COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: Susin v. Susin, 2014 ONCA 733

DATE: 20141029

DOCKET: C58399

Hoy A.C.J.O., Feldman and Blair JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Dorino Susin

Moving Party (Appellant)

and

Fermino Susin

Defendant (Respondent)

Robert Klotz, for the appellant

Margaret A. Hoy, for the respondent

Heard: September 8, 2014

On appeal from the order of Justice James A. Ramsay of the Superior Court of Justice dated January 10, 2014.

R.A. Blair J.A.:

[1] Dorino Susin appeals from the order of Ramsay J. declaring him in contempt and dismissing his request for a passing of accounts in his father’s estate to take place in Brampton.

The Factual Maelstrom

[2] The Susin brothers and sisters have been squabbling over the estate of their late father, John Sr., since the death of their mother in 1998.

[3] John Sr. died on December 16, 1983. His will directed his trustees to permit his wife to reside in his house for life and, on her death, to sell the home and divide the proceeds equally among his nine children. The residue of his estate he bequeathed to his wife absolutely.

[4] After the mother’s death, John Jr. claimed an equitable interest in the house, which is located in Niagara Falls. The litigation and skirmishes spawned by that claim have kept the estate in limbo for years. John Jr.’s claim was decided by Turnbull J. in 2007, and John Jr. finally moved out of the house in June 2008. Subsequently the house was sold for slightly more than $170,000. About $80,000 remained in the estate’s account as of October 2013, the balance having been dissipated in the ongoing litigation.

[5] The nine siblings are divided into two factions, one led by John Jr. and Dorino (supported by sisters Dianne, Esther and Theresa), and the other led by Fermino (supported by sisters Gloria, Stella and Anita). The two factions have litigated, amongst other things – mostly at the instance of the John Jr./Dorino team – John Jr.’s claim to an interest in the house; Turnbull J.’s ruling on that claim; two proceedings in the Federal Court over mouldy papers John Jr. allegedly abandoned in the house; and a motion for relief based upon an improvident sale. At one point the John Jr./Dorino team commenced contempt proceedings against Ms. Hoy, counsel for the estate and the trustees; in August 2013 the motion was dismissed. The John Jr./Dorino team also brought a repetitious series of motions seeking a change in venue from Welland or to have various matters dealt with elsewhere than in Welland.

[6] Almost all the orders made against the interests of John Jr. and Dorino were appealed – none successfully – and there are numerous costs orders against them both that remain unpaid.

[7] John Jr. was declared a vexatious litigant by Quinn J. in July 2008. That order was upheld on appeal.

[8] The venue dispute triggered the series of events leading to the present appeal. The John Jr./Dorino faction objects to the estate matters being dealt with in Welland. On March 29, 2010, however, Darla Wilson J. dismissed a motion heard in Toronto for a change in venue. This Court quashed an attempt to appeal that order.

[9] Since then, no fewer than seven Superior Court judges at different times – in separate motions brought in Toronto, Newmarket and Brampton – have affirmed, in one fashion or another, that Welland is the proper venue for proceedings relating to the estate, including proceedings for the passing of accounts. For example, in November 2012, Snowie J. ordered that all matters relating to John Sr.’s estate be “heard in Welland from [the date of the order] forward.”

[10] This did not prevent Dorino from bringing the present motion seeking a passing of accounts in Brampton.

[11] Fermino’s team had had enough. They launched a cross-motion seeking to commit both Dorino and John Jr. for contempt of court. They also sought an order pursuant to s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, declaring Dorino to be a vexatious litigant and ordering him not to commence any litigation against Fermino Susin or Habibur Rahman[^1] except with leave of the court.

[12] At a hearing in Welland, Ramsay J. dismissed Dorino’s motion for the passing of accounts to be held in Brampton and allowed the cross-motion with respect to Dorino, finding him in contempt; he dismissed the contempt proceedings against John Jr. Ramsay J. rejected a request that he recuse himself because, although he is not from Welland, he is a judge of the Central South Region of the Superior Court of Justice.

