Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Case Information

Date: 2025-05-01
File:
Before: Rohit Parghi
Parties:

• Christian Chukwuedozie Chijindu, Plaintiff
• Law Society of Ontario, Lisa Quan, and Rhoda Cookhorn, Defendants

Counsel:

• Plaintiff: Self-represented
• Defendants: Benjamin Kates and Adam Varro

Heard: May 1, 2025 (In Writing)

Endorsement

Introduction

[1] The Defendants, the Law Society of Ontario (“LSO”), Lisa Quan, and Rhoda Cookhorn, asked the Registrar, by letter dated March 10, 2025, to dismiss this action under rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. Rule 2.1 permits the court, “on its own initiative,” to “stay or dismiss a proceeding if the proceeding appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.” The Registrar has notified the court of this request and it has been provided to me for consideration. Both parties have provided me with written submissions, which I have now reviewed.

[2] For the reasons below, I dismiss Mr. Chijindu’s action. It is clearly an abuse of process.

The Rule 2.1 Framework

[3] Rule 2.1 is intended to allow a judge to exercise their gatekeeping function to make a summary determination as to whether, on its face, a proceeding should be dismissed as frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process. The rule is to apply only “where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to” the rule 2.1 process (Scaduto v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733, para 8). The rule is “an extremely blunt instrument” and “reserved for the clearest of cases” (Khan v. Krylov & Company LLP, 2017 ONCA 625, para 12). It is not intended to be used “for close calls” (Scaduto, at para. 9, citing Raji v. Ladner, 2015 ONSC 801, paras 8-9).

[4] In considering whether to dismiss an action under rule 2.1, the pleading is to be read generously to allow for drafting deficiencies and to identify the core complaint pleaded (Gao v. Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board), 2014 ONSC 6497, para 18).

Background and Procedural History

[5] Mr. Chijindu’s license to practice law was revoked by the LSO on May 11, 2020 after he engaged in what the hearing division of the LSO characterized as “serious professional misconduct that brought discredit upon the legal profession”. His misconduct was found to have included charging excessive and unreasonable client fees, failing to comply with court orders requiring him to reimburse his client for the fees, and providing a duplicative and false supplementary account to a client in an attempt to sidestep the court’s order.

[6] The hearing division’s findings of professional misconduct and its revocation of Mr. Chijindu’s license were upheld by the LSO’s appeal division. They were then upheld by the Divisional Court. Mr. Chijindu sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario and the Supreme Court of Canada, without success.

[7] Mr. Chijindu then brought an application in this court, seeking, among other things, a declaration that his rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms had been violated by the LSO and an order requiring the LSO to reinstate his license. The LSO successfully moved to strike the application. In his July 22, 2024 Endorsement granting the motion to strike, Akazaki J. described Mr. Chijindu’s application as a “flank attack” on the LSO proceedings.

[8] Mr. Chijindu appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his appeal on February 7, 2025. On April 4, 2025, Mr. Chijindu sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

[9] Eleven days after the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, Mr. Chijindu commenced this action, which alleges the tort of “malfeasance in public office” against the LSO. The alleged malfeasance is the conduct of the LSO in bringing its (successful) motion to strike the Charter application.

Analysis: Vexatious Litigation

[10] I find that this action bears the hallmarks of vexatious litigation and is appropriately dismissed under rule 2.1.

[11] This court has identified several common attributes of a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 140 that support the application of rule 2.1 (Gao, at para. 14). One such attribute is bringing multiple proceedings to try to re-determine an issue that has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Mr. Chijindu has done just that here. This is the seventh proceeding Mr. Chijindu has commenced since having his license revoked. It is the second proceeding in which he has sought damages under the Charter in connection with the LSO’s alleged misconduct. Mr. Chijindu reframes this action as involving “malfeasance in public office,” but at its core, it is concerned largely with the same substance as the previous proceedings: the LSO’s proceeding against him.

[12] Mr. Chijindu has perhaps added a new element to this action by now also complaining about the LSO’s conduct in bringing a motion to strike his previous Charter application. That does not make his conduct any less vexatious, however. It is a slight variation in the nature of his abusive litigation behaviour, but it is certainly not a departure from it. Indeed, Mr. Chijindu’s approach is something the court in Gao identified as another hallmark of a vexatious litigant: “rolling forward grounds and issues from prior proceedings to repeat and supplement them in later proceedings including bringing proceedings against counsel who have acted for or against them in earlier proceedings” (at para. 14).

[13] That is precisely what Mr. Chijindu is doing here, in two ways. First, by framing the action as one in “malfeasance in public office,” he rolls forward and supplements his earlier complaints with new complaints about the LSO’s response to his earlier complaints. It is an approach that he could conceivably deploy indefinitely.

[14] Second, he now names as defendants the counsel who acted against him previously: the Defendant Lisa Quan is the lawyer who brought the motion to dismiss Mr. Chijindu’s Charter application, and the Defendant Rhoda Cookhorn is the lawyer who responded to Mr. Chijindu’s appeal of the dismissal of the Charter application.

[15] Another attribute of a vexatious litigant identified in Gao is the persistent pursuit of unsuccessful appeals (at para. 14). As the procedural history outlined above makes clear, Mr. Chijindu has engaged in such a pursuit. He appealed the LSO hearing division’s decision to the appeal division and Divisional Court, both without success. He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada, both without success. He appealed the decision of this court in his previous Charter application to Court of Appeal, without success. He has now sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

No Reasonable Cause of Action

[16] I am also, respectfully, of the view that the action cannot succeed on its face. This court and the Court of Appeal both accepted the position of the Defendants in the Charter application. I cannot see how, in those circumstances, the Defendants’ position in that application could give rise to an action for malfeasance. In any event, I am satisfied that the Defendants’ conduct in a court proceeding is shielded by the doctrine of absolute privilege and therefore could not give rise to an action for malfeasance in public office (LaFramboise v. Kostyniuk, 2025 ONSC 430, para 10).

Conclusion

[17] For these reasons, I find that the action is an abuse of process and should be dismissed under rule 2.1.

Rohit Parghi
Date: May 1, 2025