Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CR-18-40000270-0000 DATE: 20220401

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN - and - M.E.D.

Counsel: Monica Gharabaway, for the Crown J. Parkin, for M.E.D.

HEARD: March 10, 2022

WARNING

An order restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (2.1), (2.2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2) of the Criminal Code shall continue. These sections of the Criminal Code provide:

486.4(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences;

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read at any time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged involves a violation of the complainant’s sexual integrity and that conduct would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(iii) REPEALED: S.C. 2014, c. 25, s. 22(2), effective December 6, 2014 (Act, s. 49).

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

(2.1) Subject to subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(2.2) In proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order.

(3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(4) An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community. 2005, c. 32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, s. 8(3)(b); 2010, c. 3, s. 5; 2012, c. 1, s. 29; 2014, c. 25, ss. 22,48; 2015, c. 13, s. 18.

486.6(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(2) For greater certainty, an order referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to proceedings taken against any person who fails to comply with the order, the publication in any document or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of information that could identify a victim, witness or justice system participant whose identity is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.

KELLY J.

Reasons for Sentence

[1] M.E.D. was convicted of several sexual violence offences regarding the complainant, A.M. The offences occurred over the period of August 15, 2016 to January 31, 2017. [1] In particular, M.E.D. was convicted of the following offences:

Count	Offence	Criminal Code Section
1	Human trafficking.	279.01(1)
2	Receive a financial or material benefit from human trafficking.	279.02(1)
3	Receive a financial or other benefit from sexual services.	286.2(1)
4	Procuring A.M. to offer or provide sexual services for consideration.	286.3(1)
5	Procuring by recruiting, holding, concealing or harbouring or exercising control, influence or direction over the movements of A.M. to offer or provide sexual services for consideration.	286.3(1)
6	Advertise the sexual services of A.M.	286.4
7	Sexual assault.	271

[2] M.E.D. now appears before me for sentencing. Crown counsel seeks a global sentence of eight years. Counsel for M.E.D. submits that a global sentence of five years is appropriate.

[3] Both counsel agree on the imposition of the following ancillary orders: DNA; a s. 109 weapons prohibition; a non-communication order with A.M., pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46; and registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10 (“SOIRA”) for 20 years. They agree that a restitution order should be made. They simply disagree on the amount. [2]

[4] For the reasons set out below, I find that a global sentence of seven years would have been appropriate. However, when I consider the conditions of M.E.D.’s pre-sentence incarceration and terms of release, I find that the appropriate sentence is a global one of six years. M.E.D. will be given credit of three months (pursuant to R. v. Summers [3]) for a further five years, nine months to serve. The ancillary orders are granted. The restitution order shall be in the amount of $10,000. What follows are my reasons.

Factual Overview

[5] A.M. met M.E.D. in and around the time that A.M. was starting her fourth year of studies at York University. She had been kicked out of her mother’s house at the time. Shortly after she met M.E.D., he began staying with her at her rooming house. A.M. had savings, worked part time and collected OSAP to pay for her university and living expenses. She anticipated that she would not have enough money to last until the end of the school year. She applied for other part time jobs, but she says that she was eventually persuaded, by M.E.D., to work in the sex trade. She would provide the sexual services. M.E.D. would do the rest. They would split the earnings.

[6] A.M. was eventually kicked out of the rooming house due to a flood caused by M.E.D. Thereafter, her things were moved into a storage unit. A.M. and M.E.D. began moving from hotel to hotel. Her sexual services were advertised online. A.M. testified that she provided the sexual services, but it was M.E.D. who controlled her, collected and kept the money from that work. He also sexually assaulted her during that time (forced fellatio). A.M. testified that she eventually managed to extract herself from M.E.D. and the sex trade business by paying M.E.D. $10,000. [4]

