Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CR-22-13 DATE: 20231214 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING – and – L.R. Defendant

Counsel: Moheb Tewfik for the Crown Alan Richter for L.R.

HEARD: September 18, 2023

Judgment on Sentence

C. BOSWELL J. (ORALLY)

[1] On June 30, 2023 I convicted L.R. of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation. I acquitted him on a charge of sexual assault. The reasons for the verdict are expressed in a ruling reported at 2023 ONSC 3911.

[2] Sentencing submissions were heard September 18, 2023 and L.R. was remanded to today for the imposition of sentence.

The Circumstances of the Offences

[3] The circumstances of the offence are set out in detail in my reasons for judgment. It is not necessary to repeat them all here. A brief outline will suffice.

[4] The offences occurred between 2009 and 2010. L.R. was, for much of that time, the coach of an elite girls’ hockey team in Toronto. A.F. was a player on the team. She lived in an all-girls private boarding school, away from the watchful eyes of her parents. Not long after her 15th birthday – at a time when L.R. was in his mid-thirties – they began a sexual relationship. A.F. was just beginning grade 10. The relationship began as one of coach and player. It soon became flirtatious. It progressed to kissing in a secret spot at the team’s practice arena before training sessions. Eventually it led to repeated instances of sexual intercourse. The relationship ended when A.F. was in grade 11. She could no longer go on lying to her family and friends and realized that she and L.R. were never going to run off to Bora Bora together, as they had discussed. She came to appreciate that the relationship was never going to be a “real thing”.

The Circumstances of the Offender

[5] L.R. is 50 years old. He has been with his partner for over 30 years; married for 24. He is the father to one adult daughter. He continues to have their full support. He also has a close and supportive relationship with his parents and three siblings.

[6] L.R. has had a lengthy career in coaching and training elite hockey players. He spent 27 years in that industry, though the charges that bring him before the court have all but put an end to that career.

[7] L.R. has no criminal antecedents and no mental health or addiction issues. He has been a productive member of society. His counsel filed a number of character letters on his behalf, all written by individuals who know L.R. through hockey training. They generally speak of his professionalism, respect and positive attitude. He has been a positive role model for many young players. Some express shock and disbelief that he was charged with the offences that brought him before the court.

[8] Collateral sources contacted by the author of the Pre-Sentence Report describe L.R. as a “kind, caring and family-oriented individual”. His business partner described him as a good man whose character is at odds with the offences.

[9] L.R. takes no responsibility for the offences, which he continues to maintain did not happen. In the result, he displays no remorse for the offending or its impact on A.F. Indeed, his focus in the Pre-Sentence Report is on himself and the impact that these charges have had on him and his family.

[10] L.R. was arrested on February 19, 2021. He was released that same day on a Release Order with a number of conditions. Those included a requirement that he reside with his surety (his wife), that he not communicate with a list of individuals including the complainant and a number of possible witnesses, and that he not attend locations where females under the age of 18 are present or could reasonably be expected to be present, including gyms and arenas. That provision effectively put an end to his ability to engage in his lifelong profession.

[11] L.R. brought an application to vary his release conditions on March 18, 2021 to clarify that he would be able to continue to train and coach male hockey players. The wording of the Release Order was not altered, but it appears that it was agreed that training male players would not contravene the terms of the Release Order provided no females under the age of 18 were present.

[12] A further application to vary the bail conditions was brought in May 2021 to reduce the list of potential witnesses L.R. could not have contact with.

The Impact of the Offences

[13] A.F. filed a Victim Impact Statement, which she read into the record. She spoke of living with a decade of trauma and the loss of her self-worth, her privacy, her bodily integrity, her confidence and her voice.

[14] At 15 her life was, she said, forever altered. She described herself as once being a bubbly, bright and ambitious young girl. But she has for years struggled with guilt, shame, suffering, depression and confusion because of a sexual relationship with a coach 20 years her senior. She has been in therapy for years and has sought out and received psychiatric care. She has had a difficult time building honest and healthy relationships with friends, romantic partners and family. She has lost the sense of trust in others. She has disconnected from others; particularly those closest to her. And she stopped playing hockey, perhaps her greatest passion.

