Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CR-19-50000781-0000 DATE: 20230419
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING – and – AUSTIN TONKIN Defendant
COUNSEL: Adam Schultz, for the Crown Daniel Baker, for the Defendant
HEARD: March 23, 2023
JUSTICE S. NAKATSURU
Reasons for Judgment
[1] Mr. Tonkin, you have pled guilty to one count of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
[2] Five years ago, in 2018, when you were 21 years of age, you and Gilbert Anishnabie, a friend of yours of the same age, drove from North Bay where you lived to Toronto and picked up 55.62 grams of cocaine, 27.15 grams of fentanyl, 20.41 grams of marijuana, and 110.10 grams of a cutting agent. Using your car, the two of you were to deliver the drugs to Jason Sewell and Willis Zhou of North Bay. Your criminal conduct was revealed to the police through legally authorized interceptions of private communications conducted during a major police project. In the evening of March 28, 2018, the police stopped you and Mr. Anishnabie on Highway 400. They discovered the drugs in the car.
[3] As I said to you before I adjourned the sentencing and reserved my decision, coming to the fit and proportionate sentence is not easy in your case. I have had to balance many different things. Aggravating and mitigating factors had to be identified. Important sentencing principles had to be considered. The sentence had to reflect the gravity of the offences and the degree of your responsibility. It had to meet the goals of sentencing as set out in the Criminal Code.
[4] Now, I have come to my decision. I have followed the law and applied that law to the specific circumstances of your case.
[5] The Crown, Mr. Schultz, seeks a four-year sentence. He argues that the sentence could be higher, but the four years takes into consideration that this illegal venture was Mr. Anishnabie’s idea and it respects the parity sentencing principle with Mr. Anishnabie’s sentence. On your behalf, Mr. Baker argues that the parity principle, along with the mitigating factors, means you should get a conditional sentence like the one Mr. Anishnabie received: R. v. Anishnabie, 2022 ONCJ 319, per Grinberg J. It is submitted that a two-year less a day conditional sentence, perhaps under house arrest for the whole period of time, is the fit and proportionate sentence.
[6] In coming to the right sentence, the aggravating and mitigating factors in your case must be considered.
[7] The following are the aggravating factors.
[8] First is the nature of the drugs. Fentanyl. Cocaine. Both are dangerous drugs. But fentanyl has been accepted as perhaps the deadliest of illicit drugs. It is a synthetic opioid. Its use creates dependency. Sometimes it is secretly mixed with other drugs. The smallest miscalculation in dosage can cause death. And it does not take much to kill. The concurring minority decision of Moldaver, J. in R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, 463 D.L.R. (4th) 389, a case dealing with large scale commercial trafficking in fentanyl to vulnerable northern communities, summarized the seriousness of the opioid epidemic in Canada at para. 96:
More broadly, federal statistics on opioid-related deaths show that, between January 2016 and March 2021, approximately 23,000 Canadians lost their lives due to accidental apparent opioid-related deaths, with fentanyl involved in 71 percent of these deaths (Special Advisory Committee on the Epidemic of Opioid Overdoses, Opioid and Stimulant-related Harms in Canada (September 2021) (online). The epidemic also shows no signs of abating, with over 6,000 accidental deaths occurring in 2020 alone, 82 percent of which involved fentanyl (Government of Canada, Federal actions on opioids to date (June 2021) (online)). These figures throw into stark relief the dark and inescapable reality that "[e]very day in our communities, fentanyl abuse claims the lives of Canadians" (R. v. Loor, 2017 ONCA 696, at para. 33).
[9] Whether you specifically knew one of the drugs you picked up was fentanyl or not, this does not diminish the threat to the community posed by it. [1]
[10] Second, the quantities of the drugs were not minor amounts. While I do not have enough evidence or admitted facts to conclude that you were involved in a mid-level trafficking operation, I certainly find that you were involved in the pickup, transport, and delivery of drugs beyond the street trafficking level.
[11] Third, you were bringing these dangerous drugs to North Bay from Toronto. Toronto has a terrible drug problem. You knew your actions were going to bring some of that misery to your own neighborhood; a small city of about 50,000 on the shores of Lake Nipissing, known as the “Gateway of the North”.
