ONCA 2017

The appellant, a rapper performing under the name Avalanche the Architect, appealed the dismissal of his libel action against a newspaper and its reporter.

The action was struck as statute-barred under the Libel and Slander Act.

The core issue was whether the Act's notice and limitation periods apply to online newspaper articles.

The court held that the Act applies to online versions of newspapers, that the limitation period begins when the libel comes to the plaintiff's knowledge, and that the plaintiff's initial complaint did not constitute proper notice under the Act as it merely complained of factual errors without asserting libel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment granting rescission and damages with respect to one vacant property (Petting Zoo) and issuing a certificate of pending litigation with respect to another property (Lot 511).

The respondents had made payments totalling $168,727.74 between 2006 and 2013 towards the purchase of both properties, but the appellant retained title to both.

The appellant argued the respondents had defaulted on their payment obligations and forfeited their interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's own breach in failing to obtain severance of Lot 511 justified the respondents' cessation of payments and entitled them to the remedies granted.

The appellant appealed from convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking in crystal methamphetamine and cocaine, possession of marihuana, and possession of proceeds of crime.

Drugs and cash were found in the appellant's apartment pursuant to a search warrant obtained in relation to alleged criminal activity by the appellant's former roommate.

The appellant claimed he did not know the drugs were in his apartment and that the cash came from legitimate sources.

The Court of Appeal rejected three grounds of appeal: that the trial judge erred in finding sufficient basis for the search warrant, that she erred in assessing the appellant's credibility, and that her reasons for conviction were insufficient.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of vacating the conviction for possession of marihuana, as the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to hear that count as a summary conviction offence.

The appellant was convicted of agreeing to offer a bribe to foreign public officials contrary to section 3(1)(b) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.

As an agent of Cryptometrics Canada, the appellant agreed with other employees to bribe Indian officials to secure a multi-million dollar Air India contract.

The appeal raised three main grounds: lack of territorial jurisdiction, misinterpretation of the word "agree" in the statute, and misapplication of the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

Appeals from conviction and sentence in a complex fraud case involving a scheme to divert millions of dollars from the Canadian Revenue Agency.

The appellants were convicted of fraud over $5,000 following a four-month jury trial.

The appellants challenged their convictions on multiple grounds including delay, issue estoppel, evidentiary rulings, and jury instructions.

The Crown appealed the quantum of the fine in lieu of forfeiture imposed on one appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals and the sentence appeals, but granted leave to appeal on the sentencing issues.

Members of Branch 1-7 of the Polish Alliance of Canada sought to withdraw from the organization and take with them a property held in trust for the branch members.

The trial judge found that 100% of the branch members had voted to leave and applied the "clubman's veto" doctrine, permitting them to depart with the property.

The Polish Alliance of Canada appealed, arguing that the clubman's veto did not apply because PAC was incorporated under the Corporations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the clubman's veto applied to the unincorporated branch and that there was no statutory displacement of the common law rule.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing an appeal from an Ontario Court of Justice order making a Crown wardship order with no access by either parent.

The child was apprehended at eight weeks old along with three older siblings due to expressed fears of violence by the appellant's then partner.

The child had been in the custody of prospective adoptive parents for approximately four years at the time of appeal.

The appellants sought to challenge the Crown wardship order and the no-access provision.

The appellants effectively abandoned the Crown wardship challenge and focused on the access issue.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence including a CAS worker's affidavit and video recordings of access visits, but also admitted an affidavit from Dr. Kathy Keefe regarding open adoption, though with reservations about its foundation and timing.

The Court upheld the no-access order, finding that the appellants failed to meet the statutory test requiring that the relationship be meaningful and beneficial to the child and that access would not impair future adoption opportunities.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision in a family law matter concerning income imputation and asset division.

The trial judge found the respondent was unemployed and effectively unemployable based on medical evidence and refused to impute income.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's curtailment of cross-examination on the respondent's medical condition and the refusal to grant an adjournment for additional witnesses.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions, finding no error in enforcing time limits, refusing the adjournment without reasonable explanation for late witness summoning, and finding that family assets were divided equally with the appellant purchasing Syrian properties from equalization proceeds.

An appeal and cross-appeal concerning a contractual dispute between two friends and their respective companies regarding an employment agreement.

The trial judge found that an oral employment agreement was reached in October 2003 between Mark Couper and Vitaquest International LLC, and that Vitaquest repudiated the agreement in early March 2005.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's finding that Couper was entitled to damages equivalent to base pay for the period October 2003 to March 2005.

The respondent cross-appealed on the issue of whether he was entitled to a US$5 million payment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings.

The appellants, two insurance companies, appealed the summary dismissal of their action against respondents for breach of an alleged oral agreement and inducement of breach of contract.

The motion judge dismissed the action on the basis that the parties had agreed that no binding contractual relationship would exist without a signed written agreement (the "Precondition").

The Court of Appeal found this conclusion was a palpable and overriding error.

The evidence only supported that the parties intended to eventually document their agreement in writing, not that execution of a written contract was a precondition to legal obligations.