[15] A.F. says she disclosed what had happened to her in an effort to get out from under the crushing weight of the guilt and shame of it and to find a way to move forward with a more positive state of mental health. The disclosure, of course, has been very difficult on her parents and she shoulders a good deal of guilt over the pain and sadness they have experienced.

The Legal Parameters

[16] The offending in this case occurred over a period between September 2009 and roughly the end of 2010. The Criminal Code provisions I refer to were the ones in place at that time.

[17] A person convicted of sexual interference contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code is liable to a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years and a minimum term of 45 days. The mandatory minimum has, however, been struck down by the Court of Appeal for Ontario as unconstitutional. See R. v. B.J.T., 2019 ONCA 694 at paras. 75-79.

[18] A person convicted of invitation to sexual touching contrary to s. 152 of the Criminal Code is liable to a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years and a minimum term of 45 days. To my knowledge this minimum has not been ruled unconstitutional by any court in this province. I note that the mandatory minimum was increased to one year in 2012 by the Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1, s. 11. The one-year minimum has been struck down by judges of this Court in R. v. Fluet, 2023 ONSC 3858 and R. v. Mootoo, 2022 ONSC 384.

[19] A person convicted of sexual exploitation contrary to s. 153(1.1) of the Criminal Code is similarly liable to a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years and a minimum term of 45 days. The minimum was upheld as constitutional in R. v. Aldersley, 2018 BCSC 734. It too was increased to one year in 2012. The constitutionality of the one-year minimum has been subject to inconsistent findings of various courts across the country.

[20] I have not been asked to consider the constitutionality of any existing mandatory minimums. Given the positions taken by the parties, it is unnecessary to do so.

The Principles and Purposes of Sentencing

[21] Section 718 of the Criminal Code provides that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: the denunciation of unlawful conduct, deterrence - both general and specific, the separation of the offender from society where necessary, rehabilitation, reparation for harm done to the victims and the community, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders and an acknowledgment of the harm done.

[22] The importance of these individual objectives, and how they interact, varies from case to case. In cases involving sexual offences against children, the principal drivers of any sentence imposed are denunciation and deterrence. See s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code. The primary importance of denunciation and deterrence does not exclude consideration of other sentencing objectives. A judge may give other factors significant weight, but cannot give them precedence or even equivalency. See R. v Bertrand Marchand, 2023 SCC 26, at para. 28.

[23] Identifying the principal objectives engaged in any given case is only a first step. The next step is to assess what sentence is necessary to meet those identified objectives. In making that assessment the court is guided by the fundamental principle of proportionality. Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code directs that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

[24] Proportionality engages two concepts: censure and restraint. See R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, at para. 37. As LeBel J. observed, a sentence must promote justice for victims and enhance public confidence in the administration of justice. At the same time, it should not exceed what is appropriate in light of the moral blameworthiness of the offender. The restraint principle directs the court to impose the least intrusive sentence and the shortest duration necessary to achieve a just, fit and proportionate sentence. See R. v. Hamilton (2004), 72 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.) at paras. 95-96.

[25] Inherent in the concept of proportionality is the principle of parity. Imposing sentences proportionate to the gravity of offences and the moral blameworthiness of offenders requires the court, on the one hand, to recognize where there are material differences between different offenders and different offences. On the other hand, any sentence imposed must be similar to those imposed on offenders who have committed similar offences with equivalent moral blameworthiness. Parity, in other words, is an expression of proportionality. See R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, at para. 32.

[26] Having said all of that, it is important to recognize that sentencing remains a highly individualized exercise. A sentencing court must focus on tailoring the sentence to the gravity of the offence, the moral blameworthiness of the offender and the harm caused by the offences. See R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, at para. 43. In doing so, the sentencing court must pay careful attention to the unique circumstances of the offender and of the offence, with regard to any aggravating and mitigating circumstances present.

The Positions of the Parties

[27] The Crown seeks a global sentence of 8 years imprisonment, broken down as follows: 3 years for the conviction for sexual interference; 3 years consecutive for the conviction for invitation to sexual touching; and 2 years consecutive for the conviction for sexual exploitation. In addition, the Crown seeks a number of ancillary orders, including:

(a) DNA orders on all three counts; (b) A lifelong weapons prohibition order under s. 109 of the Criminal Code on all three counts; (c) An order requiring L.R. to comply with the provisions of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act for 20 years; and, (d) An order, pursuant to s. 161 of the Criminal Code, prohibiting L.R. from seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in a capacity that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years.

