WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT
AND IS SUBJECT TO:
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act…
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person…
(1) Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published), 118(1) (no access to records unless authorized) or 128(3) (disposal of R.C.M.P. records) or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) of this Act, or subsection 38(1) (identity not to be published), (1.12) (no subsequent disclosure), (1.14) (no subsequent disclosure by school) or (1.15) (information to be kept separate), 45(2) (destruction of records) or 46(1) (prohibition against disclosure) of the Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
CITATION: R. v. D.R., 2009 ONCA 459
DATE: 20090603
DOCKET: C48296
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Doherty, Rosenberg and Gillese JJ.A.
BETWEEN:
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
and
D.R.
Applicant (Appellant)
Paul Calarco, for the appellant
Dena Bonnet, for the respondent
Heard: June 2, 2009
On appeal from the conviction entered by Justice Hackett of the Youth Court of Ontario dated May 10, 2007 and the sentence imposed on November 26, 2007.
APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT
[1] The conviction appeal is dismissed. The trial judge reviewed all of the evidence, Crown and defence alike, carefully, thoroughly, and with one very minor exception, accurately. We see no error in her analysis of the evidence. Nor do we see any difference in her approach to the evidence of the Crown and defence. She came to very different conclusions with respect to the Crown evidence and defence evidence. It does not follow from the different outcome of the analysis that the trial judge applied different standards to the defence evidence.
[2] We are not inclined to interfere with the sentence imposed. The trial judge’s reference to the appellant’s failure to “accept responsibility” for the crime as relevant to his rehabilitation was inappropriate if read as justifying the imposition of a jail term where a jail term was otherwise inappropriate. Read in its entire context, however, we are satisfied that the trial judge was referring to the appellant’s failure to take responsibility for his actions as relevant to the selection of the appropriate means by which to promote the long term rehabilitation of the offender. There is no error in principle in this analysis.
[3] The sentence was not manifestly excessive or unreasonable given the nature of the assaults, the child’s age and the breach of trust.
[4] The appellant has a child. The parties are agreed that the probation order should be amended to allow the appellant to be in the presence of his son without the presence of any other adult.
[5] The appeal is dismissed except for the probation variation.