ONCA 2017

An appeal from a motion judge's order approving a $12.5 million settlement for a minor who suffered a severe brain injury in a high school rugby match.

The motion judge approved the overall settlement but reallocated funds to ensure adequate provision for the plaintiff's future care costs and reduced the solicitor's contingency fees from 30% to 20%, disallowing an additional $339,000.

The appellants challenged both the reallocation of funds and the fee reduction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decisions regarding the allocation of funds for future care or the reduction of solicitor's fees.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment motion decision dismissing their defamation claim based on the description of the deceased as "divorced" on his death certificate.

The appellants argued that since the divorce was not final at the time of death, this description was defamatory.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the words were not capable of being defamatory.

The court also rejected the appellants' motion for fresh evidence and declined to address the issue of whether the matter should have been transferred from estates court to the civil list, finding such discretionary matters better left to the Superior Court.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim for Statutory Accident Benefits (SAB) on the ground that the limitation period had expired.

The respondent insurer issued an OCF-9 denying benefits in January 2007, and the claim was not commenced until approximately six years later.

The court upheld the summary judgment, finding that the denial of benefits was unequivocal and sufficient to trigger the running of the limitation period, even if the reasons provided were legally incorrect.

The court also rejected the appellant's submission that she was denied a fair hearing.

An appeal from a motion judge's decision certifying a class action and granting partial summary judgment against an anaesthesiologist in a bacterial infection outbreak case.

The motion judge certified the class proceeding and found the defendant breached his duty of care regarding infection prevention and control practices.

The appellate court allowed the appeal on procedural fairness grounds, finding that the motion judge reformulated the certified common issue without notice to or submissions from the parties, and then decided the summary judgment motion on the basis of this new formulation.

The court held that this violated procedural fairness and entitled the defendant to a new hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of non-consensual anal intercourse with the complainant.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to consider evidence supporting a defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's moans.

The Court of Appeal rejected all grounds of appeal, finding that the evidence did not support the mistaken belief defence, that the trial judge applied consistent standards in assessing credibility, and that any misapprehension of evidence did not affect the conviction.

On sentencing, the Court found one error regarding the characterization of abuse of a spouse or common-law partner, but concluded this did not materially affect the sentence imposed.

This is a motion to vary the Court of Appeal's decision in a solicitor's negligence case.

The moving party sought to clarify the trial judge's discretion regarding the final quantification of damages and the process for calculating the damages award, subject to a ceiling of $36.9 million.

The respondent opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party could not bring itself within the applicable rules permitting reconsideration of appellate decisions, and that it was not in the interests of justice to invoke the court's narrow jurisdiction to reconsider.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed two decisions granting habeas corpus relief to an individual detained on account of an outstanding deportation order.

The applicant had been detained for approximately 25 months on immigration grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision to release the applicant on habeas corpus, finding that the detention was lengthy and of uncertain duration and could no longer be justified as furthering the machinery of immigration control.

However, the Court found that the application judge erred by assuming jurisdiction to supervise any subsequent re-incarceration by immigration authorities.

The Court struck the problematic supervisory clause and provided guidance on appropriate conditions for release in immigration detention cases.

Appeal from a trial judgment concerning the treatment of a Maher (Islamic marriage contract) in the equalization of net family property under the Family Law Act.

The trial judge excluded the Maher payment from the calculation of net family property and treated it as a separate obligation.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, holding that the Maher payment must be included in the equalization calculation because the parties did not expressly agree to exclude it from net family property.

The court distinguished the case from Khanis v. Noor Mohamed, where the Maher contained express language excluding it from net family property.

The court reduced the equalization payment but confirmed the wife's entitlement to collect the Maher obligation as a debt.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of an on-duty police officer charged with dangerous operation causing death.

The officer was operating an undercover police vehicle at approximately 109 km/h in a 60 km/h zone when it struck and killed an 18-year-old pedestrian who was jaywalking.

The trial judge declined to leave the included offence of dangerous driving with the jury, finding no realistic scenario where dangerous driving could be proven without causation of death.

The appellate court upheld this decision but found reversible error in the jury charge, which treated causation as a live issue despite the trial judge's earlier ruling that it was not realistically available to the jury.

The court also found the charge misdirected the jury on the actus reus and mens rea elements of dangerous driving by focusing on the collision and the victim's conduct rather than the manner of driving itself.

The appellant insurer appealed a trial judge's decision that the insured was "authorized by law" to operate a motor vehicle under statutory condition 4(1) of O. Reg. 777/93, despite being in breach of a probation order prohibiting him from driving at night and driving with alcohol in his system.

The insured had a valid driver's licence at the time of the accident.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, holding that "authorized by law" refers only to the provincial licensing scheme operated by the Ministry of Transportation and does not extend to breaches of court orders unrelated to driving licence conditions.

