WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT
AND IS SUBJECT TO:
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act…
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person.
(1) Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published), 118(1) (no access to records unless authorized) or 128(3) (disposal of R.C.M.P. records) or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) of this Act, or subsection 38(1) (identity not to be published), (1.12) (no subsequent disclosure), (1.14) (no subsequent disclosure by school) or (1.15) (information to be kept separate), 45(2) (destruction of records) or 46(1) (prohibition against disclosure) of the Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
CITATION: R. v. M.C., 2009 ONCA 94
DATE: 20090130
DOCKET: C47514
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Sharpe, Armstrong and Watt JJ.A.
BETWEEN:
Her Majesty The Queen
Respondent
and
M.C. (A Young Person)
Appellant
Mark Halfyard for the appellant
Dena Bonnet for the respondent
Heard & released: January 28, 2009
On appeal from the judgment of Justice Douglas of the Ontario Court of Justice dated February 12, 2007.
ENDORSEMENT
[1] Despite Mr. Halfyard’s very able argument, we are not persuaded that there was a material apprehension of the evidence sufficient to warrant appellate intervention.
[2] The appellant’s DNA was found on the front panel of the complainant’s underwear, not as the trial judge stated on the front and back. This misstatement of the evidence does not, in our view, vitiate the key finding that the DNA was found on the front panel, a fact that strongly corroborated the complainant’s evidence.
[3] The appellant complains that the trial judge failed to distinguish between DNA and saliva. We do not regard this as material as there was evidence that the stain did come from saliva and no other explanation offered as to how the appellant’s DNA got there.
[4] On the issue of whether the complainant was fully clothed, there was ample evidence to support the trial judge’s finding on this point and the appellant’s evidence was equivocal at best.
[5] Finally, the appellant complains that in his reasons, the trial judge referred only to the appellant’s parent’s supervision of the bedroom and ignored the evidence of the three Crown witnesses. Again, we are not persuaded that this was material. The offence took a short time to commit. There was some evidence of evasion and some evidence concealment with blankets and even if the trial judge had alluded to all the supervision evidence, there was still ample proof to support his finding that the appellant did commit this offence.
[6] Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
“Robert J. Sharpe J.A.”
“R.P. Armstrong J.A.”
“David Watt J.A.”