DATE: 20050106
DOCKET: C33768
C34872
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
LASKIN, FELDMAN and BLAIR JJ.A.
B E T W E E N :
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE
Graham Reynolds and Nancy Dennison, for the respondents
Respondents
- and -
ALBERT McAMMOND
Paul Slansky, for the appellant
Appellant
Heard: May 14, 2004
On appeal from a committal for extradition ordered by Justice E.G. Ewaschuk on February 25, 2000, and by way of application for judicial review of the decision of the Minister to surrender the appellant, dated July 31, 2000.
R.A. BLAIR J.A.:
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
[1] Mr. McAmmond appeals from his committal for surrender to the United States of America to face charges of fraud and conspiracy to defraud. He also seeks judicial review of the decision of the Minister of Justice to order his surrender for trial in the United States.
[2] The charges allege that the appellant participated in a fraudulent telemarketing scheme involving non-existent or fraudulently priced gemstones. All of the targeted victims were American citizens, but the telemarketing is said to have been done from Toronto and Montreal.
[3] Evidence was gathered in Canada through – amongst other things – authorized wiretaps, the execution of search warrants, and the taking of a statement from Mr. McAmmond. Evidence was also gathered by American authorities in the United States. In May 1997, the United States requested Canada’s cooperation under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (the “MLAT”). In June of that year, Mr. McAmmond and another individual were indicted in Vermont. Shortly thereafter, the MLAT request was approved by the Minister of Justice, and in September 1997, the Quebec Superior Court granted a “sending order” pursuant to which the 70 boxes of materials and information collected as part of the Canadian investigation were forwarded to the FBI. In April 1998, the United States sent a diplomatic note seeking the extradition of Mr. McAmmond and the other individual. In February 1999, the Canadian authorities authorized a warrant of apprehension for extradition to issue.
[4] Initially, the United States relied upon information gathered in the Canadian investigation in support of its request for extradition. When counsel for Mr. McAmmond sought disclosure of the Canadian investigative materials, however – he argues that the Canadian investigation featured several breaches of Mr. McAmmond’s Charter rights – the United States withdrew the contested evidence from its application and disavowed any reliance upon it for purposes of the extradition. The extradition hearing before Ewaschuk J. proceeded on the basis of other evidence.
THE APPEAL AND APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
[5] On the appeal and the application for judicial review, Mr. McAmmond raises the following issues:
With respect to the appeal:
He submits that the extradition judge erred,
(a) by failing to hold there was at least an air of reality to the appellant’s Charter arguments and, accordingly, by failing to order disclosure of the Canadian investigative evidence and materials; and,
(b) by admitting photographic evidence of identification when the person identifying Mr. McAmmond from the photograph had not taken the photograph and the authenticity of the photograph had not been proven in accordance with Canadian evidentiary principles.
With respect to the decision of the Minister:
He submits that the Minister erred in the exercise of her discretion,
(a) by failing to make disclosure of the Canadian investigative evidence and information requested by Mr. McAmmond;
(b) by assuming that the material provided to the Requesting State by the Canadian authorities was provided in accordance with the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act[^1], when such was not the case;
(c) by failing to make it a condition of surrender – on Charter and on natural justice and procedural fairness grounds – that the United States undertake not to rely on any of the material gathered against Mr. McAmmond in Canada; and,
(d) by declining to refuse to surrender Mr. McAmmond on humanitarian grounds, having regard to his age (67) and health concerns.
[6] We did not call upon the Crown with respect to the identification or humanitarian grounds issues. There were other sources of identification than the photographic evidence to support the trial judge’s decision. The decision whether to decline to surrender Mr. McAmmond on humanitarian grounds was purely discretionary on the part of the Minister, and there is no basis for interfering with that decision.
[7] I would dismiss the appeal and the application for judicial review on the other grounds raised, as well, for the reasons that follow.
ANALYSIS
The Extradition Process
[8] At its core, extradition is a political process in which primary responsibility rests with the executive branch of government. It is a means by which nations honour their international obligations and the principles of comity through a framework of treaties and domestic legislation. In Canada, the process is two-staged. The first stage involves judicial input in the form of a screening mechanism whereby a judge decides whether the requesting state has put forth sufficient evidence to warrant a committal for surrender. If that is so, the Minister determines in the second stage whether the individual whose extradition is sought should be surrendered for that purpose.
