WARNING
THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER THE
YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT
AND IS SUBJECT TO:
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act…
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person…
(1) Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published), 118(1) (no access to records unless authorized) or 128(3) (disposal of R.C.M.P. records) or section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) of this Act, or subsection 38(1) (identity not to be published), (1.12) (no subsequent disclosure), (1.14) (no subsequent disclosure by school) or (1.15) (information to be kept separate), 45(2) (destruction of records) or 46(1) (prohibition against disclosure) of the Young Offenders Act, chapter Y-1 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985,
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
DATE: 20060928
DOCKET: C43787
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
RE:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN (respondent) – and – I.I. (A Young Person) (Appellant)
BEFORE:
MOLDAVER, GOUDGE AND SHARPE JJ.A.
COUNSEL:
Marc E. Schiffer
for the appellant
Nadia Thomas
for the respondent
HEARD & ENDORSED:
September 26, 2006
On appeal from conviction by Justice D. T. Hogg of the Youth Justice Court, dated April 20, 2005 and sentence imposed June 6, 2005.
A P P E A L B O O K E N D O R S E M E N T
[1] Appeal against sentence is dismissed as abandoned.
[2] With respect to conviction, we agree with the appellant that the reasons for judgment leave much to be desired. That said, we think it was open for the trial judge to accept Con Johnson’s evidence that the complainant, James, told him while he and James were walking through the plaza, that his assailant wore glasses and had braces on his teeth. Contrary to the submission of the appellant, we do not read the testimony of James as being in conflict with this finding.
[3] In cross-examination, James was only asked what description he gave to the officer when the officer arrived; he was not asked about any further or other description he may have given while he and the officer walked through the plaza. The officer, on the other hand, was specifically asked about the further description given while walking through the plaza and he clearly remembered the “unusual” features of the description given, particularly the braces. While it would have been helpful for the trial judge to have explained this, upon a careful reading of the transcript, we do not think that his failure to do so undermines the conclusion he reached.
[4] As to the submission that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the frailties in Christopher’s identification, in our view, the case turned on James’ identification evidence. Accordingly, any deficiencies in the trial judge’s assessment of Christopher’s evidence are of no moment.
[5] Finally, on the failure of the appellant to testify, if the trial judge thought that he could use the appellant’s failure to testify in this case to make the Crown’s case, he was wrong. However, his reasons make it clear that regardless of the appellant’s failure to testify, he was nonetheless satisfied that his guilt had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[6] Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.