COURT FILE NO.: FC1660/17 DATE: March 12, 2024

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY COURT

BETWEEN:

S.S. Alla Kikinova, for the Applicant Applicant

- and -

A.T. Lawrence Blokker, for the Respondent Respondent

HEARD: February 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16, 2024

SAH J.

REASONS FOR DECISION

Overview

[1] This is a relocation case involving an 11-year-old child.

[2] The parties enjoy equal shared parenting under a long-standing status quo. The respondent mother (the “respondent”) wishes to relocate the child from L[…], Ontario to M[…], Ontario.

[3] The applicant father (the “applicant”) opposes the relocation.

[4] Ancillary to relocation, the court is asked to determine what parenting time and decision-making regime is in the child’s best interest and what support obligations flow.

Initialization of Names and Identifiers

[5] This case involves allegations of child sexual abuse and other sensitive information.

[6] Section 70(1)(b) of the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, (“CLRA”), provides the court with the authority to initialize names of parties, children, and public information that has the effect of identifying any person in the court proceeding. This section does not prevent media from being present for hearings and does not restrict reporting about the hearing and the facts of the case.

[7] I find that the information contained in these reasons are highly sensitive and personal in nature. For the privacy of the child, I have decided to initialize the parties’ names, the child’s name, and any information that could identify her. To do otherwise could result in the public airing of intimate details in her life, and this would not be in her best interest.

[8] I am satisfied that the benefits of initializing names and identifiers in this case outweigh any negative effect on open court principles. There is no alternative measure available to protect the child’s right to privacy.

[9] The parties did not request that I initialize names and identifiers. I have decided to do so without hearing submissions from the parties or providing notice to the media. This is a 2017 case that finally proceeded to trial in 2024. Any delays involved with inviting submissions would result in a delay in issuing my reasons for decision. This case involves relocation which I consider to be an issue of relative urgency, particularly for the requesting party.

[10] Under section 70(4) of the CLRA, my order may be varied or discharged by the parties and media.

Background and Litigation History

[11] The parties began cohabitating in 2004.

[12] At the time, the respondent had three children from a previous relationship; twins, C.S and M.S., two years old, and A.S., three years old. These children were cared for by the applicant and referred to him as stepfather.

[13] The parties never married. The CLRA applies to this case.

[14] The child subject to this litigation, M.S. (the “child”), was born approximately nine years after the parties began cohabiting.

[15] The parties separated when the child was four years old.

[16] Upon separation, the child remained in the primary care of the applicant.

[17] The application was issued in December 2017, less than six months after the parties separated. An Answer was filed the following month.

[18] In April 2018, this court ordered, on consent and on a temporary without prejudice basis (the “2018 Order”), that the respondent’s parenting time with the child was to occur every Tuesday for a few hours and every other weekend, with the child to remain in the care of the applicant at all other times. A request was also made for the involvement of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (the “OCL”).

[19] The OCL became involved and authored a report dated July 25, 2018 (the “2018 OCL report”).

[20] At the time, the applicant was seeking sole decision-making, to be the primary parent with no access to the respondent or, in the alternative, with access in line with the 2018 Order. The respondent was seeking a 50/50 shared parenting regime and sole decision-making.

[21] The 2018 OCL report sets out the following recommendations relative to decision-making and parenting time:

• Sole decision-making to the respondent after input from the applicant regarding any significant decisions about health, education, or the child’s wellbeing;
• A week-about schedule with exchanges to occur on Friday.

[22] The 2018 OCL report provided that the parents could consider midweek visits if the child experienced difficulties being away from either parent for a week.

[23] On October 24, 2019, the parties signed interim minutes of settlement which led to the November 29, 2019 interim order (the “2019 Order”).

[24] The 2019 Order vacated the 2018 interim order and provided for equal parenting time on alternate weeks, from school dismissal on Monday until the start of school on Monday.

[25] The comprehensive 2019 Order dealt with parenting time exchanges, communication between the parties, daily decision-making, holidays and special occasions, and various other ancillary parenting orders.

[26] This matter was next before the court in December 2021 for a motion. The applicant sought to change decision-making responsibility and parenting time based on the fact that the respondent had moved to M[…].

[27] At the motion, the parties agreed to vary the shared parenting regime in the summer, and the applicant did not proceed with the portion of his motion related to decision-making responsibility.

[28] The parties’ consent led to a 2021 Order (the “2021 Order”) which suspended the week-about schedule each July and August, placing the child in the care of respondent for the month of July and in the care of the applicant for the month of August. The week-about schedule was to resume in September.

[29] The 2021 Order also requested the involvement of the OCL to update the previous report, with a specific request to address the respondent’s wish to relocate to M[…].

[30] The OCL assigned a clinician, who authored a report dated July 27, 2023 (the “2023 OCL report”) and testified at trial.

[31] The 2023 OCL report set out the following recommendations:

• final decision-making authority to the respondent after consulting with and considering the applicant’s input prior to making any significant decisions about the child’s health, education, or wellbeing;
• the child not to be moved more than 25 km away from L[…], Ontario;
• continuation of the week-about parenting schedule with exchanges to occur at school; the child to spend one month each summer with each parent, two weeks in March break and Christmas, and the occasional two-week period, as mutually agreed upon;
• additional recommendations were also made in relation to the parties and their access to community supports.

[32] Relocation was not pled in the Answer. The Answer was never amended to include the claim.

[33] Relocation was identified as an issue at the trial management conference and was explicitly cited as an issue for trial in the trial scheduling endorsement form.

[34] A Notice of Relocation was prepared but not served on the applicant.

[35] Despite not being pled and no formal notice being sent as required by the legislation, the parties agreed that the issue of relocation is an issue properly before the court and requires the court's determination.

Issues for Determination

[36] Though pled by the parties, requests for a restraining order and the respondent’s claim for spousal support were not pursued at trial. Therefore, the issues for the court’s determination are as follows:

1. Is it in the child’s best interest to relocate from L[…], Ontario to M[…], Ontario?
2. Following disposition of issue #1 above, what parenting time and decision-making regime are in the child’s best interests?
3. Following disposition on parenting time, what, if any, child support obligations flow?

Position of the Parties

Applicant father

[37] The applicant asks for the current week-about parenting schedule to continue, with each party making the day-to-day decisions for the child while in their care.

[38] He also requests a joint decision-making regime for any major decisions.

[39] He requests that the parties not pay child support to one another given they are both on either the Ontario Disability Support Program (“ODSP”) or Ontario Works (“OW”).

Respondent mother

[40] The respondent requests a sole decision-making regime regardless of the outcome on the relocation issue.

[41] She asks the court to permit the child to move to M[…], Ontario and for the child’s primary residence to be with her.

[42] She proposes two weeks of parenting time in L[…], Ontario, between the applicant and child, during Christmas and March Break, and one month in the summer. She further proposes bi-weekly video conferencing.