Victim Impact Statement

[7] A.M. provided a victim impact statement to the Court. Amongst other things, she said the following:

i. The experience has changed her interaction with people, including her family. She feels that she is judged and treated like “less of a person”. ii. Her friendships have been strained as she has trust issues. iii. She finds it hard to concentrate at school and at work. She has had to do much to move on from this experience, both financially and emotionally. iv. The online material has affected her friendships. She worries that it will affect her employment opportunities. v. Her ability to have a relationship has been impaired as she is sensitive to the actions and words of others. She describes that before this incident, she was an “open and loving person”. Now she feels that she will be taken advantage of if she acts in the same manner. vi. She suffered financially with debt. Her credit rating was perfect before this incident and that has changed. In addition to damage caused by her loss of savings and increased debt, A.M. was unable to work due to depression and feeling unsafe. vii. She has concerns for her own security as well as that of her friends and family.

Background of M.E.D.

[8] The background of M.E.D. was provided in a pre-sentence report. The content of the report may be summarized as follows:

i. M.E.D. is currently 28 years of age. ii. He had an unstable upbringing. He lived with his mother, but she was not financially stable and was involved in an abusive relationship. At seven or eight years of age, M.E.D. lived with his father but had supervised visits with his mother. Pursuant to a court order, he began living with his mother but, again, returned to live with his father thereafter. iii. Most of his mother’s family lives in Montreal. He joined them there after being released on bail for these charges. iv. M.E.D. has four children with two mothers. His eldest son is 12 years of age. He has three children with another woman, S.R. He told the author of the report that he sees his children as much as he can. [5] v. M.E.D.’s father indicated that their relationship has improved over the years. He described that M.E.D.’s mother was abusive and believes that M.E.D. is in denial about it. He describes his son as “loving, caring and kind”. He feels that his son has matured over the years and, in particular, since his arrest. vi. M.E.D. reports that he got into fights in school due to anger issues. He was suspended in high school for being rude. He has never been expelled. He dropped out of school at age 17. vii. M.E.D. has been on welfare due to a disability for a long period of time. He wishes to pursue a career in the music industry and/or start a jewelry business. viii. M.E.D. does not appear to have any substance abuse problems. He suffers from asthma and is currently taking medication. He also suffers from sleep apnea. He is awaiting the delivery of a CPAP machine. ix. M.E.D. suffers from panic attacks. This causes difficulty in breathing. He takes medication when necessary. He has gained a significant amount of weight due to his anxiety, especially since being charged. x. M.E.D. indicated that he regrets his involvement in “the situation” before the Court.

[9] M.E.D. has a criminal record with the following entries:

March 13, 2014: Fail to comply (X2). He received a suspended sentence and 12 months of probation. September 8, 2014: Assault. He received a $500 fine and 2 years’ probation.

[10] M.E.D. was incarcerated for 55 days, in Montreal, following his arrest. He described the conditions of his incarceration in an affidavit that may be summarized as follows:

i. That he was only let out of his cell for four hours a day and was not permitted outside for fresh air. There were no windows, and he was deprived of natural light. ii. He was not able to use the phone. iii. There were three people in his cell. He slept on the floor by the toilet. He felt anxious and cramped. iv. He was not permitted to take showers regularly.

[11] M.E.D. was on strict house arrest following his release from custody. Thereafter, the terms were modified to permit him to attend school (and school related activities) as well as work. M.E.D. described the impact of his bail conditions in an affidavit that may be summarized as follows:

i. That his emotional wellbeing has been negatively affected. ii. That he was not able to move freely. iii. That he was prescribed Xanax to deal with his anxiety. iv. That his social life was “destroyed”. v. That he could not focus on “keeping a job” or “educational courses”. vi. That he could not “be around” his father when he got sick or attend his grandfather’s funeral.

[12] M.E.D. addressed the Court. He advised that he is not the same person he was five or six years ago. He has matured, generally. More specifically, his view of women and how he is to treat them has matured.

