DATE: 20060918
DOCKET: C44788
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
RE:
FRANK GEE WONG (Applicant/Respondent in Appeal) - and - BILLIE WONG (Respondent/Appellant in Appeal)
BEFORE:
O’CONNOR A.C.J.O, CRONK AND LANG JJ.A.
COUNSEL:
Gary S. Joseph and Cheryl S. Williams
for the appellant
Gerald K. Culliton and Kenneth J. Peacocke
for the respondent
HEARD & RELEASED ORALLY:
September 13, 2006
On appeal from the order of Justice Helen A. Rady of the Superior Court of Justice dated December 15, 2005.
E N D O R S E M E N T
[1] The appellant argues that the final order of Rady J. ought not to have been granted for three reasons:
The order was granted without the case conference contemplated by Rule 14(4);
The order was granted even though the respondent was in breach of an earlier order requiring him to transfer the title to the Richmond Street property into the parties’ joint names; and
The order was granted without giving the appellant the opportunity to complete her offer to purchase the matrimonial home.
[2] On the first issue, both the respondent’s motions and the appellant’s cross-motions before Rady J. sought an order dispensing with a case conference on the basis of urgency under Rule 14(4.2). Furthermore, there was an outstanding order for the sale of the properties “forthwith”, as well as offers outstanding on certain of the properties. In those circumstances, we see no error in the application judge’s finding of urgency and her decision to dispense with the case conference.
[3] On the second issue, the respondent was in breach of the earlier order to transfer the title of the Richmond Street property. That breach, however, was known to the application judge. It was unnecessary for her to deal with the issue given her order dispensing with the appellant’s consent to the transfer of title of the Richmond Street property in accordance with a particular offer to purchase. We see no error in principle.
[4] On the third issue, the appellant offered to purchase the matrimonial home, but for a price that was to be reduced on account of repairs and outstanding judgments, including mortgage arrears. Accordingly, the evidence supports the finding of the application judge that there was reason to doubt whether the appellant’s offer was equivalent to or better than a pending third party offer.
[5] Since the appellant has not persuaded us of any error on the part of the application judge, the appeal is dismissed.
[6] Costs to the respondent fixed in the amount of $10,000.00, inclusive of disbursements and G.S.T.
“D. O’Connor A.C.J.O”
“E.A. Cronk J.A.”
“S.E. Lang J.A.”