Court File and Parties

CITATION: Teibas Ltd. v. Maintenance Construction and Skilled Trades Council, 2011 ONCA 19

DATE: 20110111

DOCKET: C52473

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

Doherty, MacPherson and Cronk JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Teibas Ltd.

Applicant (Respondent in Appeal)

and

Maintenance Construction and Skilled Trades Council

Respondent (Appellant)

and

Toronto District School Board

Respondent (Respondent in Appeal)

Sean McFarling and Virginia Nelder, for the appellant

Susan Ursel and Vaino Poysa, for the respondent, Teibas Ltd.

Ian R. Dick, for the respondent, Toronto District School Board

Heard and orally released: January 5, 2011

On appeal from the judgment of Justice S. Chapnik of the Superior Court of Justice, dated June 30, 2010.

ENDORSEMENT

[1] The appellant submits that its payments into the Trust are properly governed by the terms of a collective agreement it entered into with the Toronto District School Board. The Toronto District School Board agrees with this position. However, the respondent Teibas Ltd. – the administrator of the Trust – contends that the collective agreement between the Council and the Toronto District School Board does not come within the definition of “Collective Agreement” in the Trust Agreement. The respondent argues that contributions to the Trust must be made under a “Participation Agreement” to be entered into between the Toronto District School Board and the Trustees.

[2] The relevant definition in the Trust Agreement is set out below:

“Collective Agreement” shall mean any written collective agreement by and between the Union and the Association or an Employer and/or one to which the Union and Association and/or an Employer is bound, which provides, among other things, for Contributions to the Trust Funds, with any amendments, supplements, modifications thereto or renewals thereof.

[3] Local 353 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, a union affiliated with the appellant Council, is the Union referred to in the Trust Agreement.

[4] The motion judge in brief reasons said the following:

I do not find that sections 57(3) and (4) or any of the provisions in the LRA [Labour Relations Act] purport to make the Council Collective Agreement a collective agreement within the meaning of the 2005 Trust Agreement. The MCSTC [Council] is a separate bargaining agent with the TDSB [Toronto District School Board] and the Council Agreement does not meet the definition of a collective agreement within the meaning of the Trust documents.

[5] We disagree with the motion judge’s conclusion. The definition of “Collective Agreement” extends to any collective agreement that meets the prerequisites as set out in the definition in the Trust Agreement to which Local 353 “is bound”. The crucial part of the definition for the purpose of this case is the reference to agreements to which Local 353 “is bound”.

[6] Pursuant to the provisions of the Labour Relations Act, under the terms of the contractual documents between the Council and the Toronto District School Board and as evinced by resolutions of Local 353, it is clear that Local 353 is bound by the collective agreement entered into between the Council and the Toronto District School Board. That agreement fixes the terms and conditions of employment as between the Union and the Toronto District School Board, including the payments to be made to the Trust.

[7] We can see no basis upon which to give the word “bound” as it appears in the definition of “Collective Agreement” in the Trust Agreement any different or more restrictive meaning than the word would normally be given in the labour relations context.

[8] The appeal must be allowed. As we understand it, the parties can agree on the terms of the proper order to be substituted for the order made below. That order should simply indicate that the collective agreement between the Toronto District School Board and the Council is a “Collective Agreement” for the purpose of the Trust Agreement.

[9] In our view, this is not an appropriate case for costs for or against any party either at the court of first instance or here.

“Doherty J.A.”

“J.C. MacPherson J.A.”

“E.A. Cronk J.A.”