[43] If permitted to move with the child, the respondent wishes this court to order that no support be payable but that the parties share equally in the costs of the child’s travel back to L[…].

[44] If the child is not permitted to relocate, the respondent requests parenting time exchanges to occur at a supervised access exchange centre, an order that the respondent comply with the OCL’s additional recommendations and that the applicant be required to hire a tutor for the child with costs to be borne by him solely. It is further requested that the applicant’s parenting time be reduced to every other weekend until he complies with the additional OCL recommendations.

[45] Finally, if the child remains in L[…], Ontario under a shared parenting time regime, the respondent seeks child support from the applicant based on his imputed income of $36,000.

Legal Principles

Burden of Proof

[46] The burden of proof on relocation issues is set out in s. 39.4(5), (6), (7), (8) of the CLRA.

[47] In this case, the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order that provides that a child spend substantially equal time in the care of each party, and on the reading of s. 39.4(5) of the CLRA, the respondent has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in the best interests of the child.

[48] However, the respondent submits that, because the 2019 Order is an interim order, the court may determine that s. 39.4(5) does not apply and there is no onus on the respondent. See 39.4(8) CLRA.

[49] The 2019 Order, which initiated a long-standing status quo, was made on consent and was not varied in four years, save for changes in 2021 which provided for equal but prolonged summer parenting time to each party. The 2021 Order was also made on consent.

[50] The language of s. 39.4(8) is permissive but not mandatory.

[51] Given the circumstances of this case, including the consent order followed by the parties for the last four years, the interim nature of that order does not shift the respondent’s onus as set out in s. 39.4(5).

[52] Accordingly, I find the respondent has the burden of proving that relocation would be in the best interests of the child.

Relocation and Best Interest

[53] In determining whether to authorize the relocation of a child, the court shall take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with s. 24 of the Act, as well as,

(a) the reasons for the relocation; (b) the impact of the relocation on the child; (c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child, and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons; (d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child has complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 39.3 and any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award and agreement; (e) the existence of an order, family arbitration award or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside; (f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new residence and the travel expenses; and (g) whether each person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child has complied with their obligations under any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.

See s. 39.4(3) CLRA.

Child Support

[54] Section 31 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, (“FLA”), sets out that every parent has an obligation to provide support, to the extent that the parent is capable of doing so, for his or her eligible children.

[55] Subsection 31(7) of the FLA sets out that an order for the support of children should recognize that each parent has an obligation to provide support for the child and should apportion the obligation according to the Child Support Guidelines, O Reg 391/97, (the “Guidelines”).

[56] Subsection 31(11) of the FLA states that a court making an order for support shall do so in accordance with the Guidelines.

[57] Subsection 3(1) of the Guidelines states:

Presumptive rule

3 (1) Unless otherwise provided under these Guidelines, the amount of a child support order for children under the age of majority is:

(a) the amount set out in the applicable table, according to the number of children under the age of majority to whom the order relates and the income of the spouse against whom the order is sought; and (b) the amount, if any, determined under section 7.

[58] Section 2 of the Guidelines provides that “income” means the annual income determined under ss. 15 to 20.

Credibility Assessment

[59] The Court may accept some, none, or all of a witness' evidence: R. v. D.R., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 291 per L'Heureux-Dubé J. (in dissent in the result) at p. 318; R. v. Cunsolo, 2011 ONSC 1349, at para 228.

[60] In the assessment of credibility, the court can consider the factors listed in McBennett v. Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610, at para. 41:

1. Were there inconsistencies in the witness’ evidence at trial, or between what the witness stated at trial and what they said on other occasions, whether under oath or not? Inconsistencies on minor matters of detail are normal and generally do not affect the credibility of the witness, but where the inconsistency involves a material matter about which an honest witness is unlikely to be mistaken, the inconsistency can demonstrate carelessness with the truth.
2. Was there a logical flow to the evidence?
3. Were there inconsistencies between the witness' testimony and the documentary evidence?
4. Were there inconsistencies between the witness’ evidence and that of other credible witnesses?
5. Is there other independent evidence that confirms or contradicts the witness' testimony?
6. Did the witness have an interest in the outcome, or were they personally connected to either party?
7. Did the witness have a motive to deceive?
8. Did the witness have the opportunity and ability to observe the factual matters about which they testified?
9. Did they have a sufficient power of recollection to provide the court with an accurate account?
10. Were there any external suggestions made at any time that may have altered the witness’ memory?
11. Did the evidence appear to be inherently improbable and implausible? In this regard, the question to consider is whether the testimony is in harmony with “the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions?”
12. Was the evidence provided in a candid and straightforward manner, or was the witness evasive, strategic, hesitant, or biased?
13. Where appropriate, was the witness capable of making concessions not favourable to their position, or were they self-serving?
14. Consideration may also be given to the demeanor of the witness, including their sincerity and use of language.

[Citations omitted.]

[61] The respondent, in her testimony and Form 35.1 affidavit, alleges that the applicant was physically violent with her and both of her older sons.

[62] Both sons testified at trial and denied the allegations of physical violence by the applicant.

[63] One son testified that it was the respondent, his mother, who resorted to physical violence, and denied that the applicant ever used violence against him personally.

[64] Both of the respondent’s sons acknowledged in their evidence that there was high conflict between the parties when they were together, and they both testified about loud arguments between their parents.

[65] They both denied any physical violence between the parties. Both acknowledged that the applicant was loud and sometimes screamed, but described him as being calmer now, and that he currently parents differently than he did when parenting them.

[66] The respondent makes further allegations in her testimony and Form 35.1 affidavit of the applicant’s sexual impropriety with the child, claiming to have witnessed the applicant with an erection while the child was in front of him and alleging his hand grazed her privates over her clothes.

[67] On cross-examination, the respondent testified that the alleged inappropriate touching took place before the parties’ separation. She testified that she reported this to the police but was told she needed to take video proof, otherwise they could not do anything. She further testified that she is “not into pornography”. Her report went no further. She did not testify about reporting this incident to the Children’s Aid Society (“CAS”).

[68] Despite this alleged incident, she consented to two orders for shared parenting on an equal basis.

[69] The OCL reports state that a review of police records, the CAS worker, and CAS records did not identify any safety concerns for the child while living with the applicant.

[70] Allegations of sexual assault against a child by a parent are serious and are not to be taken lightly. The evidence supports that the allegations were investigated and not supported or verified by any other third party.

[71] The respondent testified that she suffers from complex post-traumatic stress disorder (CPTSD) as a result of the relationship with, and abuse suffered at the hands of, the applicant.

[72] During her evidence, as set out in great detail in her Form 35.1 affidavit, she alleges that the applicant was physically, emotionally, and sexually abusive towards her. She claims the applicant was obsessed with power, control, money, and drugs, and that he had problems with alcohol, cocaine, and OxyContin use. She claims the applicant exercised coercive control over her. All of these allegations were denied by the applicant.

