Editor’s Note: Corrigendum released on April 8, 2016. Original judgment has been corrected with text of corrigendum appended.
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
CITATION: R. v. Harflett, 2016 ONCA 248
DATE: 20160406
DOCKET: C59518
Watt, Lauwers and Pardu JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
and
Alexander Harflett
Appellant
Counsel:
Malcolm McRae and Erec Rolfe, for the appellant
Rick Visca, for the respondent
Heard: March 1, 2016
On appeal from the conviction entered on March 24, 2014 by Justice Catherine Kehoe of the Ontario Court of Justice.
Lauwers J.A.:
[1] Constable Robert Sinclair was a member of the East Region Highway Enforcement Team, responsible for monitoring traffic on Highway 401. He was accompanied by Tyler Brown, then an employee of the Canadian Border Services Agency. They were parked at an On Route service centre. Constable Sinclair noticed the appellant’s car had Québec plates, and wanted to show Mr. Brown how to run a computer search on Québec plates. He discovered that the appellant’s Ontario driver’s licence was suspended for unpaid fines. The officer testified that by the time he discovered this, the appellant was back on the highway. He pursued the appellant and pulled him over about six kilometres down the road.
[2] The appellant produced a valid Québec driver’s licence. The officer arrested him for driving with the licence of another jurisdiction while his Ontario licence was suspended, and charged him under s. 36 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8 (“HTA”). The officer conducted a pat-down search of the appellant, and read him his rights. He found the appellant to be cooperative throughout.
[3] The appellant could not drive his car since his licence was suspended. The officer called a tow truck because the car had to be removed from the highway for safety reasons. His plan was to have the car towed to a nearby hotel, with the appellant riding with the tow truck operator. The appellant would then be in a position to pay the fines the next day, have his licence restored, and continue on his way.
[4] As was his invariable practice, Constable Sinclair performed an inventory search of the appellant’s vehicle. He testified that when he opened the trunk, he smelled the odour of raw marijuana, and discovered a large quantity of the drug. He immediately arrested the appellant for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19. As the officer was reading the appellant his rights a second time, the tow truck arrived. The car was towed to the police detachment and a full search was performed.
[5] At trial, the appellant brought a Charter application claiming that his s. 8 Charter rights had been breached by the initial inventory search of his vehicle before it was to be towed to a hotel, because the officer had no authority to conduct such a search. The trial judge found that the inventory search was reasonable and that, even if the appellant’s s. 8 rights had been breached, s. 24(2) of the Charter favoured the admission of the evidence. The trial judge convicted the appellant and sentenced him to 12 months’ imprisonment, plus 12 months’ probation.
[6] This appeal raises two issues: (i) did the trial judge err in not finding that the inventory search of the appellant’s vehicle breached his rights under s. 8 of the Charter; and (ii) if so, did the trial judge err in finding the evidence to be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter?
[7] For the reasons set out below, I would allow the appeal and exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
Issue 1: Did the Vehicle Search Breach the Appellant’s s. 8 Charter Rights?
[8] Section 8 of the Charter provides that “everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.”
[9] The trial judge found that the initial inventory search of the vehicle was “reasonable”, at para. 153. The totality of her reasoning on whether the officer breached the appellant’s s. 8 Charter right is found at para. 154 of her reasons:
Constable Sinclair had to remove the vehicle from Highway 401, the accused could not drive it and there was no one else to drive the vehicle. It was therefore the responsibility of Constable Sinclair. It was reasonable to assess any pre-existing damage to the vehicle, to verify any valuables in the vehicle and whether there were any weapons or other dangerous items in the vehicle. Constable Sinclair was going to release the accused and the vehicle to a hotel and therefore, had to verify that there was nothing dangerous in the vehicle and, prior to the tow to the hotel, the state of the vehicle and valuables.
[10] The trial judge accurately recorded the police officer’s testimony about why he did the inventory search.