[13] Dorino and John Jr. both attended and made submissions at the hearing before Ramsay J. Both filed affidavits in response to the affidavit Fermino filed in support of the cross-motion. Because of the vexatious litigant order against him, John Jr. was not allowed to make submissions on behalf of Dorino on the passing of accounts. However, John Jr. made lengthy submissions in response to the contempt proceedings. When asked for his submissions on that issue, Dorino (after a discussion with John Jr.) deferred to his brother, confining his remarks to the s. 140 vexatious litigant issue.

[14] After dismissing the motion regarding the passing of accounts in Brampton, Ramsay J. found Dorino in contempt and ordered (a) that he be committed to prison for three days; (b) that he pay a fine to the estate in the amount of $10,000; (c) that he be prohibited from taking any further steps in this proceeding or in any proceedings to which Fermino Susin or Habibur Rahman are parties, except for an appeal from the present order; and (d) that he pay costs of the motions to the estate in the amount of $10,141.78 on a full indemnity basis. Ramsay J. declined to declare Dorino a vexatious litigant. Ramsay J. also ordered that no parties to any of the passings of the accounts of the estate or any related proceedings shall be represented by John Susin, nor shall John Susin be amicus curiae.[^2]

Discussion

[15] Dorino’s principal attacks on appeal related to the contempt finding and the sentence imposed. As his sentence to imprisonment has been served, what the appeal from sentence is really about, as Mr. Klotz observed, is the $10,000 fine payable to the estate imposed by the motion judge. Dorino contended as well, however, that the motion judge erred in failing to grant his request for an order directing the passing of accounts. In oral argument, Dorino abandoned his argument that Brampton was the proper venue for the passing of accounts.

The Passing of Accounts

[16] I see no basis for interfering with the motion judge’s exercise of discretion in refusing to order the passing of accounts at this stage. He had two reasonable bases for doing so. First, as the motion judge observed, the trustees could not pass the final accounts at that stage because there are still significant debts owing to the estate (including substantial outstanding costs awards against Dorino and John Jr.) and the estate was continuing to incur legal costs as the John Jr./Dorino team persisted in bringing further motions before the court. Secondly, Dorino sought a passing of accounts to be held in Brampton. The issue of venue, including the venue of the passing of accounts, had already been litigated repeatedly, and repeatedly Superior Court judges had held that the venue for dealing with matters relating to the estate was Welland. This was another attempt to re-litigate the issue yet again.

[17] I reject this ground of appeal.

Contempt

[18] Mr. Klotz raised a number of issues on behalf of Dorino in oral argument. The following need to be addressed:

a) whether the finding of contempt is supported in the record;

b) whether the contempt order should be set aside because Dorino was not personally served with the contempt cross-motion;

c) whether the motion judge erred in imposing a fine of $10,000 payable to the estate as opposed to the province of Ontario; and

d) whether the motion judge’s order prohibiting Dorino from taking any further steps in the proceeding or in any proceedings to which Fermino Susin or Habibur Rahman are parties (except for an appeal from his order) was too broad.

The Finding of Contempt

[19] The motion judge dismissed the cross-motion for contempt against John Jr. He did so because he was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that John Jr. was simply putting Dorino forward as his proxy on the passing of accounts motion in order to avoid the consequences of the vexatious litigant order.

[20] At the same time, the motion judge was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Dorino was in contempt of court by bringing the present motion to have the passing of accounts heard in Brampton, having regard to the history and circumstances characterizing the estate litigation. His reasons are summarized at paras. 14 and 15:

The trustees submit that John and Dorino are in contempt of court by bringing the present motion in the context of this litigation. Three times the court has pronounced that the matter must proceed in Welland.[^3] On the last occasion a clear warning was given that misbehaving beneficiaries could face imprisonment if they continue their campaign of abusive motions. In the face of that warning, the present motion, a fourth request to transfer the matter out of Welland, was brought. In my view in the particular circumstances of this case this serious and repeated abuse of process rises to the level of contempt. It subverts the administration of justice by making ineffective the rules of procedure and basic concepts of fairness such as res judicata.

I have no doubt on the criminal standard of proof that Dorino Susin brought the present motion intending to subvert the administration of justice, to show disrespect for the court and to harass the responding parties. Dorino Susin’s motives are purely vindictive. He has no hope of recovering from the estate. He owes the estate much more than his share of what remains. I find him guilty of contempt of court. [Emphasis added.]