[73] The applicant’s mother and the respondent’s two older sons, the applicant’s stepsons, all testified to his character, denying any violence between the parties though all admitted that the relationship was rocky and tumultuous.

[74] The respondent testified that the applicant has impulse control issues and is not able to control his anger. She later stated that the applicant was strategic, planning his attacks on her when there were no witnesses around.

[75] The OCL clinician testified that he had no personal observations of the applicant having impulse control and anger issues as described by the respondent.

[76] Nonetheless, the OCL recommended that the applicant get a psychological or medical assessment regarding anger and impulse control as there were indications in the police reports that these difficulties may be the result of a medical condition or injury.

[77] I accept that the applicant may have impulse control issues and place less weight on the respondent’s allegation that the applicant was calculated and thoughtful about when he was violent with her.

[78] While I acknowledge that family violence often takes place behind closed doors and is difficult to corroborate, and while I don’t deny that a form of family violence likely existed between the parties when they were together, I do not accept that each itemized act or incident occurred in the way describe by the respondent.

[79] I find the applicant could make concessions not favourable to his position. This added to his credibility. For example, he readily admitted to driving once when his driver’s license was suspended.

[80] He admitted that he developed a dependency to pain medication as a result of a prescription received after an accident but that, with the assistance of his doctor, he weaned himself off the dependency.

[81] The applicant was also candid in his evidence about how much reading the child does in his home. It was his evidence that the child, who lives with him, his girlfriend, and her four children, ages eight, six, and five-year-old twins, play basketball, go to the park, and play Nintendo switch. He recounted a typical day.

[82] The respondent attempted to suggest that the applicant does not complete the child’s reading logs by offering, as evidence, the copy of her own reading log. The reading logs produced cover one week over the last four months, when the child was in the respondent’s care. No logs were produced for when the child was in the applicant’s care. There is no explanation as to whether or not those logs exist, or what they would demonstrate in terms of the applicant’s ability to encourage and foster reading.

[83] The applicant did testify that the child struggles with reading but is “getting there”. He further testified about the additional assistance the child receives through her independent education plan (IEP). Overall, I find his evidence to be more balanced than that of the respondent.

[84] Some of the respondent’s evidence gave the air of improbability and implausibility. This diminished her credibility.

[85] For example, the respondent testified that she contacted the school in M[…] on two occasions to determine if they have the necessary supports in place to assist the child with her IEP. However, the timelines set out in her evidence do not align with the completion of the IEP. Specifically, the respondent testified that she made two phone calls to the school, one two years ago and one at the beginning of summer 2023. Both of these calls took place before the child’s assessment and the development of the IEP at her current school.

[86] Another example relates to the respondent’s claim that the child is bullied in school. This claim is unsupported by the applicant with whom the child spends half of her time, the paternal grandmother with whom the child enjoys a close relationship, and the OCL.

[87] The OCL interviewed the child on two occasions, in the middle of her last academic year. She did not report any bullying and, in fact, she admitted that she likes talking with her friends. The OCL reports that the CAS records indicate the child was observed in both homes monthly and was always seen to be in a good mood, smiling, and laughing.

[88] Without minimizing the respondent’s lived experience and her ongoing fear of the applicant, where their evidence differs, I prefer the evidence of the applicant to that of the respondent.

Analysis and Findings

[89] Best interest factors – CLRA s. 24:

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability

[90] The child is now 11 years old, has some learning disabilities and an IEP at school.

[91] Both parties testified as to the difficulties the child had at school and the measures put in place to assist her educationally.

[92] I find there is a need for stability in the child’s educational planning and that she has benefited from the educational assessments and measures put in place at her current school to assist with her development.

[93] I accept that both parties have been able to provide the child with stability while living in L[…]; however, I have concerns regarding the respondent’s relocation plan and the impact of that relocation on the child’s educational needs. The change of relocation would be a significant disruption on the child’s education as outlined further below.

(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life

[94] In considering this factor, I acknowledge that the child has a strong relationship and bond with both parents.

[95] Other relationships of central importance in the child’s life include the child’s relationship with the paternal grandmother whom she sees regularly and with whom she often interacts virtually. This relationship would be greatly affected if the child relocated.

[96] Additionally, I have considered the evidence of the child’s half-brothers who, admittedly, do not see her often but are provided with an opportunity to do so while she is and remains in L[…].

[97] Though the applicant’s new partner did not testify, there is no dispute that the child lives with the father’s common law spouse and all of her children, many of whom are close in age.

[98] The paternal grandmother and the child’s half-brothers did not provide evidence that there was no relationship of strength or significance between the child and these individuals.

[99] In fact, the evidence supports that the child routinely plays with her father’s partner’s children and that they interact together well as a family.

[100] There is also evidence to support that the child has a positive relationship with the respondent’s fiancé, however little evidence was offered as to the strength of that relationship.

(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent

[101] What is clear through the evidence is that the parties do not think highly of one another. Nonetheless, they have been able to co-parent for over four years.

[102] As set out in my credibility assessment above, I found that the applicant was willing to concede points harmful to his position while the respondent was less willing to do so.

[103] The applicant’s evidence was that the child had the opportunity to connect virtually with the respondent while in his care. He further testified that he respects the mother’s time with the child and does not interfere with that parenting time by reaching out to the child.

[104] The paternal grandmother stated that she has a virtual connection with the child in the care of the applicant but not with the respondent, claiming the child does not have the internet available to her.

[105] There is a discrepancy in the respondent’s evidence as it relates to the availability of the internet while in M[…]. The respondent testified that the internet was available through a hotspot connection while her fiancé stated he had cable internet and did not mention the availability of the internet or a hotspot connection.

[106] I am satisfied that the applicant has the willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the respondent, but the respondent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the applicant is much less.

(d) the history of care of the child

[107] The history of care of the child has been reviewed above.

[108] The parties have largely spent equal amounts of time with the child since 2019.

[109] I accept that both parties have been primary caregivers for the child.

(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained

[110] The child’s views and preferences as communicated to the OCL indicate that she did not like the week-about schedule as she did not have enough time to spend with her pets, friends, or family at either home.

[111] During her first interview with the OCL, she gave the current schedule a 6 out of 10, and in the second interview, she gave the current schedule 2 out of 10.

[112] She indicated that she would like to spend two weeks at a time with each parent and that she did not want to see the other parent during that two-week period.

[113] In relation to M[…], the child reported that she and the respondent only go there in the summer because the drive is too long when the ferry is not operating. She indicated that she was “fine” with the amount of time she spends in M[…].

[114] When asked what she thought about living in M[…], she indicated it would be “cool” as she could spend more time with her friends there and hang out with the mother’s fiancé.

