ONCA 2017

The appellant was convicted of importing 15 kilograms of cocaine.

On appeal, he challenged the conviction on two grounds: first, that the trial judge failed to properly apply the third part of the W.(D.) analysis regarding the burden of proof; and second, that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons explaining how the Crown proved the appellant's knowledge of the cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt.

The majority dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's reasons could have been clearer, they were sufficient when read in context and demonstrated proper application of the legal principles.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the combination of the trial judge's misstatement of the onus of proof and failure to make explicit findings on the critical issue of knowledge to be fatal to the conviction.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal claim on summary judgment.

The appellant was hired by Atomic Energy of Canada but was terminated after providing false information on his security clearance questionnaire and during the hiring process.

He failed to disclose his employment at Ivaco Rolling Mills and misrepresented his whereabouts when contacted about an employment offer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissal, finding that the breach of honesty went to the core of the employment relationship, particularly given the national security context and the appellant's access to nuclear facilities and sensitive information.

The appellant appealed his sentence of twelve months plus three years probation for arson, seeking leave to appeal and challenging the custodial portion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the collateral immigration consequences of the sentence.

The appellant, a 19-year-old with special needs who was unaware of his non-citizen status at sentencing, would have been deported to a refugee camp in a country where he had no connection or supports.

The court imposed a fit sentence of six months less a day, which the appellant had already served.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of armed robbery, four counts of forcible confinement, and breaking and entering a dwelling house to commit an indictable offence following a home invasion robbery.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's Charter application challenging the admissibility of statements made to police before consulting with counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in multiple respects regarding the requirement to provide a Prosper warning.

The trial judge incorrectly found that the appellant was not reasonably diligent in seeking legal advice by choosing to wait until the next day to speak to his lawyer of choice, failed to recognize that an apparent change of mind about seeking counsel without delay triggers the Prosper warning requirement, and erred in finding that a standard police caution was an adequate substitute for a Prosper warning.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the appellant's statements should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter as their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Without these statements, the Crown's case could not proceed, and the convictions were quashed with acquittals entered.

The appellant insurance company appealed a Superior Court judgment dismissing its motion to recover $600,000 held back from distribution by a receiver.

The insurance company argued the funds were paid based on mistake of fact, lack of consideration, unjust enrichment, equitable subrogation, and constructive trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the trustee lawfully received the funds to reduce a legitimate outstanding debt and had altered its position in good consideration by deferring its receivership application.

The appellant failed to establish the defence of mistake of fact.

The respondent purchased the appellant's business in exchange for securities, with the appellant becoming a minority shareholder.

The acquisition agreement contained a representation and warranty regarding tax pools.

Years later, the Canada Revenue Agency disallowed the respondent's use of the tax pools and assessed approximately $11.8 million in additional taxes, interest, and penalties.

The respondent invoked an indemnity from the appellant, who argued the respondent had breached the tax pools representation and warranty.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the respondent, interpreting the representation and warranty as directed solely to the accurate identification of tax pools and their values at closing, not as a guarantee of future tax utilization.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a matrimonial dispute, the husband appealed the quantum of an equalization payment ordered by the trial judge, while the wife cross-appealed the quantum of child support.

The wife moved to dismiss the husband's appeal for non-payment of interim child and spousal support ordered by Lauwers J.A. The Court of Appeal found that the husband's failure to comply with the interim support order and his failure to pursue or perfect the appeal on a timely basis disentitled him from continuing with the appeal.

The court dismissed the husband's appeal with costs and correspondingly dismissed the wife's cross-appeal without costs.

The appellant appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice that set aside a notice of default and dismissed her action against the Crown on the grounds of abuse of process and failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The appellant's action alleged that Ministry of the Attorney General employees misconducted themselves in relation to proceedings before the Landlord Tenant Board, Divisional Court, and Superior Court of Justice that had been decided adversely against her.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the action constituted an abuse of process as it represented an attempt to question the legitimacy of unfavourable proceedings, and that the appellant failed to plead the necessary elements of malice or intent to injure for the tort of misfeasance in public office.

The estate of a deceased lawyer appealed a trial judge's damages assessment in an undefended trial arising from breaches of fiduciary duty by former employees.

The defendants had wrongfully removed and transferred 120 client files to a competing law firm.

The trial judge awarded $344,513.87 in general damages plus $145,662.19 in prejudgment interest but declined to award punitive damages.

The appellate court found three errors: (1) improper double-counting of overhead expenses in calculating general damages; (2) failure to award punitive damages despite egregious misconduct; and (3) undercompensation of special damages for disbursements.

The appeal was allowed in part, increasing the total award to $627,678.09 plus prejudgment interest.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a Deputy Judge's order for pre-trial inspection of an iPhone in a products liability case.

The appellant alleged the iPhone overheated and caused severe burns to his arm.

