WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
AND IS SUBJECT TO S. 45 OF THE ACT WHICH PROVIDES:
45(7) The court may make an order,
(a) excluding a particular media representative from all or part of a hearing;
(b) excluding all media representatives from all or a part of a hearing; or
(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing,
where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.
45(8) No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
45(9) The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
CITATION: Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. L.G., 2015 ONCA 840
DATE: 20151203
DOCKET: C60743
Sharpe, Cronk and Miller JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Children’s Aid Society of Toronto
Applicant (Respondent to the appeal)
and
L.G.
Respondent (Appellant)
Reide L. Kaiser, for the appellant
Michelle Cheung, for the respondent
Heard: November 30, 2015
On appeal from the judgment of Justice Michael A. Penny of the Superior Court of Justice, dated June 9, 2015.
ENDORSEMENT
[1] The appellant appeals the decision of the Superior Court dismissing her appeal from the trial judgment of the Ontario Court of Justice directing that her son, K.H., be made a Crown ward without access by the appellant, her mother or K.H.’s biological father.
[2] Of the various grounds of appeal advanced in her factum, the appellant’s argument at the appeal hearing focused on one main issue. She renews her argument, advanced before the Superior Court, that the trial judge erred by failing to find that the respondent Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (the “CAS”) breached its duty under s. 15(3)(c) of the Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11 (the “Act”) to provide guidance, counselling and other services to the appellant for the protection of K.H. and the prevention of circumstances requiring his protection.
[3] We reject this submission.
[4] The appeal judge considered this claim in detail, concluding that the evidentiary record did not support the assertion that the CAS failed to discharge its s. 15(3)(c) statutory duty. For the following reasons, we agree with the appeal judge’s conclusion and his reasoning on this issue.
[5] There was overwhelming evidence at trial of a long-standing pattern by the appellant of entering into violent relationships and conflicted situations with current or former domestic partners, thus placing both herself and her son at risk of serious harm. This conduct, which persisted up to the time of trial, was exacerbated by the appellant’s lack of insight into the damaging and potentially dangerous consequences of her behaviour, her failure to take sufficient steps to address this pattern of conduct, and her documented inability, on frequent occasion, to regulate her emotions and anger and put K.H.’s best interests ahead of her own.
[6] The record reveals that, in this volatile and emotionally-charged environment, the CAS made numerous attempts to work with the appellant to address the issues of violence and emotional turmoil in her life that were impeding her ability to safely and adequately parent K.H., and to access available services to obtain assistance. Regrettably, many of these overtures were rebuffed by the appellant or frustrated by her own conduct.
[7] Counsel for the CAS candidly acknowledged that there may have been some delay in processing information and documentation for the appellant. However, when the record is examined as a whole, it cannot be said that the CAS was derelict or deficient in any material way in the performance of its statutory duties under the Act.
[8] The trial judge’s task was to determine the disposition that accorded with K.H.’s best interests, having regard to the factors outlined in s. 37(3) of the Act. The trial judge considered the factors relevant to the application of the best interests test in K.H.’s case, and reviewed the relevant evidence bearing on those factors. We agree with the appeal judge that there is no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s decision to reject the appellant’s argument that the CAS had failed in its statutory duty. Her ruling on this issue is firmly grounded in the evidence.
[9] The appellant further argues that the trial judge erred by failing to extend the period of CAS wardship for K.H. under s. 70 of the Act.
[10] This argument also fails. The appeal judge considered this issue and concluded that, even if such an extension was available as a matter of law, an extension order was neither appropriate nor justified on the record in this case.
[11] We agree. By the time of trial, K.H. was three years of age. He had been the subject of child protection litigation since his birth and in CAS care for more than 24 months. Assuming, without deciding, that a further extension of this period of care is possible, we see nothing on the facts of this case warranting an extension well beyond the 18 months contemplated under the Act.
[12] We have no doubt that the appellant cares for her son and he for her. Nonetheless, the aim of the law is to act in K.H.’s best interests. In the circumstances of this case, there is simply no basis for appellate intervention with the trial judge’s discretionary decision that K.H.’s best interests compel that he be made a Crown ward, with no access to the appellant, K.H’s maternal grandmother or his biological father.
[13] The appeal is dismissed. This is not an appropriate case for any order of the costs of the appeal.
“Robert Sharpe J.A.”
“E.A. Cronk J.A.”
“B.W. Miller J.A.”