[21] The test for civil contempt where breach of a court order is in issue is three-fold: (a) the order that is said to have been breached must be clear and unequivocal; (b) the party who is alleged to have breached the order must be found to have done so deliberately and wilfully; and (c) the evidence must prove contempt beyond a reasonable doubt: Prescott-Russell Services for Children and Adults v. G.(N.) (2006), 2006 CanLII 81792 (ON CA), 82 O.R. (3d) 686 (C.A.), at para. 27; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Torroni, 2009 ONCA 85, 94 O.R. (3d) 614, at para. 21.

[22] Dorino argues that the bringing of the present motion did not constitute disobedience of the previous orders requiring all estate matters to be dealt with in Welland and therefore that the motion judge had no authority to make a contempt order in the circumstances. The previous orders did not “[require Dorino] to do an act, other than the payment of money, or to abstain from doing an act,” he submits; therefore a contempt order could not be made to enforce them under rule 60.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.

[23] While this may be technically so at one level, I see no practical difference between failing to obey the orders and failing to recognize and accept the validly-made previous orders, in these circumstances. They are tantamount to the same thing. Substantively they have the same destructive effect on the integrity of the administration of justice. In any event, breach of a prior court order is not the only type of conduct that will justify a finding of contempt.

[24] The classic definition of contempt at common law comes from The Queen v. Gray, [1900] 2 Q.B. 36, at p. 40, quoted in R. v. Cohn (1984), 1984 CanLII 43 (ON CA), 48 O.R. (2d) 65 (C.A.), at p. 78, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1985] 1 S.C.R. vii:

Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court. That is one class of contempt. Further, any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Courts is a contempt of Court. The former class belongs to the category which Lord Hardwicke L.C. characterised as “scandalising a Court or a judge.”

[25] I agree with the motion judge that Dorino’s conduct fell within the second class of conduct referred to above. It constituted an act done that was intended to, or was likely to, interfere with or obstruct the fair administration of justice: see Cohn, at p. 71. Here, even if Dorino’s conduct did not amount to breach of a court order, it was open to the motion judge – as he recognized – to resort to the common law power to commit for contempt in the circumstances.

[26] Looked at in isolation, Dorino’s motion for the passing of accounts in Brampton could be taken as simply an abuse of process. But in the circumstances here, it is more than that. The facts outlined by the motion judge in the passages quoted above raise Dorino’s motion to another level, in my view. As the motion judge found, Dorino brought the motion intending to subvert the administration of justice, intending to show disrespect for the court, and intending to harass the opposing beneficiaries, all for vindictive reasons and in the context of having been previously warned of the risk of imprisonment for contempt.

[27] Dorino argues the motion judge misapprehended the evidence and by implication, that there is no basis in the record for those findings. I disagree and can see no basis for interfering with the finding of contempt in these circumstances.

Personal Service

[28] Procedural protections on motions for civil contempt are generally strictly enforced. This includes the requirement that the materials be served personally on the party sought to be found in contempt: see Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 60.11(2). However, procedural protections that are meaningless in a particular case ought not to trump substantive compliance where the purpose of personal service has been met in the circumstances and there has been no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice. I am satisfied that is the case here.

[29] Dorino was not served personally with the cross-motion materials and it would have been preferable had the moving parties obtained an order for substituted service. That said, I think it is inevitable such an order would have been granted, given the process server’s evidence regarding his unsuccessful attempts at service and the fact that Dorino’s son was served with Dorino quite likely on the premises at the time. The process server’s affidavit deposes to his belief that Dorino was in the house standing at the window watching what was happening when his son was served.

[30] Moreover, it is evident that the rationale underlying the requirement for personal service in contempt proceedings – which are quasi-criminal in nature – has been satisfied in the circumstances.

[31] Dorino and John Jr. had full knowledge of the terms of the previous orders determining that Welland was the proper venue for proceedings regarding the estate; those orders formed the framework for the contempt motion. Dorino and John Jr. had full knowledge of the cross-motion and of the evidentiary basis for the allegations being made against them. In fact, they each filed affidavits in response to Fermino’s affidavit supporting the cross-motion. John Jr.’s affidavit responded in detail to the allegations and Dorino’s adopted and relied upon that evidence. In addition, the lengthy and hotly contested history of the war of attrition in which he and John Jr. were engaged – at great cost to the estate – left Dorino in no doubt of what the issues were. Finally, Dorino and John Jr. both attended at the hearing and both argued, or had the opportunity to argue, the merits of the contempt proceeding – again, John Jr. made elaborate submissions and Dorino, when asked for his input, confined his remarks to the s. 140 issue.

