Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CR-20-10-2020-0000 Date: September 12, 2025

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

Between:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

— and —

REBECCA HORTON

Counsel:

• Monica Gharabaway, for the Crown
• Tania Bariteau and Malaika Henriques, for the accused, Rebecca Horton

Heard: June 30, 2025

Subject to any further Order of a court of competent jurisdiction, an Order has been made in this proceeding, pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code, directing that the identity of the complainants and any information that could disclose such identity shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

K.L. Campbell J.:

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

A. Overview

[1] The accused, Rebecca Horton, has been convicted of a variety of criminal offences in connection to the "human trafficking" of two female complainants (R.W. and M.D.).

[2] More particularly, the accused has been found guilty of all of the following eleven criminal offences, namely: (1) exercising control over R.W., for the purpose of exploiting her, contrary to s. 279.01(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, chap. C-46; (2) exercising control over R.W., for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence under s. 286.1(1), contrary to s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code; (3) receiving a financial benefit knowing that it was obtained by the commission of an offence under s. 279.01(1), contrary to s. 279.02(1) of the Criminal Code; (4) receiving a financial benefit from the sexual services of R.W., knowing that it was obtained by the commission of an offence under s. 286.1(1), contrary to s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code; (5) assaulting R.W., contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code; (6) exercising control over M.D., a person under the age of 18 years, for the purpose of exploiting her, contrary to s. 279.011(1) of the Criminal Code; (7) procuring M.D., a person under the age of 18 years, for the purpose of facilitating an offence under s. 286.1(2) of the Criminal Code, contrary to s. 286.3(2) of the Criminal Code; (8) exercising control over M.D., a person under the age of 18 years, for the purpose of facilitating an offence under s. 286.1(2) of the Criminal Code, contrary to s. 286.3(2) of the Criminal Code; (9) receiving a financial benefit from the sexual services of M.D., knowing that it was obtained by the commission of an offence under s. 286.1(2), contrary to s. 286.2(2) of the Criminal Code; (10) receiving a financial benefit knowing that it was obtained by the commission of an offence under s. 279.011(1), contrary to s. 279.02(2) of the Criminal Code; and (11) sexually assaulting M.D., contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code. All of these offences were committed by the accused in Toronto and elsewhere in Ontario during the seven-week period between March 1 and April 21, 2018.

[3] The trial of this matter started on September 11, 2023, with some pre-trial motions, and two other accused persons, namely, her then boyfriend, Daylo Robinson (also known as "Preem") and his best friend, Tyler Vickers. The trial of this matter, on a 17-count indictment, was then scheduled to last for approximately two months, beginning with one or two weeks of motions, followed by a jury trial lasting approximately a further four or five weeks. The jury trial started on September 25, 2023, but the jury did not reach its verdict (in relation to the charges against the other two accused) until November 29, 2023. Accordingly, the jury trial itself lasted for more than two months.

[4] However, on October 27, 2023, more than a month into the jury trial, Ms. Horton re-elected trial by judge alone (before me), and she was severed from the other two accused, with the evidence heard up to that point continuing to apply, to her judge-alone trial, that was eventually scheduled to resume on December 9, 2024. This severance/adjournment took place when one of her lawyers, for personal reasons, could understandably no longer continue with the joint jury trial. As part of this aspect of the proceedings, Ms. Horton also expressly waived her right to be tried within a reasonable time, pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights.

[5] In late 2024, the judge-alone proceedings continued before me in relation the charges against Ms. Horton. After the Crown's case was completed, Ms. Horton testified, at some length, in her own defence. After the evidence was finished, I heard the closing submissions of counsel. On March 3, 2025, I delivered Reasons for Judgment, finding Ms. Horton guilty of all of these offences. See: R. v. Horton, 2025 ONSC 1344.

[6] Essentially, I concluded that Mr. Robinson, Ms. Horton and Mr. Vickers had collectively decided to begin working in the sex trade in Toronto. All three individuals originally came from the east coast of Canada. Ms. Horton had earlier worked in the sex trade on her own in this east coast geographical area. However, the evidence showed that Ms. Horton decided to work with her then boyfriend, Mr. Robinson, and his friend, Mr. Vickers, in the sex industry in Toronto.

