R. v. Eade, 2010 ONCA 667

CITATION: R. v. Eade, 2010 ONCA 667

DATE: 20101012

DOCKET: C49098

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

Goudge, Sharpe and MacFarland JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty the Queen

Respondent

and

Robert Eade

Appellant

Jennifer Myers, for the appellant

Karen Shai, for the respondent

Heard: September 29, 2010

On appeal from the conviction entered on December 15, 2006 by Justice Kenneth E. Pedlar of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury.

By The Court:

[1] The appellant raises a number of issues about the way the trial judge dealt with the evidence in this case. We did not find it necessary to call on the Crown on any of them.

[2] First, he says the trial judge failed to consider the exculpatory part of the appellant’s statement to the police officers and the exculpatory identification evidence of Cindy Massey. We do not agree. The appellant’s assertion that he did not believe the home invasion happened is so demonstrably a false belief that it cannot provide the appellant with any significant assistance. As to Ms. Massey’s evidence, the trial judge carefully assessed the identification element of it and declined to accept it. He was entitled to do so.

[3] The appellant then says that the trial judge gave improper consideration to the inadmissible statements of the appellant and Ronald Summers. We disagree. The trial judge carefully assessed the evidence of the voluntariness of the appellant’s statement, found it admissible, and then determined what weight to give various parts of it. It was not necessary that the trial judge explicitly refer to all the evidence bearing on these issues and disposing of them and we see no error in the way he did so. As to the Mr. Summers’ statement, it was clearly admissible at trial as against its maker. In his reasons, the trial judge makes only passing reference to it. It is unclear if the trial judge used it at all against the appellant. If so, this is at most an innocuous error not warranting appellate intervention.

[4] Finally, the appellant says that the trial judge misapprehended certain evidence, particularly the evidence relating to footprints and failed to properly assess credibility. Again we disagree. The footprint evidence was admissible. It was properly understood by the trial judge and, in any event, he drew only limited conclusions from it. The trial judge was clear in his credibility findings, properly cautioned himself about Lee Massey, and offered reasons for his conclusions on credibility. We would not interfere with them.

[5] The appeal is dismissed.

RELEASED: OCT 12 2010 (“S. T. G.”)

“S. T. Goudge J.A.”

“Robert J. Sharpe J.A.”

“MacFarland J.A.”