The Governing Principles
[11] As Binnie J. observed, roadside stops “sometimes develop in unpredictable ways”: R. v. Nolet, 2010 SCC 24, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851, at para. 4. In such situations the court’s task is to “proceed step-by-step through the interactions of the police and the appellants from the initial stop onwards to determine whether, as the situation developed, the police stayed within their authority, having regard to the information lawfully obtained at each stage of their inquiry.”
[12] In this case, the officer’s search of the appellant’s vehicle was warrantless, and was therefore presumptively unreasonable. To justify a warrantless search, the Crown must establish, on the balance of probabilities, that (i) the search was authorized by law; (ii) the law is reasonable; and (iii) the search was carried out in a reasonable manner: see R. v. Collins, 1987 CanLII 84 (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at p. 278, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, at para. 23. The focus in this appeal is on the first and second branches of the Collins test since the appellant concedes the third branch.
[13] Under the first branch of the Collins test, “the state authority conducting the search must be able to point to a specific statute or common law rule that authorizes the search. If they cannot do so, the search cannot be said to be authorized by law”: R. v. Caslake, 1998 CanLII 838 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, at para. 12.
[14] Under the second branch of the Collins test, “the search must be carried out in accordance with the procedural and substantive requirements the law provides”: Caslake, at para 12. The second branch is not reached unless the first is met.
The Principles Applied
[15] The appellant argues that the police officer’s search of the appellant’s car fails the first branch of the Collins test because the police officer had neither the statutory nor the common law authority to conduct an inventory search of the appellant’s vehicle.
[16] I agree.
[17] Following the Supreme Court’s guidance in Nolet, a step-by-step analysis of the roadside stop shows that the officer had no authority to conduct the inventory search.
[18] I begin with the police officer’s reasons for pulling over the appellant and detaining him. A roadside stop of a vehicle for a provincial regulatory offence under statutes like the HTA (e.g. speeding) is a detention: see R. v. Hufsky, 1988 CanLII 72 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621; R. v. Mellenthin, 1992 CanLII 50 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 615; and R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494.
[19] I am satisfied that the appellant’s initial detention was lawful. Although the appellant argues that the police officer acted in bad faith and “held off” at the On Route before pulling him over on Highway 401, the trial judge rejected this argument. For the reasons outlined below, I also reject this argument. The officer was acting pursuant to his statutory authority under the HTA when he detained the appellant to investigate a possible contravention of that statute.
[20] However, the power to detain an individual under the HTA does not inevitably include the power to detain or impound a vehicle, nor does it include the power to conduct an inventory search in every situation. The officer must be able to point to a specific duty or authority to justify his search of the appellant’s vehicle.
[21] The inventory search cannot be justified on the basis of officer safety or any suspicion that the appellant was involved in criminal conduct. The officer testified that after arresting the appellant for the first time for driving while his licence was suspended, he did not impound or seize the appellant’s car, because he was only conducting a traffic investigation, not a criminal investigation. He agreed the appellant was polite, cooperative and non-confrontational throughout. The officer testified that there was, “nothing to hint of criminality, zero. He [the appellant] had no prior criminal record. He was not listed on any of the police records as being involved in any type of criminal activity, he was just simply a suspended driver.” The officer agreed that he had no reason to believe that the vehicle contained any weapons or other dangerous items.
[22] The officer explained that he searches “every vehicle” for which he calls a tow truck. His view was that he was “totally responsible” for the car. The search was to protect himself, the appellant, and the tow truck operator. The officer checked first for exterior damage to the car. He explained that in the interior search he looked for weapons, other dangerous items, and valuables. He was concerned about weapons that the appellant might use to harm the tow truck operator and wished to protect the operator against any allegation that he had stolen valuable items from the car.
[23] Neither the police officer nor the trial judge was able to identify any statutory provision that authorized police to impound the vehicle or to search the car. The Crown indicated in oral argument that he could not identify any statutory authority in the HTA that justified either step. However, in the absence of statutory authority, the common law can provide authority to impound a motor vehicle: R. v. Waugh, 2010 ONCA 100, at paras. 25-26. In Waugh, the question was whether the police had the common law power to impound an uninsured vehicle where they suspected that the motorist would continue to drive it. Blair J.A. observed, at para. 30: “[t]he ability to impound the vehicle and have it towed away, in the circumstances, is a reasonable exercise of the police common law duty to prevent crime…, to protect the life and property of the public, and to control traffic on the public roads.”