[7] The two young female complainants, R.W. and M.D. were procured into this sex trade business, where they effectively worked for the three accused persons. M.D. was clearly less than 18 years of age at the time, and everyone knew it. Mr. Robinson was the organizational head of this small sex industry business, helping to recruit young women to work in the sex trade for them, creating the general "price list" for their sexual services (individually or in "duos"), and ultimately preparing and placing advertisements for the services of the three female sex workers. Mr. Vickers was effectively the "muscle" or "enforcer" of the business, to the extent that it was needed. Finally, and most importantly for present purposes, Ms. Horton was the "Queen of the Preem Team." She was Mr. Robinson's "main girl" and the female lead of this small stable of female sex workers. She played a critical role in this sex trade business. Ms. Horton was responsible for grooming the other two young women, making them comfortable, and showing them "the life" in the sex industry. All three women (including Ms. Horton) performed in the sex trade industry in financial support of all of them. Her female leadership in this business was critical in the exploitation of the other young women. Further, Ms. Horton was one of the accused who benefitted financially from the sex work of the two female complainants.

[8] Mr. Robinson made it clear that this was the important role to be played by Ms. Horton. Mr. Robinson sent Ms. Horton text messages telling her to make one of the other young women her "bitch" and her "wifey." He told Ms. Horton to tell the other woman that they were going to get their hair and nails done together. Mr. Robinson also encouraged Ms. Horton to be "more interactive" with the other women. Ms. Horton responded positively to these suggestions, indicating among other things, "OK daddy I will." Ms. Horton said that she was already being "interactive" and advised Mr. Robinson that she had invited one of the young women into "the bathroom with [her] to shower," where they "talked about going to get piercings and stuff." Ms. Horton also provided advice about what to do if the young women were ever approached by the "cops" to talk about what was going on. Ms. Horton spent considerable time in the company of the other women when they were not on "calls," providing their sexual services to others for money. Mr. Robinson told Ms. Horton repeatedly that she was "in charge" of the other women, and Ms. Horton acknowledged her understanding of this role in the organization. In his text messages to Ms. Horton, Mr. Robinson called her the "cute" and "pretty" "Queen of the Preem team" and his "main girl." In response, Ms. Horton replied affirmatively and said "Thank you" to Mr. Robinson.

[9] At the sentencing hearing in this case, the Crown sought the imposition of a penitentiary sentence in the range of 8-10 years duration, after giving Ms. Horton a reduction in the sentence for purposes of ensuring that the principle of totality was properly applied. In advancing this position, the Crown argued that the main sentencing principles in this kind of case were deterrence and denunciation. On the other hand, at the sentencing hearing, defence counsel for the accused sought a global sentence of 4 years imprisonment. In advancing this position, defence counsel reminded me that Ms. Horton had already served some 37 days in pre-sentence custody, and had been on judicial interim release, without incident, (as of June 30, 2025) for approximately 84½ months. Defence counsel also urged me to consider that Ms. Horton was one of the "victims" in this case, as she also worked in the sex trade industry for the financial benefit of their little criminal organization.

B. The Rule Against Multiple Convictions for the Same Offence

[10] The rule against multiple convictions for the same crime prevents an accused from being convicted of multiple offences arising from the same transaction where the elements of the offences are substantially the same. In short, the rule prevents multiple convictions where there is both a factual and legal nexus amongst the different offences. In such circumstances, the accused should only be convicted of the more serious of the offences, and the findings of guilt in relation to the other similar, lesser offences should be stayed. See: R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729; R. v. Prince, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 480; R. v. Provo, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 3; R. v. K.(R.), 198 C.C.C. (3d) 232.

[11] This rule has some application in this case. More specifically, as the defence has argued, and as the Crown has fairly conceded, this rule: (1) prevents the accused from being convicted of the offences of "procuring" R.W. and M.D., given that she is also guilty of the offences of "human trafficking" in relation to both R.W. and M.D.; and (2) prevents the accused from being convicted of the offences of "obtaining a material benefit from the sexual services," of R.W. and M.D., given that she is also guilty of the offences of "obtaining a material benefit from the human trafficking" of both R.W. and M.D. In other words, the four findings of guilt in relation to Ms. Horton in connection with counts 3, 6, 13 and 14 of the indictment must be stayed. However, convictions will be entered in relation to the findings of guilt in relation to the other seven counts of the indictment.