[28] Crown counsel emphasizes the need to denounce L.R.’s offending in the strongest terms. In his submission, the range of sentence for the offending here is a penitentiary term in the mid to upper single digits. In support of that position, he cites R. v. D.D., [2002] O.J. No. 1061 where Moldaver J.A., as he then was, held as follows, at para. 44:

To summarize, I am of the view that as a general rule, when adult offenders, in a position of trust, sexually abuse innocent young children on a regular and persistent basis over substantial periods of time, they can expect to receive mid to upper single digit penitentiary terms…

[29] Crown counsel also relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Friesen. In Friesen, the Supreme Court highlighted the inherent wrongfulness of child sexual abuse and the profound physical and psychological harms caused by it. In the result, sentencing courts must, the Crown submits, impose sentences that reflect the far-reaching and ongoing damage sexual violence causes to children, families and society at large.

[30] Defence counsel submits that a more appropriate sentence would be in the range of 2-3 years. He does not disagree with the Crown’s submission that denunciation and deterrence take on a prominent role in sentencing for offences of this nature. He urges the court, however, to be mindful of the totality principle as well as the principle of restraint. A sentence should be no longer than necessary, he submits, to achieve the goals of denunciation and deterrence. In the circumstances here, 2-3 years will, counsel says, more than adequately meet those objectives. On the other hand, an 8-year sentence would be crushing.

Discussion

[31] Sentencing judges frequently begin their analyses with a consideration of the applicable range of sentence for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.

[32] Crown counsel suggests, citing R. v. D.D., that the appropriate range of sentence in this case is in the upper single digits. Additional cases cited by the Crown in support of this suggested range include the recent decisions of judges of this court in R. v. A.S., 2023 ONSC 983 and R. v. G.D., an unreported decision of Andre J. dated July 11, 2023.

[33] In my view, the circumstances of the case at bar are not on par with those of D.D., A.S or G.D.

[34] In D.D., the offender – at a time when he was between the ages of 25 and 32 – befriended and then repeatedly sexually abused four young boys, ranging in age from 5 to 8 years. In all cases he stood in a position of trust with respect to the boys. He groomed them extensively and at times used violence to compel compliance. A global sentence of 9 years and 1 month was imposed.

[35] In A.S., the offender, who was a close family friend akin to an uncle to the complainant, repeatedly sexually abused her over an eight year period beginning when she was 6 years old.

[36] In G.D., the offender, who was the complainant’s uncle, repeatedly sexually abused her between the ages of 9 and 17.

[37] I accept that L.R. was an adult offender, in a position of trust, who sexually abused a child on a regular basis over a significant period of time. But D.D. abused multiple children, much younger and more vulnerable than A.F., over substantially longer periods of time. Moreover, he used physical violence to compel compliance. That was not the case in the relationship between L.R. and A.F.

[38] A.S. and G.D. each involved complainants who were much younger and more vulnerable than A.F., who were abused by a family member, or the functional equivalent of a family member, over much longer periods of time.

[39] In my view the appropriate sentence here is not as high as the upper single digit sentence urged upon the court by Crown counsel.

[40] Defence counsel cited two cases that he submits reflect a more appropriate range.

[41] The first is R. v. D.C., 2021 ONSC 475. The facts in D.C. are somewhat unusual. D.C., at age 19, was the track coach of the complainant, who was 14. D.C. committed a sexual assault against the complainant at a hotel at a time when she was 16. He continued to coach her and their relationship continued. Just after the complainant turned 18 they married in a short ceremony at the local Court House. They separated after about two years of marriage and subsequently divorced.

[42] D.C. was charged with and convicted of sexual assault as well as assault causing bodily harm and simple assault, the latter two convictions relating to incidents that occurred during the brief marriage.

[43] Kurke J. reviewed the principles relevant to sentencing in child sexual abuse cases, discussed at length in Friesen, then sentenced D.C. to 36 months for the sexual assault plus 9 months consecutive for the simple assault and 9 months concurrent for the assault causing bodily harm.

[44] The second case referred to me by defence counsel is R. v. R.S.B., [2022] BCPC 317. There, the offender was convicted, following guilty pleas, of one count of sexual touching and three counts of sexual assault committed on four young soccer players at different times between 1988 and 2008.

