Court of Appeal for Ontario
Date: 2001-06-04 Docket: C34173
Re: Her Majesty the Queen (Respondent) – and – Jude Estigène (Appellant)
Before: Weiler and Sharpe JJ.A. and Rivard J. (ad hoc)
Counsel: John H. Hale, for the appellant Susan Ficek, for the respondent
Heard: May 18, 2001 Released Orally: May 18, 2001
On appeal from the conviction imposed by Justice Charles F. Doyle dated December 9, 1999 and from the sentence imposed by Doyle J. dated April 14, 2000.
Endorsement
[1] The appellant was convicted of sexual assault with a weapon (s. 272(a)), sexual interference (s. 151), and forcible confinement (s. 279(2)). He was sentenced to eight months imprisonment and one year of probation. He appeals both his conviction and sentence.
[2] The central issue on this appeal arises out of the reasons given by the trial judge. After an extensive review of the evidence and of some of the relevant principles of law, including the approach of R. v. W.(D.) (1991), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), 63 C.C.C. (3d) 397 (S.C.C.), the trial judge prefaced his finding of guilt with the following: Nous arrivons à la décision à faire. Si Jude réussit, qu’est-ce qui arrive à M.? Est-ce que ça veut dire qu’elle a créé un incident pour attaquer Jude et lui donner une mauvaise réputation? Cette fille de 8 ans en 1997 aurait produit une conversation entre Jude et elle-même, tout en ajoutant l’aspect physique tel que déjà faisait partie de la preuve. On verra des mots “pourquoi” et “pour rien”. Qu’est-ce que [sic] M. est coupable? Est-ce que M. est coupable de trouver des mots comme ça par elle-même? Il aurait sorti un couteau seulement dans un rêve et le sang qui coule disparaîtra complètement? Si M. a raison, même malgré les mensonges et les contradictions que Me Legault trouvait plusieurs fois, ça voudrait qu’elle n’avait aucune histoire et elle aurait perdu du sang en réalité.
[3] In our opinion, the trial judge’s reasons demonstrate that while he stated the proper principles to be applied, he did not apply them in this case. It was inappropriate for the trial judge to consider what would happen to the complainant if the accused were not convicted and to give this consideration as a reason for his decision. In addition, it was inappropriate for him to ask if the complainant was guilty, in essence, of fabrication. This was not a contest as to whether the complainant or the accused was “guilty”.
[4] For these reasons, the appeal is allowed, the conviction is set aside and a new trial is ordered.
Signed: “Karen M. Weiler J.A.” “Robert J. Sharpe J.A.” “Paul Rivard J. (ad hoc)”