C. The Basic Facts of the Various Offences

1. The Offences in Relation to the Complainant, R.W.

[12] Ms. Horton has been convicted of a host of criminal offences in relation to the complainant, R.W., including "human trafficking," receiving a material benefit from that human trafficking, and assault.

[13] In my Reasons for Judgment in this case, I explained why I was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, based on all of the evidence, that Ms. Horton had committed all of these offences in relation to R.W. See: R. v. Horton, 2025 ONSC 1344, at paras. 23-48, 55-63, 64-67. I will not repeat the evidence in relation to these counts of the indictment, or rehearse the factual findings I have already made in relation to these offences.

[14] Suffice it to say, I found that Ms. Horton intentionally fulfilled an important and ongoing role in the clear exploitation of R.W. in the sex trade, for the financial benefit of herself, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Vickers, and she periodically assaulted R.W. for this purpose. For example: (1) Ms. Horton knew that Mr. Robinson had made it clear to R.W. that she belonged, like a piece of property, to him, thereby establishing himself as the ultimate head of their sex trade business; (2) Ms. Horton groomed R.W. and otherwise prepared her for her work in the sex trade; (3) Ms. Horton psychologically, emotionally and physically abused R.W. in order to control her and to make sure that R.W. followed the directions given to her about providing her sexual services for money; (4) Ms. Horton physically took the money that R.W. earned providing her sexual services to various men, not allowing R.W. to keep anything; (5) even when R.W. was not providing her sexual services, Ms. Horton controlled her actions, including who R.W. talked to (and for how long), who she had contact with, her consumption of food, cocaine, alcohol, etc.; (6) Ms. Horton used threats of violence and physical force to make sure that R.W. provided her sexual services when and where it has been arranged through "ads" for her sexual services that had been posted electronically by means of Ms. Horton's phone; and (7) not surprisingly, R.W. was scared and afraid of Ms. Horton, knew that she had to do as she was told by Ms. Horton, and was simply unable to "escape" as she was afraid of being beaten and kept on an even shorter "leash" by the three people exploiting her in the sex trade.

2. The Offences in Relation to the Complainant, M.D. (Under 18 Years of Age)

[15] Ms. Horton has also been convicted of a host of criminal offences in relation to the complainant, M.D., who was under 18 years of age at all relevant times – to the knowledge of Ms. Horton, including "human trafficking," receiving a material benefit from her human trafficking, and sexual assault.

[16] In my Reasons for Judgment in this case, I explained why I was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, based on all of the evidence, that Ms. Horton had also committed all of these offences in relation to the complainant M.D., at a time when Ms. Horton knew full well that M.D. was under 18 years of age. See: R. v. Horton, 2025 ONSC 1344, at paras. 68-95, 96-99, 103, 106-111, 112-122. Again, I will not repeat the evidence in relation to these counts of the indictment, or rehearse the factual findings I have already made in relation to these offences.

[17] Again, suffice it to say, I found that Ms. Horton intentionally fulfilled an important and ongoing role in the clear exploitation of young M.D. in the sex trade, for the financial benefit of herself, Mr. Robinson and Mr. Vickers, and at one point had sexually assaulted her. For example: (1) Ms. Horton knew that M.D. was a vulnerable, desperate young woman, in that she had no place to stay, nor did she have any kind of safe and stable environment, but rather was basically living "on the street," regularly consuming drugs and alcohol, was wholly without any family support, and was on the verge of entering the sex trade industry on her own; (2) M.D. first met Ms. Horton when they attended a hotel together to provide their collective sexual services to a male client for money (as a duo) – Ms. Horton told M.D. to take off all of her clothes and kiss the client, and M.D. did as she was told, while Ms. Horton ultimately received all of the money from the client; (3) Ms. Horton clearly knew that M.D. was less than 18 years of age; (4) Ms. Horton helped to groom M.D. and otherwise prepare her for her work in the sex trade; (5) at one point in their relationship, M.D. was sexually assaulted in a "hot tub" by both Mr. Robinson and Ms. Horton; (6) when M.D. indicated that she no longer wanted to "escort" in the sex trade industry, Mr. Robinson threatened her, scaring M.D. into continuing to "escort" in their sex trade business; (7) M.D. rarely was given any food by Ms. Horton, but rather was typically offered alcohol and/or drugs before she made the "calls" to provide her sexual services; and (8) all of the money earned in the sex trade industry by M.D. was provided to Ms. Horton (and Mr. Robinson) – M.D. was not allowed to keep any of it.