[24] The ancillary power doctrine this court relied on in Waugh does not apply on the facts of this appeal to authorize the inventory search because the officer did not in fact impound the vehicle.
[25] There was nothing in the interactions that developed between the officer and the appellant, assessed step-by-step as required by Nolet, that might have triggered the need to do the inventory search. I note that Constable Sinclair had no public safety concerns, since he was going to release the car to the appellant. In Waugh, Blair J.A. accepted, at para. 32, that “courts should be cautious in extending police power by resort to their common law ancillary powers, particularly in circumstances where the legislature has put in place an elaborate and comprehensive regulatory regime with carefully balanced powers and sanctions.” This observation manifestly applies to this case.
[26] The determination of the reasonableness of the search is contextual, as Nolet and Mellenthin state. In this instance it was quite reasonable for the officer to look at the exterior of the car and to note any damage before asking the tow operator to take it to the hotel. The officer had taken at least that degree of control over the car.
[27] But the other reasons given by the officer for the inventory search do not hold up to scrutiny and pass constitutional muster. The owner was not going to be separated from the car, but was to ride with the tow operator to the hotel. There was accordingly no reason for the tow operator to access the interior of the car and the police officer had no cause to be concerned for the operator’s safety.
[28] I reject the Crown’s invitation to apply R. v. Nicolosi, 1998 CanLII 2006 (ON CA), [1998] O.J. No. 2554, 40 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.), at para. 36, where Doherty J.A. noted that:
With custody comes responsibility. Once the police assume control and possession of the vehicle, they had a duty to take steps to safeguard the vehicle and its contents. This duty is made clear both by the requirement [in s. 221 of the HTA] that the police take "custody" of the vehicle and the requirement that they store it in "a suitable place". It is important that those charged with a statutory responsibility take reasonable steps to fulfil that responsibility. It is equally important that they be in a position to demonstrate that they have fulfilled that responsibility. By documenting the contents of the vehicle that had any apparent value, the police serve the interests of any person who has an interest in the property and who looks to the police to safeguard that property while it is in police custody. It is quite wrong to suggest that the only interest is the police interest in avoiding civil liability.
[29] In my view, the logic of Nicolosi does not apply in this case. The officer had no statutory obligation to take custody of the car and store it in a suitable place, nor was that power necessarily incidental to the officer’s common law powers in this instance, where the necessary degree of the officer’s control was more limited than in Nicolosi. Here the officer did not impound the vehicle or exercise the degree of control of the vehicle that would have made an inventory search necessary. The police decision to call a tow truck to remove a vehicle does not justify an inventory search in every case: R. v. Martin, 2012 ONSC 2298, at para. 36.
[30] In sum, I am satisfied that the officer’s common law authority was limited by the real exigencies of the situation: see Mellenthin. His duty obliged him to get the car off the highway for safety reasons. There was no reasonable basis for the officer to go on to undertake an inventory search of the car. Accordingly, the officer’s decision to inventory search the car was unreasonable and breached the appellant’s s. 8 Charter right against an unreasonable search.
[31] I now turn to consider whether the evidence generated by the search should have been excluded by the trial judge in view of the breach.
Issue 2: Did the Trial Judge Properly Apply s. 24(2) of the Charter?
[32] Section 24(2) of the Charter provides:
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
The Governing Principles
[33] The framework for the application of s. 24(2) of the Charter is set out in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at para 71. The court must consider three lines of inquiry: (i) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct; (ii) the impact on the Charter-protected interests of the accused; and (iii) society’s interest in adjudication on the merits.