[9] It is well accepted that both the first stage hearing before the judge and the proceedings before the Minister regarding surrender are subject to Charter scrutiny to ensure that they comply with the principles of fundamental justice and fairness. The role of the judge in extradition proceedings is “a modest one”, however. It is to determine whether or not the evidence adduced by the requesting state is sufficient to establish a prima facie case against the fugitive and to justify committing the fugitive for surrender: see United States of America v. Dynar (1997), 1997 359 (SCC), 115 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) at paras. 120-122, and the authorities there cited. Given that prescribed role, the jurisdiction of the extradition judge to deal with Charter issues is limited to situations where the breach “pertains directly to the circumscribed issues relevant at the committal stage of the extradition process”: United States of America v. Cobb (2001), 152 C.C.C. (2d) 270 (S.C.C.), per Arbour J. at 282; United States of America v. Kwok (2001), 2001 SCC 18, 152 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (S.C.C).
[10] Once a fugitive has been committed to await surrender, the procedure before the Minister to determine whether or not the fugitive will actually be surrendered takes on a different tone. It is primarily political in nature, and, while the Minister has the discretion to refuse to surrender, that discretion is a limited one, having regard to Canada’s international treaty obligations. See Idziak v. Canada (Minister of Justice) (1992), 1992 51 (SCC), 77 C.C.C. (3d) 65, per Cory J. at 86-87 (S.C.C.); United States of America v. Cotroni (1989), 1989 106 (SCC), 48 C.C.C. (3d) 193, per LaForest J. at 226 (S.C.C.).
The Extradition Hearing in this Case
[11] Subsection 29(1) of the Extradition Act S.C. 1999, c. 18 states:
29(1) A judge shall order the committal of the person into custody to await surrender if,
a) in the case of a person sought for prosecution, there is evidence admissible under this Act of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial in Canada on the offence set out in the authority to proceed and the judge is satisfied that the person is the person sought by the extradition partner.
[12] Apart from his argument respecting identification, based upon the admissibility of the photographic evidence – which we reject – Mr. Slansky does not seriously contest that the evidence before the extradition judge was sufficient to meet the requirements for committal pursuant to subsection 29(1). He contends, however, that there is at least an air of reality to the allegations of potential Charter violations and misconduct by Canadian authorities in the evidence gathering process. Accordingly, he says the appellant is entitled to disclosure of the Canadian materials to permit him to attempt to demonstrate that the derivative evidence obtained as a result of that investigation fatally taints the extradition proceeding.
[13] I shall return in more detail to the alleged Charter violations and illegalities in the Canadian investigations when I deal with the application for judicial review of the Minister’s decision to surrender. For this case, they are more conveniently analysed in that context. Suffice it to say at this point that they centre around allegations of undisclosed involvement by FBI officials in the Canadian investigation, a purportedly improper arrest of the appellant that is said to have been for the real purpose of obtaining evidence for charges in the United States, and submissions that proper procedures had not been followed under the MLAT and related legislation. Ewaschuk J. was satisfied, however, that the failure to disclose the Canadian materials at the extradition hearing stage did not constitute a denial of fundamental justice or a violation of procedural fairness for the purposes of the extradition hearing. He declined to order the requested disclosure. There is no basis to interfere with that decision, in my view.
[14] In Kwok – a companion appeal to Cobb – the fugitive had sought disclosure at the extradition hearing stage of the contents of the Canadian investigation into his alleged involvement in the narcotic trafficking activities that formed the subject matter of the extradition proceedings. The Supreme Court of Canada refused to sanction such disclosure. Justice Arbour elaborated on the rationale for limiting disclosure issues at the committal stage, at paras. 99-101 of the judgment. She pointed out that extradition proceedings are akin, in some ways, to preliminary inquiries. They are limited in that respect, however, by the fact – as Cory and Iacobucci JJ noted in Dynar, supra – that “the committal hearing is neither intended nor designed to provide the discovery function of a domestic preliminary inquiry” (para. 132). Justice Arbour concluded in Kwok with the following comments, which are particularly pertinent to this appeal (paras. 100-102):
[100] The extradition judge may only order the production of materials relevant to the issues properly raised at the committal stage of the process, subject to his or her discretion to expand the scope of that hearing to allow the parties to establish the factual basis for a subsequent Charter challenge, when it is expedient to do so, including, obviously, when there is at least an air of reality to the Charter claims (Dynar, supra, per Cory and Iacobucci JJ., at para. 141). Requests for disclosure of materials related to issues which properly belong to the executive phase of extradition, and to the judicial review thereof, have no independent relevance before the extradition judge and are subsumed in his or her discretion to hear evidence related to such issues.