[115] She indicated that it would be better in M[…] as “all the kids are normally screaming” at the applicant’s home. She was unsure about going to school in M[…] as she has never gone to school there before.

[116] According to the OCL’s evidence, a move to M[…] would interfere with the child’s schooling. The OCL notes that the child was raised in L[…] and has many friends and older siblings in the area. It was further noted that the child was well supported in her school, which she has attended since kindergarten.

[117] The OCL indicated that it was not clear that the child appreciates the impact that a move to M[…] would have on her and the impact it would have on her time with the applicant. The OCL recommended that the child not move more than 25 kilometers away from either parent so that she may maintain her relationship with both.

[118] Further, the OCL indicated that, at her age, the child might not have a realistic understanding about what kind of parenting time schedule would be best for her. The OCL report cites that two weeks apart from the other parent may be too long to be away at her age.

[119] The OCL noted that the child’s wish to have occasionally longer periods of parenting time may be beneficial to the child, allowing her to spend extra time with each parent, but the OCL recommended that the child do so during March Break and Christmas Break.

[120] Both parties described the child in a positive manner but neither spoke of her level of maturity and understanding.

[121] Her comments to the OCL and words used, such as “fine and “cool”, result in a finding that the child does not have the maturity and therefore appreciation about the current parenting time schedule and the impact her relocation may have on a larger scale and on a practical basis.

[122] Given the child’s age and lack of evidence as to advanced maturity, I place little weight on the child’s comments regarding her proposed schedule and her views, to the extent they were provided, about moving to M[…].

[123] It should be noted that the OCL clinician testified that, in his discussions with the respondent, she had no formal plans to move, simply stating that she wanted to move in with her fiancé and that she wanted the child to move with her. The respondent did not report to the OCL any specifics with regard to schooling or parenting time.

[124] The OCL did not observe the home in M[…] or observe the child with the respondent’s fiancé.

(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage

[125] No evidence was tendered on this issue.

[126] While there was some suggestion that the applicant did not support the respondent’s religious beliefs, no submissions were made as to the impact of this on the best interests of the child. No evidence was led with respect to the child’s religious upbringing.

(g) any plans for the child’s care

[127] It is the applicant’s plan to continue living with his current partner with whom he claims to obtain a significant amount of support and guidance.

[128] The father is the co-owner of his residence with his parents and there is evidence to suggest that the right of survivorship flows to him upon passing of the child’s paternal grandparents.

[129] The father proposes that the child continue to attend the school that she has attended since kindergarten, in the city where she was born and raised to date.

[130] The mother’s plans are prospective in nature, indicating she would like to relocate the child to M[…] full-time to be in the care of herself and her fiancé, with whom she has had a relationship of stability for the last five years.

[131] The evidence supports that the mother has no concrete plan pertaining to the child’s education other than to suggest that the schools in M[…] will be equipped to deal with the child’s IEP. No evidence was tendered from the school or the school board in this regard.

[132] The respondent’s fiancé is building a home, which is still under construction, and is currently living in a home owned by his mother.

[133] The respondent’s fiancé previously lived with his father, who passed away. His mother is in a retirement facility and the respondent’s fiancé testified that the home is in his mother’s name through right of survivorship.

[134] Though no documentary evidence was provided on this issue, the evidence suggests that the respondent’s fiancé and his sister have a plan to invoke their mother’s power of attorney to assume ownership of the home, with the respondent’s fiancé buying out his sister’s half interest.

[135] No evidence was called to support the viability of this plan or the probability of it occurring, leaving the court with the impression that the child’s prospective living arrangement is uncertain.

[136] This is in contrast to the applicant’s current living arrangement which, according to his evidence and the evidence of the paternal grandmother, leaves the court with the impression that there is current and prospective stability for the child in L[…].

[137] Overall, the court prefers the plan of care presented by the applicant over the respondent’s.

[138] The respondent gave evidence that she will be required to move out of her current subsidized housing. She claims there is currently a housing shortage due to being over-housed. It was her evidence that under the new housing regulations, she will be required to accept the first offer for housing, which may be located in a different part of the city of L[…]. She claims it would make it impossible for transportation and travel time to the child’s current school because she would be out of zone.

[139] However, the evidence supports that the school the child attends is within the applicant’s school catchment. As such, there is no basis for the respondent’s argument that the child will have to change schools anyway because of her move. She makes this argument in support of her request to move to M[…], to diminish the significance that a change of school would have on the child.

[140] Not only is the respondent’s housing situation in M[…] uncertain, so too is her housing situation in L[…], Ontario.

[141] The only stability, as it relates to housing, is the applicant’s plan to remain in his home.

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child

[142] Both parties, to their credit, are willing and able to care for and meet the needs of the child. They have done so for the last four years and, by all accounts, the child is happy and doing well with the current parenting schedule.

[143] The respondent believes that she and her fiancé are better equipped to deal with the child’s learning disabilities as they help her with the completion of her homework, Hooked on Phonics, and ensure her participation with daily reading.

[144] The respondent attempted to portray that the child is not completing her homework and reading regularly while in the care of the applicant, which prohibits continuous learning and better building blocks for the child’s future.

[145] However, her claims are assertions only and are not supported in the evidence. For example, none of the child’s report cards tendered as evidence during trial suggest that the child’s educational needs are being met more one week over the other, or with one parent and not with the other.

[146] Further, the respondent’s attempts to discredit the applicant by suggesting that he is not completing reading logs, by offering her reading logs only, do not support her assertion.

[147] While the parties might have very different parenting styles, and while they may prioritize the completion of the child’s homework and daily reading differently, there is no evidence to suggest that either of them lacks the ability or willingness to meet her needs.

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child

[148] The parties use the parenting app, Talking Parents, to communicate. The complete records were submitted at trial.

[149] These records reveal that the parties have been able to communicate with one another. They do so sparingly and communications are limited to issues pertaining to the child.

[150] The Talking Parents communication records reveal that the parties discussed upcoming dental and medical appointments as they relate to the child, communicated changes in pickup locations due to street closures, discussed joint decisions about the child’s extracurricular activities, and provided updates regarding the child’s health.

[151] There is no evidence that the applicant is abusive in his messages to the respondent as described by her.

[152] The parties have been able to successfully co-parent on a shared parenting basis, using the Talking Parents app, since 2019.

[153] I find that there is reasonably sufficient communication between the parties in relation to the child. Communication between separated parents can never be perfect. Disagreements and different viewpoints pertaining to issues relating to childrearing are inevitable.

[154] I find that the parties are able to communicate appropriately with one another and they would be able to do so on an ongoing basis in the future.

[155] The respondent suggested that the applicant invades her space by approaching her vehicle to talk to her at exchanges. This causes her to be fearful.

[156] In support of her position, the respondent relied on the evidence of a friend who was present during some of the parenting time exchanges. The applicant’s mother was also present at parenting time exchanges and testified of her experiences.

