WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT
AND IS SUBJECT TO S. 45 OF THE ACT WHICH PROVIDES:
- (7) The court may make an order,
(a) excluding a particular media representative from all or part of a hearing;
(b) excluding all media representatives from all or a part of a hearing; or
(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing,
where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.
(8) No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
(9) The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
CITATION: N.R. v. Children's Aid Society of Toronto, 2012 ONCA 315
DATE: 20120514
DOCKET: C54126
Simmons, Pepall and Ducharme JJ.A.
BETWEEN
N. R.
Appellant (Plaintiff)
and
Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, Hanna Gavendo and David Rivard
Respondents (Defendants)
N.R., in person
James C. Dakin and Tamara Maurer, for the respondents
Heard and released orally: April 30, 2012
On appeal from the order of Justice Edward Belobaba of the Superior Court of Justice, dated July 11, 2011.
ENDORSEMENT
[1] On a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the appellant’s action the motion judge found that the personal defendants are protected from suit by s. 15(6) of the Child and Family Services Act. In addition, he concluded that the appellant had either not pleaded sufficient facts or not adduced any evidence to support her various claims against the C.A.S. In any event, he found the C.A.S. would be entitled to the defence of qualified privilege had the statements in the C.A.S. file been published or broadcast.
[2] Based on our review of the record, the motion judge was correct in making these determinations. The appellant’s claims arise from certain comments about the appellant recorded in a C.A.S. file relating to the appellant’s granddaughter. The file was open for a matter of days and was closed when protection concerns were not verified. The impugned comments appear to consist of a worker’s opinion, as well as the worker’s understanding of opinions about the appellant communicated by others.
[3] Even assuming that the worker’s opinion was unfounded and that the comments did not properly reflect the opinions communicated by others, there is no evidence to suggest that the comments were recorded for an improper purpose. Moreover, apart from disclosing the file to the appellant’s daughter and as part of their disclosure obligations under the Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no evidence that the respondents have disseminated the C.A.S. file in any way.
[4] On appeal, the appellant also alleges various procedural irregularities about the summary judgment motion, as well as criminal wrongdoing on the part of the motion judge. The motion judge was a rule 37.15 judge and may make such procedural rules as are necessary. Moreover, the motion judge’s handwritten endorsement reflects that the appellant was assisted by a translator at the hearing – her daughter. The appellant has failed to adduce any credible evidence to substantiate her other allegations and we find them to be without merit.
[5] The appeal is therefore dismissed.
[6] The respondents are entitled to costs on a partial indemnity scale fixed in the amount of $4,948, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.
Signed: “Janet Simmons J.A.”
“S.E. Pepall J.A.
“Ducharme J.A.”