COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

DATE: 20000301

DOCKET: C27550

RE: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN (Respondent) v. MARIO CORPUS
(Appellant)

BEFORE: LASKIN, O’CONNOR and SHARPE JJ.A.

COUNSEL: Lisa Freeman
for the appellant

Shawn Porter
for the respondent

HEARD: February 24, 2000

On appeal from the conviction of His Honour Judge Bentley on
December 23, 1996 and the sentence imposed on March 3, 1997.

E N D O R S E M E N T

[1] The appellant raises three grounds on his appeal against
conviction.

[2] First, the appellant argues that the trial judge had a
reasonable doubt which he ignored and, moreover, that he shifted
the onus of proof to the appellant. In the passage relied upon
by the appellant, the trial judge was only addressing those
factors relied upon by the defence at trial. He was not
expressing his conclusion on the evidence as a whole. The trial
judge gave careful and thorough reasons, which make it clear that
he properly applied the onus of proof and that he was satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had the specific
intent for attempted murder. We see no merit in this ground of
appeal.

[3] Next, the appellant argues that the trial judge erred in
disregarding expert evidence that related to the issue of
specific intent. We disagree. The experts were called to
testify on the issue of whether the appellant should be found not
criminally responsible for stabbing his wife. In the course of
giving this evidence, the experts indicated that the appellant’s
cognitive abilities were impaired, and that the appellant’s
mental illness interfered with his ability to make choices.
However, the questioning of the experts was not directed to
eliciting their opinions on whether the appellant had the
specific intent to commit murder. The trial judge did not err in
observing that there was no evidence from the experts whether the
appellant’s emotional state prevented him from forming the
specific intent to kill.

[4] Finally, the appellant submits that the trial judge erred by
taking into consideration certain statements made by the
appellant after the offence was complete. We are satisfied that
the statements referred to by the trial judge were some evidence
of the appellant’s state of mind at the time he stabbed his wife.
We see no error in this regard.

[5] The appeal against conviction is dismissed.

[6] The appellant appeals the sentence of 8 years imprisonment.
Taking into consideration the pre-trial custody, the trial judge
intended this to be the equivalent of an 11 year sentence.

[7] The appellant was a first offender and of previous good
character. The appellant argues that the trial judge erred in
failing to give sufficient weight to his mental illness as a
mitigating factor. The appellant suffered from chronic
delusions, which caused him to attempt to kill his wife. This
was a very serious offence. The appellant stabbed his wife
numerous times with a screwdriver. Although the appellant does
not appear to be a danger to anyone else, his mental illness
could pose a significant risk for his wife in the future.

[8] The most important factor in imposing sentence in this case
is the protection of the appellant’s wife. Because the danger to
the appellant’s wife is caused by the appellant’s mental illness,
that mental illness is not necessarily a reason to reduce what
would otherwise be an appropriate sentence.

[9] The appellant introduced fresh evidence on this appeal.
That evidence disclosed that the appellant was released on day
parole in January of this year. There are number of conditions
attached to the appellant’s release on day parole. He is
required to reside in a half-way house, the Keele Community
Correctional Centre. He is also required to follow psychiatric
and psychological counselling and to take his medication as
prescribed.

[10] The fresh evidence indicated that there had been some
difficulties when the appellant, while incarcerated, stopped
taking his medication. This led him to exhibit anger towards his
wife and to demonstrate certain paranoid features. In granting
the appellant day parole and directing that he reside in the half-
way house, the Parole Board pointed out that a substantial period
of residency will be necessary in order to assess the appellant’s
ability to cope in a community setting.

[11] In our view, the sentence of 8 years is fit. It is
proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and a sentence of
that length is required in order to adequately protect the
appellant’s wife. It is important that there be an extensive
period during which the appellant’s conduct may be monitored and
assessed and during which appropriate steps may be taken if the
appellant’s condition appears to be deteriorating.

[12] Accordingly, leave to appeal is granted, but the appeal
against sentence is dismissed.