The court found that a broader interpretation would be inconsistent with s. 118 of the Insurance Act and would undermine the legislative intent to protect innocent tort victims.

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a failed residential subdivision development project in Fort Erie, Ontario.

The central issues were whether the parties had entered into an enforceable written agreement dated December 13, 2005, whether there was a breach or repudiation of that agreement, and the validity of a construction lien filed by Ravenda Homes.

The motion judge had dismissed Ravenda Homes's breach of contract action, vacated its certificate of pending litigation, allowed its lien action, and allowed the respondent's counterclaim in part.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld most of the motion judge's findings but set aside the award of damages under section 35 of the Construction Lien Act, referring that issue to trial.

The appellants appealed the Divisional Court's dismissal of their judicial review application challenging three decisions of the Ontario Racing Commission: a Suspension and Freezing Order against the owner, a procedural decision dismissing motions to quash or stay the orders, and a merits decision imposing licence suspensions, account forfeiture, and a fine.

The appellants raised three grounds of appeal: inadequate notice and particulars, loss of jurisdiction due to a panel member's expired term, and inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the notice was sufficient, the panel member could continue to sit under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, and the reasons were adequate to permit review of the reasonableness of the decision.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

At trial, the appellant admitted to dishonest acts but contested whether he possessed the necessary mens rea for fraud.

The trial judge found that he did.

On appeal, the appellant raised two main arguments: first, that the trial judge erred in treating evidence about a remuneration scheme as hearsay when led to show the appellant's state of mind; and second, that the trial judge erred in relying on the Crown's suggestion that the appellant should have called other managers as witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both arguments and upheld the conviction.

An appeal from a motion judge's order rectifying a will to correct a drafting error.

The estate trustee sought to correct the will to reflect the deceased's intention to liquidate sufficient shares to provide two children with $1 million each.

The widow, who did not challenge the will and elected to take under it, appealed the rectification order and sought leave to appeal the costs disposition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in principle and that the factual findings were amply supported by evidence.

Leave to appeal costs was denied.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's decision on a franchise dispute under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000.

The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in preventing cross-examination regarding the respondent's financing arrangements with Toronto Dominion Bank and in permitting counsel to reference the bank's judgment against the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the source of funds paid by the franchisee to the franchisor is irrelevant to the statutory entitlement to refund under the Act.

The court affirmed that Ontario's legislated payback scheme requires the franchisor to refund all money received from the franchisee, regardless of how those funds were obtained.

The appellant was convicted by jury of robbery, disguise with intent, dangerous driving, and failure to stop arising from a bank robbery.

The sole issue at trial was identity—whether the appellant or his brother committed the robbery.

A police officer identified the appellant from a photo lineup.

The trial judge designated the appellant a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on three grounds regarding the conviction: eyewitness identification instructions, police officer reliability, and Crown opening address prejudice.

On sentence, the appellant challenged the dangerous offender designation and the indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The appellant challenged the validity of a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued under the Mental Health Act on the grounds that not all participants in the Community Treatment Plan (CTP) signed it within 72 hours of the medical examination.

The Consent and Capacity Board found the CTO valid, holding that only the examining physician was required to sign within the 72-hour period.

The Superior Court appeal judge reversed, finding that all participants must sign within 72 hours.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 72-hour requirement applies only to the examining physician's entry into the CTP, not to other service providers who indicate their agreement to the plan.

Indigenous Ecuadorian villagers obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation in Ecuador for environmental pollution.

They sought to enforce the judgment in Ontario against Chevron Corporation and its seventh-level indirect subsidiary, Chevron Canada.

The motion judge granted an order requiring the plaintiffs to post security for costs of approximately $942,951 before the appeal could proceed.

The appellants moved to vary this order.

The Court of Appeal set aside the security for costs order, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to conduct a holistic analysis of the justness of the order in all circumstances.

The court emphasized that security for costs orders must be just and should not be used as a litigation tactic to prevent cases from being heard on their merits.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal following his fourth conviction for sexual assault, for which he received a four-year sentence.

The Crown opposed the application on the grounds that detention was necessary in the public interest and that the grounds of appeal were frivolous.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing that detention was not necessary in the public interest under section 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the grounds of appeal to be very weak, the offence to be serious, and evidence of above-average risk to reoffend in a sexual manner.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sexual assault conviction from the Summary Convictions Appeal Court.

He raised four issues: (1) admission of fresh expert evidence regarding the complainant's medical condition; (2) admission of the complainant's undisclosed criminal record; (3) admissibility of the complainant's videotaped hearsay statement under the Khelawon framework; and (4) whether a Charter s. 11(b) delay violation occurred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' decisions and holding that the Jordan framework did not apply retroactively to trials completed before its release.