[12] Mitigating factors include a plea of guilty and your remorse. While I accept that you have true remorse, not every plea of guilty is treated the same. Yours was not the earliest of pleas. It came on the first day of your jury trial. The time scheduled for your trial was allotted and could not be used for another jury trial. Also, the plea of guilty came only after you lost your pretrial Charter application. You also were going to raise another Charter argument at trial. While I appreciate that by pleading guilty you have given up your s. 7 argument under the Charter arising from the failure to record Mr. Anishnabie’s sentencing circle, in my view, your request for a stay of the charges as a remedy was not on its face at all compelling. Finally, the Crown’s case was strong. Not only were there the intercepted private communications and the finding of the drugs in your car, Mr. Anishnabie was willing to be a Crown witness against you. All that acknowledged, a plea of guilty is still a sign of remorse. And it has saved some court resources. You will get credit for that. But I must say that it is not the most impactful guilty plea when it comes to mitigation on sentence. [2]
[13] Another mitigating factor is that you were 21 years of age at the time of the offence and a first offender. Your youth and unblemished previous character lessen your moral blameworthiness.
[14] You have filed letters of support. They are from family, your employers, and friends. You are a hard worker. Working for two businesses, you are a much-valued employee. In your working life, you have shown diligence and initiative while on bail, upgrading your qualifications in the operation of trucks. You have had a good upbringing and have a prosocial side to you. You have stayed out of trouble these long years while on bail. Overall, I accept that these offences are out of character for you. I accept that there is a strong prospect of rehabilitation. Indeed, given how well you have done over so many years, I feel that your rehabilitation has largely been complete.
[15] Your upbringing was good, middle-class, and without any significant life challenges. Frankly, it is puzzling why you would have chosen to do this crime. You do not have the kind of background that might explain such a serious offence. Puzzling though it is, this background also does speak well to your ultimate rehabilitation.
[16] While you have been on bail for a long time, your counsel has not requested this be considered as mitigating or be given credit. I agree with that decision. As I understand it, the release conditions were not onerous. Nor have I been presented with any evidence or information about how your release has negatively affected you. However, as already noted, I do recognize the lengthy period of time while on release without any breaches speaks well to your rehabilitative potential.
[17] The Crown concedes that a mitigating factor is that this illegal venture was not your idea. It was Mr. Anishnabie who had the contacts in North Bay and who asked you to do this, because you had a car and a cellphone that could be used. Thus, while both you and Mr. Anishnabie essentially did the same criminal conduct, your responsibility is lessened by the fact that Mr. Anishnabie approached you because he knew you needed money.
[18] I have no difficulty with this submission, but in my opinion, this mitigating factor cannot be given undue weight. Your degree of responsibility nevertheless remains significant. While I do not describe this as a sophisticated plan and I fully appreciate that you were doing this at the behest of others, you went into this with your eyes pretty much open. You knew you were picking up hard and dangerous drugs, although, according to the admitted facts, both you and Mr. Anishnabie believed it to be cocaine and perhaps methamphetamine, not fentanyl. While you were not going to sell the drugs, [3] your role was still an important part of the sale of hard drugs in North Bay. Moreover, this was not a spontaneous ill-thought-out decision of yours, hastily conducted. It had to have been planned and deliberated upon. You took your car. Your phone was used to be in contact with the purchasers throughout. You drove a long distance to Toronto to pick up drugs at various pre-arranged meetings. On the one call you used the phone to speak to the drug dealers, they asked you to make an additional stop in Toronto and you had the wherewithal to confirm you would be paid more money on your return for doing that. The only motive given for your actions is that you were short of funds to meet your financial obligations. In other words, financial gain. [4] You are not an addict. Nor do I have any indication that you use any illegal drugs. So, while the idea did not come from you, your degree of responsibility remains significant.
[19] The s. 10(b) Charter violation is also mitigating. At a pretrial motion, Bawden J. found a s. 10(b) violation when the police failed to facilitate a call to your lawyer before you were strip searched: R. v. Tonkin, 2020 ONSC 5206.
[20] I find this violation relevant in that it touches upon the communicative aspect of sentencing and has relevance to you as an offender. [5] The police misconduct led to no remedy from Bawden J., as he found it was unconnected to the seizure of the evidence. Although this state misconduct should be treated as a mitigating factor, its effect on sentence should not be overstated. The police treated you professionally. Justice Bawden found the Charter violation came from their misunderstanding of the law. And the delay in facilitating counsel was only minutes long.