[157] None of the evidence tendered by either of these witnesses changes my finding with respect to the parties’ ability to communicate appropriately with one another. I make this finding notwithstanding the OCL’s recommendation that the respondent consult with and consider the applicant’s input prior to making any significant decisions about the health, education and wellbeing of the child.

[158] The OCL testified that this recommendation was made due to the applicant’s “apparent difficulties” with anger management. The OCL conceded in his examination by the respondent that both parents do well with day-to-day decision-making as it relates to the child. The OCL took the position that major decisions should require input from the applicant but decision-making should be left to the respondent as she is a great mom and able to provide good care to the child. Another basis for the OCL’s recommendation stems from two outbursts the applicant had while attending two different schools.

[159] However, the OCL’s report reveals that both of these instances occurred in 2019. In April 2019, staff at C[…] Secondary School reported that the applicant was yelling at the principal and vice-principal regarding his son’s suspension. He then attended T[…] School Board and was yelling at staff there. Police was required to attend, describing him to be unreasonable and irrational. He was banned from attending the school until further notice.

[160] Another incident in December 2019 occurred when the police were contacted by the child’s school as the applicant was extremely agitated when leaving the school that day. The report notes that the applicant can be easily frustrated and was more agitated than usual as he nearly hit a deer with his car earlier that day. The applicant was described as being extremely rude and uncooperative with the police and was furious that the school had called. When the police attended to speak with the applicant, he appeared to be in crisis, was crying and extremely upset. The report continues to detail that the child advised the police that her father was upset but that she was fine, and that no other incident occurred with her father. The police had no safety concerns for the child at that time. She was in good health and the applicant was found to have been triggered but was able to care for her properly.

[161] I do not find that these two reports warrant a requirement for the respondent to have sole decision-making.

[162] In November 2019, the parties consented to an order which provided for joint decision-making, explicitly stating that neither party would make unilateral decisions without the written consent of the other relating to issues pertaining to the child’s education, medical care and religious upbringing.

[163] The parties have been operating under the 2019 Order with no issue or major incident, leaving the court to conclude that they can do so in the future.

[164] Their past practices, the clear demonstration of appropriate and effective communication on the Talking Parents app, and my findings above relating to the OCL’s recommendations lead to a conclusion that joint decision-making is appropriate and should continue going forward.

(j) family violence

[165] There are very significant allegations of family violence in this case.

[166] The respondent testified that she was traumatized, and is still traumatized, by the behaviour of the applicant.

[167] It was her evidence that she fled the relationship and went to a women’s shelter without her children.

[168] Her Form 35.1 affidavit details significant family violence, all of which was denied by the applicant.

[169] The respondent testified about her fear, which continues to exist to this date, when the applicant approaches her vehicle. She claims that her CPTSD is caused by the applicant and that she wants to distance herself from the applicant as much as possible in order to heal.

[170] I have every reason to believe that part of the respondent’s desire to relocate is so that she can put as much distance between herself and the applicant as possible. This might be a significant factor in her ability to heal from the trauma she sustained.

[171] I am deeply troubled by the allegations raised by the respondent in her Form 35.1 affidavit. If all of the allegations were found to be true, they would rise to the level of “family violence” as defined in the CLRA.

[172] However, the allegations raised by the respondent of abuse between the child and the applicant were unverified by the police and CAS.

[173] Further, allegations of domestic violence between the applicant and the respondent were not corroborated by the respondent’s two sons and the child’s paternal grandmother.

[174] What did come out loud and clear through the evidence was that the parties’ relationship was tumultuous and that there was a lot of yelling and screaming in the home.

[175] I recognize that family violence often takes place behind closed doors and is difficult to corroborate. I further acknowledge that the courts have often viewed family violence as a reason for relocation and further accept that acrimony between parties continues after separation.

[176] If I find that there was family violence, the legislation requires me to determine if the violence has an impact on the applicant’s ability to meet the needs of the child. I am also required to consider whether the violence has an impact on the appropriateness of cooperation between the parties on issues affecting the child.

[177] When interviewed by the OCL, the respondent reported concerns about the applicant being abusive towards the child in that he yells and swears at her. This concern was not supported in the evidence nor verified by third parties or the child.

[178] There is no evidence to support a finding that the applicant is not able to meet the needs of the child.

[179] The respondent claims that she was traumatised and abused emotionally by the applicant. She claims the emotional abuse continues as he stares at her and tries to intimidate her when she sees him at school or in the community. She claims he is abusive in his messages to her.

[180] As outlined above, I find the parties can communicate effectively, not perfectly. Any past family violence that may have occurred has not and does not impact the appropriate cooperation between the parties on issues affecting the child.

[181] I do find, however, that the respondent’s lived experiences have impacted the respondent so profoundly that she feels it is necessary for her mental health and emotional wellbeing to move away from L[…]. While this may be a valid reason for relocation in the respondent’s mind, as set out below, this reason is inconsistent with the best interests of the child.

[182] I now turn to the consideration of the enumerated relocation factors.

Relocation Factors – CLRA s. 39.4

(a) the reasons for the relocation

[183] The Supreme Court of Canada in Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, at paras. 28–30, cautioned the court to not judge a parent’s reasons for moving, and further cautioned that the lack of a compelling reason to move is irrelevant unless it negatively affects a parent’s ability to meet the needs of the child.

[184] The respondent cites many reasons for her relocation.

[185] She seeks to relocate to M[…] as she has met and is now engaged to a new partner who has lived there his entire life.

[186] The respondent’s partner has a business, interest in property, and family members living in M[…].

[187] The respondent submits that relocation will provide her with the ability to have emotional support. Her evidence is that her counselling is virtual and, though based in L[…], she can continue accessing resources. She did not provide any evidence of resources specifically available to her in M[…].

[188] The respondent claims that this will help with her recovery from her CPTSD and will give her the ability to live a normal life.

[189] She also claims that she will be able to reside full-time with her fiancé and can get married.

[190] The respondent also relies on her ability to secure employment in M[…]. The respondent is in receipt of ODSP. She does not work in any capacity in L[…], Ontario. According to her evidence, she will become employed with her fiancé, working for his business, doing bookkeeping and managing customers.

[191] Her fiancé testified that he currently does not have any employees. The position the respondent speaks of will be self-created and is not a position based on the business’ current needs.

[192] The respondent also claims that another reason for her relocation is that she may need to move residence in any event. Certainly, the uncertainty of where she might be living may be difficult to handle, however there is no evidence to support that she might be relocated outside of L[…], Ontario if the court decides against the child’s relocation.

[193] I do not find an improper motive in the respondent’s desire to move. I do not find that she is moving in order to affect the child’s relationship with her father. I appreciate that the respondent views the potential move as good for her personally.

[194] However, the court is required to focus principally on the child’s best interests, not the respondent’s.

