WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT
AND IS SUBJECT TO:
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act.
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person.
(1) Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published), 118(1) (no access to records unless authorized) or 128(3) (disposal of R.C.M.P. records) or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) of this Act, or subsection 38(1) (identity not to be published), (1.12) (no subsequent disclosure), (1.14) (no subsequent disclosure by school) or (1.15) (information to be kept separate), 45(2) (destruction of records) or 46(1) (prohibition against disclosure) of the Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
R. v. D.W., 2011 ONCA 669
CITATION: R. v. D.W., 2011 ONCA 669
DATE: 20111026
DOCKET: C50562
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Doherty, Goudge and Epstein JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
and
D.W.
Appellant
Counsel:
Candice Suter and Lucy Saunders, for the appellant
Emile Carrington, for the respondent
Heard: October 25, 2011
On appeal from the finding of guilt entered on August 8, 2008, and the disposition imposed on May 7, 2009 by Justice Norris Weisman of the Ontario Court of Justice.
APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT
[1] We agree with counsel for the appellant that the trial judge made certain errors in his s. 11(b) analysis, particularly in his application of the guidelines relevant to a Youth Criminal Justice Act accused. However in the end, the important issues are those of prejudice and the gravity of the offence.
[2] In our view, the assessment by the trial judge of the extent of actual prejudice to the appellant is one we would not interfere with. He had the advantage of hearing the evidence. Even if we were to include in the balancing some inferred prejudice, given the length of delay, in our view it does not outweigh the societal interest in having such a serious charge proceed to trial.
[3] Thus, we agree with the result reached by the trial judge. The appeal must be dismissed.