[101] In this case, the Appellant was entitled to know the case against him, including the materials upon which the United States relied upon to establish a prima facie case. Since the requesting State was not relying upon materials in the possession of Canadian authorities, and in the absence of any indication of bad faith or improper motives on the part of the prosecuting authorities, there was no obligation to provide further disclosure of materials requested. [Underlining added]
[102] . . . As I indicated earlier in these reasons, I would not preclude altogether the exercise of a residual discretion on the part of the extradition judge to allow evidence on some of these issues in a proper case, and to order disclosure accordingly. That discretion would only be exercised for reasons of convenience, in an effort to expedite further the full disposition of the case. There was no need to resort to it in the present case.
[15] In my view, the foregoing observations, and the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kwok, Cobb, and Dynar, generally, are dispositive of the issues on this appeal.
[16] The extradition judge was faced with a situation where the requesting state had taken the impugned Canadian investigation materials off the table for purposes of the extradition proceedings and disavowed any reliance upon them. Consequently, any argument that the evidence originally relied upon from the Canadian investigation should be excluded on Charter grounds was pre-empted. Even accepting the allegations of Charter violations and illegalities put forward by the appellant at their face value, they fall far short of circumstances that would have justified the extradition judge in imposing the rare remedy of a stay of the committal proceedings.
[17] Even so, the extradition judge was asked to order disclosure of the Canadian investigation on derivative evidence grounds. Mr. Slansky submitted that, even though the requesting state was not relying on the Canadian investigation in support of its extradition application, it nonetheless relied upon evidence that was derived from that investigation, thus fundamentally tainting the fairness of the committal hearing. He concedes that he cannot tie the alleged Charter breaches directly to the evidence relied upon by the requesting state without disclosure, but argues there is at least an air of reality to the alleged misconduct of the Canadian officials in the investigation, and therefore he should be entitled to that disclosure in order to permit an assessment of the derivative evidence/procedural fairness concerns.
[18] Precisely what derivative evidence is said to give rise to the Charter concerns in this matter is not clear. However, the identity of Mr. McAmmond as a participant in the fraudulent gemstone scheme seems to be the most likely focus. The wiretaps provided the first investigatory indication of the involvement of the appellant and others – including an alleged co-conspirator, David Beckler – in the scheme. Mr Beckler is the person who identified Mr. McAmmond for purposes of the committal hearing. He did so from the contested photograph referred to at the outset of these reasons and by way of voice identification from wiretap evidence obtained by American authorities in the United States.
[19] The appellant relied upon the discovery of Mr. Beckler by the police through the wiretap interceptions made in Canada as his principal ground of attack before the extradition judge. Ewaschuk J. rejected this argument. Although I would not assume, as he did, that the interceptions constituted an unreasonable seizure because they had not yet been proven to have been legally and reasonably made[^2], his reasons for rejecting the argument were nonetheless sound, in my view. He held that the interception, by which Mr. Beckler was presumably discovered, touched Mr. Beckler’s constitutional rights and not those of Mr. McAmmond, and that Mr. McAmmond had no reasonable expectation of privacy in private communications between Mr. Beckler and others. In addition, the wiretap interceptions occurred many years before Mr. Beckler’s deposition made in the extradition proceedings and the extradition judge concluded that his evidence was “too temporally remote and causally tenuous from the presumed Charter breaches to qualify as derivative evidence under Section 24(2) of the Charter”.
[20] These findings were open to the extradition judge on the record, and he was entitled to conclude that there was no air of reality to the Charter complaint concerning derivative evidence and the fairness of the extradition process itself.