[32] In short, Dorino knew what he was facing and was provided with a full opportunity to be heard. He knew as well of his potential exposure to imprisonment. Before dismissing Dianne, Esther and Theresa’s attempt to cite Ms. Hoy for contempt, Price J. warned John Jr. and Dianne in open court that if they did not desist in their ways they risked imprisonment for contempt. The motion judge found it was “inconceivable that this warning did not come to the attention of Dorino”.

[33] In my opinion – whether the motion for contempt here is viewed as a motion pursuant to rule 60.11 relating to the breach of an order or as a common law motion for contempt in other respects – the fact that Dorino was not personally served with the notice of motion and supporting materials is not fatal to the finding of contempt made against him. The court has authority under rule 2.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dispense with full compliance with the rules where the interests of justice require it. I am satisfied that the proceedings leading up to the contempt finding afforded Dorino adequate procedural fairness and did not deprive him of a fair hearing.

[34] In spite of the strictissimi juris approach to contempt proceedings where committal is sought, there are examples in the jurisprudence supporting the view that the strict compliance principle may not always carry the day. In Dickie v. Dickie (2006), 2006 CanLII 576 (ON CA), 78 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.), Laskin J.A. in dissent would have refused to hear Dr. Dickie’s appeal from a contempt finding until his contempt had been purged, but noted that, if the appeal were to be heard – as the majority concluded – he would have dismissed it in spite of the lack of personal service (at paras. 119-23). Mrs. Dickie appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which allowed the appeal, stating that “[o]n the appeal from the decision on the contempt motion, we are in substantial agreement with the reasons of Laskin J.A.”: Dickie v. Dickie, 2007 SCC 8, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 346, at para. 7.

[35] Another example of relaxation of the strictissimi juris rule – albeit in a slightly different context – is Bhatnager v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1990 CanLII 120 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 217, where the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that the order the contemnor has allegedly violated need not be served personally where actual knowledge is proven or can be inferred (at pp. 225-26). See also Scaffidi v. Scaffidi (1998), 1998 CanLII 14890 (ON SC), 41 R.F.L. (4th) 166 (Gen. Div.), at paras. 12-14.

[36] Such is the case here. I would not give effect to this argument.

[37] I do think, however, that when it came to the penalty phase of the proceedings, it would have been proper for the motion judge to have adjourned the proceedings to enable Dorino – a self-represented litigant, now exposed to the deprivation of his liberty – to obtain legal advice, and to consider his submissions as to sentence. Instead, when the motion judge asked Dorino for submissions and Dorino appears to have become flustered – saying he intended to appeal and that he wanted to retain a lawyer for that purpose because he was “desperate” – the motion judge took that as his submissions and proceeded to impose the penalty.

[38] That said, I do not think the motion judge’s failure to adopt this procedure makes a difference in these circumstances. As counsel acknowledged, the real area of concern at this point with respect to the penalty is the $10,000 fine that was imposed. For the reasons that follow, that fine must be set aside, in any event.

The Fine

[39] Respectfully, in my view the motion judge erred in imposing a fine payable to the estate. This Court has held, in SNC-Lavalin Profac Inc. v. Sankar, 2009 ONCA 97, 94 O.R. (3d) 236, that a fine imposed for civil contempt of court ought not to be payable to a party in the action but, rather, to the Provincial Treasurer. As Laskin J.A. explained, at paras. 14 and 15:

Contempt of court for breach of a court order is an offence against the authority of the court and the administration of justice. As Cumming J. said in Sussex Group Ltd. v. 3933938 Canada Inc. (c.o.b. Global Export Consulting), [2003] O.J. No. 2952, 2003 CanLII 49334 (S.C.J.), at para. 13, “It does not have, and must not appear to have, the function of a civil action in tort or for breach of contract.” See, also, Royal Bank of Canada v. Yates Holding Inc., [2007] O.J. No. 1264, 2007 CanLII 23601 (S.C.J.), per Cumming J., at para. 19. A fine for contempt of court, therefore, should not go to the plaintiff in the lawsuit.