[45] R.S.B. coached soccer at the provincial and professional level as well as with the Canadian National Women’s team. He had coached, in one capacity or another, each of the four complainants. He stood in a position of trust to each of them. He offended in different ways with respect to each complainant. With one, he had oral sex and, eventually, sexual intercourse. With another, he suddenly grabbed her and kissed her intimately. With the third, he massaged her back and the sides of her breasts under her shirt. With the fourth, he kissed her on the cheek and stroked the back of her neck. In each instance, the touching was unwanted.

[46] Gaffar J. imposed a sentence of two years less one day, broken down as 15 months and 29 days in a correctional facility and 8 months on a conditional sentence.

[47] Neither of the cases referred to me by defence counsel are particularly helpful, in my view, in establishing the appropriate range of sentence in the case at bar.

[48] D.C. involved one discrete instance of sexual assault, which is markedly different than the circumstances in the case at bar.

[49] R.S.B. involved a prosecution in the B.C. Provincial Court. The Crown only sought a sentence of 2 years less one day. R.S.B entered a guilty plea and was extremely remorseful for his conduct. That conduct was, I note, far less intrusive and prolonged than L.R.’s offending here.

[50] My sense is that it is a little too early, in the post-Friesen era, to be able to confidently identify an established range of sentences for cases like this one, which involve an ongoing sexual relationship between an unrelated adult, who nevertheless stood in a position of trust, and a naïve, adolescent female. I have reviewed many of the post-Friesen cases involving the sexual abuse of children and find that they generally trend towards the mid-single digit range. See, for instance, R. v. R.A., 2021 ONCA 126 at para. 39.

[51] The mid-single digit range is consistent with the message sent by the Supreme Court at para. 114 of Friesen, specifically that,

…[M]id-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal and…upper single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances.

[52] It is, of course, important that the court adhere to the direction provided by the Supreme Court in Friesen. At the outset of the ruling, the Court was emphatic about the need to increase sentences for sexual offending against children, saying, at para. 5:

…[W]e send a strong message that sexual offences against children are violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children's vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, families, and communities. Sentences for these crimes must increase. Courts must impose sentences that are proportional to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of the offender, as informed by Parliament's sentencing initiatives and by society's deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children. Sentences must accurately reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, families, and society at large.

[53] The court went on to express a number of principles that sentencing courts should be mindful of in child sexual abuse cases. They include:

(a) The emphasis in sentencing in child sexual abuse cases is on “personal autonomy, bodily integrity, sexual integrity, dignity, and equality. This emphasis requires courts to focus on emotional and psychological harm, which can be more pervasive and permanent in its effect than physical harm. (Para. 56); (b) Sentences must recognize and reflect both the harm that sexual offences against children cause and the wrongfulness of sexual violence. Sentences must reflect the “life-altering consequences” that can and often do flow from sexual violence (Para. 74); (c) The sentence imposed must reflect the normative character of the offender’s actions and the consequential harm to children and their families, caregivers and communities (Para. 76); (d) The wrongfulness of the exploitation of children is always relevant to the normative character of the offender’s conduct and thus the gravity of the offence (Para. 78); and, (e) Intentional sexual exploitation and objectification of children is highly morally blameworthy because children are so vulnerable. The use of a vulnerable child for the sexual gratification of an adult cannot be viewed as anything but a crime demonstrating the worst of intentions (Para. 90).

[54] The court also outlined a number of factors that sentencing courts should consider when imposing sentences in child sexual abuse cases, which include:

(a) The likelihood to re-offend; (b) The abuse of a position of trust or authority; (c) Duration and frequency; (d) Age of the victim(s); (e) Degree of physical interference; and, (f) Victim participation.

[55] I want to take a moment to specifically address the issue of victim participation in this instance. Some people may consider that A.F.’s apparent willingness to engage in a sexual relationship with L.R. might reduce his moral blameworthiness for the offences. That sort of thinking is wrong.

[56] First of all, Friesen instructs that it is wrong to characterize sexual offences against children that involve a participating victim as free of physical or psychological violence. As Monahan J.A. recently observed in R. v. W.V., 2023 ONCA 655, at para. 30, “violence is inherent in such offences since they necessarily involve an adult’s serious violation of a child’s sexual integrity, human dignity and privacy.”