The Principles Applied
[34] The totality of the trial judge’s reasoning on the Grant analysis is found at para. 156:
[G]iven that the vehicle was not, but for the marijuana found in the inventory search, going to be impounded, I find that Constable Sinclair acted in good faith and, as in Nolet, it was a technical breach with minimal impact on the Charter-protected interests of the accused as there is a lower expectation of privacy on the public roadway. The marijuana is real evidence and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
[35] The appellant concedes that the third line of inquiry – society’s interest in adjudication on the merits – favours inclusion of the evidence because the marijuana is real and reliable evidence of drug trafficking. But the appellant argues that the first two lines of inquiry favour exclusion.
The First Grant Line of Inquiry
[36] In Grant, the Supreme Court noted, at para. 72, that the function of the first line of inquiry into the "seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct" is:
to assess whether the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute by sending a message to the public that the courts, as institutions responsible for the administration of justice, effectively condone state deviation from the rule of law by failing to dissociate themselves from the fruits of that unlawful conduct.
[37] The focus is on the nature and degree of police misconduct. The Court stated at para. 72:
[T]he more severe or deliberate the state conduct that led to the Charter violation, the greater the need for the Courts to dissociate themselves from that conduct, by excluding evidence linked to that conduct, in order to preserve public confidence in and ensure state adherence to the rule of law.
Bad Faith
[38] At trial, the appellant challenged Constable Sinclair’s testimony that he had already driven away by the time the officer discovered the expired licence. The appellant argued that the officer had intentionally held off from speaking to him at the gas pumps about his suspended licence because he wanted to pull the car over on the highway in order to arrest him and search his vehicle. The appellant submitted the trial judge erred in failing to rule on, or to provide sufficient reasons about, the argument that the police had used this stratagem.
[39] I would reject this argument. In concluding that the police officer was acting in good faith throughout, the trial judge showed that she had accepted his evidence about the timing of the licence plate search and the appellant’s apprehension, and rejected the appellant’s credibility challenge to that evidence. The appellant has not demonstrated that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error in doing so.
A Pattern of Abuse
[40] The appellant argues that Constable Sinclair exhibits a pattern of abusing his search authority as a police officer, and that this militates in favour of exclusion of the evidence: see R. v. Little, [2009] O.J. No. 3385, at para. 17. The appellant points to two other reported cases where Constable Sinclair was found to have abused his search powers leading to the exclusion of evidence.
[41] In R. v. Rodrigue, 2012 ONCS 1739, 2012 ONSC 1739, [2012] O.J. No. 1538, Constable Sinclair intercepted another Quebec licensed vehicle, pulled it over, searched it and found drugs. The trial judge found that the officer had no reasonable grounds to pull over the motorist and that the subsequent search was abusive. The trial judge cited Harrison and excluded the marijuana on the basis of the officer’s deliberate and flagrant violation of Mr. Rodrigue's rights.
[42] In R. v. Nguyen, [2011] O.J. No. 6252 (S.C.), Constable Sinclair was in a Highway 401 On Route and saw the accused behaving "suspiciously". He pulled over the vehicle and noticed an air freshener and cigarettes. Constable Sinclair asked for permission to search the vehicle. He got the accused, a Vietnamese immigrant who did not speak English well, to sign a waiver. He then found over $100,000 in cash and charged the accused with possession of proceeds of crime. The judge found the waiver was not informed due to the significant language barrier. The Crown conceded s. 24(2) exclusion.
[43] As noted, Constable Sinclair testified that he always searches cars that he stops. He was an instructor in “pipeline techniques” and taught police officers and others the skills to “recognize indicia of the criminal element in traffic enforcement” during “traffic stops”. He testified that Highway 401 was a popular route for drug and weapons traffickers and that he was always alive to possible criminal activity when conducing traffic stops. He testified that, as a member of the East Region Highway Enforcement Team, he had been involved in over 100 investigations involving large quantities of marijuana. In his testimony Constable Sinclair agreed that he is “really good at finding ways to search motor vehicles”, adding, however, that he does so “lawfully”.