[195] The mother claims that she will have the ability to give the child more assistance with her educational needs. She claims that the child’s best interests would be served by allowing the child to live with her alone and allowing the child to live what the respondent expresses is a “normal life”.

[196] However, as described above, there is little to no evidence to support that the child is not living a “normal life”. The child’s life since the parties separated has been fairly consistent, and the change described by the respondent would be significant.

[197] Discrediting the applicant’s ability to meet the child’s educational needs and focusing on her requirement to move in any event are not, in my view, compelling reasons to move.

(b) the impact of the relocation on the child

[198] It cannot be denied that there would be an impact upon the child if she were to relocate from L[…], Ontario to M[…].

[199] The child has attended the same school since kindergarten. The child has had some academic struggles at her current school and is being supported.

[200] The child would leave her birthplace and an environment that she has been accustomed to for almost 11 years. She would be a considerable distance from several extended family members, including her half-brothers, paternal grandmother, and the applicant’s extended family with whom the child has lived for a number of years.

[201] By all accounts, the child is comfortable with her community and homes, and has a strong sense of attachment to both parents.

[202] While children are adaptable, this case involves a pre-teen child who might be easygoing but who likely did not appreciate the practical and reflective implications of the proposed move when speaking with the OCL.

[203] I find that moving to M[…], starting a new school, and moving the child away from a parent who has had a regular role in her life, will have a significant, disruptive impact on the child.

(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child, and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons

[204] As indicated above, the child has spent equal time with each party since 2019.

[205] Both parents are bonded with the child. The past pattern of parenting time, being the week-about schedule, is recognized as a long-standing status quo.

[206] Both parents engage the child in different ways. While the respondent might take on the primary responsibility of Hooked on Phonics and meeting her educational needs, the applicant has engaged with the child by playing video games and spending time with his large extended family and pets.

[207] The applicant is an important and regular part of the child’s life, and this role cannot be discounted because of a difference in parenting styles.

[208] The applicant’s house is filled with four other children and four dogs, while the respondent’s house allows the child to have one-on-one attention. To me, this suggests that the child has the best of both worlds.

(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child has complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 39.3 and any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award and agreement

[209] The respondent prepared the requisite notice but it was not served on the applicant.

[210] The respondent made her plans to move to M[…] known in court; these plans were known to the OCL.

[211] On the consent of the parties, this factor is not one for the court to consider as it has been accepted that relocation is a proper issue for determination.

(e) the existence of an order, family arbitration award or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside

[212] The existing consent temporary order, made without prejudice, provides that neither party shall make a unilateral decision without the written consent of the other or a court order for a new residence of the child beyond 50 kilometres from the present residence with that party.

[213] No findings are made in respect of this order pending this decision. The issue of relocation was argued at trial on its merits.

(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new residence and the travel expenses

[214] The respondent submits that the distance between M[…] and L[…] is not unreasonable. She proposes weekly video time between the child and the applicant and claims this is a viable parenting plan. She intends for the child to travel between M[…] and L[…] with the costs of travel to be offset against child support.

[215] She also proposes to become the sole decision-maker as it relates to the child.

[216] The respondent suggests that the father share half of the airfare cost for the child to travel to and from M[…] for parenting time. She provided evidence that the trip, by plane, would cost between $599 and $890 roundtrip, plus $100 each way for an unaccompanied minor service.

[217] Both of the parties are in receipt of ODSP. According to their financial statements served for trial, they are of extremely limited means.

[218] The respondent did not testify as to her ability to pay for one half of the airfare for the proposed parenting time.

[219] The respondent also proposed that the applicant come to M[…] on Father’s Day, which, in the court’s view, was an unreasonable suggestion considering he has other children in L[…] and such a proposal would require him to choose between his other children and the child subject to this litigation.

[220] I find the respondent’s proposal on parenting time to be unreasonable based on the foregoing.

[221] The 2019 Order provides for decision-making on a joint basis. The parties’ experience over the last several years shows no difficulty in joint decision-making.

[222] If the child were permitted to relocate, it would be reasonable for decision-making to rest with the parent with whom the child predominantly resided. However, if the child were not to relocate, I see no reason to disrupt the regime that has been in place and has worked for the child to date.

[223] A relocation would disrupt the applicant’s current parenting time schedule significantly. He would go from having the child 50 percent of the time to significantly less. Travel expenses for the child are high and the proposed plan is not economically practical.

(g) whether each person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child has complied with their obligations under any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance

[224] The evidence supports that each party has substantially complied with the terms of all existing consent orders.

Child Support

[225] In view of my findings and conclusions above, the parties shall continue their shared parenting regime.

[226] Both parties agreed that support should be set off. However, the applicant submits no support should be payable as the parties’ only income is ODSP, and the respondent submits the offsetting of support should include income imputed to the applicant as his household income is greater than hers.

[227] The respondent submits that her income for support purposes in a shared parenting regime should be $18,000 whereas the applicant’s income should be imputed to $36,000.

[228] The respondent submits that the applicant’s income should include the $22,000 disclosed in his financial statement plus $14,000 of rental income which she asks the court attribute to him based on reasonable rent for the five additional people living in his home.

[229] No documentary evidence was led in support of the respondent’s submissions at closing of trial.

[230] Imputation of income was not pled in the respondent’s Answer, identified as an issue in the trial scheduling endorsement form or mentioned in the respondent’s draft order submitted at the start of trial.

[231] Nevertheless, the respondent, as the party who is seeking to impute income, bears the onus of establishing an evidentiary basis for such a finding: Homsi v. Zaya, 2009 ONCA 322, at para. 28.

[232] I do not find that the respondent has met the onus of establishing an evidentiary basis for a finding that income should be imputed to the applicant in the amount suggested.

[233] According to the parties’ financial statements and supporting tax returns and notices of assessment, the applicant’s gross income from all sources last year was $22,050, and the respondent’s was $13,264.

[234] Section 9 of the Guidelines provides that:

Where each parent or spouse exercises parenting time with respect to a child for not less than 40 per cent of the time over the course of a year, the amount of the order for the support of a child must be determined by taking into account,

(a) the amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the parents or spouses; (b) the increased costs of shared parenting time arrangements; and (c) the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each parent or spouse and of any child for whom support is sought.

[235] The starting point of a s. 9 analysis requires a simple setoff in Table child support. The analysis does not end there. The court must also look at the parties’ respective budgets relating to the care of the children, as well as a comparative analysis of the parties’ standards of living (i.e., the condition, means, needs, and other circumstances of each spouse). See Contino v. Leonelli-Contino, 2005 SCC 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 217.

[236] A direct setoff calculation would result in the applicant paying to the respondent monthly support in the amount of $176, and the respondent paying to the applicant monthly support of $46. The net setoff results in a payment by the applicant to the respondent in the monthly amount of $130.

[237] No evidence was led regarding increased costs of the shared parenting time arrangement.