[57] Second, the relationship between L.R. and A.F. was born of a serious breach of trust and based on entirely false pretenses. The Supreme Court was clear, at para. 153 of Friesen, that where a breach of trust led to participation by an adolescent, it should properly be seen as an aggravating circumstance. They held specifically:

Adolescence can be a confusing and challenging time for young people as they grow and mature, navigate friendships and peer groups, and discover their sexuality... [T]o exploit young teenagers during this time by leading them to believe that they are in a love relationship with an adult reveals a level of immorality that is of great concern.

[58] They added, at para. 154, that “adults, not children, are responsible for preventing sexual activity between children and adults.”

[59] I turn now to a consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances reflected by the facts of this case as I found them to be.

[60] By way of aggravation, I note the following:

(a) During the course of the sexual relationship between L.R. and A.F., L.R. was in his mid-thirties; A.F. was 15-16. In other words, there was an age gap of 20 years between them; (b) L.R. took full advantage of A.F.’s vulnerabilities. She was young, away from home for the first time, and away from the watchful eyes of her parents. She was naïve. For instance, for a time she believed that L.R. would, as he told her, leave his family and run off with her to Bora Bora. I have not been to Bora Bora, but I suspect that, as a small island in the South Pacific, there is very little demand there for hockey skills training; (c) L.R. took advantage of a position of trust and authority. Hockey meant everything to A.F. L.R. was her coach. She looked up to him. And she was at an age where scouting is very active at the provincial and federal levels as well as at the U.S. college level. L.R. had a good deal of influence over her future career in the game; (d) L.R. took advantage of A.F.’s parents’ trust in him. In a purported effort to help them out with driving between their home in Sutton and his training facility in Pickering, when A.F. was assisting him with summer training camps, he arranged to meet them partway to pick up A.F. They could not have known they were delivering their daughter into the hands of a sexual predator. They had no idea that L.R. and A.F were engaging in sexual touching in L.R.’s vehicle during those drives. L.R., as a father to a young daughter himself, ought to have understood the harm he was inflicting on A.F.’s parents; (e) There were multiple instances of sexual touching over an extended period. The touching ranged from kissing to repeated instances of sexual intercourse; and, (f) A.F. has suffered significant emotional trauma over a decade. The repercussions of the offending are an ongoing struggle for her.

[61] By way of mitigation, I observe the following:

(a) L.R. is a first-time offender; (b) L.R. has the support of his immediate and extended family; and, (c) Apart from the offending now before the court, L.R. appears to have lived a productive and pro-social life.

[62] Defence counsel raised two further factors that he contends ought to be taken into account by way of mitigation. They are (1) the lengthy period of time following the commission of the offences when L.R. has led an exemplary lifestyle; and (2) the impact of the stringent release conditions on L.R. I will address these two factors in turn.

[63] Defence counsel asserts that, apart from the specific offending here, L.R. has been, and continues to be, a model husband and father and, indeed, a model citizen. Counsel argues that the passage of a significant amount of time since the offending, without the commission of further offences, is a factor the court may consider as a mitigating circumstance on sentence. He cites the Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. H.S., 2014 ONCA 323 in support of his position.

[64] In H.S., the offender had sexual intercourse several times with a young foster child in the care of H.S. and his wife. The offending occurred in the late 1970s. The complainant reported the offending to the police in 2010. H.S. was convicted, following a guilty plea, of having sexual intercourse with a female between the ages of 14 and 16 and of having illicit sexual intercourse with his foster daughter. A conditional sentence of 2 years less 1 day was imposed by the trial judge.

[65] The Court of Appeal found the sentence to be manifestly unfit and substituted a 3-year prison term. In fixing the sentence, Epstein J.A. considered the fact that the offending had occurred 35 years earlier and that H.S. had lived an exemplary lifestyle in the intervening period. Citing R. v. Spence (1992), 1992 ABCA 352, 78 C.C.C. (3d) 451 (Alta. C.A.), at pp. 454-456, she held that a lapse of time “does not in any way render inapplicable the principles of general deterrence and denunciation.” The need to denounce the type of offending here was not diminished by the passage of time.