[44] I do not doubt that Constable Sinclair believes that he is doing the right thing, and to that extent shows good faith. But, to borrow the words of MacPherson J.A. in R. v. MacDonald, 2012 ONCA 495, [2012] O.J. No. 3210, at para. 35, Constable Sinclair’s invariable practice of searching every car fits the description of an impermissible “fishing expedition conducted at a random highway stop". As an instructor of other police officers, he ought to be fully conversant with his legal authority, but the evidence shows either that he was not or that he was prepared to search regardless. His attitude was exemplified by his testimony: he resisted the notion that what he did was a “search”: “I do an inventory sir, not a search”. This was plainly a search.
[45] In my view, the first line of inquiry under Grant therefore militates in favour of the exclusion of the evidence obtained in violation of the appellant’s s. 8 rights. I am satisfied that the state conduct in this case falls on the serious end of the spectrum of misconduct described by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Kitaitchik, 2002 CanLII 45000 (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 2476 ,166 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (C.A.), at para. 41.
The Second Grant Line of Inquiry
[46] The second Grant line of inquiry "calls for an evaluation of the extent to which the breach actually undermined the interests protected by the right infringed (para 76)." The relevant right here is to be free from unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter. In that context, "[a]n unreasonable search that intrudes on an area in which the individual reasonably enjoys a high expectation of privacy, or that demeans his or her dignity, is more serious than one that does not": see Grant, at para. 78.
[47] The case law has consistently held that drivers have a reduced expectation of privacy in their vehicles: see Caslake, at para. 15; Nicolosi, at para. 9. However, a reduced expectation of privacy does not mean that an unjustified search is permissible. As stated by McLachlin C.J. in Harrison, “[a] person in the appellant's position has every expectation of being left alone - subject, as already noted, to valid highway traffic stops”: Harrison, at paras. 31-32.
[48] As Iacobucci J. noted in R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, at para. 56, the impact of even a minimally intrusive search “must be weighed against the absence of any reasonable basis for justification”. There was no justification for Constable Sinclair’s inventory search. I am satisfied the second Grant factor also militates in favour of the exclusion of the evidence in this case.
The Third Grant Line of Inquiry
[49] The third line of inquiry in the Grant analysis involves a consideration and weighing of society's interest in the determination of the charges on their merits. The court must consider whether "the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process would be better served by admission of the evidence, or by its exclusion": Grant, at para. 79.
[50] The exclusion of the hard evidence found in the car would gut the prosecution. That evidence is conceded by the appellant to be highly reliable. At para. 83 of Grant, the Court noted that "the exclusion of highly reliable evidence may impact more negatively on the repute of the administration of justice where the remedy effectively guts the prosecution."
[51] However, I am mindful of the caution referred to by the Supreme Court, at para. 40 of Harrison, in endorsing the words of Cronk J.A.:
Allowing the seriousness of the offence and the reliability of the evidence to overwhelm the s. 24(2) analysis "would deprive those charged with serious crimes of the protection of the individual freedoms afforded to all Canadians under the Charter and, in effect, declare that in the administration of the criminal law 'the ends justify the means.'”
[52] In Harrison, the Supreme Court acquitted the appellant, where an illegal roadside search found 35 kg of cocaine, a far more dangerous drug. The court did so, as it noted at para. 37, on the basis that the trial judge had placed undue emphasis on the third line of inquiry, and had turned the analysis into a contest between the degree of the police misconduct and the seriousness of the offence, or, as McLachlin C.J. noted at para 41, “between the misdeeds of the police and those of the accused”.
[53] As Cory J. observed in Mellenthin, at para. 27:
The unreasonable search carried out in this case is the very kind which the Court wished to make clear is unacceptable. A check stop does not and cannot constitute a general search warrant for searching every vehicle, driver and passenger that is pulled over. Unless there are reasonable and probable grounds for conducting the search, or drugs, alcohol or weapons are in plain view in the interior of the vehicle, the evidence flowing from such a search should not be admitted.
[54] In my view, the third Grant factor cannot be used to systematically require the admission of reliable evidence obtained in plain disregard of an accused’s Charter rights. This is a case in which s. 24(2) of the Charter must be applied so as to ensure that the administration of justice is not undermined by the admission of evidence obtained in violation of an accused’s Charter rights.