[21] In the canvass of mitigating factors, it is not mitigating that you did not know that fentanyl was among the substances you were transporting. I find that you were willfully blind to what the substance was. I conclude this despite Grinberg J.’s finding that Mr. Anishnabie was not willfully blind and only recklessly committed the crime. I make a contrary finding for the following reasons.
[22] First, I am not bound by Grinberg J.’s factual finding. Moreover, the record she relied upon in coming to that conclusion is different and more extensive than that which is before me.
[23] Second, respectfully, I cannot see how a finding of wilful blindness can be avoided. You knew you were picking up illegal drugs in Toronto. You were of the view that the drugs you were transporting were most likely cocaine and perhaps methamphetamine. In other words, you were not certain. You were doing this for others and did not know the source of the drugs. You went to a number of meetings and were going to drive the drugs back a long way. You had plenty of time and opportunity to examine the drugs or make inquiries about the drugs. The admitted fact was that neither you nor Mr. Anishnabie made any inquiries. In these circumstances, a finding of wilful blindness is inescapable.
[24] Third, again respectfully, Grinberg J.’s reliance on the case of R. v. Mesfin, 2020 ONCJ 93, is misplaced. On the facts of Mesfin, the sentencing justice concluded that the offender was not willfully blind because of an unusual set of facts. The offender, who was a cocaine dealer, had gone to a client’s place and, by reaching through an open window, had stolen a plastic bag that he thought contained cocaine. He grabbed the bag because the client owed him money. Coincidentally, the police had the place under surveillance and within minutes arrested Mr. Mesfin. In the bag was 12 grams of fentanyl. The sentencing justice found that given that Mr. Mesfin did not have any time to make, or to even decline to make any inquiries, and the fact that he had taken the drugs from someone he sold cocaine to, Mr. Mesfin was not willfully blind and only reckless. These facts are very different from the facts in your case. Here you had lots of time and opportunity to make inquiries about the drugs you were transporting. You simply did not do so because you just did not want to know. That is wilful blindness.
[25] The case of R. v. Sidhu, 2009 ONCA 81, 94 O.R. (3d) 609, at paras. 15-19, establishes that a courier who purposefully shuts their eyes to the nature and quantity of the drugs cannot expect to receive a lower sentence than if they actually learned the nature and quantity of the drugs. [6] There is no meaningful distinction between the two situations when it comes to sentencing. While it still can be mitigating in cases where the offender takes reasonable steps to determine the nature of the drug and is duped, that is not the case here, as you made no inquiries.
[26] It is beyond controversy that the primary sentencing principles involved in this sentencing are general deterrence and denunciation. This is due to the nature of the drugs, the quantity, and the circumstances of the possession for the purpose of trafficking. Others must be deterred from doing what you did. The conduct, bringing such dangerous drugs to a small northern community, must be denounced.
[27] I have determined that specific deterrence should play little role in fashioning a sentence, since it is highly unlikely you will find yourself committing a similar offence in the future. Rehabilitation, on the other hand, must figure prominently in fashioning a sentence, given your age, the lack of a record, and the rehabilitative efforts you have made over these past five years. As already stated, I find that that your prospect of complete rehabilitation is very good.
[28] Before moving on to determining the sentence, I must discuss an important sentencing principle in play. This is the parity principle. Not only with other similar cases, but importantly, more specifically with the sentence given to Mr. Anishnabie because the two of you committed the same crime.
[29] The parity principle in sentencing means a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. It is a principle of fairness. To the extent it is possible and appropriate on the individual facts of a case, convicted persons must not be left with a sense of injustice or grievance because their sentence is different from others similarly situated. Especially when sentencing two offenders for the same crime, careful attention must be paid to this parity principle.
[30] In my opinion, this principle does not mean I must give you the same sentence as Mr. Anishnabie. The overriding principle in sentencing is one of proportionality. There are several key things that distinguish your case from Mr. Anishnabie. First, he plead guilty early. As noted above, you did not. Second, he was an addict trafficker, and you are not. This was a significant mitigating factor mentioned by Grinberg J. The law treats addict traffickers, even in hard drugs, more leniently, especially when they have achieved a level of successful rehabilitation since the commission of the offence. Third, most notably, Mr. Anishnabie was an Indigenous offender where the principles set out in a case called Gladue [7] had a great influence on his sentence. The evidence before Grinberg J., including a Gladue report and a psychiatric report, provided case-specific reasons why Mr. Anishnabie deserved the exceptional result of a conditional sentence.