Provisions of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 and the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 support this conclusion. The Criminal Code is relevant because, although the appellants committed a civil contempt of court, civil contempt bears the imprint of the criminal law. A person found in civil contempt may face any sanction available for the commission of a criminal offence. A fine is one of those sanctions: see s. 734.1 of the Criminal Code; Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006 SCC 52, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, [2006] S.C.J. No. 52; and Chiang (Trustee of) v. Chiang, [2009] O.J. No. 41, 2009 ONCA 3. [Emphasis added.]

[40] As mentioned above, I see no material difference for these purposes between the breach of a court order and – as is the case here – the failure to recognize and accept the validity of previous orders by repeatedly launching unmeritorious motions seeking the same relief that was the subject matter of these orders and was denied. And I see no reason why the principle in SNC-Lavalin would not apply equally where, as here, contempt at common law is made out. Nor do I see any difference between the reference to the “plaintiff” in SNC-Lavalin and the estate in the present proceedings; both are parties to the proceedings.

[41] Recently, in Boily v. Carleton Condominium Corporation 145, 2014 ONCA 574, this Court ordered a fine payable to a condominium corporation, one of the parties to the appeal. The directors of the corporation had been found in contempt for refusing to implement the provisions of a court order concerning the restoration of certain portions of the garage and landscaping. On appeal, this Court set aside a penalty provision requiring the individual directors to personally bear the costs of restoration, but replaced it with an order that the individual directors each pay a fine of $7,500 to the condominium corporation (at para. 145).

[42] In its outcome, Boily appears to be in conflict with SNC-Lavalin. The majority in Boily ordered the directors who were found in contempt to pay a fine to another party, the condominium corporation. SNC-Lavalin established that if a fine is imposed for civil contempt the fine should be payable to the Provincial Treasurer.

[43] In Boily, however, the principal issues were the quantum of the fine and the personal liability of the directors, and not the fact that the fine had not been made payable to the Provincial Treasurer. Each director was fined approximately $100,000 payable towards the costs of restoration as a means of ensuring those costs were not shouldered by the individual unit owners. Speaking for the majority, Epstein J.A. concluded that the fines imposed were unfit – they were “above an amount necessary to reflect the public interest in the matter” – and that the motion judge erred in focusing on the costs of his restoration order rather than on the central issue of deterrence (at para. 133). She held that a fine of $7,500 imposed on each director “would achieve the necessary degree of deterrence” (at para. 136).

[44] Although the Court in Boily made the fine payable to the condominium corporation, there does not appear to have been an argument about the propriety of a fine being made payable to a party, and the Court does not seem to have been referred to SNC-Lavalin. SNC-Lavalin was not cited in any of the parties’ facta, nor did any of the parties argue that making the fine payable to a party was problematic. It was not cited by the court below.

[45] As noted above, the issues in Boily were quantum, liability, and deterrence. Moreover, in arriving at her conclusion, Epstein J.A. reinforced the principles – as stated by this Court in SNC-Lavalin – that civil contempt proceedings are not to have the appearance of a civil action for the recovery of damages and that the court’s concern in such circumstances is the failure to respect the court’s process (at para. 130): see also Royal Bank v. Yates Holdings Inc. (2007), 2007 CanLII 23601 (ON SC), 33 C.B.R. (5th) 268 (S.C.), at para. 19; Sussex Group Ltd. v. 3933938 Canada Inc., 2003 CanLII 49334 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 2952 (S.C.), at para. 13; Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc., 2001 FCT 589, 12 C.P.R. (4th) 456, at para. 11, var’d 2003 FCA 234, 227 D.L.R. (4th) 106, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 366.

[46] I do not think that in these circumstances the outcome in Boily is of assistance.

[47] In the result, I am satisfied that the motion judge erred in imposing a fine payable to the estate. This opens the issue of a fine for reconsideration.