[238] The applicant submitted that the respondent’s rent is subsidised and that, while she has less income, the applicant does not have subsidised housing but higher costs due to his medical needs.

[239] Despite this submission being made in closing argument, no evidence was led regarding the parties’ conditions, means, needs or other circumstances, or any circumstances of the child as required in s. 9(c).

[240] No evidence was led about the difference in the parties’ standards of living and no budgets were filed.

[241] The court heard no evidence about overall increased costs of childrearing for either parent, nor whether there are duplicated costs or disproportionate spending by one parent over another. Neither party filed the child’s expense budget.

[242] I am not persuaded that setoff child support should be modified due to a different standard of living or due to the respondent’s inability to meet the needs of the child.

[243] Accordingly, the applicant shall pay to the respondent setoff support in the monthly amount of $130.

Conclusion and Orders

Decision-making, Relocation and Parenting Time

[244] The best interests of the child subject to this litigation have been considered holistically having regard to the factors above. In this case, weighing all factors, I conclude that the respondent has not discharged her burden of proving that it is in the child’s best interests to relocate.

[245] I would have reached the same conclusion had I determined that the onus did not rest on the respondent, as requested by her.

[246] I appreciate that the respondent’s relocation plan will provide her with emotional, financial and marital stability through the establishment of a new home with a new partner and the prospect of a job. However, the court is required to consider the child’s life, and not solely that of the respondent.

[247] Though a relocation plan might result in an improvement in the respondent’s overall emotional and financial circumstances, it would deprive the child of the life that she has known, in L[…], Ontario and at her school.

[248] I appreciate that the respondent has very legitimate interests in moving to M[…], but those interests must be balanced with the applicant’s legitimate interest in maintaining his relationship with his child as he has for four years.

[249] I also find no compelling reason to suggest that the respondent should have sole decision-making authority with respect to the child.

[250] Despite comments made by the OCL clinician in his report and testimony suggesting final decision-making rest with the respondent, for reasons outlined above, I find the parties have done well in making day-to-day decisions regarding the child and have been able to manage her IEP and educational needs jointly.

[251] If the OCL’s reason for suggesting final decision-making authority rest with the respondent was based on the applicant’s apparent difficulties with anger management, as described in two different situations involving a school, I would simply note that those incidents took place almost four years ago and that there has been no recent evidence of the applicant’s inability to control his anger.

[252] Evidence regarding the child’s education and school performance does not lead me to conclude that the applicant should hire a tutor for the child at his own expense. The parties are encouraged to explore this option for the child as a joint expense or to seek additional help from the school if they both deem it required and/or beneficial for the child.

[253] In his draft order, the applicant seeks various other parenting clauses, many of which appear to have been taken from the 2019 Order.

[254] The respondent did not make submissions as to the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the proposed clauses.

[255] The respondent included three additional clauses incidental to parenting time in her draft order. None of these paragraphs were addressed by the applicant.

[256] I have considered each proposed clause carefully and will include in my order those which I find will assist the parties in co-parenting the child and those consistent with s. 28 of the CLRA.

[257] With regard to Christmas and March breaks, I take the view that the parties should share these school breaks on the basis that they have the child in their care for the entire break in alternating years.

[258] The respondent requests that parenting exchanges occur at a supervised access exchange centre, suggesting that the current exchanges are marred with tension between the parties.

[259] I do not find the evidence supports that the child is being adversely affected at these access exchanges.

[260] I appreciate that the respondent is working through her CPTSD and wants to distance herself from the applicant. I further understand she feels that she continues to be traumatized by his behaviour. However, focusing on the needs of the child, and in the absence of any evidence that the child is adversely affected during parenting time exchanges, I do not view the involvement of the supervised access exchange centre to be required.

[261] Most exchanges shall occur at school. When school is not in session, the exchanges take place at a MacDonald’s restaurant parking lot. This practice can continue but, to address some of the concerns of the respondent, an order shall issue requiring each party to remain in their vehicle at the time exchanges occur and to not directly or indirectly engage with the other during exchanges.

[262] Lastly, the respondent requests that this court order a reduction in the applicant’s parenting time until such time as he has complied with the recommendations of the OCL, specifically until such time as he completes an assessment, follows treatment recommendations, and participates in a parenting program.

[263] It was the applicant’s evidence that he was in the process of completing a parenting program.

[264] When the OCL was questioned as to what kind of medical assessment was recommended for the applicant, he testified that it would be an assessment with a physician or psychiatrist, as there was some indication that the applicant has organic conditions that might be related to behaviour.

[265] I refuse to reduce the applicant’s parenting time. Despite the secondary recommendations made by the OCL, the OCL’s primary recommendation was that the parents continue with the week-about parenting schedule.

[266] There was no evidence at trial to suggest that the applicant’s participation in a parenting program or medical assessment was a precondition to his ongoing weekly parenting time.

[267] Additional secondary recommendations made by the OCL include a suggestion that the respondent attend counseling related to her “anxiety coping skills” to help her be more supportive of the father’s relationship with the child.

[268] In this case, I would strongly urge both parties to follow the additional recommendations made by the OCL. Their requirement to do so will not be tied into parenting time as ordered by this court.

Child Support

[269] As set out above, an offset of child support payable by each parent is appropriate in this case. Given the incomes of the parties as outlined in their financial statements, the net effect results in the applicant paying the respondent child support.

[270] Most of the evidence at trial focused on the issue of relocation.

[271] Though counsel, in closing submissions, attempted to creatively argue what other child support provisions should apply, regrettably the evidence borne out at trial did not support either of their requests.

Orders

[272] Based on the foregoing, a final order shall issue as follows:

Pursuant to the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, this court orders:

Parenting Time

1. The Applicant and the Respondent shall have equal parenting time with the child, M.S., born […], 2013.

2. The parties shall share the day-to-day care of the child on alternating weekly parenting schedules, from school dismissal on Monday until the start of school on Mondays. If school is not in session, the exchange shall be at 10:00 a.m.

3. Unless otherwise agreed, exchanges shall occur at the McDonald's parking lot at Dundas St. East. Each party shall remain in their vehicle at the time the exchange occurs and they shall not directly or indirectly engage with one another during the parenting time exchanges.

4. The parties shall have the following special parenting time during holidays, which schedule shall override the regular schedule set out above:

   Mother’s and Father’s Day a) Every year, if the child is not otherwise in the care of the Respondent, the child shall spend Mother’s Day with the Respondent from Sunday at 12:00 p.m. to Monday at school drop off. The child shall spend Father's Day with the Applicant, regardless of the schedule, from Sunday at 12:00 p.m. until Monday at school drop off.

   Christmas b) The parties shall share the two-week school Christmas Break each year as follows: i. In even-numbered years, the child shall spend the entire school break with the Respondent from school dismissal on the Friday to the start of school on the Monday. ii. In odd-numbered years, the child shall spend the entire school break with the Applicant from school dismissal on the Friday to the start of school on the Monday.