[31] Summarizing what is found in Grinberg J.’s decision, Mr. Anishnabie is Ojibwe and a member of the Nipissing First Nation. His father was Indigenous. His father was spiritual and practiced ceremony. Though his father did not attend residential school, close family members did. Alcohol abuse ran in the family. Mr. Anishnabie himself was bullied at school, had a learning disability, and suffered from an autistic disorder. At age 18, he lost his father. This led to his mother and him having to leave the reserve. The death of his father also left a significant emotional toll on him. He resorted to hard drugs and developed a cocaine dependency. In turn, he sold drugs to feed his addiction. Since his arrest, a remarkable transformation has taken place. Mr. Anishnabie has dissociated himself from those in the drug trade, abstained from drug use, and has obtained counselling and medication for his addiction and depression. He has deepened his connections to his Indigenous heritage. He enjoyed significant support from his mother and those in the Indigenous community. He has diligently involved himself in various forms of healing, enrolled at Nipissing University, and aspires to be a social worker.
[32] The circumstances unique to Indigenous offenders, including intergenerational trauma and addiction, as well as Mr. Anishnabie’s own lived experience as a young Indigenous man, were tied to the offences he committed. Considered carefully, they significantly diminished his moral blameworthiness.
[33] These circumstances do not exist in your case Mr. Tonkin.
[34] I appreciate that there are some mitigating circumstances in your case that did not exist in Mr. Anishnabie’s case. However, overall, especially given the Gladue factors in Mr. Anishnabie’s case that lessened his moral blameworthiness, while I find that your sentence cannot be disproportionately different from his, your sentence does not have to be the same in order to respect the parity principle. Sentencing is unique to the offender. You are unique and different from Mr. Anishnabie.
[35] All this being said, parity must still play a significant role in your sentencing. The Crown has not appealed Mr. Anishnabie’s sentence. [8] Thus, your sentence cannot leave you with a justifiable sense of unfairness or injustice.
[36] In looking at what the range of sentence should be, no appeal decision has given me exact guidance on what that should be. Indeed, in 2017, in the case of R. v. Loor, 2017 ONCA 696, our highest appellate court expressly found it to be too early to set a range. At the same time, the court did say, at para. 50, that "generally, offenders -- even first offenders -- who traffic significant amounts of fentanyl should expect to receive significant penitentiary sentences". In cases since Loor, except for traffickers in minor amounts of fentanyl, offenders have indeed generally received penitentiary sentences, often significant ones. [9] We have travelled some ways since 2017, but sadly the fentanyl crisis has become worse.
[37] Mr. Baker concedes that a sentence below the penitentiary range for an offence such as this would be an exceptional one. He has provided caselaw in support of this. Some of the cases he relies upon can be readily distinguished, given that they involved addict traffickers, trafficking in relatively small amounts. [10]
[38] Mr. Baker focuses on R. v. Grant, 2021 ONCJ 507 and submits that it is very similar to your case. In Grant, Calsavara J., while recognizing it to be an exceptional sentence, granted a first-time offender, who was 18 years old at the time of the offence, a two year less a day conditional sentence for possession of several different drugs, including fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking. She recognized that the Crown position of 3.5 to 4 years was within the range of fit sentences. Like you, Mr. Grant was not an addict trafficker. He committed the offence as an easy way to make money. Like you, his offence was an isolated instance where he was found in a vehicle with the drugs. Like you, he showed good rehabilitative potential, had done a lot of good things since his arrest, and had matured. In those ways, he was like you Mr. Tonkin. However, there are some relevant distinguishing factors. First, the amount of fentanyl was lesser. He was in possession of 9.5 grams of fentanyl, though he also had 26 grams of crack cocaine, 13 grams of cocaine, 4 grams of methamphetamine, and 1.5 oxycodone pills. Moreover, Calsavara J. characterized what Mr. Grant was involved in as street level trafficking. I cannot conclude the same in your case. Lastly, Mr. Grant suffered more than a few significant challenges growing up: bullying, anxiety, suicidal ideation, and the death of his father at 14 years of age. While the sentencing judge does not do any analysis regarding the effects of racism or systemic racism on Mr. Grant, she does note that he was bullied due to his “black skin”.