The Legal Framework

a. General Principles

[13] In determining an appropriate sentence for M.E.D., regard must be had to the sentencing objectives in s. 718 of the Criminal Code, which provides as follows:

The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

[14] The sentencing judge must also have regard to the following: any aggravating and mitigating factors, including those listed in ss. 718.2(a)(i) to (vi); the principle that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances (s. 718.2(b)); the principle that where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh (s. 718.2(c)); and the principle that courts should exercise restraint in imposing imprisonment (ss. 718.2(d) and (e)). [6]

b. The Range

[15] As I have stated above, Crown counsel submits that the appropriate sentence is a global one of eight years’ incarceration. Counsel for M.E.D. submits that a global sentence of five years is appropriate. Their positions are as follows:

Count	Offence	Crown Position	Defence Position
1	Human trafficking (over 18)	6 years consecutive to sexual assault but concurrent to others.	4 years consecutive to sexual assault but concurrent to others.
2	Material benefit from sexual services (over 18)	4 years concurrent.	3 years concurrent.
3	Material benefit from sexual services (over 18)	Conditionally stayed.	Conditionally stayed.
4	Procuring (over 18)	4 years concurrent.	2 years concurrent.
5	Recruits, holds, conceals, harbours, or exercising control, influence or direction.	4 years concurrent.	2 years concurrent.
6	Advertising sexual services	2 years concurrent.	1 year concurrent.
7	Sexual assault	2 years consecutive to human trafficking but concurrent to other counts.	1 year consecutive.

[16] Counsel have provided cases which support their respective positions on sentence. [7] I have reviewed them and I have concluded that the sentences proposed are within the range of sentences imposed in circumstances such as this.

[17] Based on his conviction for the offence of human trafficking, M.E.D. faces the mandatory minimum sentence of four years’ imprisonment as set out in s. 279.01(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. However, the law supports a range of four to eight years. [8] Some guidance for sentencing an offender for human trafficking was addressed by Campbell J. in Lopez at para. 53:

In terms of the range of sentences that are appropriate for pimping offences, Canadian courts have generally accepted that, in cases like the present one, where the accused has coerced a woman into becoming or remaining a prostitute and exercised a significant degree of control over her activities, sentences of four or five years are typically imposed. General deterrence, denunciation and specific deterrence are said to be the paramount sentencing considerations. Even longer sentences have been imposed and upheld in more aggravating circumstances. The imposition of any specific sentence depends, of course, upon the individual circumstances of each case, and consideration of a variety of factors including: (1) the degree of coercion or control imposed by the pimp on the prostitute's activities; (2) the amount of money received by the pimp and the extent to which the pimp allowed the prostitutes to retain their earnings; (3) the age of the prostitutes and their numbers; (4) any special vulnerability of the prostitutes; (5) the working conditions in which the prostitutes were expected or encouraged to operate, including their physical surroundings in terms of soliciting and servicing customers, and safety concerns, in addition to whether appropriate health safeguards were taken; (6) the degree of planning and sophistication, including whether the pimp was working in concert with others; (7) the size of the pimp's operations, including the numbers of customers the prostitutes were expected to service; (8) the duration of the pimp's exploitative conduct; (9) the degree of violence, if any, apart from that inherent in the pimp's parasitic activities; (10) the extent to which inducements such as drugs or alcohol were employed by the pimp; (11) the effect on the prostitutes of the pimp's exploitation; (12) the extent to which the pimp demanded or compelled sexual favours for himself from the prostitutes; (13) the age of the customers attracted to the services of the prostitute; (14) any steps taken by the pimp to avoid detection by the authorities; and (15) any attempts by the accused to prevent the prostitute from leaving his employ. Lesser terms of imprisonment may, however, be appropriate in cases where coercion and/or exploitation are lacking. See generally R. v. Foster (1984), 1984 ABCA 204, 13 C.C.C. (3d) 435 (Alta.C.A.), at p. 441; R. v. Glasgow, [1993] O.J. No. 1502 (Gen.Div.), at para. 3; R. v. Tang (1997), 1997 ABCA 174, 200 A.R. 70 (C.A.), at paras. 5, 11; R. v. Rose, [1997] O.J. No. 1947 (C.A.), at paras. 1, 33; R. v. Miller, at paras. 38-39; R. v. B.(K.) (2004), 184 C.C.C. (3d) 290 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 3, 6, 77-89; R. v. Mfizi, [2008] O.J. No. 2430 (S.C.J.), at paras. 10, 14-35, 62-67; R. v. A.A., 2012] O.J. No. 6256 (S.C.J.), at paras. 32-33.