[18] In short, Ms. Horton (and Mr. Robinson) exerted their control, direction and influence over M.D. in the sex trade, by lying to her about how they would help her in the sex trade business, when their intention, from the outset, was not to help her, but rather to help themselves, by exploiting her to the extent that they could in the sex trade, and benefitting financially from her providing her sexual services to others for money.

D. The Personal Circumstances of the Offender

[19] The accused was born on December 23, 1996, and is now 28 years of age. She has a grade nine education, and she lives in Nova Scotia. Ms. Horton has no prior criminal record.

[20] Ms. Horton had an admittedly "traumatic" childhood. Ms. Horton explained that she was sexually abused by her now deceased father, when she was less than seven years of age. When Ms. Horton disclosed the abuse, her father was charged, and he was ultimately sentenced to a term of imprisonment. However, Ms. Horton eventually forgave him for that sexual misconduct with her.

[21] The man who is now romantically involved with Ms. Horton's mother, is effectively the "step-father" to Ms. Horton, and they have a positive ongoing relationship.

[22] When Ms. Horton was a child, she was diagnosed as suffering from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and was prescribed "Adderall" when she was attending school.

[23] Ms. Horton got pregnant when she was just 17 years old, which is what caused her to drop out of high school and leave home. Ms. Horton is now the mother of her 11-year-old daughter, who is currently in the care of Ms. Horton's mother.

[24] While Ms. Horton is still single (her previous romantic relationship with Mr. Robinson is over), she is now in a positive, romantic, long-term relationship with a 40-year-old man who runs a construction business in Nova Scotia. Ms. Horton advised the author of the Pre-Sentence Report that he is the "only man who has never traumatized [her]."

[25] For the past four years, Ms. Horton has lived in Nova Scotia, with her mother, her "step-father," her daughter, and her nephew, in a "supportive [and] loving home" environment.

[26] During the Covid-19 pandemic, Ms. Horton began attending a community college in Nova Scotia in an effort to earn her "General Equivalency Diploma," but once the school shut down, Ms. Horton left and did not return. However, she maintains that she would like to eventually obtain her grade 12 diploma.

[27] Ms. Horton is currently unemployed and in receipt of some $604/month of Income Assistance. However, for a few months in 2022, Ms. Horton worked as a Personal Support Worker at Bayshore Health. Previous to that, Ms. Horton had started a cleaning company with her mother, however it never really "took off." She currently has approximately $60,000 of outstanding debt.

[28] Ms. Horton has been diagnosed, several years ago, with "depression and anxiety." She is, however, not currently receiving any counselling or medication.

[29] Ms. Horton told the author of the Pre-Sentence Report that she feels "horrible for the victim, as well as all the females involved, including [herself]." Ms. Horton also indicated, however, that the offences took place some "eight years ago" and that her life is "very different now."

[30] It is difficult to view this perspective as true "remorse" on the part of Ms. Horton. Indeed, she appears to maintain that she was not personally involved in the commission of the offences and she still views herself as one of the historical "victims" in this case. I did not view the evidence in this way. In my view, Ms. Horton played an integral role in the commission of these serious criminal offences. She worked with Mr. Robinson and Mr. Vickers to create a sex trade business, and she fulfilled the critical role of the "Queen of the Preem Team" – as the female leader and organizational "role model" for the two young women that had been procured into their sexual service. There is no doubt that Ms. Horton personally worked in the sex trade business herself. But, in my view she did that, and engaged in all of her other efforts in relation to the two young female complainants, R.W. and M.D., in order to help her then boyfriend, his friend, and herself, to financially benefit from the sex trade business.

[31] In short, Ms. Horton was no victim – she was one of the perpetrators of these terrible crimes. Without her consistent assistance and female leadership, these offences would have been much more difficult, if not virtually impossible, for Mr. Robinson and Mr. Vickers to commit on their own. The true victims in this case – the only true victims in this case – are the two young female complainants who were trafficked in the sex trade, R.W. and M.D.