The central issue was whether Deputy Judges of the Small Claims Court have jurisdiction to order pre-trial inspection of property.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that such jurisdiction exists under the Rules of the Small Claims Court where trial fairness and the interests of justice require it, and that the jurisdiction was properly exercised in this case.

A dispute arose between a commercial landlord and tenant concerning the tenant’s attempt to exercise a lease renewal option and alleged arrears of additional rent.

The landlord refused renewal and ultimately locked the tenant out, causing a planned sale of the restaurant business to collapse.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the tenant, awarding damages for loss of the business sale, arbitration and settlement expenses, the security deposit, and punitive damages, and dismissed the landlords’ counterclaim.

The landlords appealed on multiple grounds including refusal of an adjournment, improper notice of renewal, and alleged rent default.

The Court of Appeal rejected each ground and upheld the summary judgment.

The appellant was convicted of importing 830 grams of cocaine dissolved in two bottles of ginger wine that she carried on a flight from Jamaica to Toronto.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his findings of fact and credibility assessments and gave unsupportable reasons for rejecting her evidence.

The appellant claimed she was an innocent dupe unaware of the cocaine in the bottles.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, made reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, and that the value and manner of the cocaine smuggling supported an inference that the appellant was a knowing participant rather than a blind courier.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing her claim for survivor pension benefits following the death of Michael Shestowsky, a former employee of the respondent.

The appellant claimed entitlement to survivor benefits as a "spouse" under the Pension Benefits Act, which requires living together in a conjugal relationship for at least three years before retirement.

The trial judge found the appellant was not an eligible spouse based on objective, contemporaneous evidence including a cohabitation agreement stating the parties intended to commence cohabiting, pension election forms confirming no eligible spouse, and tax returns.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law and his factual findings were amply supported by evidence.

The appellants were successful on appeal from a summary judgment decision.

The Court of Appeal addressed costs following the appeal.

Counsel for the respondent agreed that the appellants' claimed costs of $18,686.25, comprising $17,132.50 in fees on the partial indemnity scale and $1,553.75 in disbursements, were reasonable.

The court ordered that amount in costs, inclusive of HST, be paid by the respondent to the appellants.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering detention in hospital rather than conditional discharge for a person found not criminally responsible on a charge of arson.

The appellant argued the Board erred in failing to consider legal mechanisms under the Mental Health Act for managing her condition in the community.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order, finding the Board properly considered the appellant's history of decompensation episodes, medication non-compliance, homelessness, and the need for supervised accommodation to monitor medication compliance and manage public safety risks.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated November 29, 2016.

The appellant sought a hybrid order, but the Board imposed secure detention.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the Board acted reasonably in rejecting the hybrid order request based on evidence from the treatment team and the hospital that secure detention was the necessary and appropriate disposition.

The Board retained discretion to determine when the appellant would be ready for transfer to a less secure setting.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that imposed a constructive trust over their properties, declared that Venanzio Pingue was not a shareholder of the respondent company, and removed him as an officer and director due to breach of fiduciary duties.

The trial judge found that Venanzio had misappropriated $592,671.43 from the company and never paid for his shares.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in interpreting the parties' written agreements and in refusing to admit their expert report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interpretation of the agreement or her discretionary decision to exclude the late expert report.

The court also dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence and the motion for leave to appeal the costs order.

The accused was convicted of child luring by means of computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after engaging in sexual conversations with a police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl on Craigslist.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of three provisions: the presumption of belief in section 172.1(3), the reasonable steps requirement in section 172.1(4), and the mandatory minimum one-year sentence in section 172.1(2)(a).

The trial judge found section 172.1(3) violated the presumption of innocence under section 11(d) of the Charter and was not justified under section 1.

The trial judge upheld section 172.1(4) as constitutional under section 7 of the Charter.

The trial judge found the mandatory minimum sentence grossly disproportionate under section 12 of the Charter and imposed 75 days intermittent incarceration instead.

Both the conviction appeal and Crown's sentence appeal were dismissed.

The applicants sought to transfer an appeal from the Court of Appeal for Ontario to the Divisional Court, arguing that the Divisional Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from orders made under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The underlying application was a contested winding up application where the application judge determined shareholding and ordered the corporations wound up as just and equitable.

The respondents argued the appeal should remain with the Court of Appeal because the core issue involved common law and equitable doctrines rather than purely statutory interpretation.

The court held that the appeal was fundamentally a winding up application under the OBCA, with shareholding determination and ancillary orders being necessary to that core relief, and therefore fell within the Divisional Court's jurisdiction under section 255 of the OBCA.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted robbery and his 20-month sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge failed to adequately account for the frailty of Crown witness evidence and applied more rigorous scrutiny to the appellant's evidence than to Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly assessed the credibility of the accomplice and victim witnesses and did not reverse the onus of proof.

On sentencing, the Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding trial counsel's suspension, the co-accused's role in adjournments, and the appellant's bail variation application.

The Court also considered the appellant's extraordinary rehabilitation efforts since sentencing.

The sentence was varied to time served.