[18] The sentence for the offence of sexual assault must be consecutive. The act of forced fellatio is a major and violent sexual assault on the victim. It was committed separate and apart from the human trafficking offence. Sentences in the range proposed have been imposed. [9]

[19] Although the cases assist me in determining the governing principles that must guide my decision, a careful review of them demonstrates that sentencing is not an exact science. It is instead, a profoundly individualized process driven by the unique facts of every offence and the unique characteristics of every offender. As Chief Justice Lamer noted in R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 SCR 500, at para. 92, “there is no such thing as a uniform sentence for a particular crime”. The circumstances of any case, including this one, can be readily distinguished from any other case.

c. Other Considerations:

i. Presentence Custody

[20] M.E.D. should be given credit for the time he has spent in presentence custody pursuant to s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code and R v. Summers.

[21] Certain circumstances, particularly in the instance of harsh presentence incarceration conditions, can be relevant in the determination of an appropriate sentence: see R. v. Duncan. [10] The approach to be taken in considering the harsh conditions of presentence incarceration was clarified by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Marshall: [11]

The ‘Duncan’ credit is not a deduction from the otherwise appropriate sentence, but is one of the factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence. Particularly punitive pretrial incarceration conditions can be a mitigating factor to be taken into account with the other mitigating and aggravating factors in arriving at the appropriate sentence from which the ‘Summers’ credit will be deducted. Because the ‘Duncan’ credit is one of the mitigating factors to be taken into account, it cannot justify the imposition of a sentence which is inappropriate, having regard to all of the relevant mitigating or aggravating factors.

[22] In light of Marshall, the practice of assigning a credit of a specific number of days or months to punitive conditions of presentence custody is not to be encouraged. The reason? It may skew the fact that the harshness of pre-trial custody is only one of many factors that go into the determination of an appropriate sentence. [12] That said, presentence custody is a relevant consideration on sentencing.

ii. Bail Conditions

[23] Stringent bail conditions, especially house arrest, are a factor to be considered on sentencing. [13] However, the conditions of pretrial bail are a mitigating factor. As stated by our Court of Appeal in R. v. Joseph, [14] at para. 108:

… Mitigation is given because stringent bail conditions can be punitive and therefore "akin" to custody: Downes, at para. 29. The criteria to be considered in assessing the weight of the mitigation to be given therefore include the amount of time spent on bail conditions; the stringency of those conditions; their impact on the offender's liberty; and the ability of the offender to carry on normal relationships, employment and activity: R. v. Place, [2020] O.J. No. 3685, 2020 ONCA 546 (C.A.), at para. 20. The mitigating effect that such considerations have on the sentence to be imposed falls within the discretion of the trial judge: Downes, at para. 37. …

iii. COVID

[24] COVID is also a valid consideration on sentencing. Pomerance J. has given guidance on this issue in R. v. Hearns, [15] commencing at para. 16, wherein she held:

16 COVID-19 also affects our conception of the fitness of sentence. … Fitness looks, not only at the length of a sentence, but the conditions under which it is served. As a result of the current health crisis, jails have become harsher environments, either because of the risk of infection or, because of restrictive lock down conditions aimed at preventing infection. Punishment is increased, not only by the physical risk of contracting the virus, but by the psychological effects of being in a high-risk environment with little ability to control exposure.

