DATE: 20010921 DOCKET: C36018
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
RE: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN (Applicant/Appellant) v. JAMES STURGE (Respondent)
BEFORE: DOHERTY, GOUDGE and CRONK JJ.A.
COUNSEL: Grace Choi for the appellant Delmar Doucette for the respondent
HEARD: September 17, 2001
RELEASED ORALLY: September 17, 2001
On appeal from the sentence imposed by Justice William J. Babe on February 22, 2001.
E N D O R S E M E N T
[1] The respondent pled guilty to 7 counts of robbery, 1 count of dangerous driving, 1 count of failing to stop his vehicle while being pursued by the police and 1 count of possession of a stolen vehicle. The trial judge imposed a sentence of 4 years on each of the robberies and 6 months on each of the other three charges. All sentences were made concurrent.
[2] The totality of the sentences imposed by the trial judge was manifestly inadequate given the number of offences, their seriousness, the respondent’s extensive criminal record and the fact that he was on parole at the time he committed these offences.
[3] The trial judge also erred in principle in failing to make the sentences imposed on the offences committed while the respondent was in flight from two of the robberies consecutive to the sentences imposed on the robbery charges.
[4] The robberies were unsophisticated, no weapon was involved, relatively little money was unrecovered and they were all part of one spree. The respondent has an extensive criminal record, but little by way of violence. He is unfortunately addicted to cocaine. He pled guilty at the first opportunity and readily acknowledged his responsibility for the robberies when arrested. Bearing these factors in mind and also taking into consideration the totality of the sentences to be imposed for all of the offences, we would not interfere with the 4-year sentence imposed on the robbery charges.
[5] The dangerous driving offence occurred immediately after the sixth robbery. The respondent fled the scene in a stolen car striking a police officer and causing him some injury. He drove at a high speed through red lights and stop signs evading capture.
[6] The sentence imposed for this offence must reflect the need to deter and denounce both conduct which endangers the police and the extremely dangerous nature of the respondent’s driving. Police officers and other members of the public were put in immediate and real danger by the respondent’s conduct. We are also satisfied that the sentence imposed on the dangerous driving charge should have been consecutive to the sentences imposed on the robbery charges. A concurrent sentence suggests that flight from the scene of a crime might well be worth the risk.
[7] Considered in isolation, this offence would have merited a significant sentence. Bearing in mind the totality of the sentences to be imposed on this respondent, we would impose a sentence of 6 months on the dangerous driving offence. That sentence should be consecutive to the sentences imposed on the robbery charges.
[8] The charge of refusing to stop a vehicle when ordered to do so by the police occurred when the respondent fled the scene of the last robbery. After he refused to stop, the respondent drove away in a very dangerous manner for a considerable distance. He eventually rolled the vehicle. When approached by the police, he resisted arrest, striking and injuring one of the police officers.
[9] As with the dangerous driving conviction, general deterrence and denunciation had to be given paramount consideration. Police officers who are required to put themselves at risk to make arrests must be assured that those who physically resist arrest will be dealt with sternly by the courts. A consecutive sentence was essential.
[10] A very significant sentence would have been entirely appropriate for this offence alone. Moreover, this was the appellant’s second in flight offence in the space of less than two days. Once again, however, totality concerns must be borne in mind. We would impose a sentence of 18 months consecutive to the dangerous driving sentence and consecutive to the robbery sentences. The respondent’s total sentence will be 6 years.
[11] We would not interfere with the sentence imposed on the charge of possession of stolen vehicle.
[12] We would impose a s. 109 order for 10 years.
[13] Accordingly, leave to appeal sentence is granted, the appeal is allowed and the sentences are varied to accord with these reasons.
“Doherty J.A.”
“S.T. Goudge J.A.”
“Cronk J.A.”