   Easter Weekend c) The parties shall share Easter weekend each year as follows: i. In odd-numbered years, the child shall be in the Respondent’s care from Saturday at 4:00 p.m. until Sunday at 8:00 p.m., and in the Applicant’s care from Sunday at 8:00 p.m. until Tuesday drop off at school or 9:00 a.m. ii. In even-numbered years, the child shall be in the Applicant’s care from Saturday at 4:00 p.m. until Sunday at 8:00 p.m. and in the Respondent’s care from Sunday at 8:00 p.m. to Tuesday drop off at school or 9:00 a.m.

   March Break d) The parties shall share the child’s March Break each year as follows: i. In odd-numbered years, the child shall be in the Respondent’s care from school dismissal on the Friday to the start of school on the Monday school resumes. ii. In even-numbered years, the child shall be in the Applicant’s care from school dismissal on the Friday to the start of school on the Monday school resumes.

   Summer e) The parties shall share the summer holidays equally where one parent has the child in his/her care for one summer month (July and August only). i. In odd-numbered years, the child shall be in the care of the Respondent for the month of July and in the care of the Applicant for the month of August. ii. In even-numbered years, the child shall be in the care of the Applicant for the month of July and in the care of the Respondent for the month of August.

5. Regardless of the parenting schedule, each party shall have the right to attend the child’s school functions and any extracurricular activities in which the child might be involved.

Decision-Making and Ancillary Parenting Time Orders

6. The Applicant and the Respondent shall jointly make all important decisions regarding the child, M.S., born […], 2013, using the following steps: a) If either party is of the view that a major decision, including but not limited to education, major non-emergency health care, major recreational activities and religious activities concerning the child needs to be made, that party shall provide the other with a written proposal for the decision together with information related to the decision, and request a response from the other party. b) The responding party shall respond to the proposal in writing within 14 days either in the affirmative or, if the parties have a different perspective, he or she shall respond with his or her view, also providing information which is the basis for that view. c) The party who made the initial proposal for the major decision shall reply in writing to the other party within 7 days. d) If the decision the parties cannot agree upon relates to the child’s education, special education plan and services available to the child in support of her education, the parties shall consult and seek input from a service provider with specialized knowledge of the issue and make the decision based on the specialist’s recommendations. e) The parties shall cooperate and endeavour to reach a consensus regarding any medical, dental or other healthcare treatment for the child, including surgery, based on the recommendations of the treating physician, dentist or other healthcare provider. f) In the event of an urgent issue requiring prompt attention, the timelines set out above may be abridged, as required by the issue. g) The parties shall attempt to resolve any dispute regarding major decisions by mediation before commencing legal proceedings to resolve the issue.

7. Day-to-day care shall be the responsibility of the parent residing with the child at the relevant time. These day-to-day decisions do not include major decisions regarding the child’s medical treatment, education, and/or religion.

8. The parties shall keep each other informed as to significant events or issues that arise and that are reasonably expected to impact the child’s wellbeing while in either parent’s home, no later than the next access exchange.

9. If the child should require emergency medical care while with one parent, that parent shall promptly notify the other of the emergency and the other parent may attend at the place where the child is being treated.

10. Both parties shall keep each other up to date regarding education, health, developmental milestones, or other serious concerns regarding the child.

11. The parties shall advise the school that they both shall be designated as the primary contact, and both should be contacted every time. The parent who receives the call from the school regarding the child shall immediately notify the other to ensure that the information is delivered to both parents.

12. Each party shall be noted as a contact person with each school, doctor, dentist, party, or institution providing extracurricular activities or other services.

13. Each party shall provide the other with reasonable notice of any doctor or dental appointment, and the other may attend the appointment regardless of the parenting schedule.

14. Each parent shall have the same right to obtain information directly from any service and care provider involved with the child without a need to obtain consent from the other parent.

15. Neither party shall make a unilateral decision without written consent from the other or without a court order regarding: a) Any elective surgery for the child; b) Change of the child’s current school, other than to comply with local school board requirements; c) Change of residence of the child, beyond 25 km of the other party’s residence; d) Change in the child’s present religious worship and instruction.

16. Neither party shall schedule activities for the child during the other party’s parenting time, without the written consent of the other party. Each party shall be authorized to schedule activities for the child during that party's parenting time without the need to obtain consent from the other, save and except when the Section 7 contribution is required from the other parent.

17. Communications between the parties shall occur through the online program, Talking Parents, and only regarding the child’s care and wellbeing. The communications shall be reasonable and respectful of the other party.

18. The parties shall be entitled to request detailed information from any third-party caregivers, including any pediatricians, physicians, dentists, consultants, teachers, or specialists, attending to the child for any reason whatsoever and to obtain copies of any records or reports without requiring consent from the other party.

19. The parties shall be entitled to request detailed information from all teachers, schools, summer camps or other institutions that the child may attend and shall be entitled to communicate directly with them and to attend any extracurricular activities in which the child may be involved without requiring consent from the other party.

20. Neither party shall change the name of the child, M.S., born […], 2013, without the consent of the other party or by order of this Court.

21. The parties shall not attend the other party’s residence, except with the consent of the other party.

Pursuant to the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, this court orders:

Child support

22. Commencing April 1, 2024 and payable on the first day of each month thereafter, the Applicant shall pay to the Respondent child support in the monthly amount of $176 based on his 2022 gross annual income of $22,050, and the Respondent shall pay to the Applicant child support in the monthly amount of $46 based on her 2022 gross annual income of $13,264, resulting in a net payment by the Applicant to the Respondent in the monthly amount of $130.

23. The parties shall share equally (50/50) any special expenses for the child, M.S., born […] 2013, provided he or she obtains the consent of the other party in advance, in writing, which consent will not be unreasonably withheld.

24. The parties shall exchange financial information, including income tax returns and notices of assessment, by July 1 each year and child support will be readjusted in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97, commencing January 1 the following year.

25. Unless the support order is withdrawn from the Office of the Director of the Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the support order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed.

Costs

[273] The parties are encouraged to settle the issue of costs. If they cannot, and if the applicant seeks cost, he may serve and file written submissions, no more than four pages, typed and double-spaced, excluding offers to settle and a costs outline, on or before March 27, 2024.

[274] The respondent shall have up to April 5, 2024 to serve and file her response to the applicant’s costs submissions. Her costs submissions shall not exceed three pages, typed and double-spaced, excluding offers to settle and a costs outline.

[275] There shall be no right of reply unless requested by the court.

[276] If no costs submissions are received in accordance with the timeline set out above, it will be presumed that costs have been settled.

[277] The parties shall file cost submissions through the JSO (portal) or to london.courthouse@ontario.ca.

“Justice Kiran Sah” The Honourable Justice Kiran Sah Released: March 12, 2024