[39] Let me pause to explain something in more detail. Sometimes, offenders like Mr. Grant, or Mr. Anishnabie, for that matter, receive the benefit of having their challenging lives looked at by the courts as a significant mitigating factor. The reason is that such lives can affect the choices offenders are able to make. Choices that are constrained by their past and their current circumstances. In such a situation, their blameworthiness in committing the crime they are being sentenced for is sometimes lessened. This does not mean, Mr. Tonkin, that offenders like yourself, who have more stable and socio-economically privileged backgrounds, are treated more harshly by the law. Indeed, as I have already held, such backgrounds can help in the process of rehabilitation. What it does mean is that it is not always unfair to provide more understanding, more leniency, to those who find themselves before the courts due to unfortunate circumstances largely beyond their control when it comes to determining a fit and proportionate sentence.
[40] So, I have given serious consideration to the Grant case. However, I do not find it to be a persuasive precedent. Some factors in that case which justified a reformatory sentence do not exist in yours. Moreover, it strikes me that the case is somewhat of an outlier when it comes to fentanyl sentencing cases.
[41] At the end of the day, I conclude that the gravity of the offence and your degree of responsibility calls for a penitentiary term. The amount of fentanyl possessed and the circumstances of its possession, including your role in the crime, despite the mitigating factors, leads me to this conclusion. This conclusion is consistent with the caselaw on fentanyl sentencing. [11] While the mitigating factors do reduce your degree of responsibility, they do not take your case out of the penitentiary range. In my determination, I have not forgotten that the amount of cocaine possessed was also significant. [12] It bears repeating at this point that Mr. Anishnabie’s situation is sufficiently different from yours, such that it is not unjust to send you to the penitentiary while his sentence fell at the uppermost reformatory range.
[42] Given this conclusion, a conditional sentence is not available.
[43] I do not doubt that the Crown’s position of 4 years is within the range of sentence for this type of offence. However, I find that leniency should be extended, given you are a young first offender, had a limited role as a courier, the idea did not originate from you, you have shown remorse by pleading guilty, you had incurred a Charter violation in your interactions with the police, and you have demonstrated excellent prospects of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation remains important and cannot be forgotten, though the sentence must give primary effect to general deterrence and denunciation.
[44] In determining how long that penitentiary sentence should be, any first offender’s penitentiary term should be as short as possible while meeting the goals of sentencing. This is in keeping with the sentencing principle of restraint. The restraint principle means just that. Restraint. Judges should not go beyond what is absolutely necessary in punishing offenders. In applying the restraint principle, recognition of the principle of parity to Mr. Anishnabie’s sentence further curbs my sentencing hand. The parity principle remains significant in fixing the length of the penitentiary sentence.
[45] In conclusion, after considering and balancing all the relevant factors and applying the sentencing law, the sentence I impose is 29 months incarceration for count 1, the fentanyl. I impose a sentence of 15 months concurrent for count 2, the cocaine.
[46] Pursuant to s. 109(1)(a), you are prohibited from possessing any firearm, crossbow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, and explosive substances for a period of 10 years. Further, you are required to submit a sample of your DNA to the DNA Data Bank.
[47] I would like to thank counsel for their fair and comprehensive submissions.
[48] Mr. Tonkin, I was moved by your statement to me on your sentencing. While you might disagree with the sentence I have imposed, if you are true to the sentiments expressed in that statement, I know that when you again regain your freedom, your future path in life will remain bright.
Released: April 19, 2023 Justice S. Nakatsuru
Citations
[1] R. v. Campbell, 2022 ONCA 666, 163 O.R. (3d) 355, at para. 99. leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted, 40465 (March 30, 2023).
[2] R. v. Daya, 2007 ONCA 693, 229 O.A.C. 291, at para. 15.
[3] Possession for the purpose of trafficking is generally considered less serious than actual trafficking: R. v. King, 2013 ONCA 417, 309 O.A.C. 39.
[4] I do note that the facts do not say how much you were to receive.
[5] R. v. Nasogalauk, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at paras. 4 –65.
[6] See also R. v. Giammarco, 2014 ONCA 242, at para. 4.
[7] R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688.
[8] In Mr. Anishnabie’s case, the Crown also sought a four-year sentence.