[21] Consequently, the extradition judge was left with determining whether to exercise his limited discretion to order fuller disclosure on matters pertaining to the alleged Charter violations and illegalities in the Canadian investigation – all matters extraneous to the issues on the extradition hearing itself, and all pursued by the appellant for purposes of preparing a record for the proceedings before the Minister. The authorities do not stand for the proposition that, even if there is an air of reality to the complaints alleged, the extradition judge must order disclosure, but only that he or she may exercise a limited discretion to do so. United States of America v. Cheema, 1999 6966 (BC SC), [1999] B.C.J. No. 1365 (QL) (B.C.S.C.), leave to appeal dismissed, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 418 (QL), is an example of an extradition judge exercising that discretion. Ewaschuk J. declined to follow that route. He took the position that such disclosure was premature in the circumstances of this case, and better dealt with either by the Minister or (in the event of further refusal by the Minister) on a review of the Minister’s decision in this Court. He was entitled to make that choice and I can find no error in principle in his decision in that regard.
[22] I would therefore dismiss the appeal from the extradition judge’s decision to commit Mr. McAmmond for surrender.
Judicial Review of the Minister’s Decision
The Minister’s Decision
[23] By letter dated July 31, 2000, the Minister communicated her decision to surrender Mr. McAmmond to United States for trial. In substance, her reasons were as follows. Firstly, a person sought in extradition proceedings has only “a limited right to disclosure”. Given that limitation, together with the fact that the requesting state was able to obtain the extradition committal order by relying on materials not directly connected to the Canadian investigation, the Minister refused to order the disclosure sought. Secondly, she was satisfied the materials had been provided to the United States in accordance with the MLAT and related legislation. Thirdly, she did not agree that the facts of the case lent an air of reality to potential Charter breaches. She declined to postpone her decision pending an application for disclosure to the Superior Court of Justice pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter, because the disclosure sought was not consistent with that required to be made in an extradition case and the matter would be adjudicated by the Ontario Court of Appeal in any event. Finally, the Minister rejected Mr. McAmmond’s argument that she should impose a condition of surrender requiring the Requesting State not to rely on any of the materials gathered against him in Canada at his trial in the United States, and she declined to refuse the surrender on humanitarian grounds.
The Standard of Review
[24] The decision of the Minister to surrender a person for extradition lies “at the extreme legislative end of the continuum of administrative decision-making”: Idziak, supra, at p. 86. It is therefore entitled to considerable deference by this court. In United States of America v. Whitley (1994), 1994 498 (ON CA), 94 C.C.C. (3d) 99 (Ont. C.A.)[^3] at 110, Laskin J.A., after referring to earlier Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, said:
These passages, together with the requirements of the Act, indicate that if the Minister violates the fugitive’s constitutional rights or otherwise errs in law, or if the Minister denies the fugitive procedural fairness, acts arbitrarily, in bad faith or for improper motives, or if the Minister’s decision is plainly unreasonable, then the reviewing court is entitled to interfere; otherwise, the court should defer to the Minister’s surrender decision.
The Attack on the Minister’s Failure to Order Disclosure
[25] Mr. McAmmond’s primary ground of review is the Minister’s failure to order disclosure of the Canadian investigation materials. He advances two basic submissions in support of this argument. First, he argues that the Minister erred in deciding that a fugitive has “a limited right to disclosure” in extradition proceedings. Secondly, he contends that the Minister failed to consider the accountability of Canadian authorities for apparent Charter violations and illegal investigation techniques, including a failure to comply with the Mutual Legal Assistance process.
The Limited Right to Disclosure
[26] The first argument is based on the premise that the Minister erroneously confused “the limited nature of the extradition process” with a “limited right to disclosure”. Mr. Slansky submits the latter does not necessarily follow from the former. I disagree.
[27] Indeed, it is because of the limited juridical nature of the extradition process that the fugitive’s limited right to disclosure arises. As previously noted, the extradition process is essentially a political exercise – with an initial judicial screening mechanism – designed to enable the executive branch of government to ensure that Canada complies with its international extradition treaty obligations. It is not concerned with a Canadian criminal trial, nor is it concerned with the establishment of guilt or innocence. For that reason, the full extent of the Crown’s Stinchcombe obligations to disclose does not apply. See Kwok, supra, at para. 99, and Dynar, supra, at para. 122. In this respect, therefore, the Minister was correct to observe that persons subject to the extradition process have a limited right to disclosure.
