home.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the evidence was not based solely on eyewitness identification but rather on a combination of circumstantial evidence and observations by experienced police officers conducting surveillance.

The court also found that exigent circumstances justified the initial police entry to prevent destruction of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for payments under a family agreement.

The respondent estate cross-appealed the dismissal of its claim for return of a $13 million payment characterized as a gift.

The appellant argued that an oral agreement made after the family agreement was signed should be enforceable and would excuse his payment obligations.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the oral agreement preceded the family agreement and was therefore superseded by its integration clause.

The court also upheld the finding that the $13 million was a valid gift with no resulting trust.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed with no costs awarded.

The appellant challenged the application judge's finding that the respondent's insurance policy was excess to the appellant's policy.

The appellant argued the application judge erroneously applied the Minnesota approach to determine policy priority.

The Court of Appeal found no error, as the application judge properly interpreted the policy terms to determine that the respondent's policy was specifically made excess to the appellant's.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

Fresh evidence indicated the underlying claim had been settled within the appellant's policy limits, rendering the cross-appeal issues moot.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for unpaid bonus installments under the respondents' Variable Incentive Plan (VIP).

The appellant resigned before the pay-out dates for the final installment of his 2009 bonus and two installments of his 2010 bonus, totaling $114,916.79.

The VIP contained an "active employment" requirement stipulating that employees must be actively employed on the payment date to receive installments.

The appellant contended that sections 11(5) and 13(1) of the Employment Standards Act, 2000 required the respondents to pay the future installments upon his resignation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the active employment requirement did not contravene the ESA because the future installments did not constitute wages to which the employee was entitled at the time of resignation.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment under s. 264(1) and (2)(d) of the Criminal Code for creating a private Yahoo!

Group website that portrayed the complainant in a false and sexually degrading manner.

The sole ground of appeal was whether the trial judge erred in finding that the actus reus of the offence had been established.

The appellant argued that establishing the actus reus requires proof of subjective intent to engage in threatening conduct.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, holding that the actus reus of threatening conduct under s. 264(2)(d) is assessed objectively, not subjectively, and does not require proof of the accused's specific intent to instil fear.

The appellant appealed his conviction on various drug offences, challenging the validity of a search warrant on the grounds that material misstatements and omissions were made in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The appellant contended that the warrant breached his Charter rights under section 8.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the omissions and alleged misrepresentations were not material to the issuance of the warrant and that a reasonable inference could be drawn that drugs would be found at the residence based on police observations and evidence.

The appellant loaned $500,000 to a company with the understanding that it would receive registered shares in a related company as consideration.

Years later, the respondent guaranteed repayment of the loan.

The respondent sought summary judgment to declare the guarantee unenforceable, arguing that a trust agreement had discharged the loan by providing the appellant with a beneficial interest in shares.

The motion judge agreed, but the Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the motion judge's conclusion contradicted his own factual findings and misconstrued the purpose of the trust agreement.

The court held that the trust agreement was intended to provide security, not to discharge the loan, and that the guarantee and general security agreement were enforceable under the Business Corporations Act.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to extend the time to bring a claim for equalization of net family property.

The parties separated in February 2005 after nearly 16 years of marriage.

In October 2007, the appellant signed a separation agreement waiving any right to equalization.

He sought equalization in January 2016, over 11 years after separation and 9 years after the separation agreement.

The parties had previously executed a marriage contract in 1989 that barred equalization claims.

The motion judge found no apparent grounds for relief and refused the extension based on the lengthy delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the motion judge properly applied the statutory test under the Family Law Act and that the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference of a 14-year-old complainant.

The Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on the complainant's allegation of intercourse on multiple occasions, despite both the appellant and complainant initially denying sexual contact when discovered spooning on the appellant's bed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's reasons were infected by impermissible reliance on evidence of bad parenting, which was used to characterize the appellant as the type of person likely to commit the alleged offence.

The appellant appealed a Rule 2.1 order dismissing his claim as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The claim arose from an incident at the respondent's café where the respondent allegedly refused to provide ice in a drink for the appellant's disabled friend.

The appellant sought damages for isolation and negative emotional impact allegedly resulting from this incident and subsequent events.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the claim had no hope of success and that Rule 2.1 was properly invoked.

The appellant also sought to note the respondent in default for failing to file a proper statement of defence, but this request was dismissed as moot following the action's dismissal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing its claims in nuisance and negligence relating to contamination of its lands.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the appellant failed to produce evidence of negligence or that the respondents knew or ought to have known the facts necessary to ground an action in nuisance.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the respondents had a duty to inspect or supervise the activities of dry-cleaning tenants on their property, and found that environmental reports obtained by the respondents did not put them on notice of contamination migrating to the appellant's lands.

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court order dismissing his dispute of the garnishment of his pension benefits paid through a Retirement Compensation Arrangement (RCA).

The appellant argued that his RCA was exempt from garnishment under the Pension Benefits Act and that garnishment should be limited to 50 percent under either the Wages Act or the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that RCAs are excluded from the definition of "pension plan" under the Pension Benefits Act and therefore receive no protection from garnishment.

The court also found that RCA payments do not constitute wages and that support-related garnishment restrictions do not apply to equalization payments.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown conceded that the two convictions for possession of proceeds of crime could not stand and those convictions were set aside with acquittals entered.

The convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking were upheld as the trial judge had a reasonable basis to uphold the warrant issuance and police had reasonable grounds to arrest and conduct searches incident to arrest.

The sentence was reduced from 14 months on each count to 6 months less one day on each count running consecutively, resulting in a global sentence of 12 months less two days, to account for the appellant's risk of deportation and demonstrated rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed her conviction from the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to make more detailed inquiries into the appellant's mental status while she was testifying.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the trial judge had made sufficient inquiries, the appellant had confirmed she was able to continue and had no difficulty with her memory, and defence counsel did not pursue the issue at trial.

No fresh evidence was produced to support the appellant's claim that her mental status would have interfered with her ability to testify.