DATE: 20020305 DOCKET: C34940

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

RE:

LIANI GONAWATI (Respondent) -and- THORDUR HELGI TEITSSON (Appellant)

BEFORE:

ROSENBERG and FELDMAN JJ.A. and GILLESE J. (ad hoc)

COUNSEL:

Joseph Markin, for the appellant

Herschel Fogelman, for the respondent

HEARD:

February 27, 2002

On appeal from the judgment of Justice Lucien A. Beaulieu dated August 10, 2000.

E N D O R S E M E N T

[1] O’Connell J. found that the order of Speigel J. was obtained on incomplete financial statements resulting in non-disclosure. He found that it was evident that the appellant had a beneficial interest in the property at 19 Ruden Crescent. He therefore held that there was a genuine issue for trial with respect to equalization of the parties’ respective Net Family Property and ordered a trial of that issue. The order of O’Connell J. was not appealed.

[2] The trial came before Beaulieu J. The appellant submits that the trial judge erred in finding that the property at 19 Ruden Crescent had any value since during the marriage, although he and the respondent were living in the home, he did not have legal title to it. In our view, the trial judge properly rejected that submission. There was evidence, especially from the appellant’s own affidavit filed in other proceedings, that he was not only the beneficial owner of the home but that this interest had some value on valuation day. It was open to the trial judge to make this finding even if the appellant had to pursue litigation to obtain legal title. The definition of “property” in the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.4 is very wide and inter alia includes any interest “present or future, vested or contingent” [emphasis added.]. This definition is wide enough to include a beneficial interest. See Rawluk v. Rawluk (1989), 23 R.F.L. (3d) 337 (S.C.C.).

[3] The appellant adduced no credible evidence to rebut the evidence of the respondent as to the value of this beneficial interest. It was therefore open to the trial judge to accept the respondent’s evidence as to value and thereby calculate the equalization payment as contemplated in the order of O’Connell J.

[4] Counsel for the respondent has explained the apparent error in paragraph 10 of the reasons for judgment, which in any event was not carried over into the judgment.

[5] We are also not persuaded that there is any basis for interfering with the trial judge’s conclusion that the respondent was entitled to pre-judgment interest.

[6] Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel for the respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis. At the request of counsel for the appellant we did not hear costs submissions at the hearing of the appeal. Counsel for the appellant will have seven days to serve and file written submissions with respect to the scale of costs and quantum. Counsel for the respondent will have seven days to respond to those submissions and counsel for the appellant will have three days to reply.

Signed: “M. Rosenberg J.A.”

“K. Feldman J.A.”

“E. Gillese J. (ad hoc)”