[66] Indeed, the only sentencing objectives that may be impacted by a significant passage of time are individual deterrence and rehabilitation. In the case at bar, rehabilitation and individual deterrence, as sentencing objectives, are only minimally engaged. I accept that L.R. has lived an exemplary lifestyle since the relationship with A.F. ended and that he has not engaged in any similar conduct since. In my view, the likelihood of re-offending is at the very low end.

[67] I conclude, as Epstein J.A. did in H.S., that while a significant lapse of time is a relevant consideration, its mitigating impact in cases of child sexual abuse is minimal given its lack of relevance to the operative sentencing principles of denunciation and general deterrence.

[68] I turn to an examination of L.R.’s release conditions. I set those conditions out earlier. In many respects, they were not particularly stringent. For instance, though L.R. was ordered to reside with his surety, that surety is his wife, with whom he was residing in any event. He was not otherwise subject to house arrest or even a curfew.

[69] The stringency of L.R.’s release conditions is reflected, however, by their impact on his ability to carry on his profession. I understand, in fact, that those conditions have made it impossible for L.R. to work since his arrest.

[70] In R. v. Downes, [2006] O.J. No. 555 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal held that time spent under stringent bail conditions, especially (but not limited to) house arrest, must be taken into account as a relevant mitigating circumstance. The amount of credit to be given, by way of mitigation, is in the discretion of the sentencing judge. The extent to which release conditions will mitigate the length of a sentence depends on factors that include the stringency of the conditions, the length of time they have been imposed, the impact on the offender’s liberty, and the ability of the offender to carry on normal relationships, employment and activity.

[71] L.R. has spent almost three years subject to a release condition that has effectively prevented him from working in his lifelong profession. That condition, in his circumstances, has been a particularly stringent one and has had a significant impact on his liberty and ability to carry on employment and earn an income. He is entitled to some mitigation of the length of sentence to reflect that impact.

[72] Youth sports are a vital part of a thriving community. For many families in this community and others across Ontario, youth sports are a focal point of family life. They offer the opportunity of recreation and fun but much more than that. They are a means by which young children and adolescents learn about the rewards of hard work, how to deal with the thrill of victory and the agony of defeat, and the values of teamwork, fairness, inclusion, respect and perseverance.

[73] Youth sports rely heavily on volunteers, most often parents, who devote countless hours to fundraising, as well as to organizing, coaching, managing and training individual and team sports. Coaches of youth players occupy a special role, particularly in competitive-level youth sports. They can spend a great deal of time with players and have a great deal of influence on their lives. Significant trust is reposed in them by parents.

[74] L.R. breached that trust in the case of A.F. Instead of looking out for her best interests and reinforcing the values I have just mentioned, he engaged in a sexual relationship with her. She was a naïve adolescent who looked up to L.R. and was vulnerable to being taken advantage of. The sexual abuse of her was intrusive and sustained. It has resulted in very serious repercussions to her, which she eloquently described in her Victim Impact Statement. It is necessary that the court denounce L.R.’s conduct in very clear terms.

[75] In all the circumstances, I am of the view that a fit and just global sentence of five years’ imprisonment is warranted. It is the sentence I would impose, subject to some mitigation to recognize the impact of the stringent pre-sentence release conditions L.R. has been subject to. Taking those conditions into account, I impose a global sentence of 57 months.

[76] Crown counsel sought shorter sentences for each offence, imposed consecutively. The Supreme Court recently instructed, in Bertrand Marchand, at para. 95, that "offences that are so closely linked to each other as to constitute a single criminal adventure may, but are not required to, receive concurrent sentences, while all other offences are to receive consecutive sentences. In my view, the offences committed in this case are sufficiently linked to one another as to constitute a single criminal adventure. In the result, I impose concurrent sentences of 57 months on each of counts 2, 3 and 5.

[77] I agree that the ancillary orders sought by the Crown should be imposed. In the result, I impose the following:

(a) DNA orders on all three counts; (b) A lifelong weapons prohibition order under s. 109 of the Criminal Code on all three counts; (c) An order requiring L.R. to comply with the provisions of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act for 20 years; and, (d) An order, pursuant to s. 161 of the Criminal Code, prohibiting L.R. from seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in a capacity that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years.

C. Boswell J. Released: December 14, 2023