[32] It is noteworthy that Ms. Horton's current boyfriend told the author of the Pre-Sentence Report that Ms. Horton may have been "naïve" at the time, but that she had made "grave mistakes" and that what happened to the complainants was "terrible." He described Ms. Horton as a "very caring, trustworthy individual who is also a good mother." Further, he indicated that these offences were "not reflective of the person Ms. Horton is now." Nevertheless, he also indicated that "a period of incarceration may be helpful" to make her "accountable" for her offences.

[33] At the sentencing hearing in this case, the defence filed a significant number of "character reference" letters that were prepared by the family and friends of the accused. Without detailing the contents of each letter individually, in these materials Ms. Horton was positively described as someone with "determination, strength and resilience" to face the adversities of life; as someone who "held herself accountable for her mistakes;" as a "kind and caring person"; who always "shows compassion to others, especially those who are vulnerable or in need of help"; as someone who consistently demonstrates "honesty, responsibility and deep emotional intelligence"; that these offences are entirely out of character for Ms. Horton, given that she is a "caring, generous and decent" and "forgiving" person; that Ms. Horton has a "big heart" as a mother and is "nice to everyone"; and that Ms. Horton is "extremely kind," has a "heart of gold," and is "actually very tender" with others.

[34] As one such letter makes clear, Ms. Horton enjoys the continuing support of a "very big family" that "truly loves and cares for her." This familial support should stand Ms. Horton in good stead when she is finished serving her custodial sentence.

E. The Governing Sentencing Principles

1. The General Sentencing Principles

[35] Pursuant to s. 718 of the Criminal Code, the "fundamental purpose" of sentencing is to contribute to "respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society" by imposing "just sanctions" that have one or more of the following objectives: (1) to denounce unlawful conduct; (2) to deter the offender and others from committing offences; (3) to separate offenders from society where necessary; (4) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (5) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or the community; and (6) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and the community.

[36] According to s. 718.1 of the Code, the "fundamental principle" of sentencing is that a sentence "must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender."

[37] Section 718.2 of the Code requires a sentencing court to also consider a number of other principles: (1) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender; (2) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances; (3) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh; (4) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and (5) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

2. The Sentencing Principles Specific to the Present Case

[38] As I have indicated on earlier occasions, for many years Canadian courts have decried the inherently exploitive, coercive and controlling actions of "pimps" in relation to prostitutes. The unfortunate contemporary reality of the sex trade is that pimps typically are involved in the exploitation, degradation and subordination of women. At its most basic level, it is a form of slavery, with pimps living parasitically off the earnings of their prostitutes. As this case illustrates, pimps exercise their control over prostitutes by means of a variety of tactics including emotional blackmail, verbal abuse, threats of violence and/or pure physical violence and brutality. The individuals that are the subject of this coercive exploitation are typically vulnerable and disadvantaged women, who have been manipulated and taken advantage of by their pimp. Even in cases where their initial participation in the sex trade is "voluntary," including perhaps their business association with the pimp, and adopted for reasons of perceived increased security and safety in an inherently dangerous line of work, the relationship invariably becomes one-sided and exploitive. Prostitutes are ultimately forced, in one way or another, to provide sexual services for money in circumstances where they would not otherwise have agreed to provide such services, and the money earned from those sexual services is invariably collected by their pimp. Accordingly, in a very real and practical sense, pimps traffick in the human resources of prostitutes, callously using their sexual services as an endlessly available commodity to be simply bought and sold in the marketplace. Accordingly, pimps have been aptly described as a "cruel, pernicious and exploitive evil" in contemporary society. See, for example, Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123; R. v. Downey, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10; R. v. Grilo, 2 O.R. (3d) 514; R. v. Naud, 106 C.C.C. (3d) 348, affirmed, , [1997] 1 S.C.R. 312; R. v. Miller, [1997] O.J. No. 3911 (Gen.Div.); R. v. Lopez, 2018 ONSC 4749.