The Alleged Charter Breaches and Investigative Illegalities
[28] The second argument is founded on allegations of possible Charter violations and alleged illegalities in the Canadian investigation. Mr. Slansky argues that Mr. McAmmond’s arrest, after execution of the search warrant at his home on October 8, 1996, was “bogus” because it was made purely for investigative purposes and in order to obtain evidence for charges in the United States. He says that the FBI was unofficially and improperly conducting an investigation in Canada without authorization prior to the request for assistance under the MLAT in May, 1997 (including through the presence of an FBI agent at the search of Mr. McAmmond’s home), and that this FBI involvement was not disclosed at the time of the application to obtain the search warrants in Canada. Finally, he submits that the transmittal of the seized material to the United States pursuant to the ex parte sending order, and without any opportunity on his part to challenge the propriety of the search, was contrary to his rights.
[29] I do not accept these submissions.
[30] The Minister has a duty of fairness to ensure that the fugitive has adequate disclosure of the case against him or her and a reasonable opportunity to state his or her case, but is not obligated “to provide the kind of disclosure or the kind of procedural safeguards applicable in judicial proceedings”: Whitley, supra, at 113. The law recognizes there may be situations where either the Minister or the extradition judge may endorse fuller disclosure on Charter violation or abuse of process grounds. However, those situations will not arise unless there is at least an air of reality – “a justiciable Charter issue” – in relation to the complaints asserted about the potential involvement of the Canadian authorities in the gathering of evidence: see Kwok, supra, at p. 268. This is particularly so, it seems to me, where what is sought is the disclosure of materials and information that is not being relied upon by the requesting state in support of the extradition process.
[31] Even where there may be an air of reality to the complaints alleged, it remains a matter of the proper exercise of discretion on the part of the extradition judge and the Minister. The Supreme Court of Canada has cautioned in Dynar, at para. 125 that:
Even where there is sufficient involvement of Canadian authorities in the proceedings to justify applying the Charter, courts must proceed with caution. It has been observed that “judicial intervention must be limited to cases of real substance”. [citation omitted] To do otherwise might all too easily place Canada in a position of violating its international obligations. [underlining added]
[32] Here, it was within the purview of the Minister’s discretion not to order disclosure of the Canadian investigation on the basis that there was no air of reality, or at least no real substance, to the complaints alleged, in my opinion.
[33] There is no evidence in this case that the Canadian authorities acted in bad faith or for any improper motives. Moreover, there is no justiciable issue – or issue of real substance – on the record that American authorities were involved in directing or leading an investigation in Canada prior to the request for assistance under the MLAT in May, 1997. These submissions were based upon an interpretation of one statement of a Canadian investigator in an affidavit and on a comment in a letter from Mr. McAmmond’s counsel saying his client told him an FBI investigator was present at the search of his home. The interpretation is inconclusive, at best, and counsel’s comments in a letter do not constitute evidence; moreover, counsel’s information is inconsistent with all the other evidence in the record. I would not give effect to these allegations.
[34] Nor is there an air of reality to the complaint that Mr. McAmmond’s arrest was “bogus”. He was arrested, advised of his rights, and chose to give a statement. He does not contest that there were adequate legal grounds for his arrest. As indicated above, there is nothing to indicate that the investigation was being driven by the American authorities. At the time it was being led by the RCMP, assisted by the FBI through a parallel investigation in the United States, but no decision had been made as to whether any charges would be laid and, if so, where. Mr. McAmmond made no attempt to move to set aside the search warrant or to contest the continued detention of the Canadian materials. His then counsel concedes that he was content to wait and see if he would be extradited, rather than taking any such steps. Canadian prosecutors later determined that prosecution in Canada would not be viable. There is nothing in the record to support the allegation that the arrest was made for the purpose of obtaining evidence for charges in the United States.
[35] Nor is there any merit to the complaint concerning the transmittal of the seized materials to the United States pursuant to the “sending order” issued under s. 20 of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act. That Act provides both for the gathering of evidence, at the request of a foreign state, by means of a Canadian court order (ss. 17 and 18) and for the sending of such evidence to the requesting state on the order of a Canadian court (s. 20). Section 17 expressly states that the gathering order may be obtained ex parte, subject to any terms and conditions the judge may impose. Although s. 20 does not expressly authorize an ex parte procedure, this court has said that the Act does not require such applications to be brought on notice to anyone: United Kingdom v. Ramsden (1996), 1996 1527 (ON CA), 108 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at 308 (Ont. C.A.). In that case Charron J.A. stated (at 308):
In my view, requiring that notice be given in all cases to anyone who may have an interest in the proceedings would be contrary to the intended expediency of the process. The matter is better left to the discretion of the judge seized with any such application who can make any order in this respect as he or she deems fit in the circumstances.