The court allowed the appeal against the Vancity respondents and directed the matter to trial, but dismissed the appeal against the Co-operators respondents on alternative grounds.

A client appealed a decision confirming an assessment officer's assessment of a lawyer's fees and disbursements at $125,602.83.

The lawyer had been retained under a contingency fee agreement that provided for hourly billing if the retainer was terminated.

After the solicitor-client relationship broke down, the client retained new counsel and later self-represented.

The client settled a claim against Food Basics for $30,000, with the settlement agreement providing that costs be paid directly to the lawyer.

The assessment officer rejected the client's argument that an undertaking limiting recovery to $50,000 applied, finding that the undertaking no longer governed once the client self-represented.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error and confirming the assessment officer's jurisdiction and reasoning.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated sexual assault in the death of a 29-year-old woman found naked in a wooded park in Guelph.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on DNA evidence linking the appellant to the deceased, forensic entomology evidence establishing time of death, and toxicology evidence showing cocaine in the deceased's blood.

The trial judge admitted evidence of a subsequent assault by the appellant on another sex worker (the "Barrie incident") to establish motive and rebut innocent association.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: admissibility of the Barrie incident evidence, unreasonableness of the verdict on causation and fault elements, and adequacy of jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Barrie incident evidence was wrongfully admitted and that the jury instructions on the fault element in murder were deficient.

The appellant, a unionized employee of Lakehead District School Board, sought long-term disability benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, which administered the benefits under contract with the school board, denied her claim.

The appellant commenced an action against Sun Life seeking a declaration of total disability and an order for payment of benefits.

The motion judge dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding the dispute arose from the interpretation and administration of the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the dispute was arbitrable under the collective agreement and that Sun Life, as a mere agent of the school board, lacked standing to be sued directly.

The appellant's remedy lay in arbitration against the school board.

The applicant sought to enforce an agreement between Canada and three municipalities regarding the storage of low-level radioactive waste.

The applicant alleged that the municipality had misused income earned on a $10 million payment by failing to apply it exclusively to defray lower-tier municipal taxes for ratepayers of the former Hope Township.

The application judge found that Schedule 8 of the agreement created a non-charitable purpose trust and that the municipality had breached its trustee duties.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the agreement was a contract and did not create a trust over the payment or the fund.

The appellant, a small family-run grocery store, was convicted of operating food premises in a manner permitting a public health hazard contrary to Ontario Food Premises Regulation 562.

The Justice of the Peace imposed a fine of $6,255.

The appeal concerned sentence only.

The Crown conceded that the sentence was based on a misapprehension of evidence regarding the duration of the violation.

The parties jointly requested a reduction to $1,500 payable over two years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the justice of the peace had misapprehended the evidence, ignored the fact that the store had been sold, failed to consider the appellant's ability to pay, and lacked information about previous convictions.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault causing bodily harm, kidnapping, and two counts of breach of probation, as well as seeking leave to appeal sentence.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant and three others arrived at the complainant's apartment, demanded return of allegedly stolen property, threatened violence, and subsequently assaulted and confined the complainant, causing severe injuries.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual findings.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that although the trial judge did not expressly address the appellant's history of childhood sexual abuse as a mitigating factor, this omission did not affect the fitness of the sentence imposed.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that it was not required to provide a justification for requesting examinations under oath of statutory accident benefits claimants.

The application judge had found that section 33(4)3 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule required insurers to provide a specific justification or reason for requesting such examinations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 33(4)3 does not require an insurer to provide a justification for its request that an applicant attend an examination under oath.

A general statement of the purpose of the examination that gives the applicant notice of the general type of questions that will be asked is sufficient.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.

The trial judge had refused to exclude evidence of cocaine and cash seized during a vehicle stop for a Highway Traffic Act offence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his analysis of whether the appellant's detention became unlawful (s. 9 breach) after the HTA investigation concluded and a groundless criminal investigation commenced.

The court also found a prolonged s. 10(b) breach (right to counsel) lasting over 30 minutes.

Applying the Grant factors for s. 24(2) exclusion analysis, the court determined that the serious Charter breaches and their impact on the appellant's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

An appeal concerning the validity of a continuing power of attorney for property executed by an elderly woman in favour of one of her twin sons.

The appellant challenged the validity of the power of attorney on grounds of undue influence and suspicious circumstances, arguing that the respondent son had coerced the grantor into executing the document by restricting her access to funds needed for basic living expenses.

The motion judge upheld the validity of the power of attorney, finding no evidence of undue influence or suspicious circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the transaction was rational and explicable by the parties' relationship, and that the motion judge correctly applied the law.

The appellant was convicted of importing marijuana into Canada following a judge-alone trial.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on the grounds that the guilty verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in finding that the appellant's exculpatory statement to police was deliberately concocted.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by making a finding of concoction based solely on evidence that proved the statement false, without independent evidence of fabrication as required by R. v. O'Connor.

Although the court found sufficient evidence to support a conviction on other grounds, the error in law regarding the treatment of the exculpatory statement warranted a new trial.