[39] Pimps are usually men. They are not often women. However, these awful offences may be committed by individuals of any gender who are callous and cold enough to take advantage of a more vulnerable individual and try to selfishly cash-in on their financial earnings in the sex trade. Indeed, the present case provides a sad and tragic example of the great human damage that can be caused when a woman chooses to provide a leadership role in a sex trade business, showing younger, more impressionable, and more vulnerable women, how to behave as sex slaves in the industry, for the greater financial benefit of their pimps. See, generally: R. v. Graham and Ali (unreported, O.S.C.J., per B. O'Marra J., November 29, 2024).

[40] In terms of the range of sentences that are appropriate for pimping offences, Canadian courts have generally accepted that, where the accused has coerced a woman into becoming or remaining a prostitute and has exercised a significant degree of control over her activities, sentences of four or five years-imprisonment are typically imposed. General deterrence, denunciation and specific deterrence are said to be the paramount sentencing considerations. Even longer sentences have been imposed and upheld in more aggravating circumstances. The imposition of any specific sentence depends, of course, upon the individual circumstances of each case, and consideration of a variety of factors including: (1) the degree of coercion or control imposed by the pimp on the prostitute's activities; (2) the amount of money received by the pimp and the extent to which the pimp allowed the prostitutes to retain their earnings; (3) the age of the prostitutes and their numbers; (4) any special vulnerability of the prostitutes; (5) the working conditions in which the prostitutes were expected or encouraged to operate, including their physical surroundings in terms of soliciting and servicing customers, and safety concerns, in addition to whether appropriate health safeguards were taken; (6) the degree of planning and sophistication, including whether the pimp was working in concert with others; (7) the size of the pimp's operations, including the numbers of customers the prostitutes were expected to service; (8) the duration of the pimp's exploitative conduct; (9) the degree of violence, if any, apart from that inherent in the pimp's parasitic activities; (10) the extent to which inducements such as drugs or alcohol were employed by the pimp; (11) the effect on the prostitutes of the pimp's exploitation; (12) the extent to which the pimp demanded or compelled sexual favours from the prostitutes; (13) the age of the customers attracted to the services of the prostitute; (14) any steps taken by the pimp to avoid detection by the authorities; and (15) any attempts by the accused to prevent the prostitute from leaving his or her sexual stable. Lesser terms of imprisonment may, however, be appropriate in cases where coercion and/or exploitation are reduced or minimized. See generally: R. v. Foster, 1984 ABCA 204, 13 C.C.C. (3d) 435; R. v. Glasgow, [1993] O.J. No. 1502 (Gen.Div.); R. v. Tang, 1997 ABCA 174, 200 A.R. 70; R. v. Rose, 100 O.A.C. 67; R. v. Miller; R. v. B.(K.), 184 C.C.C. (3d) 290; R. v. Mfizi, [2008] O.J. No. 2430 (S.C.J.); R. v. A.A., [2012] O.J. No. 6256 (S.C.J.); R. v. Antoine, 2020 ONSC 181; R. v. McIntosh, 2022 ONSC 6437; R. v. Reid, 2023 ONSC 4452; R. v. McEwan, 2023 ONSC 1608; R. v. Gordon, 2023 ONSC 1036. I have considered all of these various factors in the present case.

[41] This general approach to the sentencing of pimps in their parasitic exploitation of prostitutes has, not surprisingly, continued to have application under the "human trafficking" provisions of the Criminal Code. See, for example, R. v. R.R.S., 2016 ONSC 2939, varied, 2017 ONCA 141; R. v. D.A., 2017 ONSC 3722; R. v. Finestone, 2017 ONCJ 22.

[42] It is important to keep in mind, however, that following upon the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, Parliament enacted Bill C-36 (Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, S.C. 2014, c. 25), which was designed as a "significant paradigm shift" in criminal law policy regarding prostitution-related offences, from treating prostitution as a type of "nuisance," toward treating "prostitution as a form of sexual exploitation that disproportionately and negatively impacts on women and girls." See Technical Paper: Bill C-36, Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, available online at: http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/protect/p1.html. This "paradigm shift" must be kept in mind in now sentencing offenders in connection with these types of sexual exploitation offences.