[36] Mr. McAmmond does not challenge the constitutionality of these provisions. As noted above, he chose not to contest the validity of the search warrant proceedings. Nor did he contest two further hearings, of which he had notice – one in Ontario and one in Quebec – where the authorities requested an additional period of detention for the seized materials. At both detention order hearings, the presiding judge was advised of the role of the RCMP in directing the investigation and of the role of the FBI in assisting, particularly by interviewing victims in the United States. The judge of the Quebec Superior Court who granted the sending order under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act specifically enquired whether anyone had contested the search warrants, and was advised, correctly, that no one had. She accordingly did not impose any conditions respecting notice as a term of the order. No appeal was taken from that order, once its existence was discovered. To permit Mr. McAmmond to complain about the procedures underpinning the sending order at this stage would be to permit an improper collateral attack upon the order of the Quebec Superior Court. The Minister was entitled to refuse to order disclosure on this ground.
[37] Mr. Slansky submits that in any event, this court should exercise its original jurisdiction to order such disclosure and remit the matter back to the Minister for further consideration: United States of America v. Shulman (2001), 2001 SCC 21, 152 C.C.C. (3d) 294, per Arbour J. at 312 (S.C.C.); Kwok, supra at 261-262; Larosa v. The Queen (2002), 2002 45027 (ON CA), 166 C.C.C. (3d) 449 at paras. 70-76 (Ont. C.A.). I would not do so, in the circumstances of this case.
[38] In Larosa, Doherty J.A. summarized the parameters of this Court’s jurisdiction to receive evidence on extradition appeals and judicial reviews of the Minister’s surrender orders. At para. 76 he said:
In my view, before ordering the production of documents and compelling testimony in support of allegations of state misconduct, this court should be satisfied that the following three criteria have been met by the applicant:
• the allegations must be capable of supporting the remedy sought;
• there must be an air of reality to the allegations; and
• it must be likely that the documents sought and the testimony sought would be relevant to the allegations.
[39] For the reasons outlined above, there is no air of reality, or no real substance, to the allegations of Charter breach or of illegalities in the Canadian investigation. Accordingly, the criteria for such an order have not been met.
The Failure to Impose Conditions on Surrender
[40] Lastly, Mr. Slansky submits that the Minister erred by not imposing a condition on surrender that the Requesting State not rely on the evidence gathered in Canada in Mr. McAmmond’s trial in the United States. I would not give effect to this ground of review either.
[41] The United States has due process constitutional protections, and Mr. McAmmond will be able to challenge the ultimate admissibility of the material forwarded pursuant to the sending order at his trial. As LaForest J. noted in Republic of Argentina v. Mellino (1987), 1987 49 (SCC), 33 C.C.C. (3d) 334 at 350-351 (S.C.C.):
The assumption that the requesting state will give the fugitive a fair trial according to its laws underlies the whole theory and practice of extradition and our courts have over many years made it abundantly clear that an extradition judge should not give effect to any suggestion that the proceedings are oppressive or that the fugitive will not be given a fair trial.
DISPOSITION
[42] For all of the foregoing reasons, then, I would dismiss the appeal from the order of Ewaschuk J. committing Mr. McAmmond for surrender, as well as the application for judicial review of the Minister’s decision to surrender him for trial in the United States.
“R.A. Blair J.A.”
“I agree J.I. Laskin J.A.”
“I agree K.N. Feldman J.A.”
RELEASED: January 6, 2005
[^1]: R.S. 1984, c. 30.
[^2]: The interceptions were made in accordance with an authorization order made by the Quebec Superior Court, which remained unchallenged and in force. An order authorizing interception of private communications is valid on its face until set aside or lawfully quashed: Wilson v. The Queen (1983), 1983 35 (SCC), 9 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at 117 (S.C.C.)
[^3]: affirmed 1996 225 (SCC), 104 C.C.C. (3d) 447 (S.C.C.)