WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT
AND IS SUBJECT TO S. 45 OF THE ACT WHICH PROVIDES:
- (7) The court may make an order,
(a) excluding a particular media representative from all or part of a hearing;
(b) excluding all media representatives from all or a part of a hearing; or
(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing,
where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.
(8) No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
(9) The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. M.S., 2011 ONCA 282
DATE: 20110408
DOCKET: C52529
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Weiler, Simmons and Epstein JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Children's Aid Society of Toronto
Applicant (Respondent)
and
M.S.
Respondent (Appellant)
Linda Choi, for the appellant
Michelle Cheung, for the respondent
Elizabeth McCarty, for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer
Heard: April 7, 2011
On appeal from the order of Justice Jane E. Kelly of the Superior Court of Justice, dated July 7, 2010.
APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT
[1] The appellant submits that at the time of the trial judge’s decision, the trial judge was dealing with four children and held out some hope for the mother’s ability to parent them in the absence of her mentally ill husband. With respect to the two older children, the trial judge wanted to give the mother some time to prove that she would not be reunited with the father. Counsel asks, “Why would she not have the same expectation for the two younger children?” Counsel further submits that the trial judge ought to have considered extending Society wardship pursuant to s. 70(4) of the Family and Child Services Act.
[2] In our opinion, the trial judge differentiated the situation of the children in her reasons. She discussed each of the older children and the situation of the two younger children giving proper attention to their needs and situation. M. could go back to the grandparents if reintegration failed. The older children were unhappy at not being with their mother and had expressed a consistent wish to return home. Their wishes had to be given considerable weight. The younger children were in a foster home and were doing well. There was no place for the two younger children to go if reintegration with the family failed as the grandparents were unable to look after them.
[3] Even assuming that the trial judge had the discretion to extend the time pursuant to s. 70(4) as submitted, the trial judge made the placement decisions that she did based on a careful and individual assessment of the best interests of each child. The findings of fact made by the trial judge were supported by the evidence. We see no error in Kelly J.’s decision to uphold the decision of Waldman J. The disposition of crown wardship with no access was appropriate. The fresh evidence does not alter the outcome of this appeal. The best interests of the children who are the subject of this appeal require that we balance all the considerations set out in s. 37(3) of the Act.
[4] The appeal is dismissed.