[43] It was in this legislation, which came into force on December 6, 2014, that Parliament introduced the mandatory minimum sentence of four years imprisonment in s. 279.01(1)(b) of the Criminal Code with respect to the offence of "human trafficking" an adult, and the mandatory minimum sentence of five years imprisonment in s. 279.011(1)(b) of the Criminal Code with respect to the offence of "human trafficking" a person who is under the age of 18 years. It is important to note, however, that in the present case, the accused, Ms. Horton, brought an application, pursuant to ss. 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, challenging the constitutional validity of the mandatory minimum periods of imprisonment in ss. 279.01(1) and 279.011(1) of the Criminal Code. In response to this Charter application, the Crown expressly denied any potential reliance upon the mandatory minimum statutory penalties outlined in these provisions of the Criminal Code. Accordingly, Ms. Horton will be sentenced today as if there were no mandatory minimum statutory penalties in this case.

F. The Custodial Credits Due to the Accused

1. The Enhanced Credit for Pre-Sentence Custody – Pursuant to R. v. Summers

[44] I understand that Ms. Horton had already served some 37 days in pre-sentence custody (between May 10 and June 15, 2018). The parties agree that the accused should be given the maximum statutory enhanced credit for this pre-sentence custody. I agree. There is no reason why the accused should not be given 1.5 days credit for each day of her pre-sentence detention, pursuant to s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code. See: R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575, affirming, 2013 ONCA 147, 114 O.R. (3d) 641. Accordingly, the custodial sentence that would otherwise have been imposed upon the accused will be reduced by approximately two months, in order to give Ms. Horton the appropriate credit for this period of pre-sentence custody.

2. Additional Credit for the Lengthy Duration of Judicial Interim Release Order

[45] Ms. Horton has been at large on judicial interim release since June 15, 2018. That bail order required her to live in a specified residence, and report to the police once a week, but it did not impose any "house arrest" or "curfew" condition on the accused. Nevertheless, Ms. Horton has been subject to the terms of this judicial release order, without incident, for approximately 7 years and 3 months. In my view, Ms. Horton should be given fair and appropriate credit for this lengthy restraint on her ordinary liberty.

[46] In R. v. Downes, 79 O.R. (3d) 321, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that, where an accused is the subject of "stringent pre-trial bail conditions" including time spent effectively under "house arrest," this mitigating circumstance must be given some weight in the sentencing of the accused. Rosenberg J.A., for the Court, held more specifically that, in the circumstances, the accused was entitled to five months credit in relation to the 18 months he was on bail and subject to a condition of "house arrest" requiring him to remain in his residence "except in the company of his surety." See also: R. v. Ijam, 2007 ONCA 597, 87 O.R. (3d) 81; R. v. Daniels, 2015 ONSC 2520, affirmed, 2017 ONCA 551, 385 C.R.R. (3d) 188.

[47] The present case is not factually similar to R. v. Downes, in that the conditions of Ms. Horton's judicial interim release order have always been much less stringent than the order discussed in R. v. Downes. As I have mentioned, Ms. Horton was subject to neither "house arrest" nor "curfew" conditions as part of her judicial interim release order. However, the duration of the bail order for Ms. Horton has been much longer than the judicial interim release order discussed in R. v. Downes.

[48] In my view, the sheer duration of the lengthy judicial interim release order regarding Ms. Horton, and her consistent compliance with its terms, is a mitigating circumstance of this case and merits a custodial credit of approximately another four months.

3. Conclusion on Custodial Credits

[49] Adding these various custodial credits together results in a total credit of approximately six months. Accordingly, the penitentiary sentence that would otherwise have been imposed upon the accused will be reduced by that total credit.

G. Analysis

[50] In my view, the accused should be given a total sentence of 8 years imprisonment. Subject to what I have just said about the total custodial credits that must fairly be given to Ms. Horton, I would have sentenced her to a total of 4 years imprisonment in connection with all of her offences against R.W. With respect to the offences concerning the second complainant, I would have sentenced Ms. Horton to a consecutive term of 4 years imprisonment with respect to her offences against M.D.