[9] I have looked at a number of fentanyl cases. I have not put the cases into the body of my decision so that my message to Mr. Tonkin remains clear. In three more recent Court of Appeal cases, the strict attitude towards fentanyl has not changed. In R. v. Lynch, 2022 ONCA 109, 160 O.R. (3d) 241, a relatively young offender with a minor unrelated record had his sentence increased from four years to six years on a Crown appeal. While there are distinguishing factors, including the amounts of the drugs (1 kilograms of cocaine, 146 grams of meth, 41 grams of fentanyl) and the fact he trafficked seven times to an undercover officer, the case is of significance in that it alludes to a range of six to eight years for such mid-level traffickers (at para. 15) and reaffirms the quote in Loor, at para. 25. Similarly, in R. v. Olvedi, 2021 ONCA 518, 57 O.R. (3d) 583, where a first offender who was essentially a courier for the importation of .5 kilogram of pure fentanyl, received a 15-year sentence. At para. 54, the Court declined to set a range for fentanyl importing, noting that the sentencing jurisprudence needed further evolution and maturation. At para. 55, though, they reaffirmed Loor, stating that trafficking in significant amounts of fentanyl should attract significant penitentiary sentences given the dangerous nature of fentanyl (the evidence led at sentencing on the danger is found at paras. 39-46). In R. v. Disher, 2020 ONCA 710, 153 O.R. (3d) 88, the Court of Appeal reduced trial sentences for possession for the purpose of trafficking heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, and carfentanil (47.3 grams total) given the failure of the sentencing judge to consider rehabilitative prospects. For one Indigenous offender with no record, but on probation to stay away from the co-accused at the time of the offence, his sentence was lowered from seven years to four years.
[10] In R. v. Shearer, 2022 ONCJ 288, a youthful addict trafficker without a record who trafficked .43 grams of fentanyl and had 2.84 grams of fentanyl in his possession received a conditional sentence in a case where the Crown position was maximum reformatory time. In R. v. Nacinovich, 2020 ONSC 7604, the offender pled guilty to possessing 8.6 grams of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, with a lengthy criminal record but had achieved great success with his addiction. He received a conditional sentence of two years less a day. In R. v. Mori, 2020 ONCJ 620, a longtime heroin addict who had 38.66 grams of heroin with some fentanyl mixed in received a conditional sentence of two years less a day after successfully completing an residential treatment program.
[11] The following cases show that fentanyl sentences, whether for trafficking or possession for the purpose of trafficking, can fall into the low penitentiary range. I appreciate that the amounts of fentanyl possessed in these cases are lower. But some are trafficking offences. Starting at the lower end. R. v. Oksem, 2019 ONSC 6283. 18 months on a plea. 5.62 grams of fentanyl, 7.64 grams of cocaine. A 22-year-old first offender. However, the offender was an addict trafficker who had successfully completed programs for his addiction. R. Hillier, 2018 ONCJ 397. Effectively, a 2-year less a day sentence on a plea. 3.5 grams of fentanyl. A first offender with an addiction and who had community support. R. v. Menzie, 2020 ONCJ 654. 2 years 2 months 7 days. 5.05 grams fentanyl mixed with other drugs. A 23-year-old first offender found guilty after trial who committed the offence for financial gain. R. v. Clayton, 2018 ONSC 4125. 26 months on a plea. 45 patches of fentanyl. First offender with addiction and mental health issues, who trafficked twice. R. v. Willis, 2019 ONSC 7324. 2.5 years on a plea. 6.2 grams of fentanyl. The offender had a record but had supports. R. v. Lu, 2016 ONCA 479. 30 months after trial. 20 patches of fentanyl. R. v. Gatfield, 2015 ONCJ 526. 30 months on a plea. 2 patches of fentanyl sold commercially.
[12] Sentences for cocaine trafficking falling within the reformatory range: R. v. Woolcock; R. v. Speziale, 2011 ONCA 580, 107 O.R. (3d) 447. 14.87 grams of cocaine. Sentence reduced from 5 years to 14 months, as it fell within the reformatory range; R. v. Harrison, 2009 ONCA 386. 8.95 grams of cocaine. First offender after trial. 12 months; R. v. Johnson (2006), 213 O.A.C. 395 (C.A.). After trial for possession of packets of crack cocaine, 18 months was considered to be a fit sentence; and R. v. Morton, 2021 ONSC 5706. A 28-year-old first offender who acted as a courier of 520 grams of cocaine to a local safehouse received 2 years less a day. A conditional sentence was rejected.