[55] I am mindful of the Supreme Court’s caution in Grant that where the trial judge has considered the three lines of inquiry, appellate courts should defer to the trial judge’s ultimate decision. Deference is not warranted in this case because the trial judge’s reasoning on the application of s. 24(2) of the Charter was sparse, deficient and erroneous in material ways.
[56] The trial judge erred in concluding that the evidence should not be excluded. Her classification of the s. 8 breach as “technical,” as described in Nolet, was incorrect. In Nolet, the breach was considered “technical” because the fruits of the illegal search would have been discovered if the police had continued their prior lawful search: Nolet, at para. 54. Here, Constable Sinclair had no authority to conduct any type of search of the interior of the vehicle. The trial judge further erred by holding that the impact of this breach was “minimal” simply because the appellant had a lower expectation of privacy in his vehicle on a public roadway. The impact of an unjustified search is magnified where there is a total absence of justification for it.
Disposition
[57] Taking together the three Grant lines of inquiry, I conclude that the evidence should be excluded. The state misconduct was serious and the impact on the appellant’s Charter rights was significant. As McLachlin C.J. observed in Harrison, at para. 42, “the price paid by society for an acquittal in these circumstances is outweighed by the importance of maintaining Charter standards”.
[58] I would allow the appeal, exclude the evidence obtained in violation of the appellant’s Charter rights. Because the evidence in question was essential to the Crown's case, rather than order a new trial, I would enter an acquittal, as the Supreme Court did in Harrison.
Released: April 6, 2016 “DW”
“P. Lauwers J.A.”
“I agree David Watt J.A.”
“I agree G. Pardu J.A.”
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
CITATION: R. v. Harflett, 2016 ONCA 248
DATE: 20160408
DOCKET: C59518
Watt, Lauwers and Pardu JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
and
Alexander Harflett
Appellant
Counsel:
Malcolm McRae and Erec Rolfe, for the appellant
Rick Visca, for the respondent
Heard: March 1, 2016
On appeal from the conviction entered on March 24, 2014 by Justice Catherine Kehoe of the Ontario Court of Justice.
CORRIGENDUM
By the Court:
[1] This court’s reasons for decision in this appeal were released on April 6, 2016. This corrigendum addresses paras. 6 and 9 of those reasons.
[2] In para. 6, the phrase “(i) did the trial judge err in finding that the inventory search of the appellant’s vehicle breached his rights under s.8” is to be deleted and replaced with the following: “(i) did the trial judge err in not finding that the inventory search of the appellant’s vehicle breached his rights under s. 8”. In the result, paragraph 6 is to read as follows:
[6] This appeal raises two issues: (i) did the trial judge err in not finding that the inventory search of the appellant’s vehicle breached his rights under s. 8 of the Charter; and (ii) if so, did the trial judge err in finding the evidence to be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter?
[3] In para. 9, the first sentence of the quoted text is to be deleted and replaced with the following: “Constable Sinclair had to remove the vehicle from Highway 401, the accused could not drive it and there was no one else to drive the vehicle.”
[4] In the result, para. 9 is to read as follows:
[9] The trial judge found that the initial inventory search of the vehicle was “reasonable”, at para. 153. The totality of her reasoning on whether the officer breached the appellant’s s. 8 Charter right is found at para. 154 of her reasons:
Constable Sinclair had to remove the vehicle from Highway 401, the accused could not drive it and there was no one else to drive the vehicle. It was therefore the responsibility of Constable Sinclair. It was reasonable to assess any pre-existing damage to the vehicle, to verify any valuables in the vehicle and whether there were any weapons or other dangerous items in the vehicle. Constable Sinclair was going to release the accused and the vehicle to a hotel and therefore, had to verify that there was nothing dangerous in the vehicle and, prior to the tow to the hotel, the state of the vehicle and valuables.
Released: April 8, 2016 “DW”
“David Watt J.A.”
“P. Lauwers J.A.”
“G. Pardu J.A.”