[51] In my view, a total sentence of 8 years imprisonment properly reflects the enormous gravity of the crimes committed by the accused, and her very considerable degree of personal responsibility for their commission. The accused was engaged, in a profound and integral way, with the human trafficking of two vulnerable young women in the sex trade, for reasons of purely selfish financial gain. The significantly lower sentence of imprisonment proposed by defence counsel for the accused simply cannot accomplish that "fundamental" sentencing principle. On the other hand, this total sentence of 8 years imprisonment is at the lowest end of the range of sentence proposed by the Crown. In my view, the custodial sentence on Ms. Horton needs to be at this end of the governing range as Ms. Horton has no prior criminal record, she enjoys the continuing support of all of her friends and family, and she certainly has the capacity to be fully rehabilitated and to eventually become a valuable, contributing member of society – especially given that she is no longer under the romantic sway of Mr. Robinson, who was undoubtedly the ultimate leader of this small criminal organization. An effective custodial sentence of 8 years imprisonment also ensures that the totality of the sentence is not a crushing one for Ms. Horton to serve.

[52] However, as I have already indicated, Ms. Horton must fairly be given a total custodial credit of effectively having already served a total of 6 months imprisonment. In order to accomplish this goal, I will reduce the sentences to be imposed upon Ms. Horton in connection to her offences against R.W. from 4 years imprisonment to 3½ years imprisonment.

[53] In the result, I now sentence the accused as follows:

[54] Ms. Horton is now sentenced to 3½ years imprisonment for her "human trafficking" of R.W. (count 1); to a concurrent sentence of 3½ years imprisonment for receiving a material benefit from the human trafficking of R.W. (count 5); and to a concurrent sentence of one year imprisonment for her assault of R.W. (count 8).

[55] With respect to the crimes concerning the second complainant, Ms. Horton is sentenced to a consecutive term of 4 years imprisonment for her human trafficking of M.D. (count 11); to a consecutive (but concurrent) sentence of 4 years imprisonment for her procuring of M.D. (count 12); to a consecutive (but concurrent) sentence of 4 years imprisonment for receiving a material benefit from the human trafficking of M.D. (count 15); and to a consecutive (but concurrent) term of 1 year imprisonment for her sexual assault of M.D. (count 17).

[56] That amounts, according to my calculations, to a total sentence, starting today, of 7½ years of penitentiary imprisonment for Ms. Horton. Once the 6 months credit is factored into the equation, this is effectively an 8-year sentence of imprisonment for the accused.

H. Ancillary Sentencing Orders

[57] In all of the circumstances of this case, I am compelled to also make the following ancillary sentencing orders in this case. I understand from the submissions of the parties that these orders are not controversial.

[58] First, pursuant to s. 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code, I make an order, in form 5.03, requiring that samples of bodily substances be taken from the accused for purposes of forensic DNA analysis. Some of the crimes committed by the accused are listed as "primary designated offences" as defined in s. 487.04(a) of the Criminal Code and, accordingly, such an order is statutorily mandated in the circumstances.

[59] Second, pursuant to s. 109(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, there shall be an order prohibiting the accused from the possession of any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition for life – and prohibiting the accused from the possession of any other firearm, and any crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition and explosive substance for a period of ten years after her release from imprisonment for these offences.

[60] Third, pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code, there shall be an order prohibiting the accused from communicating, directly or indirectly, with either of the two victims in this case (R.W. and M.D.), as well as Tyler Vickers and/or Daylo Robinson.

[61] Fourth, as the accused has been convicted of a number of "designated offences," as defined by s. 490.011(1) of the Criminal Code, pursuant to the combination of ss. 490.012(1) and 490.013(2.1) of the Criminal Code, I make an order requiring the accused to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10, for life.

[62] Fifth, pursuant to s. 490.1 of the Criminal Code, I order the forfeiture, of the seized cell phone (IPhone) of the accused, which I find to be offence-related property related to the commission of the current offences, to His Majesty in right of the Province of Ontario, and disposed of or otherwise dealt with as directed by the Attorney General or the Solicitor General of Ontario.

I. Conclusion

[63] In conclusion, in an effort to now impose the functional equivalent of an 8-year penitentiary term of imprisonment on the accused, Ms. Horton is now sentenced (after she is fairly given her custodial credits) to a total penitentiary term of imprisonment of 7½ years duration, as I have indicated.

[64] The accused is, of course, also subject to the five ancillary sentencing orders made today.

Kenneth L. Campbell J.

Released: September 12, 2025