The Fit Sentence

[25] In determining the fit sentence, I have considered the factors outlined in Lopez and Tang. [16] My observations are as follows:

Degree of coercion/control: There was a degree of control exercised over A.M. In this case, M.E.D. exerted significant control over her activities. The text messages show that he controlled the locations, schedule, the clients, etc. Money received: It is not entirely clear how much money was earned by A.M. from the sex trade business. She says that she earned approximately $5,000 from the business. However, what is clear is that A.M. did not receive any of the monies she earned. Age and number of sex trade workers: A.M. was 22 years of age at the time of the offences. She appears to have been the only sex trade worker employed by M.E.D. at the time. Vulnerability of A.M.: A.M. was vulnerable at the time. She was stressed, confused and lonely. She had been kicked out of her mother’s home and was not in the best place emotionally. Working conditions: A.M. was expected to work in the sex trade at the direction of M.E.D. She worked in hotels. She felt unsafe if she failed to perform sexual services at M.E.D.’s direction. Planning and sophistication: It is clear that there was some planning as shown in the texts, the advertisements and the hotel bookings. Number of customers: It is unclear as to the exact number of customers who were serviced. However, ads were posted and it appears that A.M. was working daily. Duration of the exploitation: The duration of the exploitation was from October 22, 2016 to December 3, 2016 as shown in the ads. Violence: M.E.D. had slapped A.M. for not performing fellatio and her nose bled. Subsequently, she had to perform fellatio on his friend. Drugs or alcohol: There is no evidence of drugs or alcohol being used as an inducement. Victim impact: A.M. provided a victim impact statement. It is clear that she has suffered. Her online habits have changed. She fears that M.E.D. will find and harm both she and her family. Her interaction with others has been affected. Personal sexual favours: M.E.D. sexually assaulted A.M. He wanted her to “suck his penis” and “stuff like that”. He would push her head down and force her to do so. He did this several times. He rapped about it thereafter. [17] Ages of the customers: The evidence is unclear as to the ages of the customers. Avoiding the authorities: There is no evidence that M.E.D. took steps to avoid authorities. Preventing the complainant from leaving: A.M. asked M.E.D. repeatedly to leave and he refused. Ultimately, she had to buy her freedom by giving him $10,000.

[26] In considering the fit sentence, and in addition to the factors I have already mentioned, I find the following to be the aggravating factors:

i. The impact on A.M. has been profound and has affected her many years later. It will continue to affect her. ii. M.E.D. assisted in producing the ad offering A.M.’s sexual services for money. Those ads show A.M. semi-nude. They were posted on the Internet, will remain there and will continually victimize A.M. iii. These offences were committed by M.E.D. with the intent to earn a profit. A.M. received none of the monies from her work in the sex trade. iv. A.M. tried to leave the situation many times. She had to purchase her freedom. v. In addition to being denied access to the monies from her work, her savings were depleted and her credit card debt rose. vi. The control lasted for a significant period of time: over 6 weeks. vii. In addition to being trafficked, A.M. was sexually assaulted.

[27] I consider the following to be the mitigating factors:

i. M.E.D. is now 28 years of age. ii. M.E.D. had a difficult upbringing. iii. He suffers from anxiety and other mental health issues. iv. He has the support of his father. v. He has a minimal criminal record (but the assault is against a female partner). vi. He has suffered due to the conditions of his presentence incarceration and his bail conditions. vii. His incarceration (going forward) may be more difficult because of his health conditions, including difficulty breathing. This is especially so in the climate of the COVID-19 pandemic. viii. He showed some insight when addressing the Court at the sentencing hearing.

[28] The appropriate sentence imposed must be one from which our society feels protected and which deters others from committing similar crimes, without crushing the hopes of M.E.D. M.E.D. also deserves a sentence that addresses the appropriate legal principles in consideration of his background and the facts. Deterrence (general and specific) and denunciation are paramount. The sentence for sexual assault must be imposed as consecutive.

[29] This is M.E.D.’s first sentence of incarceration. In coming to my conclusion about the appropriate sentence, I am cognizant of the principles set out in R. v. Priest, at p. 296: [18]

[I]t is a well-established principle of sentencing laid down by this court that a first sentence of imprisonment should be as short as possible and tailored to the individual circumstances of the accused rather than solely for the purpose of general deterrence.