[48] After consulting with her client, Ms. Hoy advised that if we were inclined to rule that payment of the fine to the estate was an error, the respondent would prefer that no fine be imposed. The reason for this position is that a fine of $10,000 payable by Dorino to the Provincial Treasurer would have the effect of further diminishing Dorino’s assets, thus making it even more unlikely that the estate will recover Dorino’s outstanding liabilities.

[49] While the preferences of a party are not necessarily persuasive in determining an appropriate penalty for civil contempt, I think that a fine was not necessary in this case to meet the goals of deterrence and the need to stress the importance of respect for the court’s process. The sentence of three days’ imprisonment underlined those points. This is not a case where strengthening the message by doubling the sanction was necessary, in my view.

[50] Accordingly, I would set aside the portion of the order compelling Dorino to pay a fine of $10,000 to the estate.

Scope of the Prohibition Order

[51] Fermino’s cross-motion also sought an order pursuant to s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, declaring Dorino to be a vexatious litigant and ordering him not to commence any litigation against Fermino Susin or Habibur Rahman except with leave of the court.

[52] The motion judge declined to grant a vexatious litigant order, but nonetheless ordered “that Dorino Susin is prohibited from taking any further steps in this proceeding or in any proceeding to which Fermino Susin or Habibur Rahman are parties, except for an appeal from today’s Orders to the appropriate Appeal Court”. He does not appear to have made this order pursuant to his powers to deal with vexatious litigants under s. 140. Instead, he stated at para. 17 of his reasons that the order prohibiting Dorino from filing further motions was imposed “as part of the penalty for contempt.”

[53] A judge has a broad discretion in crafting the penalties on a finding of contempt of court. It is not necessary to resort to s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to make such an order. Under rule 60.11(5) the judge “may make such order as is just” and, where a finding of contempt is made, may order the person in contempt (d) to “do or refrain from doing an act” or (f) to “comply with any other order that the judge considers necessary”. A judge has a similarly broad discretion when imposing a penalty for contempt at common law. As well, a judge’s exercise of that discretion is entitled to considerable deference and should only be interfered with where there has been an error in principle or the sentence is clearly unfit.

[54] For those reasons I would not interfere with the motion judge’s decision to impose a prohibition order in relation to further steps in these proceedings or in other proceedings to which Fermino or Habibur are parties. However, the scope of the order goes beyond what is reasonably necessary in my view and constitutes an error in principle.

[55] A review of the transcript indicates that what the motion judge initially intended to do was to “make directions as to [Dorino’s] further participation in the passing of accounts”. His ultimate order went further, however. It prohibits Dorino “from taking any further steps in this proceeding or in any proceeding to which Fermino Susin or Habibur Rahman are parties, except for an appeal from today’s Orders to the appropriate Appeal Court”. I take no issue with the motion judge’s ultimate decision to broaden the order to encompass estate matters beyond the passing of accounts, but an absolute prohibition without any further recourse goes beyond what is reasonably necessary. Accordingly, I would vary the order by adding the words “without leave of the court”.

Disposition

[56] Accordingly, I would allow the appeal to the extent that the order of Ramsay J. dated January 10, 2014 is varied as follows:

a) by deleting the provisions of paragraph 4; and

b) by amending paragraph 5 to add the words “, without leave of the court,” in line three after the words “are parties” and before the words “except for an appeal”.

[57] I would dismiss the appeal otherwise.

[58] As success has been divided, there will be no order as to costs on the appeal. I would not interfere with the costs order below.

Released: October 29, 2014 (“D.D.”)

“R.A. Blair J.A.”

“I agree, Alexandra Hoy A.C.J.O.”

“I agree, K. Feldman J.A.”

[^1]: Habibur Rahman is the husband of Anita (one of Fermino’s supporters) and was appointed executor to replace Dorino by Turnbull J. in 2007.

[^2]: This order arose because John Susin had made submissions before Justice Ramsay and had attempted to do so as amicus curiae for Dorino. Ramsay J. cited Price J.’s earlier finding that John Jr. had used his siblings as proxies in other proceedings in order to circumvent the vexatious proceedings order.

[^3]: The motion judge referred to three, but by my count there were seven. Darla Wilson J., Hoy J. (as she then was), Di Tomaso J., Snowie J., McCarthy J., Herold J., and Price J. have all made orders directly or indirectly confirming Welland as the venue for the hearing of the estate matters.