[30] Further, in reaching my conclusion about the fit sentence, I am mindful of the fact that this is M.E.D.’s first visit to the penitentiary and of the direction of Rosenberg J.A. in R. v. Borde, [19] that a “first penitentiary sentence should be as short as possible”. That said, the jump principle is not applicable in light of the seriousness of these offences, including the moral blameworthiness of M.E.D.

[31] M.E.D. is being sentenced during the global COVID-19 pandemic. The circumstances of COVID-19 adversely affect the conditions of imprisonment. There are increased risks for those incarcerated in any institution, both presentence and post sentence. This observation has been made by several jurists, including Harris J. in R. v. Kandhai. [20]

[32] M.E.D. was also on a house arrest bail for almost five years. That has been considered in coming to my conclusion about the appropriate sentence. The principle of totality has also been considered.

[33] M.E.D. has spent 55 real days in custody. Enhanced at 1.5 days for each day spent in presentence custody (pursuant to Summers), M.E.D. will be given credit for 90 days or three months.

Conclusion

[34] M.E.D. is sentenced to six years imprisonment. M.E.D. will be given credit of three months, requiring him to serve a further five years, nine months in custody. His sentence will be reflected as follows:

Count	Offence	Sentence
1	Human trafficking.	4 years less 3 months for a further 3 years, 9 months to serve.
2	Receive a financial or material benefit from human trafficking.	4 years less 3 months for a further 3 years, 9 months to serve concurrent to Count 1.
3	Receive a financial or other benefit from sexual services.	Conditionally stayed.
4	Procuring A.M. to offer or provide sexual services for consideration.	4 years less 3 months for a further 3 years, 9 months to serve concurrent to Count 1.
5	Procuring by recruiting, holding, concealing or harbouring or exercising control, influence or direction over the movements of A.M. to offer or provide sexual services for consideration.	4 years less 3 months for a further 3 years, 9 months to serve concurrent to Count 1.
6	Advertise the sexual services of A.M.	2 years concurrent to Count 1.
7	Sexual assault.	2 years consecutive to Count 1.

[35] The following ancillary orders are imposed:

a. DNA; b. s. 109 order for life; c. a non-communication order with A.M. pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code; d. SOIRA for 20 years; and e. restitution in the amount of $10,000.

Kelly J.

Released: April 1, 2022

[1] M.E.D.’s trial proceeded before me (judge alone) on the Zoom platform. [2] Crown counsel submits that the restitution order should be in the amount of $14,000. Counsel for M.E.D. submits that the restitution order should be in the amount of $10,000. [3] 2013 ONCA 147, aff’d 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575 [4] The facts giving rise to these convictions and considered in sentencing are set out more fully in my reasons for judgment at: 2022 ONSC 265. [5] S.R. was interviewed for the PSR. She contested M.E.D.’s interest in their children and his commitment to them. [6] See R. v. Nur, 2011 ONSC 4874, 275 C.C.C. (3d) 330, aff’d 2013 ONCA 677, 117 O.R. (3d) 401, aff’d 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 [7] See for example: R. v. Byron, 2014 ONSC 990, [2014] O.J. No. 723; R. v. Lopez, 2018 ONSC 4749, [2018] O.J. No. 4145; R. v. Gardner, [2020] O.J. No. 4341, amongst others. [8] See for example, R. v. Gardner, [2020] O.J. No. 4341 at para. 99 [9] See for example, R. v. U.K., 2021 ONSC 1423 and R. v. Allen, 2017 ONCJ 405 at paras. 22 and 25 [10] 2016 ONCA 754, at para. 6 [11] 2021 ONCA 344, at para. 52 [12] R. v. Marshall, at para. 53 [13] R. v. Downes, [2006] O.J. No. 555 (C.A.), at para. 33 [14] 2020 ONCA 733 [15] 2020 ONSC 2365 [16] 1997 ABCA 174 [17] M.E.D. recorded rap songs during this time. One of them was entitled “She Doesn’t Suck Dick”. [18] (1996), , 110 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.) [19] (2003), , 63 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.), at para. 3 [20] 2020 ONSC 1611